An economic assessment of the Commonwealth sugar agreement by Rajcoomar, B.R.H.S.
 
AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH SUGAR AGREEMENT 
 
 
B.R.H.S. Rajcoomar 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
at the 
University of St Andrews 
 
  
1979 
Full metadata for this item is available in                                                                           
St Andrews Research Repository 
at: 
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14625 
 
 
 
 
 
This item is protected by original copyright
 
ABSTRACT ï
An Economic Assessment of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
This study is concerned with assessing the impact of the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA) on sugar production and exports 
in the major exporting countries of the Commonwealth hy concentrating 
on a detailed analysis of one of the principal exporting members of 
the Agreement as a case study - Mauritius. Since the Agreement expired 
in 19T4 after 24 years of operation, a detailed examination of the CSA |
can be expected to shed light on the general question of the usefulness 
and desirability of commodity agreements in general, and on the more |
specific question of the response of producers to given price and 
market incentives#
The general approach adopted in this study is aimed at a compre­
hensive examination of the various factors relevant to the Commonwealth I
Sugar Agreement; apart from assessing the development of the CSA itself, 
it was found useful to conduct an economic analysis of the world sugar 
economy as a whole in order to place the CSA in a more global context.
The next obvious step was to assess critically the economic theory under-
3lying international commodity agreements in general, and to examine the '4'
justification for their application. Since commodity agreements 
represent, in an important sense, a man-made barrier to free international |
trade, we examine the implications of various agricultural policies on 
international trade in primary commodities as well as in sugar.
In an attempt to obtain quantitative measurements of the effects 
of the CSA on sugar production in Mauritius, we devise a simultaneous- 
equation model to explain a number of important variables in the Mauritian
' Î
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sugar industry» Since agricultural models usually involve lagged 
variables being used as explanatory variables, we critically examine 
the literature on distributed lag models and a number of studies using 
such results.,, as well as the ^ usual) econometric problems that these 
models 'invariably^involve» We finally present our model and the results 
obtained from applying the two-stage least-squares method of estimation 
to most of the equations of the model*
The main conclusion to emerge from the study is that producers 
tended to respond significantly to the prices they received, which were 
more closely related to the stable and high prices offered by the United 
Kingdom under the CSA than to the volatile prices prevailing on the 
world free market, even when International Sugar Agreements were 
operative. The implications for the future concern the pricing and 
quota policies to be implemented under the Lome Convention between the 
EEC and the 46 (now 52) AGP countries; if the objective of the Convention 
is to promote the sugar industry in the exporting countries, then stable 
prices and guaranteed markets would appear to be an effective method.
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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
-2-
In-troduction and Objectives
The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement (OSA) on production of sugar in the major exporting 
countries of the Commonwealth under the agreement* Since the CSA 
generally provided a higher price than would have been obtained at the 
ruling world free market price, it would be useful to determine whether 
producers* response to high and stable CSA prices was significantly 
different from their response to changes in world market prices. A 
favourable response would suggest that bilateral'agreements of this type 
could be effective in encouraging steady growth in the sugar industries 
of such countries. Although the title of the study appears to refer to 
all the exporting members of the CSA, in practice we found that for a 
number of reasons,, (spelt out below) it was more useful to concentrate 
on one country as a case study - Mauritius.
Although the CSA came into existence in 1951 » research into the 
economic implications of the agreement for the sugar exporting countries 
has been very limited indeed. We are in the rather fortunate position 
of being able to assess the performance and implications of the agreement 
over the entire duration of its operation, since it expired in December 
1974* An examination of the impact of the CSA on the sugar exporting 
countries of the Commonwealth is expected to shed some light on the more 
general question of the effectiveness (According to certain predetermined 
objectives) and desirability (according to certain criteria to be examined 
later) of market divisions in international trade covering individual 
commodities. While a number of studies of response to specific bilateral 
arrangements have been undertaken relating to other commodities and/or 
other countries (which may enable some form of comparison and evaluation), 
no similar study exists for the CSA. In this respect, at least, the
—3—
present study is breaking new ground. Our results, however, are not 
exclusive in terms of policy implications to the CSA or to trade in 
sugar alone ; a number of other commodities have been subjected at 
various periods to commodity agreements, and their effectiveness and 
desirability can therefore be assessed more objectively.
A second important aspect in which the present study represents a 
departure from other studies on supply response covering various 
commodities is the emphasis placed on assessing the suitability of the 
data before actually estimating the response functions. Since we are 
using time—series data, covering the period 1951—74» we are almost 
bound to encounter two estimation problems: serial correlation in the 
residuals (the problem of autocorrelation), and collinearity among the 
explanatory variables (the problem of multicollinearity). Both these 
types of defects in the. data essentially render the parameter estimates 
inefficient and statistical tests of significance unreliable. If these 
two estimation problems are ignored or simply assumed away - as they 
generally are - the usefulness of the regression results is highly 
uncertain. Accordingly, an important part of this study will be concerned 
with detecting the existence or otherwise of multicollinearity and auto­
correlation in the data, before finally acceping the estimated relation­
ships. A large amount of preliminary computation has been undertaken 
covering the major exporting countries, but these results cannot be 
included in this study.
The third objective of this study is to extend the quantitative 
analysis of sugar supply response to examine the policy implications that 
arise. Since the CSA has now been, in a sense, replaced by the STABBX^*^
* STABEX stands for "stabilisation of exchange earnings".
scheme under the Lome Convention, the study will enable us to determine 
whether producers in the Commonwealth sugar exporting countries are 
likely to regard the new arrangement as providing the price and market 
security that the CSA provided over 24 years. The major question in 
this respect is the viability of importing 1.4 million tons of raw sugar 
from Commonwealth exporters into an enlarged European Economic Community 
when the Six was, in fact, producing a surplus of approximately 1 million 
tons of subsidised sugar by 1972, which was subsequently "dumped" on the 
world market. We will not, however, be concerned with the operation of 
the Lome Convention itself.
Since the CSA has operated over such a long period and been directly
responsible for a substantial share of the export earnings of most of
the less developed sugar exporting countries of the Commonwealth, one
would expect its impact on sugar production to have been quite significant.
How significant that impact has been will be the cornerstone of the
present study. However, because of the theoretical and practical 
boobjections^applying the same simultaneous equation model to a number of
different exporting countries, we have devised one model to explain sugar
production in Mauritius. The results obtained from this one case study 
can then be used for general policy conclusions, though we must emphasise 
the limitations of such an exercise. There are a number of reasons for
our choice of Mauritius as a case study under the CSA.
The most important reason is that Mauritius was allocated the largest 
negotiated price quota (NPQ) and the second largest overall agreement 
quota (OAQ) under the Agreement, mainly in recognition of its critical 
dependence on sugar exports for over O^fo of its exchange earnings, and 
on the sugar industry for over 33^ of its employment and gross domestic 
product. Thus Mauritius would appear to be a possible beneficiary from
*“5—
the Agreement in a more obvious sense than other countries which were 
less dependent on sugar exports* A second reason for the choice of 
Mauritius is that long time series sets of data are available for the 
major economic variables in the sugar industry, thus enabling econometric 
testing of various relationships. Of course, there were a number 
of data limitations (especially in the case of costs of inputs, and 
investment data), but a more complete set of data could be obtained for 
Mauritius than for any other sugar exporting member of the CSA. It would 
have been impossible to repeat the exercise for the remaining CSA exporters 
because of time and resource limitations.
The impact of the CSA will, be examined in the context of a supply 
model relating to the Mauritian economy, designed to test whether 
producers did in fact, respond to the high and stable price that the CSA 
generally granted. The model we will derive and use to test the above 
hypothesis is based on a Nerlovian type of partial adjustment model of 
supply to.take into account the special characteristics of sugar cane 
production, and on the Almon scheme of polynomial lag.
The objectives of this study can therefore be summarised as follows:
(a) To estimate a series of response functions in order to isolate 
the "true" supply relationships for Mauritius.
(b) To estimate short-run and long-run elasticities to ascertain the 
nature and degree of supply response.
(c) To examine in detail the econometric problems associated with 
objectives (a) and (b).
(d) To assess the implications for future policies regarding production 
and exports of sugar.
—6—
After preliminary examination of the literature on similar 
studies and after preliminary study of the data, the following hypotheses 
have been postulated:—
(a) Price changes induce significant supply response in all the 
exporting members of the CSA; hence, prices play an important role 
in producers’ decisions. Further, these price responses are 
reflected in acreage allocation rather than in yield changes.
(b) The countries under study will tend to continue to maintain
or even increase supplies of sugar to any country in response to 
a stable price and a premium offered by that country.
These two hypotheses will be tested by appropriate techniques to 
determine their validity in the case of our sample of observations in 
our case study of Mauritius. If we accept the usual "economic" assumption 
of rationality on the part of producers, we expect response to a price 
incentive to be generally positive.
The results of our study are presented in five parts. After this 
introductory section. Part Two will examine the detailed operation of 
the. Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in the context of the world sugar economy. 
The theory underlying international commodity agreements on a general 
level is analysed in Chapter Pour, while Chapter Five examines the impact 
of various agricultural policies on international trade in sugar. Part 
Three contains a study of agricultural supply models: general production 
functions as well as specific studies are analysed in Chapter Six, 
followed by an examination of estimation problems posed by distributed 
lag models in Chapter Seven.
Part Four is devoted to a case study under the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement, in the shape of the Mauritian Sugar economy. Chapter Eight 
examines the development of the industry, and in Chapter Nine we derive
—7—
a simultaneous equation model to estimate various aspects of sugar 
production in Mauritius. In Part Five, we present the conclusions 
of our study and some tentative policy implications, as well as the 
limitations of the study.. Finally, in Part Six, we present an 
appendix on data used and relevant data for the major CSA members, 
as well as a selected bibliography.
PART TWO
WORLD SUGAR ECONOMY: 
THEORY AND HISTORY
CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL APPRAISAL 
OF THE WORLD SUGAR ECONOMY
.10.
Introduction
In this chapter, we will examine the main features of the world 
sugpr economy that are of special significance for a proper under­
standing of the pattern of production and trade in the poet-war 
period. Sugar is one of the most important agricultural commodities 
entering international trade. Over the period 1968-1973, the value 
of sugar exports was on average 1.1% of the value of total world 
exports of merchandise, and 8.2% of the value of total exports of 
food, A COI Reference Pamphlet argued that sugar is 'probably more 
subject to import discrimination and outright prohibition than any 
other commodity* entering trade.' '
Three main reasons can be put forward to explain the special 
problems faced by sugar exporteras-
(1) Firstly, it is a chemically identical commodity produced from 
two completely different plants - sugar beet, a root crop of the 
temperate zones, and sugar cane, a giant tropical and sub-tropical 
plant. Competition is essentially between the two entirely different 
agricultural systems that these two crops support. Sugar beet is 
grown mainly for domestic consumption and in developed countries, 
while sugar cane is an important exporting commodity for a number of 
developing countries.
* See Britain as a Market for Developing Countries* CÛI Reference 
Pamphlet No.82 (London: HMSÔ, 1967), p.15.
.11.
(il) Secondly, world production of sugar has tgenerally been in 
surplus over consumption since the First World War. This has 
resulted in a number of (largely unsuccessful) attempts to control 
sugar over-production and dumping on world markets in the form of 
international sugar agreements. The general pattern in world 
production has been one of long periods of gluts, followed by 
smaller periods of acute shortage (the most obvious example being 
the 1973-74 sugar crisis in most of the sugar-importing countries 
of the world).
(iii) Thirdly, chronic overproduction on a world scale hgs not 
prevented many developing and developed countries from setting up 
new or expanding existing sugar industries. The main explanation 
is that sugar production is a relatively easy development avenue 
and can be an important means of import saving in less developed 
countries (given the minimal agronomic and climatic constraints on 
sugar production).
Intercommodity Competition
Technologically, the process of manufacturing sugar is similar
(-)<• )though not identical for sugar bset and sugar cane.' In each case 
it involves extraction of sugar syrup from the raw product, the 
removal of colour and impurities, with water boiled off at restrained 
temperatures under vacuum, crystallization induced, and sugar crystals
For technical details, see G.L.Spencer and G.P. Meade, Cane-Su 
Handbook, New York, 1945; R.A.McGinnis (ed), Sugar-Beet Technology, 
New York, 1951; Andrew van Hook, Sugars Its Production, Technology, 
and Uses, New York, 1949.
12.
separated by centrifugal action from the final juice, leaving 
uncrystallizabla sugar and residual impurities in the molasses.
The introduction of sugar beet can be associated with an 
important transformation in European agriculture involving highly 
advanced crop rotations. Almost every sugar-beet farming operation 
today is characterised by a highly diversified system in which 
cereals are grown as well as root crops, and livestock is produced. 
In contrast, major cane areas are 'typically highly specialized 
monocultures externally oriented both for markets ;and for inship- 
rnents of the basic food supply*,  ^ The mere fact that cane is a
perennial crop (available for successive croppings) limits com­
petition from other crops for use of the land. The economic 
implications of these rigidities are far-reaching; in times of world 
sugar surpluses, the adjustment burden may be shifted on to cane 
producers, who are less equipped to change output readily, given 
the heavy fixed costs of investment.
The empirical evidence supporting the existence of cano mono­
cultures is ample when one considers the degree to which this crop 
can dominate the economy of a country or region. Whatever the 
historical reasons, in some offshore ex-territories of metropolitan 
countries, sugar overshadows all other commodities, in export trade, 
in local agriculture, and in gross domestic product. Almost 90% of 
total arable land is devoted to sugar cane in ‘’Mauritius, while the
# V,P.Timoshenko and B.C.Swerling, The World's Sugar: Progress and 
Pol^cy^, Stanford University Press, 1957.
.13.
figures are approximately 66% in Barbados, 50% in Martinique and 
Reunion, 72% in Hawaii and 45% in Puerto Ricoo^ ' However, no 
ex-colonial territory is more heavily committed to cane production 
than Queensland in Australia, where cane occupies more than 96% of 
total cultivated land, ' Other examples of cane-dominated
have to compete with grain and mangels for their place in the rotation,
* FAD, Production Year Book, Rome, various issues.
^  Notes on the Australian Sugar Industry, CSR Limited, 3une 1976, 
Queensland.
***3.D.Black and C.T.Corson, Sugar; Produce or Import?, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Agricultural Series, No,6, 
Berkeley, California, 1947.
1
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segments of national economic systems are Louisiana in the United 
States, Natal in South Africa, Tucuman in Argentina, and the north- %
eastern states of Brazil.
The possibilities for intercrop substitution (between sugar 
beet and sugar cane on the one hand, and other agricultural crops 
and livestock on the other) vary significantly between regions and 
countries. Clearly, because beet is an annual crop, unlike cane,
competition from other crops is likely to be, and indeed is, more 
severe, and the response by beet producers to changing relative 
prices is therefore expected to be quicker. However, the number of 
competing crops will depend on the type of soil, climate, and even 
irrigation facilities available. Black and Corson '  ^ have argued
that the beet producer on irrigated land in western United States
may also incorporate alfalfa as a forage crop and Field beans or 1potatoes as a marketable output. In many European countries, bests |
■14.
“■ C.H.Wadleigh, "Expansion of Research on Sugar Beets", The 
California Sugar Beet, 1953, Stockton.
** Charles Issawi, Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis,
London, 1947,
Caribbean Commission, Monthly Information Bulletin, (Port ~ of 
Spain), December 1953.
This implies that a poor wheat or barley crop in the winter can be ■ H
i.followed by larger beet acreages in the spring. However, the ,'ï
widest range of competing crops in response to market incentives 
is to be found on the irrigated lands of California,(*) where 
lettuce and tomatoes, and even cotton, are direct competitors with 
beet for water and land.
The situation regarding competition from other crops is rather
different for sugar cane. The introduction of sugar cane (outside 
the Far East and the Indian sub-continent) has historically been 
associated with reclaiming virgin land or turning cattle ranges to 
field crops rather than by bidding the land away from other culti­
vated plants. Some exceptions to this general pattern do exist, 
however; cane production was increased at the expense of wheat in 
the upper Nile' land shifts slowly between cane and pineapples
in Hawaii (but over very long periods); out of bananas and into cane 
or from cane to citrus in Jamaica ^; from cane to cotton in parts 
of central Peru; and from cane to rice in Guyana.
Cane comes into close annual competition with other crops, in Iparticular rice, only in the densely populated countries of Asia, -|*1
where the pressure of demand for land is obviously greater. A 1number of studies have shown a rational issponse on the part of |
%
h: ■. >producers to changes in the relative prices of sugar and rice in 4
(#) (341')Taiwan '. Ebi' ' points out that water, which is in ample supply
in Taiwan, was apportioned in such a way as to enforce a rigid three- 
year rotation including cane, rice, and an upland crop, usually pea­
nuts or sweet potatoes. A rather similar situation exists in Java; '|
Metcalf' has shown that in certain parts of Java, an 18-month 
cane crop in rotation with rice and an upland crop (usually corn or 
cassava) was standard practice before the war. In some parts of the
(i»\Philippines, cane is rotated with rice' \  while in Pakistan, acreage
( I!tî )under cane increased when jute acreages were subjected to restrictions. * 
The significant factor that emerges, however, is that while substantial 
substitution can take place between cane and other crops as a result
( «»îif \of institutional or historical forces' cane has tended to reassert
itself, with considerable tenacity, even in places such as Indonesia,
(-)where the local environment was not particularly hospitable. *
* See, for example, C.Fan, Determination of Sugar Supply Functions
in Taiwan, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1967.
** Saburi Ebi, 'Sugar Industry in Java and Formosa - A Comparative
Study', (Econ. Coop. Admin., Mission to China, Tokyo, 1947, mimeo).
J.E.Metcalf, The Agricultural Economy of Indonesia , U.S. Dept. 
Agric., Agricultural Monograph 15, 1952.
" O.H,Grist, R.ic£, London, 1953.
"" F.O.Licht's Sugar Information Service, Ratzeburg, 1962.
""" For example, the Second World War saw cotton and local food
crops almost completely replace sugar cane production in the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Formosa, the cultivation of local 
foodstuffs, manioc and sweet potatoes in Mauritius, peanuts 
and rice in Cuba, corn, wheat, and rice in India, all at the 
expense of cane.
See U.Pf,Timoshenko and B.C.Swerling, op. cit., p.7.
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Supply Conditions
The share of sugar beat in the total output of sugar has varied 
between 38% and 44% in the postwar period, while actual output of beet 
sugar has increased from 13.37 million metric tons per annum in the $
early 1950s to 29*92 million metric tons in 1974 (compared with a 
world output of 33*57 million metric tons in 1951 and 78,70 million 
metric tons in 1974)' \  The importance of sugar beet increased signif­
icantly in the nineteenth century, Britain operated a policy of duty­
free import of sugar from 1874 to 1901, which led to the complete 
disintegration of the Jamaican sugar cane plantations,' * but simul- ’4
taneously opened the key British market to sugar beet from European 
producers. Largely with the help of subsidization from various govern­
ments, the share of beet in world sugar production reached 15% in 1850 
and 65% by 1900,  ^ Although boat sugar was grown with a view to
satisfying domestic demand, by 1914 beet supplied nearly 25% of total
(’* )world exports of sugar « Since Britain had no domestic production of 
beet before the First World War, she had to rely on th&? Continent for a 
major part of her imports®
The dominant role of beet was soon challenged, however, even before 
the European beet sugar economy was ravaged by the First World War.
# Sugar statistics are reported in a number of different .units, such
as English short tons of 2,000 pounds, metric tons of 2,204.6 pounds, t
English long tons of 2,240 pounds, and Spanish long tons of 2,271.6
pounds. Conventionally, international data are converted into metric
tons.
P.O.Curtin, 'The British Sugar Duties and West Indian Prosperity',
Journal of Economic History, Spring 1954*
H.C.Prinsen Geerligs, The World's Sugar Cane Industry, Past and 
Present, Manchester, 1912.
Lois B.Bacon and F.C.Schloemer, World Trade in Agricultural products;
Its Growth., _ Its Crisis., _and_the New Trade Policies^ . Internat M  Inst, of
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Subsidization of beet sugar exports turned out to bo very expensive to 
the public treasuries in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. By 
imposing an embargo on imports of subsidized sugar, Britain opened 
the way for the Brussels Sugar Convention of 1902, which largely removed 
the artificial competition faced by tropical sources of supply More­
over, many cane-producing regions began to use improved factory equipment 
before 1900, especially Louisiana, Hawaii, Java and Cuba. Indeed, Cuban 
production of cane exceeded one million tons by the early 1890s, while 
heavy export of American capital to ex-Spanish territories (Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and the Philippines) led to significant improvements in cane 
processing. The result was that by 1913 the world was again producing 
more sugar from cane than from beets.
The Interwar Period
While the First World War severely disrupted the European beet 
economy, the years of economic disorganisation that followed the war 
saw an even more dramatic fall in production. Total European production 
of sugar was only 2.6 million tons in 1919/20 compared with total pro­
duction of 8.3 million metric tons in 1913/14. Not until 1928/29 did 
European production exceed its prewar level. During this period, two 
factors combined to enable such cane areas as Cuba, Java, and the 
Dominican Republic to make use of modernised milling facilities in pro­
duction for exports the rising levels of consumption in the United States 
and Japan, and the deficiency in European production.
* U.P.Timoshenko and B.S,Suerling, op. cit., p.18.
Cane producers' exports to Europe, however, were soon threatened. 
Great Britain joined the ranks of beet producers by imposing a direct 
subsidy on home-grown beets effective October 1, 1924. The Great 
Depression gave rise to intensified protection of beet sugar, which 
implied further marketing problems for exporting countries. However, 
production of cane sugar expanded rapidly also under the umbrella of 
protection, in other parts of the world. In some cases, higher output 
was directed almost exclusively at the domestic market and had little 
impact on international trade in sugar (for example, Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico). But the effect of the increase in Indian production of 
white sugar (under various protectionist policies introduced in 1930 
and 1931) was a direct displacement of imports from Java. Production 
of cane sugar in Java was again adversely affected when Japan success­
fully established Formosa as a base of sugar self-sufficiency by the 
early 1930s. The implications for Java's industry were very serious: 
market losses in India and Japan coincided with significant improvements 
in agricultural productivity, involving new varieties of cane capable of 
very high yields.
Agricultural policy in the major importing countries, i.e. the 
United States and the United Kingdom, was designed to reconcile a 
number of conflicting interests: domestic beet producers, metropolitan 
cane refiners, offshore cano producers and overseas suppliers, as well 
as the consumer and the public treasury. A brief analysis of these two 
key markets would be useful at this stage.
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Britain operated a policy of free trade in sugar from 1874 to 
1901j and imposed a light revenue tariff after that date; however, 
the substantial tariff imposed during tho first World War was 
continued after 1918 for both revenue and protectionist reasons*
In 1919, a system of imperial preferences was introduced, and a 
domestic beet subsidy was started in 1924, The result was that 
domestic production of beet sugar exceeded half a million tons by 
1934/35, The pattern of Britain's sugar trade was also undergoing 
changes Before the First World War, 80% of total sugar imports was 
beet, but by 1930, 92% of total imports was from sugar cano sources.
The effect on domestic consumption was that by 1937, 60% of total 
consumption was Empire-grown (compared with only 4% in 1913 and 24% 
in the middle 1920s), The main beneficiaries from this change in 
the pattern of supplies were (apart from subsidised beet producers 
in Britain) Australia and South Africa, and tho colonial cane-producing 
territories (mainly the British West Indies, and Mauritius)» The 
total sugar output of the Empire in 1937 (excluding India) was four 
to five times larger than the output in 1913, Another important 
change related to the nature of the imported sugar; imports of boot 
sugar had typically been in refined form, but the tariff schedule in 
1928 ’ was designed so as to promote imports of raw sugar and dis­
courage refined imports. While this revised tariff system boosted 
the re-export business of British cane-sugar refiners, it also meant 
an end to Czech sugar-beet exports to Britain.
The main principle underlying American sugar policy was an 
emphasis on protecting domestic supply and maintaining the American
See Chapter Three*
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domestic market as a preferential market for certain off-shore and 
overseas cane exporters. The interwar period witnessed a rapid 
growth of insular cane sugar production (in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, 
and the Philippines), the rise of a domestic beet sugar industry 
(to a level exceeded only by prewar Germany and the USSR), the 
expansion of cane production in Florida, and the recovery (from the 
effects of cane disease) of production in Louisiana, The main 
instrument of American sugar policy had remained the tariff until 
1934; this provided the basis for slow growth in Hawaii and domestic 
beet production. But it was Puerto Rico and the Philippines which 
benefited most as a result of tariff increases in the United States 
in 1921 and 1922. The offshore producers gained again from the high 
Smoot-Hawley tariff introduced in 1930, by displacing about one 
million tons of Cuban sugar and threatening mainland sugar producers 
at the same time*
The present instabilities on the world sugar market can be traced 
back directly to the policies adopted by these two main importers in 
the interwar period. The immediate combined effect of the sugar 
policies of the United States and the United Kingdom (which together 
accounted for about 50% of total sugar imports during this period) was 
to "place exporters to nonpreferential markets in an increasingly precarious# 
position",  ^ Cuba and Java were the main exporters to be adversely 
affected. Total Cuban exports reached nearly 5 million tons in 1925, 
compared with approximately 2.5 million tons in 1913, but progressive 
displacement from the key American market reduced exports to below 2 
million tons by the early 1930s. Since Java lacked both a preferential 
market abroad and a significant domestic outlet, it was even more
V.P.Timoshenko and B.S.Swerling, op. cit., p.23,
i
71 @
■■SiI
adversely affected by the 'imperialization' of world sugar trade.
She was compelled to reduce production from 3 million tons in 1830/31
to just over half a million tons in 1935/36, During this period of :J
the setting up of preferential bilateral agreements regarding trade 
in sugar, only the less important exporters, such as Peru and the 
Dominican Republic, were able to maintain reasonably stable levels 
of exports.
Post-war developments in the world sugar economy
The sugar policies embarked upon by the major importing countries 
in the interwar period set the tone for the post-war developments in 
world sugar trade* Preferential markets absorbed on average about 
50% of total sugar exports, with the remaining exports disposed of on 
the 'residual' world free market. Tho main bilateral arrangements 
have been the United States Import Quota System (1934 to 1974), the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (195# to 1974), the Cuban-Russian-Chinese 
agreement (1962 onwards), and minor arrangements covering supplies of 
sugar from French overseas territories to Francs, ex-Dutch territories 
to the Netherlands, and ex-Portuguese territories to Portugal* The 
significant factor to emerge in the post-war period is that while 
production and consumption increased by nearly 150% between 1950 and 
1975, the share of world trade has been steadily falling. While the 
basic structure of trad© still remains unchanged (cane surplus areas 
in developing countries exporting to deficit countries in North J
America, Western Europe, and Japan), political events have led to /I
significant shifts in the direction of trade and in the position of h|
:individual countries on the market. Moreover, continued attempts at J
J
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greater self-sufficiency in importing countries has resu&ted in a
gradual decline in the role of world trade in sugar.
Currently, by far the greater part of world consumption is met 
by domestic production in the consuming areas' the share of imports 
in consumption has declined from just under 30% in 1950 to about 20% 
in the 1970s. This very high and rising degree of self-sufficiency is 
of comparatively recent vintage; up to the 1930s, deficit countries 
relied on imports to a much larger extent to meet domestic require­
ments. In fact, before the First World War and again during the 
1920s, when total and per caput consumption were rising rapidly' \  
the share of trade in total consumption amounted to well over 50%.
Table 2.1 shows that the proportion of world consumption met by imports 
fell from over 50% between 1909 and 1930 to just over 25% in the mid- 
1960s. We have seen that the depression of the early 1930s activated 
radical changes in sugar policy; per caput consumption stagnated; the 
slow rise in total consumption hardly matched the rise in world 
population, and trade showed a sharp decline. The specific sugar 
policies adopted in many importing countries during and following the 
depression were aimed particularly at raising domestic output and 
reducing the level of imports.
* In 1975, for example, world production amounted to 81.6 million 
metric tons; the figures for world consumption and imports were 
respectively 77.3 and 20.6 million metric tons.
** It has been estimated that per caput consumption rose from about 
7.3 kilograms in 1920 to approximately 12,3 kilograms in 1930 
(an annual growth rate of some 5.5%). In the late 1930s, per caput 
consumption fell back to 11.4 kilograms. See Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations, The World Sugar Economy in 
Figures, 1880-1959, Rome, 1961.
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Table 2.1: Development of Consumption and iMst Trade in Sugar
(Million metric tons)
Annual
Averages
World Consumption
Exports (net)
World
Developing countries
Developing Countries' 
net exports as % of:
1. World net exports
2. World consumption
World net exports as 
% of consumption
1909- 1926- 1934- 1952- 1955- 1958- 1961- 1964- 
1913 1930 1938 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966
13.9 22.2 24,3 35.9 41.0 47.0 53.3 59.4
7.2
51 ai
12.1 8.6 11.6 12.8 14.1 16.0 15.9
7.5 9.7 11.0 12.1 12.7 12.6
87.2 83.6 85.9 85.8 79.4 79.2
30.9 27.0 26.8 25.7 23.8 21.2
54.8 35.4 32.3 31.2 30.0 30.0 26.8
(1) World production
(2) Estimated on the basis of production and changes in stocks
Sources: International Institute of Agriculture, International Yearbook
of Agricultural Statistics, various issues; FAQ Trade Yearbook 
1958; International Sugar Organization, The World Sugar Economy 
1963, Vol.II ; Sugar Yearbook, various issues; FAQ, The World 
Sugar Economy in Figures, 1880-1959.
Per caput consumption began to rise again after the Second World War 
but the trend toward increasing self-sufficiency has continued. Between 
1966 and 1976, the share of trade in total consumption has averaged about 
20 to 22% due again to expanded domestic output in importing countries
The average rate of growth of aoncumption per head was roughly 3% 
per annum after 1950. A major factor explaining this slowdown in 
growth is the fact that per caput consumption in many of the 
developed countries had already reached or were very near to 
saturation levels at the start of the period (in particular the 
United States and the United Kingdom).
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under the shelter of heavy protection* In many of the importing 
countries, increased self-sufficiency in sugar must be seen in the 
overall context of agricultural policy, which was designed to main­
tain a strong agricultural sector in the economy. This is closely 
connected with the general desire to reduce dependence on foreign 
supplies of basic foodstuffs, a tendency greatly enhanced by war­
time scarcities. Moreover, in the early postwar years and through 
most of the 1950s, balance of payments consideration - the need to 
limit foreign exchange (especially dollar) expenditure - provided 
added incentives to stimulate domestic production. Finally, 
temporary sharp rises in world 'free* market price of sugar, triggered 
by speculative increases in demand during the Korean (1951/52) and 
Suez (1956) crises, and, later on, by shortage of supply from crop 
failure in Cuba (1963/54), gave furtner impetus toward reducing 
dependence on imports. The latest peak in the cycle of long periods 
of depressed prices on the world free market occurred in the period 
1972-1975 with far-reaching consequences.
The appearance of severe worldwide shortages in the early and 
mid-1970s and recent changes in the structure of the world sugar
(*)market have called for a re-examination of the world sugar economy.
These shortages have resulted in a dramatic change in world price levels
"i
* For example, an assessment made as recently as 1972, "Sugar - A 
Reappraisal of Investment Policies for Developing Countries",
Sec.1972-571, November 10, 1972, carried out by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was based on prices pre­
vailing in the 1965-69 period, which bear little resemblance to <
prices operating in the mid-1970s.
-M-x- It is useful at this point to noto that the ’world price' is quoted 
for raw sugar, f.o.b. Caribbean and Brazilian ports, that is traded 
on the so-called free market; the free market price is also quoted 
on the London commodity market, c.i.f. London Daily Price (LDP).
In recent years net exports to the free market have amounted to 
about half of the world net exports and about 12-13% of qorld output. 
Prices of sugar traded under the different bilateral agreements are
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During the period 1965-69, world prices were approximately 2 cents per 
pound (Caribbean), but in November 1974 they reached an unprecedented 
level of 65 cents per pound. (This can be compared with an all-time 
low of £12.25 per metric ton in January, 1967, on the London sugar 
market with an all-time high of £650 per ton in December 1974). The 
main reason for such a sharp rise in pricds was a growing imbalance 
between production and consumption over almost a whole decade, accentu­
ated by a greater tightening of supply in more recent years! Between 
1965 and 1974, production increased by about 1.9% per annum, while 
consumption increased by about 3.2% annually* Consequently, sugar stocks 
as a percentage of total consumption fell from 32.3% in 1965 to 18.7% 
in 1974.
For the first time since the Cuban crisis in 1962, which involved 
massive reallocation of export quotas by the United States to cane 
exporters, significant changes in the sugar market structure occurred 
as a result of three recent developments:- (1) the expiration of the 
International Sugar Agreement at the end of 1973 and failure to renew
(-X- )it' (2) the expiration of the United States Sugar Act at the and of 
1974, which led to the entry of the world's largest consumer and importer 
into the free market; and (3) the expiration of the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement (CSA) at the end of 1974 and the concomitant entry into force 
of arrangements with the European Economic Community to accommodate 
imports of sugar from the developing countries which exported sugar 
under the CSA.
* International Sugar Agreements between sugar importers and exporters 
were designed to regulate prices on the free world market, which was 
subject to considerable instabilities due to its residual nature.
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For many years, three separate and protected international markets 
for sugar have been in existence, with little direct interaction between
( -X- \them.  ^ The residual ’free market’ has been rather small (about 13—14% 
of world production) and therefore highly volatile. Table 2.2 shows the 
varying amounts traded under the different bilateral arrangements in 
selected years over tha period 1950 to 1973, The importance of the free 
market has increased relative to the other major markets subject to 
agreements. Since the expiration of the U.S. Sugar Act in 1974, United 
States demand is met from the free market which has grown even larger now 
to include virtually all sugar trade, with the exception of the sugar 
traded between Cuba and the Eastern European countries and China, and 
that traded under the Lome Convention of the EEC.
Table 2.2/
Since the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, the United States Sugar 
Import Quota System, and the agreement covering trade between 
Cuba and tha centrally planned economies have accounted for over 
95% of trade under bilateral agreements, we will generally ignore 
the other less important arrangements regulating trade in sugar. 
Three such arrangements are: the African and Malagasy Sugar Agree­
ment between the Organisation Commune Africaine, Malagase et 
Mauricienne (OCAM countries); the agreement covering trade between 
Portugal and previous Portuguese overseas territories; and between 
France and French overseas departments (Martinique and Guadeloupe),
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Table 2.2 % World Production and Exports to Major Markets, 1960-62, 1970-72 
Average, and 1973
Average
1960-62
Average 
1970-72 1973
M.m.t. % M.m.t. % M.m.t. %
Total world production 52.8 100.0 74.2 100.0 78.1 100.0 ^^ \World net exports' ' 17.1 32.4 18.8 25.3 20.1 25.7
Main destination of exports:
United States 4.3 8.1 4.8 6.5 4.8 6.1
United Kingdom 2.0 3.8 1.9 2.6 1.6 2.1
Centrally Planned Countries 2.8 5.3 2.2 3.0 2.2 2.9
Free world market 8.0 15.2 9.9 13.2 11.5 14.6
Exports to free market as %
of total exports 46.8 52,7 57.2
(1) The sum for all countries which are net exporters.
M.m.t, refers to million metric tons of rqw sugar.
Source: International Sugar Organization, Statistical Bulletin, various issues
Over the period between 1950/51 and 1974/75, world production more 
than doubled. The rate of growth per annum for the period between 1950 
and 1960 was 4.2%. This rate fall to about 2.7% for the period between 
1960 and the mid-1970s. Table 2.3 divides the 1950/51 to 1974/75 period 
into three groups, and shows the figures for total production, consumption 
and stocks in each period, along with the respective rates of growth. The 
slow rate of growth of output in the early 1970s was mainly attributable 
to a succession of bad harvests in major producing areas, On the other
hand, world consumption lagged behind production in the period between the
* For example, production in Cuba fell from 7.56 million tons in 1970 
to 5.95 million tons in 1971 and 4.69 in 1972; in the USSR it fell 
from 10.08 million tons in 1969 to 8.85 million tons in 1970, and 
8.40 million tons in 1971.
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1950s and 1960s but increased more rapidly than production in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, The result of these production shortfalls in 
recent years has been that world stocks have fallen to very low levels. 
World stocks are generally considered normal when they range from 28 to 
32% of current world consumption, or three to four months’ supply. *
In the mid-1970s, they declined to their lowest levels since the Second 
World War, and by the end of 1974, they were equivalent to only ten 
weeks’ consumption, which was considered insufficient to ensure conti­
nuity of supplies (thus leading to the boom in sugar prices).
Table 2*3 : World Sugar Production, Consumption, and Stocks between 1950/51 
and 1974/75 and their growth rates (in million metric tons)
1950/51- 1950/61- 1970/71-
1959/60 1959/70 1974/75
(i) Annual world production 40,9 61,8 76*4
Average annual growth rate 4.2 2.7
(ii) Annual world consumption 39,7 59,7 77.7
Average annual growth rate 4.1 3.4
(iii) Average final stocks 11.2 17.1 16,7
Average final stocks as %
of consumption 28,2 28,6 21,5
Source: International Sugar Organization, Sugar Year Book, various issues.
World trade in sugar increased slowly for many years, but then 
expanded sharply in the early 1960s. Between 1954 and I960' \  the
This refers only to the proportion of stocks at the end of the crop 
session. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Commodity Paper No.20, The Sugar Market; Review and Outlook, March 1976.
During the whole of the period 1954-73, an International Sugar Agreement 
was operative (in some form or other). An analysis over this period 
makes it possible to compare the ’free market’ trade and total world 
trade on the basis of the definitions of these markets given in the 
International Sugar Agreement, and of the statistics supplied by the 
International Sugar Organization*
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volume traded Increeised by less than 2% per annum. With the termination
of imports of Cuban sugar by the United States in 1960, world trade
increased by 19% between 1959 and 1960 and by more than 14% between 1960
and 1961® The most important cause of this significant expansion in trade ^
was the inability of the centrally planned economies to absorb large
quantities of Cuban sugar which had to be reexported (*)|-to the free market. :i
As Table 2.4 shows, during the 1960s world trade did not grow significantly
although it fluctuated more than during the 1950s.
Table 2.4 2 World Sugar Imports and Exports , 1954-73 (Million metric tons)
Imports Exports ( 1World DCs LDCs CPCs World DCs LDCs CPCs' '
1954 13.5 9.2 3.6 0.7 13.4 2.6 5.1 5.6
1955 14.5 9.7 3.4 1.4 14.5 2.7 6.0 5.0
1956 14.1 10.4 3.1 0.6 14.2 2.6 5.6 5.9
1957 15.5 11.5 3.2 0.8 15.5 2.9 6.7 5.91958 15.5 11.4 3.4 0.7 15.7 2.4 6.6 6.8 g1959 14.7 11.1 3.2 0.4 14.9 2.3 6.2 6.41960 17.5 11.5 3.5 2.5 17.7 2.9 7.9 6.9
1961 20.0 10.4 3.9 5.7 20.4 3.4 8.1 8.9
1962 19.0 11.0 3.7 4.3 19.2 3.2 7.7 8.3 3
1963 17.4 11.9 3.1 2.4 17.7 3.5 8.4 5.8
1964 17.0 10.7 3.7 2.7 17.6 3.6 7.5 6./
1965 18.8 10.8 4.5 3.5 19.5 3.3 8.4 7.8
1966 18.1 11.7 3.7 3.2 18.4 3.1 8.1 7.2
1967 19.6 11.3 3.6 4.7 20.0 3.7 7.7 8.5
1968 19.2 11.5 4.2 3.5 10.5 4.7 8.2 7.6 ;
1969 18.7 11.4 4.3 3.0 18.3 3.3 7.6 7.4
1970 21.2 11.9 4.3 5.1 21.5 3.7 8.2 9.5
1971 20.6 12,3 4.6 3.7 20.8 3.8 9.4 7.6 ^
1972 21.3 12.9 4.7 3.8 21.8 5.5 11.0 5.2
1973 22.3 12,4 5.2 4,7 22.1 5.3 10.9 5.9 /
-------
(1) Includes Cuba
DCs j~ developed countries, LDCs = less developed countries,
CPCs - centrally planned countries
Sources; International Sugar Organization, Statistical Bulletin « various 
issues; Sugar Year Book, various issues
# It may be argued that part of this expansion in trade is due to double
counting of exports such as exports from Cuba to the USSR and from the USSR
to other Eastern European countries. However, oven on a net basis, there 
was a significant increase of 13.5% in trade between 1959 and 1960 and about
15% increase in trade between 1960 and 1961.
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The developed countries have remained the most important market 
for sugar exports, while the less developed and centrally planned 
economies have been absorbing approximately the same amount of imports 
in the 1960s and early 1970s. Table 2,5 shows the average share of 
country groups in world sugar trade for 1960-62 and 1970-72.
Table 2.5 % Average Shares of World Trade in Sugar by Economic Class 
Groups, 1960-62 and 1970-72 (%)
Imports Exports
1960-62 1970-72 1960-62 1970-72
World Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Developed 58.7 58.6 17.0 21.6
( 1 )Less Developed' ’ 19.7 21.4 71.3 68.9
(2)Centrally Planned 21.6 20.0 11.7 9.5
(1) Including Cuba
(2) Excluding Cuba
Sources I International Sugar Organization, Sugar Year Book, various 
issues; Annual Report, various issues.
The bulk of trade takes place between developing and developed 
countries. Traditionally, the developing countries as a group have 
exported three to four times as much sugar as they import. However, 
the share of LDCs in world exports fell from 70 to 75% in the 1950s to
65 to 70% in the 1960s and early 1970s, with no major fluctuations
occurring in the period as a whole. By contrast, there were major
fluctuations in the exports and imports of centrally planned countries
in the years after 1954, mainly reflecting the special trading arrange­
ments between Cuba and Eastern Europe. Since 1960, several of these
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countries, including China, guaranteed Cuba the purchase of its 
exportable surplus at prices above the free market price and re­
exported part of these imports to the 'free' market. The net 
result was a change in tha position of the centrally planned 
countries from one of approximate balance in sugar trade in the 
1950s to one of net axporterin the 1960s and early 1970s.
The World Free Market for Sugar
The world free market is the largest among the four major markets 
for sugar, and more than half of world trade is conducted through it.
It is a free market in the sense that prices are not administratively 
fixed, and normally no export or import quotas are allocated. However, 
the supply of sugar to the free market has been regulated during several 
periods by a number of multilateral arrangements in the form of Inter­
national Sugar Agreements (iSAs), For example, from 1953 to 1962 trade 
in sugar was governed by the 1953 and 1958 ISAs. In 1963, after prices 
rose to a peak of 8,5 / par lb in New York (and £105 per ton in London), 
negotiations to renew the Agreernont failed. Although the ISA remained 
nominally in force between 1963 and 1968, its economic provisions were 
suspended. A new ISA was, however, concluded in 1968 to be operative 
over five years, and it covered over 90% of free market sugar exports. 
The main economic provision of the 1968 ISA was to impose export quotas 
and institute a mechanism of quota adjustments to ensure the world price 
ranged from 3.25 cents per pound to 6.5U cents. However, prices rose 
above the ceiling laid down in the Agreement, reaching 7.3 cents in 
1972, due mainly to severe shortfalls in production in Cuba and the USSR* 
The result was a suspension of quotas to encourage production.
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The 1968-1973 International Sugar Agreement was not renewed. 
Negotiations began in 1973 for a new ISA, but the exporting countries 
demanded a minimum price of at least 9 cents per pound while the 
importing countries proposed a price range virtually identical to 
that contained in the 1968-73 Agreement, Discussions also related to 
the allocation of export quotas among supplying countries (in particular 
the European Economic Community was a major new force on the export side). 
In a situation of increasingly short supply, the significance of any 
new ISA was different from previous agreements, especially as importing 
countries could potentially benefit more from an Agreement than exporting 
countries, at least in the short run. It was therefore agreed to extend 
the existing Agreement beyond 1973, but significantly enough, without 
its economic provisions which deal with price fixing and quota alloca­
tions. In other words, all effective controls on free market transactions 
were removed.
The total quantities actually traded through the free market changed 
very little between 1954 and 1970 but increased rapidly after 1971,
Between 1954 and 1970, annual net trade in the free market averaged 
about 8 million metric tons; in 1971, total net imports exceeded 9 million 
tons and in 1972 they amounted to 11 million tons. Table 2,5 gives a 
breakdown of average free market sugar trade by country groups over the 
period 1970-72, to exporters from less developed countries,
Table 2,6/
Table 2.6 % Free Market Sugar Trade by Country Groups (1970-72)
( 1 )Net Imports 
Mom,tons %
(2)Net Exports 
M.m.tons %
Free Market Total 9.6 100,0 9.9 100.0
Developed Countries 4.9 51.0 3.2 32.3
Developing Countries 4.2 43.7 5.0 50.5
Centrally Planned Countries 0.4 5.3 1,7 17.2
(1) Sum of net imports of importing countries in each group
(2) Sum of net exports of exporting countries in each group
Mom.tons refers to million metric tons
Sources International Sugar Organization* Sugar Year Book, London, 
various issues.
The Free Market for Sugar and International Sugar Agreements
A number of international agreements have been devised to control 
the levels of production and quantities supplied on the free market for 
sugar. Here, we examine briefly the principles underlying these agree­
ments and assess their economic significance, and the degree of success,
International Sugar Agreements Prior to 1953
Concerted action on an international scale to solve some of the 
problems relating to trade in sugar can be traced back to the nineteenth 
century: in 1864, a ten-year Agreement was concluded between the United 
Kingdom, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands with the objective of 
gradually abolishing bounties on domestic production and export subsidies, 
Tha agreement did not prove to be very successful and was discontinued,
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but nevertheless highlighted the two major problems of trade in sugar: 
on the one hand, protection of domestic industries in European beet- 
producing countries involved "a system of bounties and subsidization “
of exports, which imposed upon the governments of most of these
(•H)countries a heavy fiscal burden of which they could not rid themselves", ' 
except in the framework of international agreements which allowed soma 
protection to domestic beet producers; on the other hand, some of these 
governments, while realising the benefits that could potentially be 
gained by importing subsidized sugar at artificially low prices, were '
also aware of the danger which such exports represented for their 
relatively low-cost cane-producing overseas territories.
The next Agreement to be concluded was the Brussels Convention, 
on March 5, 19Ü2 . Under this Agreement, the Governments of the
signatory countries undertook to remove all direct and indirect bounties 
on production and exports of sugar and to impose countervailing duties 
on imports of sugar originating from countries granting such bounties.
No significant increase in world price was achieved, nor was production 
in European sugar beet countries reduced. The really important achieve- 
ment was an enormous increase in domestic sugar consumption (since 
exports no longer needed to be subsidized, internal prices could be 
reduced). The convention was extended in 1908 and was formally annulled 
in 1918.
* International Sugar Organization, The World Sugar Economy, Vol.Ill, 
p.211, 1963, London.
See The Brussels Convention, 1902 (mimeographed).
The Agreement was concluded between the Governments of Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In 1907, Luxembourg, Peru, and 
Switzerland joined the Convention, and Russia joined in 1908®
( X - ' )A report by the League of Nations in Duly 1929^ 'suggested tha 
need for international action again? but concluded that an Agreement 
based on the principles of the Brussels Convention would not solve the 
new problems*' ' What was required? it argued? was an agreement to
stabilise production for three or four years by the major exporting 
countries* The result of negotiations between the sugar industries 
of these countries was the Chadbourne Agreement of 1931 . This
Agreement was the first arrangement designed to control the sugar trade 
on a World-Wide basis. Its provisions covered all the exports of member 
countries (with the important exception of exports from Cuba to the 
United States}' '» Tho main provision of the Agreement, intended to 
last for five years, related to the restriction of production and 
regulation of exports by member countries, in a bid to eliminate the 
surplus stocks during that period. The ultimate objective was to arrest 
any further decline in world prices. The Chadbourne Agreement failed 
mainly becbusa limitation of output in member countries was more than 
offset by expansion of production in non-member countries. Prices 
therefore remained depressed, while the general expansion of production 
in non-member countries (in particular, in some cane and beet sugar 
importing countries) meant that the exportable surplus for the world 
market was increasing at the same time that that market was shrinking.
See League of Nations, The World Sugar Situation, Report by the 
Economic Committee, Geneva, 1929,
•x-x-K- International Sugar Agreement of 1931 (Chadbourne Agreement), 1931, 
(mimeographed).
After the First World War, sugar beet production soon exceeded pre­
war levels in Europe resulting in an excess of supply over demand 
of 4 million tons and bty 1920 prices had fallen below average pro­
duction costs in even the most efficient producing countries,
•x-7<"X“X- The signatories to the Chadbourne Agreement were the sugar industrie: 
of Belgium, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, and 
Poland; Peru and Yugoslavia acceded to the Agreement at a later date,
At the World Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933, countries that 
exported to the free market pressed for a more effective international |
agreement*
The result was a new Agreements the International Sugar Agreement 
of 1937' * For the first time, a distinction was made between the so-
called ’free market* and the total or world trade? the former (about 70% 
of total world trade at that time) being defined as that part of world 
trade to which special trading arrangements did not apply, and which 
therefore had to bear all the burden of adjustment necessitated by 
changes in supply and/or demand. Thus defined, the free market covered 
all exports except those to the United States, certain exports by the 
USSR to adjoining territories, and movements between French territories
{-Jf-X- )and between Belgium and Luxenbourg.' The objective of the Agreement 
was the same as in previous ones; to encourage the regulation of pro­
duction and the marketing of sugar. To achieve these objectives, the 
Agreement contained provisions to limit production in exporting countries 
by imposing a ceiling on maximum stocks; it also contained guarantees by 
the United Kingdom and the United States under which these countries 
agreed to meet a stated minimum proportion of their consumption require­
ments through imports* To further discourage high-cost producers, the 
price objectives of the Agreement was defined as a * reasonable price, not 
to exceed the cost of production, including a reasonable profit, of 
efficient producers.** Recognising the need to expand outlets, in
* See International Sugar Agreement of 1937, London, 1937, ,■
The signatories to the Agreement included both importing and 
exporting countries, as follows; the Commonwealth of Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Germany, 
Haiti, Hungary, India, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, 
The USSR, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.A.
See International Sugar Agreement, 1937, Text of Agreement, London,
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order to dispose of the existing surplus at least? the Agreement called 
for the promotion of consumption increases» A system of export quotas 
was designed to regulate the marketing of sugar? fixed each year by the 
Council as a percentage of the basic export tonnage provided for each 
participating country in the Agreement.'  ^ It is impossible to judge 
the effectiveness of theso economic provisions? for the Agreement? 
originally intended to run for a period of five years? was suspended 
on the outbreak of war. Though the economic provisions were inoperative 
from 1939 to 1953? the administrative provisions of the Agreement were 
extended on a year-to-year basis. '
Operation of the 1953 and 1-958 International Sugar Agreements
The main effects of the Second World War in the world sugar economy 
were a drastic reduction in trade? widespread damage to the European 
sugar beet industry? and to the sugar cane industry in the Far East,
But production soon recovered in most countries and increased dramatically 
in Cuba. The pre-war problems besetting sugar production and trade were 
evident once again, and by 1953, the need for a new agreement to regulate 
trade and production became acute.' This led to the first agreement
in the post-war period, the International Sugar Agreement of
* These quotas were subject to adjustments by the Council during the
quota year in the light of fluctuations in world demand. Any upward ■ 
adjustment would require 60% of the votes cast (there was a total of 
100 votes, of which exporting countries held 55 and importing countries 
45) I reductions in quotas could not exceed 5% of the basic export 
tonnages.
** During this period, the following countries joined the Agreement;
France, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Yugoslavia, The 
USSR ceased to participate from September 1, 1947.
•:h h {- See International Sugar Agreement oF 1953 and Protocol of Amendment -t 
of 1956; London 1953 and 1956 respectively.
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(-K-)1953' \  The member countries accounted for 84% of the net exports to, 
and 54% of the net imports from, the free market in 1954. The definition 
of the 'free market* was redefined in the 1953 Agreement to refer to "the 
total of net imports of the world market except those excluded under any 
provisions of this Agreement**. The specific trade excluded was that into 
the U.S.A., into the USSR from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, between 
member exporting countries and their overseas departments, territories, or 
associated states, and some movements between adjoining territories or 
islands covered by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement of 1951. Curiously 
enough; exports under the latter Agreement formally constituted a part of 
the free market as then defined. Since most of the trade that was 
excluded was protected from the uncertainties of the world free market, 
it seems rather anomalous that the trade under the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement should have been treated as part of the free market.
The Agreement was originally concluded for a period of five years 
with provisions for review in the third year, 1956 . When it expired
on December 31, 1958, it was replaced by the International Sugar Agreement 
of 1958 « like its predecessor, this Agreement was intended to operate
-'f- The Agreement was concluded between the governments of the following 
exporting and importing countries: the exporting countries were 
Australia, Belgium, China,(Taiwan), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican 
Republic, France, Haiti, Hungary, Netherlands, Mexico, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, South Africa, and the USSR; the importing members 
were Canada, West Germany, Greece, Japan, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States of America.
** In 1956, membership increased to include Indonesia, Nicaragua, Panama, 
and Peru as exporting members, and Ghana and Ireland as importing 
members,
*** See International Sugar Agreement of 1958, London, 1958,
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for five years, with similar provisions for review in the third year 
of its operation, 1951' , In 1960, member countries accounted for
95% of total not exports to, and 65% of total net imports from, the 
world free market, A United Nations Sugar Conference held in 1961 
reviewed tho Agreement with a view to renegotiation' %  However, 
major structural changes in the patte#; of world trade (occasioned by 
the Cuban missile crisis) made it impossible for member governments 
to agree upon export entitlements to the free market. In 1962 and 
1963, therefore, no provisions could be made for the regulation of 
exports, and the economic clauses of the 1958 Agreement were, to all 
intents and purposes, inoperative for that period*
The overall objectives of the 1953 and 1958 International Sugar 
Agreements were to assure supplies of sugar to importing, and markets 
for sugar to exporting, member countries at ’’equitable and stable prices”. 
The more specific objectives of the Agreements were fourfold ;-
(1) to facilitate steady increases in the consumption of sugar 
and corresponding increases in the supply of sugar;
(2) to contribute to the improvement of the living conditions 
of consumers throughout the world;
* In addition to governments already parties to the 1953 ISA, as 
amended under the Protocol of 1955, new exporting members were 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Italy, and Paraguay; new importing members were Morocco, New 
Zealand, and Nigeria.
■K-x- Tho basic export tonnages under the Agreement were established
only for the first throe years of tha Agreement (1959, 1960 and 
1961), and new tonnages had to be negotiated for the fourth and 
fifth years (1962 and 1963)
■îHHc See International Sugar Organization, The World Sugar Economy, 
Vol.II, 1953, London.
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(3) to assist in the maintenance of the purchasing power in world 
markets of producing countries or areas and especially of those whose 
economies are largely dependent upon the production or export of sugar 
by providing adequate returns to producers and making it possible to 
maintain fair standards of labour conditions and wages; and
(4) to further,in general, international co-operation in connection 
with world sugar problems.
Since the general provisions underlying the price stabilization 
objective contained in both Agreements are fundamental to their successful 
operation, a brief examination of these provisions would be useful at this 
stage. The Agreements called for "the adjustment of production in partici­
pating countries” in order to support the price stabilization mechanism. 
Adjustment was to take place during the term of the Agreements, and "in so 
far as practicable in each quota year", so that, after allowing for domestic 
consumption requirements and exports authorised under the Agreements, the 
level of stocks in each of these countries at a date immediately preceding 
the start of the new crop would not exceed 20% of annual production. '
The experience of many commodity agreements highlights the dangers 
to an Agreement that non-participating countries may pose, and none more so 
than in the case of sugar. In order to "prevent non-participating countries 
from taking advantage of the obligations accepted by member exporting 
countries", the Agreements imposed limits on the quantities which importing 
member countries wore allowed to import from mon-momber countries as a
The level of minimum stocks designed to meet increased requirements 
of the free market was fixed at 10% of its basic export tonnage for 
each country under the 1953 Agreement; the percentage was raised to 
12,5% of these tonnages under the 1958 Agreement.
 ^i
Ni')group during each quota year' Members also recognised the need to
reduce any "disproportionate fiscal and other burdens" as might inhibit 
increased consumption of sugar, and also to "seek to maintain fair 
labour standards in their sugar industries".
The price stabilization mechanism was essentially based on a system 
of export quotas (under both the 1953 and 1958 Agreements), the regula­
tion of which was designed to bring total supplies available to the 
free market into balance with the demand requirements of that market. To 
achieve this objective, the Agreements established basic export tonnages 
for each exporting country' which were to serve as the basis for the 
allocation and adjustments of export quotas during each quota year 
(January 1 to December 31)« In order to take into account the existence 
of special trading arrangements outside the free market, maximum annual 
export entitlements were also specifically provided.
Shortly before the beginning of each year, in the light or estimated 
requirements, the level of export quotas for each quota year were deter­
mined, However, those quotas were subject to two kinds of adjustment 
during the quota year. Firstly, the overall level of quotas were subject 
to upward or downward revision on account of movements of the prevailing
In the event of quotas and other export restrictions becoming 
inoperative under the price provisions of the Agreements, these 
general limitations would be suspended*
The recipients of the largest basic export tonnages were Brazil 
(550,000 metric tons per annum from 1959-51), China (Taiwan)
(600,000 tons from 1954-55, and 655,000 tons from 1957-61),
Cuba (2,250,000 tons from 1954-55, and 2,414,000 tons from 1957^61), 
Czechoslovakia (275,000 tons from 1954-61), Dominican Republic 
(600,000 tons from 1954-56, and 555,000 tons from 1957-61), Indo­
nesia (350,000 tons from 1958-61), Peru (457,000 tons in 1958, 
490,000 tons from 1959-61), Poland (220,000 tons from 1954-61) 
and the USSR (200,000 tons from 1954-61)*
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Price, defined as the moving average of the spot prices over a period 
of 17 consecutive marketing days' , Secondly, quotas of individual 
countries were adjusted as a result of redistribution of any short­
falls in the quotas previously allocated to the members for use during 
any quota year. While upward adjustment of total or individual quotas 
was not subjected to any limitation, the Agreements provided generally 
that quotas of individual countries could not be reduced below 80%, and 
for countries with basic export tonnages of less than 50,000 tons, 
below 90%, of their respective basic export tonnage*
These variations of the overall level of quotas were designed to 
be the principal means of maintaining the free market price within 
certain predetermined limits® The range of ’stabilised prices’ was 
defined as 3*25 to 4*35 cents (per pound) under the 1953 Agreement, 
and the Council had full discretion to adjust quotas within those 
limits. The 1956 Protocol limited the discretion of the Council 
regarding automatic quota adjustments by introducing certain provisions 
to operate when prices ranged between 3,15 and 4,00 cents. It also 
allowed for the suspension of quotas and other export limitations when 
the price exceeded 4,00 cents,' ^
How effective were the Agreements in stabilising free market prices? 
In the earlier years (1954 and 1955), quotas were kept at their minimum 
levels under the Agreement (80% of basic export tonnages), but by the
For an explanation of the market price, see International Sugar 
Agreement, Text of Agreement, London, 1953 and 1958, See also 
International Sugar Organization, The World Sugar Economy, Vol.II 
London, 1963,
These amendments were continued under the 1958 Agreement*
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end of 1956 they could be operated at their full 100% levels* The 
result was that prices remained remarkably stable? although mostly 
close to the minimum price in the range (3.25 cents per pound) 
allowed for in the Agreement A number of factors combined to
send prices soaring rapidly in November 1956? reaching a peak of 
6.85 cents in April, 1957, and remaining high till July, 1957, On 
January 25, 1957, quotas and all other limitations on exports were 
automatically suspended. At the same time, importing member countries 
were allowed unlimited imports from non-participating exporters.
However, over 1957 as a whole, supplies on the free market were 
adequate to meet demand, and notwithstanding some delays, importing 
members suffered no actual sugar shortages. Prices began to fall 
rapidly from the middle of July and on November 19, 1957, quotas and 
other limitations on exports wero restored. The average pricej for the 
year 1957 was 5*159 cents, but the averages for November and December 
were 3.63 and 3.87 cents respectively. In 1958, the Agreement operated 
with full quotas (at 100% of basic export tonnages), and the price 
averaged 3.49 cents over the year. A study'  ^ by the International 
Sugar Council concluded that "with the exception of the period from 
the end of 1956 to the middle of 1957, when a combination of unfavourable 
circumstances was encountered, the 1953 Agreement undoubtedly had a 
moderating effect on price fluctuations'*.
The 1958 International Sugar Agreement was much less successful in 
terms of its price stablization objective. The first year of the Agreement
The free market recorded an average price of 3*258 cents per 
pound in 1954, 3.238 cents in 1955, and 3,466 cents in 1956.
See International Sugar Council, The World Sugar Economy, Vol.II, 
London 1963.
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1959? witnessed a considerable discrepancy between estimated free 
market requirements and estimated total supplies. The spot price 
of sugar remained below (and sometimes significantly below) the floor 
price of 3,25 cents throughout the year. Quotas had to be adjusted 
as early as February with an automatic reduction of 2^% of basic 
export tonnages to bring supplies and requirements into line. By 
the middle of 1959? quotas had been progressively reduced to the 
minimum premissible under the Agreement, but the price continued to 
decline, reaching a low point of 2,55 cents in July. Over the year 
as a whole, the price averaged 2,97 cents.
Dramatic changes in the world sugar economy in 1960 caused 
unprecedented difficulties in the operation of the Agreement, Pro­
duction in Europe was expected to be well below output in 1959, due to 
poor beet crops. Provisional initial export quotas for 1960 were 
fixed at 87^% of basic export tonnages, which would imply an excess 
of supply on the free market (from members and non-members) over 
requirements to the tune of 5%. In February, quotas were reduced to 
85% of basic export tonnages, reducing the excess on the free market to 
3-|-% of total estimated demand. By March, 1960, however, free market 
requirements were estimated to have increased by 1,35 million tons, 
mainly because of a five-year trade agreement under which the USSR 
contracted to purchase one million tons of sugar per annum from Cuba, 
Quotas were nevertheless maintained at their previous minimum levels 
due to the low prevailing prices, in spite of the estimated shortfall 
of supply by nearly 400,000 tons, A temporary improvement in price 
resulted, with an average of 3.04 cents for April, and 3,05 cents for 
May, but the average for 1960 remained below the minimum laid down in
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the Agreement, at 3.19 cents per pound.
The year 1951 opened with a situation of very large potential over-
 ^vf 1production, due to a record European beet crop in 1960/61. ' By February
the International Sugar Council estimated that total supplies, including 
some 800,000 tons from non-member countries, would exceed demand require­
ments by about ono million tons (even after allowing for reduced Cuban 
supplies on the free market due to very large commitments by Cuba to 
China (Mainland) and the USSR), Quotas were further reduced to 82.5% of 
basic export tonnages and member exporting countries ware relieved of the 
previous obligation of declaring shortfalls in export quotas in advance.
As a result, supplies and estimated requirements were finally brought 
approximately into balance. The world price began to strengthen and 
reached 3.28 cents in May, but the failure of the United Nations Sugar 
Conference of 1961 to provide for the regulation of exports for the years 
1962 and 1963, and subsequent confirmation that supply would again exceed 
demand, brought about a fall in price to 2.18 cents in dune, and thereafter 
to 1.96 cents.
We have seen that the economic provisions of the Agreement were 
inoperative since 1962. At the end of 1962 a steep rise in prices set 
in (reaching between 10,00 and 11.00 cents per pound a year later). Three 
main reasons can be identified; a poor Cuban harvest, stockpiling by
The degree of influence of European sales was exempli Pied most vividly 
by the reversal of the traditional relationship between the prices of 
raw and white (refined) sugars. From December 1960 and throughout 1961 
and 1962, quotations for white sugar were below, and often considerably 
below, those for raw sugar.
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centrally planned economies, and the United States’ decision to revise 
its supply system. In 1964, a rapid rise in production led to another 
decline in prices - so pronounced that they eventually dropped to their 
lowest level of 1,30 cents in tho post war period in December 1966, A 
Uni^r'^ Nations Sugar Conference held from 2Ü September to 14 October 1965 
failed to produce an agreement» At the end of February 1966, the export­
ing member countries of the International Sugar Council agreed that they 
should pursue policies to improve tha free market price in the short term. 
As a first step, exporting member countries decided that they would not 
sell at a price below 2^ cents per pound, raw sugar, 96° polarisation in 
bags f.Oob, and stowed Greater Caribbean basis. The scheme was voluntary 
and to bo implemented by the commercial sector with the least possible 
involvement of governments in its operation* Modifications were made to 
the minimum price at a meeting in April, but the scheme was abandoned in 
Juno because some countries exported sugar at prices well below the 
theoretically permitted levels. Efforts to establish a new International 
Sugar Agreement were renewed in late 1965 and succeeded at last in October 
1968 with the signing of the new Agreement. '
The International Sugar Agreement of 1958
The basic features of the new Agreement were essentially the same as 
those of previous International Sugar Agreements, but it did contain 
several important new provisions which were framed specifically in the
See International Sugar Agreement, Text of 1968, London, 1968, 
HMSO, Cmnd.4210.
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light of recant developments in the world sugar economy» Such important 
developments included the marked change in the pattern of world trade 
after the exclusion of Cuba from tho United States market; the increasing 
self-sufficiency in many major consuming areas? particularly among the 
developed countries; and the continuing heavy reliance of the economies 
of many developing countries on their sugar industries*
The main provisions of the 1958 ISA, therefore? like those of i
previous ISAs, .related to the system of variable export quotas and other 
supporting measures designed to regulqte supplies of sugar to the world 
free market and thus influence prices on that market,' ' Tho major 
obligations of the exporting members were the acceptance of quotas to 
regulate their exports to the free market (to be adjusted in accordance :
with variations in free market prices); they were to hold specified =
stocks to be released for sale at the call of the Council., and to make 
various assurances to supply sugar to importing member countries when v-
world prices reached a certain level. Importing members undertook to -
limit their total imports from non-member countries (in most cases, the 
limit was the average level of imports from the non-participating countries ,{■ 
over the period 1966 to 1968), liihen the world price fell below a ’
specified level, member importers agreed to ban imports from non-members
The Agreement referred to sugar in ...any of its recognised commercial 
forms derived from sugar cane or sugar beet? and used for human 
consumption? including raw sugar and refined sugar, edible and 
fancy molasses, and syrups, Ib did not cover final molasses, low 
grade types of non-centrifugal sugar, or, in the main, sugar 
destined for non-human consumption. However, if the Council 
resolved that the increased use of sugar mixtures became a "threat 
to the objectives of the Agreement", tliese mixtures would be 
deemed to be sugar in respect of their sugar content.
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but when it rose above a certain level, restrictions on imports from 
non-members were completely removed* (See below).
The 1968 ISA allocated "basic export tonnages" (b,e,t.®s) to 34 
countries or groups of countries and certain quantities for other 
countries or purposes. These provided the framework for establishing 
individual member exporters’ shares of the world free market. The basic 
quotas were intended to remain in effect for the first three years of 
the Agreement, but were as usual subject to review by the International 
Sugar Council for the remaining two years. The total b»e,t,'s for 1969 
were 7.689 million tons, and provisions were made for increasing the 
quotas of three developing countries, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, 
and Peru, to obtain a final figure of 7.880 million tons by 1971. Cuba 
was allocated the largest b.e.t. (2,150,000 tons), followed by Australia 
(1^100,000), China (Taiwan) (630,000), South Africa (625,000), Brazil • 
(500,000), Poland (370,000), Czechoslovakia (270,000), India (250,000), 
Mauritius (175,000), Colombia (164,000), and Fiji (155,000). Australia's 
basic quota was more than three times the equivalent amount under the ISA 
of 1958. However, overall, the b.e.t.'s allocated to developing countries 
(though smaller than the allocations under the 1958 ISA) were at least as 
high as their best recent annual volume of free market sales, whereas those 
of Australia and South Africa, the major developed exporters, were con­
siderably lower. Indonesia and the Philippines were granted a net export 
entitlement in any quota year of 81,000 and 60,000 tons respectively which 
were not subject to any adjustment (Article 41).
Again, the b.e.t,'s only applied to member countries' exports to the 
world free market, and sugar traded under "special arrangements" did not
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fall within the scope of the quota provisions of the Agreement, The
Agreement did provide, however, that should there be changes in any
of these special arrangements which "significantly" affected member
countries, then the Council would meet to consider "appropriate compensating
adjustments in basic export tonnages". Although sugar trade between Cuba
and the centrally planned economies of Asia and Eastern Europe was
generally excluded from the quota restrictions of the Agreement, provisions
existed for regulating re-exports of Cuban sugar from these countries;
such re-exports, especially by the USSR, were becoming a significant
feature of world sugar trade during the 1960s. The USSR, in fact, agreed
to limit its exports (including re-exports) to the free market to 1.1
million tons in 1969, and to between 1.1 million and 1.25 million tons in 
(*)1970 and 1971. tour other Eastern European countries, Hungary, Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Romania wero allocated b.e.t,*s totalling 737,000 tons.
( x-'J:-)However, if Cuban exports to the first three of those countries' 
exceeded 250,000 tons in any quota year, the excess would be charged to 
the Cuban quota; this provision was designed to limit the extent to which 
these countries could use Cuban exports to make up for any shortfalls in 
their own exports. Control was also indirectly exercised over exports and 
re-exports from \Mainland) China and East Germany, both oF whom were non- 
members. If Cuba’s exports to these two countries exceeded 910,000 tons, 
and if the latter’s sales to the free market were above 300,000 tons, tho 
Cuban quota would be correspondingly reduced.
This 'quota* does not vary with changes in the world free market 
price as do the basic export tonnages. Also, it does not apply 
to USSR shipments to other centrally planned economies in Asia 
and Eastern Europe. The actual amount was to !be determined each 
year, and was set, for example, at 1.1 million tons for 1970.
•5^  Romania has generally imported negligible amounts of sugar in 
recent years.
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An innovation introduced in the 1968 ISA, of special significance 
to developing countries, was the ’hardship fund’ consisting of up to
150,000 .tons* This was to be available for use at the discretion of the 
Council to meet special cases of hardship among developing member countries 
which had sugar available for export over and above the level permitted 
under the Agreement* Priority was to be given to small countries whose 
export earnings were heavily dependent upon the export of sugar. Provisions 
were also made for net exports (up to a maximum of 10,000 tons) from 
developing member countries who are normally importers.
The obligations oF member exporting countries related not only to 
basic export tonnages, but also to the maintenance of certain minimum 
stocks, amounting to some 15% oF b.e.t.’s for developed countries and 10% 
to 12,5% for developing countries, in addition to any holdings required 
for domestic consumption or obligations under special arrangements*
However, the Agreement provides that stockholdings should not exceed 
certain maximum levels, viz. 20% of production in tha preceding calendar 
year or 20% of b.e.t.’s plus holdings for domestic requirements, depending 
upon the choice of the exporter on joining the Agreement. Though these 
levels may bo varied by the Council in "special circumstances", they do 
entail some degree of management of production on tho part of exporters*
After estimating free market import requirements and taking into 
account all the factors affecting the supply of and demand For sugar 
(including the quantities likely to be exported to the free market by 
non-members), the Council determined the initial level of quotas applicable 
during a calendar year. Quotas were allocated to member exporters pro rata 
to their b.e.t.'s, but no individual member's quota could be loss than 90%
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of its b.e.t,*s, unless the Council decided by special vote' that 
quotas should initially be reduced to 85%, Except for certain countries 
with small b.e.t.'s, quotas could then be varied during the year in 
accordance with changes in free market prices. Quota shortfalls could 
also be redistributed, among othor exporting members, depending upon the 
supply/demand position, and particularly the level of free market prices.
Apart from the variation of quotas, the Agreement prescribed three 
principal types of actions to be taken if the "prevailing price" 
rose above or fell below certain levels: these were limitations on imports 
from non-members? the release and sale of stocks by exporting members to 
importing members, and commitments by member exporters to sell specified 
quantities to importing members at a prescribed prico. Table 2.7 presents 
a summary of these measures, whose basic aim is to apply pressure on prices 
up to 4 cents per pound and then increase supplies to moderate further 
price rises.
Once the prevailing price rises above 4 cents per pound? the aggregate 
permissible level of exports (or "quotas in effect" in the terminology of 
the Agreement) could not be kept below the total of the b.e.t.'s. Falls 
in the prevailing price are similarly moderated by the successive reduction
•3BÎ-
A ’special vote* entails a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast 
by both exporting members and importing rnembors present and voting, 
counted separately.
The prevailing price is determined by taking the arithmetic mean of 
the spot price under the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange Contract 
No,8 , and the London Sugar Market daily price after conversion of 
both prices to U.S.cents per pound avoirdupois, free on board, and 
stowed Caribbean port? in bulk, except when the différence between 
the two prices is greater than 0,06 cent; in the latter case, the 
lower of the two prices plus 0.03 cent is taken. Where the Agree­
ment refers to the prevailing price being above or below any stated 
figure, that condition is deemed to be fulfilled if the average
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of export quotas. Quotas may first come into effect at an aggregate 
level not exceeding 115% of total b.e.t.'s, when the price, having 
been above 5.25 cents, moves below 5 cents per pound. They may be 
reduced by degrees if the price continues to fall, until individually 
they are 90% of b.e.t.'s if the price is at or below 3.50 cents. Any 
further cuts in quotas to 85% of b.e.t,*s require a special vote.
These measures designed to stabilise free market prices were con­
siderably more comprehensive than those in previous ISAs. In particular, 
the commitments by exporting countries to sell specified quantities to 
member importers at prescribed prices, and the undertaking by importers 
to ban purchases from non-members in certain circumstances, were entirely 
new features of the 1958 Agreement. The range of prevailing prices 
specified, 3.25 cents to 6.50 cents per pound, was considerably wider 
than in the ISA of 1958 (3,25 to 4,35 cents respectively), and contained 
a greater number of reference points. Moreover, the price above which 
the b.e.t, level of quotas would apply (4.00 cents) was set substantially 
higher than in 1958 (3,45 cents) and was approximately double the 
depressed free market price which prevailed over much of the period 
1965 - 68.
Table 2.7/
#(cont,)
price over a period of seventeen consecutive market days, including 
the first day and no I: less than twelve other days in the period, is 
above or below the stated figure.
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Table 2.7; Summary of Price Stabilisation Measures to be Adopted when the 
'Prevailing Price* Rises or Falls through Spcified Levels
Price rises above 
(cents per pound)
4.00
2. 4.50
3. 4.75
4. 5.00
5. 5.25
6.50
Price falls below 
(cents per pound)
5.00
2. 4,50
3. 4,00
4. 3.75
5. 3.50
3.25
Measure Applicable
Aggregate quotas in effect are not less than 
100% of b.e.t.'s (1)
Aggregate quotas in effect are not below 110% 
of total b.e.t.*s (i)
After 10 days, 50% of minimum stocks are offered 
for prompt sale and shipment to importing members (i
After 10 days, the remainder of minimum stocks 
are offered for prompt sale and shipment to 
importing members (i)
All quotas become inoperative; limitation on 
imports from non-members becomes inoperative;
USSR undertaking becomes inoperative; exporting 
members give priority to importing members on 
commercially equal terms
Each importing member is given the option of buying 
from each of its traditional exporting partners at 
the equivqlent of the Supply Commitment Price 
(6,50 cents) the average quantities imported during 
the two preceding calendar years less any quantities 
already shipped or committed for shipment (unless 
it is eligible for a higher price under one of the 
special arrangements). The supply commitments do 
not apply to the following land-locked less develops 
countries: Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uganda.
Measure Applicable
Quotas in effect do not exceed 115% of the total
b.e.t. *8 (ii) ,
Individual quotas in effect are reduced by 5% of 
respective b.o.tls (ii)
Individual quotas in effect are reduced by 5% of 
respective b.e.t.*s (ii)
Aggregate quotas in effect are not to exceed 95% 
of total b.e.t. *8 (ii)
Individual quotas in effect are established at the 
minimum 90% level of b.e.t.*s for most countries,
(iii), (iv); the redistribution of shortfalls is 
prohibited; no further reduction for Bolivia, •;
Ecuador, Haiti, Panama, Paraguay, Venezuela, and 
the Central American Common Market
Members prohibit imports from non-members; the 
Council, by special vote, may have recourse to 
additional measures, including a further reduction 
of quotas in effect to 85% of respective b.e.tls (v
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Table 2.7 (cent.)
Notes: (i) Unless Council decides otherwise by special vote.
(ii) Unless Council decides otherwise*
(iii) Unless Council decides on a higher level by special vote*
(iv) Quotas are established at the minimum level when the prevailing
price is at or below 3.50 cents.
(v) The latter provision applies when the prevailing price reaches
3,25 cents.
Quotas of certain specified developing countries with small 
b«e.t.*s are not subject to adjustment as the result of 
movements in the prevailing price.
Sources g PAO, "The International Sugar Agreement of 1968", Monthly 
Bulletin of Agricultural and Economic Statistics, Vol.17.
No*12, December 1968, Articles 30, 40, 49.
The most important of the remaining features of the 1968 ISA relate 
to the special provisions for less developed countries, to access to 
markets in developed countries, and to measures to encourage consumption. 
The Agreement recognised the importance of the world free market for sugar 
to the developing countries by setting up a hardship fund, by allowing 
lower minimum stock requirements, and by according some of them prefer-
(H-)ential treatment in the redistribution of quota shortfalls.,' The Agree­
ment also gives some attention to the trend towards self-sufficiency, 
particularly in developed countries. Several developed importing countries 
guaranteed "minimum" levels of access to their domestic markets?
Canada; production would not exceed 20% of domestic consumption;
Finland; sugar-growing area would not exceed 25,000 hectares;
Sweden; sugar-growing area would not exceed 40,000 hectares;
Switzerland: production would not exceed 30% of domestic consumption 
New Zealand; all sugar for domestic consumption would be imported;
Japan; imports would not be less than 1.5 million tons (and 35% of future 
growth in domestic consumption over 2.1 million tons);
United Kingdom; imports would not be less than 1.8 million tons.
* Shortfalls by Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela 
were to be redistributed automatically among themselves.
«“5 5"
Though the United Kingdom? for example, actually imported quantities well 
in excess of 2*0 million tons annually during the 1960s, the "minimum access" 
guarantee is significant in so far as it représente for the first time in 
an ISA a specific commitment on the part of importing countries to limit 
the trend towards self-sufficiency* Finally, member countries agreed to 
take appropriate measures to encourage the consumption of sugar and to 
remove obstacles to its growth, taking account of such factors as customs
( ir 1duties, internal taxes, and quantitative controls»'
The most obvious potential stumbling-block to the successful operation 
of the 1958 ISA regarded the absence of two major trading blocs: the United 
States, the world’s largest importer (but not from the free market), and 
the EEC, which had developed into the position of a net exporter by the 
mind-1960s. The EEC was offered a b.e.t. of 300,000 tons (compared with its , 
own demand for a b.e.t. of 1.2 million tons), but this figure was neither 
negotiated nor. accepted. The degree of self-sufficiency in sugar in tho EEC 
continued to rise rapidly. The average for the years 1961-62 to 1955-66 was 
107%. but for the 1968-59 season (soon after the inception of the Common 
Sugar Policy within the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy) the 
figure was 115%, representing almost 900,000 tons (white sugar) more than 
domestic requirements.' '
How successful was the 1968 ISA in maintaining prices within the 
prescribed range? Although prices began to rise at the beginning of 1969 
(see Table 2,8), they were still below the minimum level, so that in February 
1969, the quotas in effects had to be set at 90% of the b.o.t.’s (or 7.20
For further details, see M.A.G.Van Meerhaeghe, International Economic 
Institutions, 2nd ed., Longman, London 1971
Some 300,000-400,000 tons of this surplus were destined for non-human 
consumption within the Community.
.56*
million tons, after deducting the share of the EEC from the initial amount). 
Prices improved and the minimum level of 3,25 cents was reached by March,
But in mid-1969, prices dropped again below the minimum level. In September, 
the Council decided that shortfalls (amounting to 806,000 tons) would not he 
redistributed* After deducting for these shortfalls, the quotas in effect 
were therefore only 81% of the basic export tonnages. Furthermore, imports 
from non-members were prohibited, but prices remained below the minimum level.
The main reason for these unfavourable price developments apart from ; 
purely seasonal influences, was extensive low-price supplies of "white" sugar 
(especially from Turkey and Eastern Europe), The prospect of a 20% decline 
in production in Eastern Europe, however, stabilised the market in December® 
Prices benefited strongly too as a result of the prohibition of artificial 
sweeteners in the United States, The average price recorded in 1969 was 3*20 
cents (compared with pre-Agreement prices of less than 2 cents), Basic 
export tonnages remained unchanged at the start of 1970, and quotas in effect 
were set at 90%. Furthermore, the re-export entitlement of the USSR was left 
unchanged at 1.1 million tons. Prices rose again during 1970, averaging 3,68 
cents over the year* The quotas in effect were set at 95% on 10 November 1970 
However, severe shortfalls in production in Cuba and the USSR occasioned 
sustained rises in price (leading eventually to a suspension of all quotas in 
1972).
Initial export quotas^for 1971 were set at 95% of b.e.t,'s, but with 
prices reaching 4.7& cents in January, they were automatically raised to 100% 
from 1st January. Prices rose to a sufficient extent, as a result of quota 
shortfalls on the part of some exporters, for quotas in effect to be raised 
to 110% of b.e.t.’s on 4th February. However, in March the re-allocation of ' 
the 150,000 metric tons shortfall in Poland's quota, together with the 
granting of hardship and special temporary relief quotas to Thailand and the ■; 
Dominican Republic/
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Table 2.8; World Sugar Prices and the International Sugar Agreement of 1968
London daily 
price(c.i.f., 
in bulk)
£ per ton
£ per ton
London daily 
UK price(adjusted 
to f.o.b.and 
stowed, Carib­
bean port, in 
bulk)
US cents/pound
New York No.11 
foreign contract 
(f.o.b. and 
stowed, Carib­
bean port, in 
bulk)(a)
US cents/pound
Internationa 
Sugar Agree­
ment
{
US cents/pou
1 965 Average 21.51 2.12 1.99 2.88
1966 tt 17.87 1.81 1.75 1.81
1967 a 19.36 1.95 1.90 1.92
1958 I) 21.83 1.90 1.87 1.90 .
1969 n 33.83 3.20 3.31 3.20
1970 tt 40.06 3.69 3.68 3.68
1971 M 46.18 4.52 4.52 4.50
1972 a 72.53 7.34 7.44 7.37
1969 January 30.76 2.87 2.89 2.88
F ebruary 32.94 3.10 3.17 3.12 '
March 36.51 3.48 3.64 3.51
April 38.21 3.67 3.70 3.65 _
May 37.98 3.64 3.72 3.65
June 37.73 3.61 3.89 3.64
July 36.05 3.44 3.67 3.47
August 31.23 2.93 3.12 2.95
September 29.29 2.71 3.04 2.74
October 31.46 2.94 3.06 2.95 ;
November 32.80 3.08 3.02 3.04
December 31.25 2.89 2.80 2.82
1970 January 33.30 3.07 3.05 3.06
F ebruary 34.85 3.14 3.17 3.15
March 37.30 3.37 3.38 3.38 \
April 39.47 3.58 3.56 3.57
May 40.21 3.60 3.69 3.61
June 41.13 3.67 3.76 3.69 '
July 42.21 3.83 3.80 3.82
August 41.99 3.80 3.83 3.81
September 42.49 3.86 3.87 3.87
October 43.14 3.94 3.93 3.93
November 43.82 4.10 4.11 4.09 .
December 44.01 4.20 4.08 4.11
1971 January 48,56 4,72 4.73 4.72
F ebruary 49.43 4.82 4.82 4.82
March 48.10 4.70 4.71 4.69
April 46.60 4» 54 4.61 4.56 ;
May 44.98 4.36 4.35 4.36
June 43.11 4.16 4.14 4.15
July 42.80 4.15 4.20 4.17
August 43.38 4.22 4.38 4.25
September 41.22 4.00 4.00 3.99
October 43.71 4.30 4.18 4.21 i
November 45.53 4.51 4.21 4.24
December 57.50 5.79 5.95 5.78 ^
1972/
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1972 January 77.21 7.88 8.25 7.90
February 79.90 8.16 8.62 8.19
March 81.95 8.38 8.73 8.40
April 70.05 7.10 7.29 7.08
May 65.30 6.60 7.01 6.63
June 62.73 6.32 6.58 6.33
July 56.24 5.60 5.58 5.56
August 62.72 6.28 6.28 6*26
September 72.02 7.21 7.07 7.07
October 76.16 7.57 7.42 7.41
November 75.66 7.52 7.25 7.28
December 93.33 9.38 9.13 9.15
Notes: (a) Prior to 19th November, 1970, prices for New York contract No*8 
spot price reduced by bag allowance 
(b) The ISA Daily Price is the arithmetic average of the New York 
Coffee and Sugar Exchange Contract No.11 spot price and the 
London Daily Price after conversion of the latter to US cents 
per pound, foO.b. and stowed Caribbean port in bulk, or, if 
the difference between these two f.o.b* prices is more than 
sii points, the lower of the two prices plus three points.
Prior to 19th November 1970, the basis for the New York price 
was the Contract No.8 spot price after conversion to f.o.b, 
and stowed in bulk basis
Sources; Plantation Crops, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, variou: 
issues
Sugar Year Book, International Sugar Organization, London, 
various issues
(cont-)
Dominican Republic reduced the pressure, and prices eased to finisfi at an 
average of 4*59 cents for March. The market in fact reacted to such an 
extent that on 19th May the ISA prevailing price fell below 4.40 cents,
§nd quotas in effect ware automatically cut# by 5%, bringing the average 
for May down to 4»36 cents. The state of the market was such that total 
notified shortfalls' of 290,000 metric tons could not be re-allocated. 
Quotations on the London and New York Commodity markets continued to ease,
and at the beginning of October, after the prevailing (ISA) price had remained
below 4o00 cents for the stipulated 17 marketing days, export quotas were cut 
by a further 5%. Prices rallied later in the month, however, averaging 4,21 
cents, and climbing steadily above 4,00 cents, and a further re-allocation :
of 200,000 metric tons was possible.
At the end of November, the International Sugar Council set initial 
export quotas for 1972 at 105% of b.e.t.'s, on the basis of an estimate of 
net import requirements from the free market of 9.3 million metric tons, and 
prices stabilising at an average of 4.24 cents for November (three points 
above the October level). The limits on Soviet Union exports were raised by
25,000 metric tons to 1*175 million tons, and possible changes in b.e.t,*s 
were considered. In December, prices soared to an average of 5.78 cents, ; 
following the development of sudden buying pressure on the exchanges, and the'. 
Council decided to remove all quota limitations from 1st January 1972, Quotas 
remained in abeyance throughout 1#72, and the supply situation was such 
that in January 1972 (average price was 7.90 cents), it was decided that the 
minimum stocks held under the agreement should be released for prompt shipment 
thus adding 732,700 tons to available supplies. When the Council reviewed
Exporters with major shortfalls declared by 15th May 1971 included 
the following (quantities in thousand metric tons): Czechoslovakia (84), 
West Indies (50), Peru (50), Taiwan (50), and Colombia (40),
'60.
the situation in May (average price was then 6.63 cents), it raised its 
estimate of free market requirements to 10,9 million metric tons, largely 
as a result of unfavourable harvests in Eastern Europe, Given an average 
price of 7,37 cents for 1972 (and g.15 cents for December 1972), no export 
quotas were set for 1973, the last year of the 1968 ISA. Table 2.9 shows 
the extent oF shortfalls in quotas and subsequent re-allocation during the 
years that quotas were in operation.
Table 2.9; 1968 International Sugar Agreement; members* quotas and exports
(thousand metric tons)
Basic Export Initial Declared Final Net Exports Net
Year Tonnage Quotas Shortfalls Quotas to Free Under-
(1st 3an) (31st Dec) Market shipment
7,138.0 6,429.6 795.2 5,745.9 5,574.4 170.5
(i)
,(i)
1970 7,324.0 6,595.9 845.1^^) 6,252.4 6,214.9 37.4
19MM 7,324.0 6,960.0 1,228.9'^'^ 6,921.4 6,563.5 359.0
(i) Adjusted according to inability to accept previous quota increases
(ii) Of which 656,100 metric tons were not re-distributed
Source; Plantation Crops, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, Various issues
The most significant achievement of the 1968 ISA must be the quick reversal 
in price trends compared with the four to five years immediately preceding 
the Agreement., Though producers* expectations of more remunerative and stable 
prices (in the new climate of an improved supply-demand situation) were not 
fully realised^ at least in the short run (prices rose during the first few 
months of 1969, but the trend thereafter that year was downwards, and the 
amplitude of fluctuations not inconsiderable), the 1969 average, at 3.20 cents 
was 66^ higher than the mean during the previous four years (1965-68), while
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the range between tiie highest and lowest quotations (20% each side of the 
mean) was considerably less than during that earlier period, when the highest;.:, 
level had been almost 60% above the mean, and the lowest level nearly 40% 
below it. The ISA met most of the aspirations of producers during 1970, 
in which year q^ptations did not undergo any marked fluctuations but made 
steady upward progress. The lowest daily quotation, of 2.77 cents, was 
recorded on the first market day and the highest, of 4*28 cents, on the last;  ^
the annual average, of 3,68 cents, was about 90% higher than that for 1965- 68 
and 15% higher than in 1969, i:
Table 2*10 brings the situation up to date regarding prices on the 
world market.
Table 2,10: World Sugar Prices, 1968 to 1975
Year
London Daily Price New York I.S.A,
c.i.fa; UK Equivalent No.11 Foreign Daily
in bulk (1) Contract (2) Price(3)
(£ per ton) f,o,b»and stowed (Caribbean) (Port,in bulk;
( US cents per pound
1969 33.83 3.20 3.31 3.20
1970 40.06 3.69 3.68 3.68
1971 46.18 4.52 4.52 4.501972 72.63 7.32 7.42 7.271973 99.46 9.5% 9.59 9.45
1974 305.13 30.11 29.91 29.66
1975 216.47 20.86 20.44 20.37
Averages
1959-63 35.75 4.03 4,08 4.021964-68 26.34 2.72 2.73 2.701969-73 58.43 5,66 5.70 5.621974-75 260.80 25.49 25.18 25.02
Note; (1) London Daily Price, c.i.f,, United Kingdom, in bulk. Conversions 
of LDP made after deducting the freight and insurance element, to? 
basis f.o.b. and stowed Caribbean port in bulk at £1 = US%2,80 up 
to November 17, 1967, at £1 = US%2.40 up to December 1973, and 
from 1974 at the closing spot rate of exchange on the London 
market between the Pound and the US Dollar, for the relevant day,
(2)/
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Table 2*10 (cant.)
Notes: (2) Spot prices for Contract No*4 f.a.s, Cuba up to 1961 and for 
Contract No.8 in bags up to 18 November 1970 converted to 
f.Owb, and stowed Caribbean port, bulk basis. Subsequent 
prices are for Contract No»11 basis f.o.b. and stowed 
Caribbean port, in bulk.
(3) Calculated in accordance with Article 33 of the 1968 ISA up 
to 1973. Prices from 1974 were calculated in accordance with 
Statistical Rule S-14 under the 1973 International Sugar 
Agreement, which contains no economic provisions»
Sources: Annual Report, International Sugar Organization, London,
various issues.
Note that the periods 1959-63 and 1969-73 correspond to the duration of the 
1958 and 1958 ISAs respectively, while the period of depressed prices, 
1964-68, was not covered by any ISA. The 1973 ISA did not contain any 
economic provisions regarding allocation of export quotas, in the light of
high sugar prices in the mid-1970s (averaging 25.02 cents per lb. over 
1974-75).
The general conclusion to be derived from the above discussion is 
that although after the Second World War prices in the free market were 
regulated by various International Sugar Agreements, they remained more 
volatile than the U.S. preferential and the Commonwealth prices. As 
Table 2.11 shows, the free market price was on average well below the 
prices obtained in preferential markets in the post-war period.
Table 2.11/
Table 2.11: Average Prices in the Free Market, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom in Selected Years between 1950 and 1974 
(cents per pound)
Free U.S. CSA Weighted
Year Market(i) Proferential(ii ) Price(iii) of the 3
1950 4.98 5.93 3.76 5.1
1955 3.24 5.95 4.98 4.2
1960 3.14 6.30 5.44 4.5
1965 2.02 6.75 5.82 3.9
1970 3.69 8.07 5,10 5.2
1974 29.99 29.50 10.11 27.7
Constant 1967-59 Dollars (iv)
1950 6.73 8.01 5.08 6.9
1 955 3.77 5.02 5.79 4.9
1960 3.45 6.92 5.98 4.9
1965 2.10 7.03 6.06 4.1
1970 3.39 7.40 4 « 68 4 o 8
1974 16.48 16.21 5.55 15.2
(i) F.a.s, or f.o.b, Caribbean or Brazilian ports
(ii) Export price under the U.S. Sugar Act
(iii) Starting in 1965 the figures include the special payments to 
developing countries introduced in that year
(iv) Prices deflated by index of manufactured goods (CIF index, SITC 5-8 
classification)
Sources The Sugar Markets Review and Outlook, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Commodity Paper no«20, March 1976
Using the coefficient of variation as a measure, the precentago dispersion 
around the mean was 9,1% for free market prices for the period 1950 to 
1972, compared with 2.8% for US preferential prices and 2.2% for Common­
wealth prices*
United States Sugar Quota Operation
No analysis of the world sugar economy could be complete without an 
assessment of the sugar policy of the United States, however briefly. The 
aim ond direction of the US sugar policy has changed markedly with the
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passage of time. During the last two centuries, the US government regarded
sugar trade principally as a source of revenue. For instance, during the
nineteenth century, duties collected from sugar trade alone accounted for
( 1 )about 20 per cent of all customs collections' The sugar policy makers 
took full advantage of the inelastic demand and well-defined trade channels 
for sugar. Tho protection of the infant sugar industry (the cane sugar 
industry of Louisiana and Hawaii and the later beet sugar industry) was a 
secondary consideration of US sugar policy' \
The post-war sugar policy was, however, geared towards protection of 
the domestic sugar industry, and to maintain a stable price considered fair 
to producers as well as to consumers. The origin of this new policy can be 
traced back to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and its subsequent 
amendments. The Great Depression disrupted sugar trade severely’, and, 
following the depression, sugar imports to the US increased at a very rapid 
rate, causing a serious fall in the domestic price. (By 1932 the world 
price fell below 1 cent and the US price below 3 cents per pound). Increased 
tariff rates failed to remedy this situation. Hence further legislative 
action was thought imperative.'
On May 9, 1934, the Oones-Costigan Act was passed to fulfil several 
objectives. The instruments contained in the Act to deal with the sugar
See Robert A,Young, An Economic Study of the Eastern Beet Sugar Industry^ 
Agricultural Experiment Station, Research Bulletin No.9, Michigan State 
University, East Lansing, Michigan 1965, p.13. :
ibid., p.14.
ibid., p.15: see also International Sugar Council, The World Sugar >
Economy: Structure and Policies, Vol.2, The World Picture, London 
1963, p.166.
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problems were mainly six. These were:
(1) The determination each year of the quantity of sugar needed to supply 
tho nation's requirements at prices reasonable to consumers and fair to 
producers ;
(2) The division of the United States sugar market among domestic and 
foreign supplying areas by the use of quotas and subordinate limitations 
on offshore direct-consumption sugar;
(3) The allotment of these quotas to various processors in each domestic 
area;
(4) Tho adjustment of production in each area to the established quotas;
(5) THb use of tax receipts to finance payments, to compensate growers for 
adjustment of production to marketing quotas and to augment their income; and
(6 ) The equitqble division of sugar returns among beet and cane processors,
(-H-)growers, and farm workers.' '
The 1934 Sugar Act was amended on a number of occasions'  ^Each
subsequent Act contained new economic provisions which superseded the 
previous Act. The authorization of the Secretary of Agriculture, however, 
was never altered in any of the amendments. Since the introduction of the 
quota system, the Secretary has determined overall consumption requirements 
and assigned quotas, which are fixed every year as certain precentages of
the total US sugar requirement, to domestic and specified foreign producing
areas. The individual quotas, then, represented respective shares of the 
US sugar market.
The 1934 Sugar Act established the base figure for quota allocations 
at 6,452,000 short tons raw value. Of this total (or any lesser amount 
determined as consumption requirements), 1,550,000 short tons raw value
-K- See International Sugar Council, op.cit., p.167
The amendments took place in 1937, 1948, 1952, 1956, 1962, 1965,
1969, 1971, and 1973.
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were allocated to the domestic beet area and 260,000 short tons to the 
mainland cane area. The difference between the total estimated consumption 
and tho quotas established for the mainland producers was prorated to off­
shore areas in proportion to their exports in the three most representative
(*)years for each country during the period 1925 to 1933' ^.
The Sugar Act of 1937 established a new formula to allocate quo Las, or 
to revise existing quotas: domestic producing areas received a proration of 
55,59% of the total amount determined as consumption requirements (but not 
less than 3,715,000 short tons raw value), ' foreign countries and the 
Philippines received the remaining proration of 44,41% of the total quota
(•K-X-X-')determination,  ^ The 1937 Act, originally scheduled to run till 1940, 
was extended periodically and finally expired in 1947, During this period, 
quotas were suspended on account of the war from April 13, 1943, to November 
28, 1947.
The objectives of the 1948 Sugar Act were specified in the preamble 
as follows:
"To regulate commerce among the several States, with 
the territories and possessions of the United States, 
and with foreign countries; to protect the welfare of 
consumers of sugar and of those engaged in the domestic 
sugar-producing industry; to promote the export trade 
of the United States; and for other purposes.,."
In principle, the basic mechanism to achieve these objectives was the same
as under previous Sugar Acts (1934 and 1937), and was not affected by
This meant that Cuba’s quota was 40.06% of the ’determined' difference, 
with Philippines receiving 21.59%, Puerto Rico 17.33%, Hawaii 20.35%, 
Virgin Islands 0.11%, and other countries 0.56%
In percentage terms, domestic beet area received 41.72% of this amount, 
mainland cane area 11.31%, Hawaii 25.25%, Puerto Rico 21.48%, and the 
Virgin Islands 0,24%,
-x-'X-K- of this proration, the Philippines received 34.70%, Cuba 64.41%, and 
other countries 0.89%,
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subsequent amendments introduced in the post-war period (1951 to 1973).
All of these amendments were mainly concerned with changes in the division
of the total U.S. requirements between domestic and foreign supplying areas,
/ •K* ^i.e. the method of quota distribution . The 1962 amendment involved the 
reallocation of the Cuban quota to other foreign suppliers.
In summary, U.S. sugar policy was designed primarily to protect domestic 
producers, but it also protected the favoured foreign suppliers whenever the 
U.S. price exceeded the free market price (which was the usual situation; see 
Table 2,12), In 1971 a specific price-objective was written into the Act so 
that quotas ware to be adjusted in order that the domestic sugar price should 
rise at a rate indexed to the arithmetic average of the wholesale-price and 
the agricultural input-price indices. Stated formally, this is
P* ~ PSUG
(AGINDEX -h WPI) / 2
where P* ss the price objective for sugar
PSVG = the price of sugar from September 1, 1970 to August 31, 1971
AGINDEX = the parity index of agricultural input prices (1967 -100)
WPI - the wholesale price index (1967 - 100)
Table 2.12 shows that the price of sugar on the United States market, whether ■
of domestic or foreign origin, is more stable than the free market price
and, in normal conditions, generally higher. The difference between the price.
of raw sugar sold f.a.s. for shipment under quota to the United States and the
price of raw sugar sold on tho free market is referred to as the 'quota
premium *. A negative quota premium is referred to as a 'quota discount'*
For details of changes in quota divisions and individual allocations, 
see various issues of Sugar Year Book, International Sugar Organization, 
London.
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Table 2.12: United States and World Sugar Prices and Quota Premiums and
Discounts »- Annual Averages, 1934 to 1974 (US cents per pound)
U.S.A. World Quota premium or
Preferential Price discount
Year Price(a) (b) (U.S.price - world price)
1934 1.50 0.91 0.61
1935 2.33 0,88 1.45
1936 2.69 0.88 1.81
1937 2.54 1,13 1.41
1938 2.04 1.00 1,04
1939 1.91 1.43 0.48
1940 1.89 1.11 0,78
1941 2,48 1.46 1.02
1942(c) 2.99 2.69 0.30
1943 2.99 2.69 0.30
1944 2.99 2.69 0.30
1945 3.00 3.14 -•0.14
1946 3.86 4.24 -0.38
1947 5,46 5.03 0.43
1948 5*05 4.23 0.82
1949 5,31 4.16 1.15
1950 5.93 4.98 0.95
1951 6.06 5.70 0.36
1952 6.26 4.17 2.09
1953 6.29 3.41 2.88
1954 6.09 3.26 2.83
1955 5.95 3.24 2.71
1956 6.09 3.47 2.63
1957 6.24 5.16 1.08
1950 6.27 3.50 2.77
1959 6.24 2.97 3.27
1960 6.30 3.14 3.16
1961 6.30 2.70 3.60
1962 6.45 2.78 3.67
1 963 8.18 8.31 -0.13
1964 6.90 5.73 1.17
1965 6.75 2.02 4.73
1966 6.99 1.81 5.18
1967 7.28 1.92 5.36
1968 7.52 1.90 5.62
1969 7.75 3.20 4.55
1970 8,07 3.69 4.38
1971 8.52 4.50 4.02
1972 9.09 7.27 1.82
1973 10.29 9:45 0.84
1974 29.50 29.99 -0.49
Notes 2 (a) Export price under the U.S .Sugar Act
(b) From 1934 to 1949, cost of sugar, plus insurance and freight to
New York from Cuba; from 1950 to 1974, ISA daily price, f.a.s.
or f.o.b. Caribbean or Brazilian ports
(c)/
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Table 2.12 (cent)
Notes ; (c) From 1942 to 1947, quota provisions wore suspended, and the 
U.S. Government bought the whole Cuban crop
Sources; International Sugar Organization, Sugar Year Book, London, 
various issues
Throughout the period during which the quota system has been in operation, 
the average annual U.S. price has been higher than the world price except 
in 1963 and 1974 when poor harvests in Cuba and Western Europe caused free 
market prices to rise to unprecedented levels. From 1942 to 1947, it was 
below the world price (on f.a.s, basis), but then all quota provisions were 
suspended, ■
The U.S. sugar price has shown a tendency to rise steadily due to the 
policy of ensuring a reasonably profitable price to the domestic industry. 
Foreign suppliers to the United States, therefore, have benefited both from ? 
the generally higher price level and from the greater stability of prices,
A very crude measure of the benefit domestic and foreign suppliers derived 
from the quota premium in any one year, used by the International Sugar 
Council, can be obtained by multiplying the tonnage supplied by the respectiv 
quota premium (discount in the case of a ’disbenefit')' The ISC suggests
that in 1957, for instance, the benefit derived from the quota premium by 
all foreign countries amounted to only %12,1 million, while in 1960, the 
figure was / 22Ü.8 million, reflecting very depressed prices on the world 
market. A more recent study^  ^ suggests that the annual cost of the sugar
* The International Sugar Council points out, however, that in relation ti 
disposable incomes and the prices of other foods, sugar has become 
comparatively cheaper.
^  Such partial equilibrium exercises can be extremely misleading as the 
'ceteris paribus* assumption made here is very stringent indeed. It 
is assumed in this type of calculation that the world price would rernai 
unchanged even if exporters to preferential markets were to sell their 
exports on the free market!
See D.Gale Johnson, The Sugar Program, American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., April 1974, p.3.
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program to American consumers and taxpayers was between /SOO and %730 
million at 1972 levels of U.S. prices and consumption. Approximately 
one third of the gross transfer went to foreign quota holders and the 
remainder to domestic sugar producers*
The U.S. decision not to extend the U.S. Sugar Act, effective
January 1, 1975, had the effect of abolishing quantitative import
restrictions except from countries with which the United States had
no diplomatic relations (e.g. Cuba). If no further measures are adopted
by the U.S. government, this liberalization of trade is likely to cause
a gradual shift in production from high-cost domestic producers to
( X )lower-cost foreign producers. Horton has argued that sugar production
in the United States could fall by two thirds, i.e., from 50% to 20% of
domestic consumption. As a much higher proportion of total world trade
should now take place on the world free market, price fluctuations should
be dampened in this market. An IBRD study has estimated that increased
sales to the United States should raise the export earnings of developing
countries by %750 million to %1 billion above the level projected for
f-x-% )1980 without U.S. trade liberalization
It might be tempting to argue that the abolition of the U.S. Sugar 
Act implies a complete liberalization of trade in sugar, but this is not 
necessarily the case. The Agricultural Act of 1949 and the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 provide sufficient legal powers to reintroduce 
protective measures. Thus the Department of Agriculture can support the
* See Donald Horton, 'Policy Direction for the United States Sugar 
Program', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, May 1970
See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The 
Sugar Market: Review and Outlook. Commodity Paper No.20, March 1975
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price of cane sugar at 90 per cent of 'parity* under Section 301 of
the 1949 Act, and the President can establish import quotas under
( “'t )Section 22 of the 1933 Act/ Under this Act, the Secretary of 
Agriculture can also establish loans or purchase programs as well as 
crop acreage controls linked to price supports  ^ A report by 
C.Czarnikow Ltd suggests that the lack of a U.S.Sugar Act for two 
successive years is now "causing considerable difficulties for 
domestic producers in the USA who are finding it impossible to compete 
on even terms with sugar refined from imported raws".' ' It predicts
that “measures will be brought into operation early in the New Year (1977) 
to ameliorate the problems of the U.S. industry, though their form is 
by no means certain". '
The quota announced for 1975 amounted to 7 million tons for foreign 
imports, or 45% above average 1970-73 imports.
•K-X' The basic difference with the Sugar Act is that the Department of 
Agriculture is not allowed, without the Sugar Act, to manipulate 
quotas in order to achieve an objective price other than that 
related to parity
C.Czarnikov Ltd, Sugar in the Year 1976, Sugar Review No.1316,
65 Mark Lane, London, 1976
#*** ibid., p .2
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CHAPTER THREE
THE COMMONWEALTH SUGAR AGREEMENT
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The culmination of British sugar policy in the first half of the 
twentieth century was the signing of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement 
(CSA), on December 21, 1951, between the United Kingdom Government on 
the one hand, and the Queensland Sugar Board, the South African Sugar 
Association, the British West Indies Sugar Association (inc.), the 
Mauritius Sugar Syndicate and the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, Ltd., 
Fiji, on behalf of the sugar industries and exporters in Australia, the 
British West Indies (Antigua, Barbados, British Guiana, Jamaica, St.Kitts,
St Lucia and Trinidad), Fiji, Mauritius, and the Union of South Africa, 1 
(%)on the other hand. ' Provision was also made for the accession of 
St Vincent, British Honduras and East Africa at a later date.' * British 
Honduras and St Vincent acceded to the Agreement with effect from 
1 January 1954, and East Africa with effect from 1 January, 1960. The 
South African Sugar Association ceased to be a party to the Agreement on 
31 December, 1961, while Swaziland and India joined as exporting members < 
in 1965. C"**)
The agreement was based upon the allocation of export quotas to the 
sugar-exporting countries, and the quotas depended on the individual 
country's aggregate production, exports, and degree of dependence on sugar 
exports. The objectives of the CSA were stated in the preamble as follows;..
See Great Britain, Ministry of Food, Bulletin, London, January 12, 1952
See "Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal", London, February 28, 1952
F or further details of the agreement, see the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement with explanatory notes, 1962, and the revised text of 1968, 
Ministry of Agriculture, London, and press notices of the Ministry 
issued since.
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"This Agreement is formalised from the general 
understanding that has been reached between the 
parties that it is desirable on the terms and 
conditions arrived at to have a long-term agree­
ment for supplying sugar to the United Kingdom, 
for developing the production of sugar in the 
Commonwealth countries and for tho orderly 
marketing of that sugar," (#)
Provisions were made to extend the Agreement by one year in 1952 
and subsequent years; this was accomplished every year since 1952 and 
in 1963 the Agreement was extended until the end of 1971; in 1968, the 
Agreement was finally extended to expire in December 1974 as a result 
of the terms of entry of the United Kingdom into the European Economic 
Community,
The CSA imposed limits on the exports of sugar in any of its recognised 
commercial forms (including Barbados and other fancy molasses) from 
exporting territories which were parties to the Agreement to preferential 
and negotiated price markets, "Negotiated price markets" in this context 
refers to markets which accept negotiated price sugar, i*e, mainly the
(-K-K-)United Kingdom, "Preferential markets" are markets available for the
entry of Commonwealth sugar on a preferential tariff basis, i.e. mainly
( 4C-X-K- )the United Kingdom and Canada,' ‘
^ See Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, Text of Agreement of 1968, Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, London 1969
** Until the end of 1961 there were arrangements between the United
Kingdom, South Africa, and the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
by which 13/40 (or 32,5%) of the raw import requirements of the 
Southern Rhodesian refinery were supplied under South Africa's 
Negotiated Price Quota (this quantity being deducted from the total 
of N.P.Q.'s sold to the U.K.), During 1953-56, New Zealand each 
year accepted 75,'000 long tons of sugar at the negotiated price. 
These quantities were in excess of the basic negotiated price 
quotas as established under Article 13 of the CSA.
Since 1957 New Zealand each year bought 75,000 long tons of Common­
wealth sugar under special pricing arrangements.
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Article 3 of the Agreement dealt with exports to Canada, an
important traditional market for Commonwealth sugar. The Article states
"It is agreed that the parties to this Agreement 
will give priority to sales of Commonwealth sugar 
to Canada and subject to market considerations 
will make sugar available for sale to Canadian 
refiners through normal commercial channels in 
such quantities and from such sources as they may 
require". (*)
The "negotiated price quota" (iM.P.Q.) is the maximum annual quantity 
of exports from each exporting territory to which the negotiated price 
paid by tho United Kingdom applies. The NPQ forms part of an overall 
agreement quota (o.A.Q,). While the relationship between the two is 
fairly stable, it is not a fixed constant. For example, in 1951, the 
total NPQ amounted to about 70% of O.A.Q.'s and about 55% of total export 
quotas under the 1958 International Sugar Agreement; the NPQ/OAQ ratio 
amounted to 68% in 1970. The "overall agreement quota" is the total 
quantity to which each exporting territory agrees to limit its exports in 
any one year for sale or shipment to preferential and negotiated price 
markets. Whereas NPQs establish quantities which the exporters are 
obliged to supply and importers (the United Kingdom) ape obliged to 
purchase, the DAQs constitute an upper limit which must not be exceeded 
by the exporting territories. Until 1956 the OAQs were at the same time 
the limit for total net export entitlements under tho International Sugar 
Agreement of 1953. Since then total net export entitlements of Common­
wealth producers under the International Sugar Agreements of 1958 and 
1968 have exceeded OAQs by amounts sometimes referred to as the "inter­
national quota".
Although Commonwealth sugar had enjoyed a degree of protection in 
the United Kingdom through tho tariff for a long period before the
->5- See International Sugar Organization, The World's Sugar Economy,
London, 1963.
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Second World War, the CSA of 1951 was the first formal declaration by
Britain that Commonwealth sugar was to be granted preferential treat-
monte Sugar entering the UnitE)d Kingdom from British Colonial Terri­
tories first received preferential treatment in 1651 when a 5% ad valorem
duty which had to be paid on sugar as well as on other articles, was 
abolished and a specific duty was imposed, differentiating between raw
(-K-)and white sugar, and sugar of imperial and of foreign origin. '
"Imperial Preference" was maintained at varying rates until 1 May,t
1074, when all duties on sugar were abolished and sugar imports wore
allowed duty-free until 19 April 1901. In that year, a customs duty
for revenue purposes was imposed at rates equal for all origins. In
( )the words of the Food Research Institute ' , "sugar duties were light, 
non-discriminatory, and for revenue purposes only".
Empire sugar was again granted preferential treatment as of 1 Septembei
1919, when the rate for sugar imports from Empire sources was fixed at 
five-sixths of the full duty rate and the preference established at 
3sh. 0.8d per cwt. basis 96^ polarisation. In April 1924, the full duty 
on foreign sugar was reduced from 22rh. 4.5d, to 10sh. 2d per cwt, 
reducing the preference margin (still maintained at five-sixths) to 
1sh«Bd per cut. In July 1925, the full duty rate on foreign sugar 
remained unchanged, but the preferential rate was reduced to 6sh.5.2d, and 
the preference margin restored to its original amount of 3sh.8.8d per cwt. 
basis 96^ polarisation.
"K- The duties levied wero 7.5 pence (new) per cut.on imperial raw sugar, 
25p per cwt.on imperial clayed or white sugar, and double these rates 
for sugar of foreign origin.
** See V.P.Timoshenko and B.C.Swerling, The World's Sugar: Progress and, 
Policy, Food Research Institute, Stanford, California, 1957,
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An important alteration in the scale of duty took place in April 1928
in order to protect British refiners against the importation of white and
refined sugar, the preference margin remaining at 3sh.8*8d per cwt., basis 
o96 polarisation. This meant, however, that the preference margin on 
Empire sugar exceeding 99^ polarisation was about 1sho less than on sugar 
between 98° and 99'-^ * In return for this protection, the United Kingdom 
refiners undertook to buy Commonwealth sugar rather than foreign sugar, so 
long as it was offered competitively* The whole benefit of the tariff 
preference was therefore intended to accrue to the producer* ;
While a number of alterations have been made to the different duty 
rates payable since 1932, the basic principle of directly relating duties 
to degree of polarization has survived,' At one stage. Empire sugar was
divided into two parts on the basis of origin, and two rates of duty were 
applied: the Preferential Colonial Sugar duty (the lower of the two), and 
the Preferential Dominion Sugar duty. Another innovation was the Preferential 
Certificated Colonial Sugar, which applied only to a limited quantity of 
exported sugar, but which received the greatest preference margin in terms 
of duty. In April 1962, the revenue element in the United Kingdom Customs 
duties on sugar was abolished. '
Three factors led to the considerable increase in Commonwealth sugar 
exports to the United Kingdom that took place in the first half of the
The basis of British policy regarding duties on sugar to data can be 
traced back to this alteration.
There are basically five degrees of polarisation for duty purposes 
involving five different rates of duty. These are 95°-960, 96°-9?o, 
970-98°, 980-99°, and exc.990.
For details of the different levels of duty relating to different 
degrees of polarisation and relating to different sources of imports, 
see International Sugar Council, The World's Sugar Economy, Vol.1, 
London 1963,
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twentieth century;- the steady growth of consumption in the United Kingdom, 
the protection afforded to Commonwealth exporters by the discriminatory 
tariff system, and the co-operation of British refiners. For example, 
in 1913, when no preference existed, sugar imports from the Empire 
constituted only 3,7% of total sugar imports (73,000 metric tons). By 
1930, total imports from Commonwealth sources had increased by 650% and 
their share of the British market had risen to 28.3% (548,000 metric tons). 
Further inroads were to take place in the 1930s; during the three-year 
period 1936/37 to 1938/39, average sugar imports by the United Kingdom 
from the Commonwealth wore 131% higher than in 1930 and amounted to 53,1% 
of total imports (1,267,700 tons). In the immediate post-war period, 
total sugar imports by the United Kingdom were substantially lower than 
the pre-war imports, and the share of imports from the Commonwealth also 
slumped. But by 1950, the old pattern was re-establishing itself, and 
during the period 1948/49 to 1950/51, sugar imports from the Commonwealth 
amounted to 919,775 metric tons, or 41.2% of total United Kingdom sugar
imports. '
The negotiations, which began in 1948, and culminated in 1951 in the 
signing of the CSA, emerged from a well-established trading pattern amongst 
Commonwealth countries. Whilst tariff protection afforded Commonwealth 
sugar entering the United Kingdom a significant measure of advantage, the 
cyclical variations of high and low prices on the world market induced 
instabilities, uncertainties, and risks, detrimental to the long-term 
growth of the industry. At least three factors led to the eventual signing 
of the agreement:-
For a detailed breakdown of imports of sugar into the United Kingdom 
by countries of origin during these years, see Table 32, The World 
Sugar Economy, op.cit., p.197, London, 1963.
(i) The Ministry of Food had used bulk purchasing during the Second 
World War as an instrument to assure minimum Commonwealth production 
compatible with maintaining severe consumer rationing at home; it was 
relatively easy to convert the arrangement after the war into a more 
formal and long-term device for expanding Commonwealth output,
(ii) After the war, most sugar sold only for dollars, and moreover, even 
after the end of shortages, ‘world’ sugar prices were still well above 
pre-war levels. During the war, the United Kingdom had become the sole 
purchaser of the exportable surplus of sugar produced in Commonwealth 
countries at fixed prices. Though it is true that under this scheme, 
the prices paid for Commonwealth sugar by the Ministry of Food were much 
higher than those which prevailed before the war, they were nevertheless 
substantially lower than the prevailing world prices for that period. So 
from the British point of view, price and currency considerations justified 
and demanded a greater dependence on sterling sources, while at the same 
time, sugar purchases were a form of economic aid to British colonial 
territories which were heavily dependent on sugar, '
(iii) It was necessary to lengthen the term of the bulk arrangements 
because producing countries would otherwise have been unwilling to under­
take the significant capital investments essential for expansion. The 
objective was generally in accordance with the expressed objective of t(ie 
United Kingdom to assist in the overall economic development of the Common­
wealth countries.
The Ministry of Food guaranteed Commonwealth producers a market for 
their entire output at prices to be negotiated annually for the period
-«• That is, when sugar prices returned to their ‘normal’ depressed 
levels on the world market.
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1948-52, and, as export performance during that period was to be the 
yardstick for minimum quotas to be allocated to individual countries 
in any future agreement, there was a particularly strong incentive to 
expand. In accordance with the objectives of the CSA, the United Kingdom 
undertook to purchase, during each calendar year, agreed quantities from 
each territory at prices which were negotiated annually and fixed at a 
level considered to be "reasonably remunerative to efficient producers". 
In 1951 the amount of 1,568,000 long tons tel quel was agreed upon as 
the basic irreducible negotiated price quota and divided among the 
exporting territories as shown in Figure 3.1
Figure 3.1: Basic Negotiated Price Quotas, 1951 
Territory Long Tons Equivalent in metric tons
Australia 300,000 304,814
West Indies and Guyana 640,000 650,270
British Honduras 18,000 18,289
East Africa 5,000 5,080
Fiji 120,000 121,926
Mauritius 335,000 340,376
South Africa 150,000 152,407
Total basic NPQ 1,568,000 1,593,162
N,B, Conversions at the rate 1 Metric Ton - 0,9842 long tons
1 Long Ton = 1,0160 metric tons
Source: International Sugar Organization, Sugar Year Book, various 
issues, London.
In addition, a further purchase of some 800,000 long tons was guaranteec 
by the United Kingdom, but only at the world price "plus imperial preference* 
As already mentioned, the agreement was initially to last at least till 1959j
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and was subject each year to renewal so as to continue commitments for 
a full eight years in advance. After sugar derationing in the United 
Kingdom, the negotiated price quota together with domestic beet, pro­
duction of some 700,000 to 800,000 long tons raw value would leave 
room for purchases of only 200,000 to 300,000 tons from the world free 
market. Thti Agreement also provided for an increase in NPQs when
unrestricted consumption in the United Kingdom exceeded 2,550,000 long 
tons. In that case, quotas would be increased by at least the percentage 
by which the increased consumption exceeded 2,550,000 long tons. However, 
shortfalls in the NPQs for any territory were not subject to reallocation 
to other territories.
Table 3.2 shows the change between the prewar and the postwar sugar 
position in the United Kingdom, in thousand long tons, raw value, and 
also the degree of dependence of some Commonwealth countries on the 
British market for their sugar exports from as early as 1953. It can be 
seen that only Australia succeeded in fulfilling her NPQ requirements in 
1953 with substantial shortfalls for Fiji, Mauritius, and South Africa. 
Nevertheless, total UK imports from the (Commonwealth in 1953 had already 
exceeded the average level of imports for the period 1937-39 from that 
source.
In general, overall quotas (OAQs) wore about 50% above prewar exports 
of individual countries which were parties to the Agreement, and no further 
expansion was contemplated in the domestic sugar beet industry in the 
United Kingdom. The principle to which the guaranteed price was to conform
Britain's retreat from free market sources for sugar became well-nigh 
complete in the late 1950s and early 1970s. The proportion of domestic 
requirements supplied by the Commonwealth and domestic beet producers 
varied from 94.6% in 1965 to 95.6% in 1968 and 97.6% in 1971.
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was that it be a "reasonably remunerative price to efficient producers"
unlike the practice in other bulk-purchase contracts and contrary to the
prewar policy that allowed a higher preferential on colonial sugar (than
on sugar from the Dominions). The uniform price "was specifically
intended as an inducement to and reward Tor efficiency" /,in spite of
differences in productivity and costs in the different Commonwealth
exporting countries. The objective of leaving part of the export sugar
to receive only the free-market price was to bring some independent
indicator of efficiency to bear; but it must be emphasized that such
bilateral arrangements as the CSA itself (besides other arrangements like
the United States import quota system) seriously impaired the role of the
free market price as an independent guide of efficiency. Another problem
( )is comparison of costs and efficiency between different countries , 
and the CSA adopted a special device for comparing costs. The negotiated 
price was also closely tied to the internal price structure within the 
United Kingdom. The exclusive importer of sugar at that time was the 
Ministry of Food, which resold raw sugar at prices meant to equate the 
cost of Commonwealth and foreign raw, and that rate was the basis for 
pricing domestic beet sugar as well.
Table 3*2/
See H.Frankel, ’Controls end Subsidies on Agricultural Products 
and Requisites: Sugar Beet and Sugar, 1939-53", Supplement to 
the Farm Economist, VII, 7, 1954.
4HÎ- See, for example, F .G .Sturrock, 'Sugar Beet or Sugar Cane’, 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.XX, No,1, 1969,
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Commonwealth exporters were thus assured of a guaranteed market for 
a substantial part of their produce, at a negotiated price; but they also 
had an interest in the ability of any new International Sugar Agreement 
to provide a stable price. Revenue from tho final third of their CSA 
quotas was dependent upon world price, to which a special imperial 
preference was added for tho less developed members of the CSA (i.e. all 
except Australia and South Africa), Since their exports were assured of 
a destination, their main objective in negotiations towards establishing 
any new ISA was to secure aa high a price as possible, regardless of the
f 7>* )burden placed on free-market exporters in supporting that price* ^
The most important part of the Agreement from the point of view of 
both importing and exporting members, in particular the less-developed 
exporters, related to the method of fixing negotiated prices. The 
mechanism whereby prices were determined conformed to three basic principles
(1) A fixed basic price was paid to all territories, free on board and 
stowed in bulk, basis 95° polarisation. (This price amounted to £43,50 
per ton in 1969, for example).
(2) A special payment was made to the less developed countries in recog­
nition of the dependence of most of them upon their sugar exports and of 
the effect on them of depressed world prices. This special payment was 
subject to annual calculations and consisted of a fixed and a variable 
element. The fixed element was intended to restore the benefits that
* Note that the United Kingdom, though herself a net sugar importer,
had an important interest in a high free-market price for two reasons'
(i) The more satisfactory the return earned on their sales to the frp 
market, the less hard would Commonwealth exporters bargain at annual ; 
price negotiations with the United Kingdom. (ii) The UK was re­
exporting about 700,000 tons of sugar refined from imported raw 
annually as part of the postwar export drive and even at the cost of 
starving the domestic market. Sugar sold abroad had to compete on a i 
free-market basis. See Timoshenko and Swerling, op.cit., pp.330-1. .
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formerly accrued to the exporting countries under the Colonial Certificated 
Preference System. (This amounted to £1o50 per ton in 1969). A system 
of sliding scale of world prices was used to compute the variable element. 
In. 1969, the maximum value of this variable element amounted to £2,50 
pep ton, f.o.b.; basis 96° polarisation, which applied when the average 
world price (as established by the International Sugar Organization for 
the twelve-month period from 1st April of the year preceding to the 31st 
March of the year concerned) was less than £31 per ton, f.o.b.^*) If the ’ 
average world price was higher, the variable element was reduced, according 
to a given sliding scale, and fell to zero when the average world price v 
reached £39 per ton.
(3) The third element represented payment in respect of the U.K. duty 
preference on sales by Commonwealth exporters of 'free’ sugar (i.e. other 
than NPQs) to the United Kingdom for domestic consumption. Since 1967, 
for example, the parties to the CSA agreed that the payment of the preferenc 
element, at the rate of £3.75 per ton, basis 96° polarisation, should be 
related to the quantity of free sugar shipped in the previous year and 
should be expressed as amounts per ton of the NPQs of the countries con­
cerned in the year of payment. It was also agreed, however, that the total 
quantity of sugar on which payment at that rate would be made should not 
exceed the quantity of such sugar required for the home trade, and if the 
quantity of free sugar shipped exceeded the maximum quantity eligible, the 
total sum payable should be apportioned among the exporting countries 
concerned.
* The London Daily Price of sugar for 1969 as a whole was £33.83 per
long ton, c.i.f., U.K. in bulk (or 3.20 U.S.cents per pound, with .
a high of 3.6,7 cents in April and a low of 2.71 cents in September).
The average ISA Price for 1969 was also £33.83 per long ton, c«.i.f.,U.K
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The next question is the determination of the 'basic price* itselfj 
the CSA takes into account the different costs of production in the 
various countries, but these costings are not published. The principles 
that guide the CSA members are quite specifics-
(1) The price for shipments of sugar from 1 January 1950 to 31 December 
1950 of £30.50 per long ton, basis 96° polarisation, was considered to be 
the ’Basic Price*.
(2 ) The sugar exporters were required to submit a statement showing the 
percentage distribution of cost factors in respect of the crop harvested 
by the 30th June of the previous year, and representing all costs of pro­
ducing and shipping the export sugar from the exporting territories; this 
statement was accepted by the contracting parties as relating to the 
'Basic Price* (which was also known as the ’Basic Weighting of Costs’).
(3) Each exporting country wqs required to submit an annual report which 
included indices reflecting changes in wage levels and prices of goods and 
services entering into the costs of production as compared with the base 
year. These indices were then weighted according to the estimated nego­
tiated price quantities from the respective countries and combined to 
yield an overall index of costs. The negotiated price for the year in 
question is then arrived at by varying the Basic Price proportionately
to the movement of the price index.
Negotiations took place in November each year between the United 
Kingdom Government and the representatives of the exporting territories 
acting jointly to establish the negotiated price and quantities. The 
price agreed upon is a single price applicable to all the exporting
* See International Sugar Organization, The World’s Sugar Economy, 
□p.cit.,p.199.
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territories of the Commonwealth « The exporters were liable each year 
for agreed rates of freight and insurance at pre-war levels, as accepted 
for the years from 1950 to 1952, and the importers for any amount in 
excess thereof.
Table 3,3, taken from the British Sugar Board’s Annual Report for 
1969, gives a summary of the main components of prices paid to members 
of the CSA for sugar exported to the U.K. in 1969,
Table 3.3 : The Sugar Board’s Purchase Prices for 1969
Country of Origin Price Per Ton f.o.b, stowed Bulk 
Basis 96° Polarisation (in £)
Australia 
West Indies; 
Antigua 
Barbados 
Jamaica 
St Kitts 
Trinidad 
Guyana 
Br.Honduras 
Fiji
Mauritius 
India 
Swaziland 
East Africa
(1)
43-50
47-50
47-50
47-50
47-50
47-50
47-50
47-50
47-50
47-50
47-50
47-50
47-50
(2)
-19
0.02
0.29
0,22
0.175
(3)
44.69
47-50
47-50
47-50
47-50
47-52
47-50
47-50
47-79
47-72
47-50
47-675
47-50
Notes: (1) The: negotiated prices include a special payment of £4*00 per
ton to the less developed countries (i.e. all except Australia.
(2) These amounts representing the preference payments on non-NPQ 
(’free') sugar shipped to the U.K.from Commonwealth countries 
in 1968 are shown as rates per ton of NPQ sugar.
(3) indicates total.
Source?, Sugar Board, Annual Report, 1969.
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A few minor changes were to affect the operation of the CSA over 
the period 1951-74. The first of these *■» the accession to or secession 
from the Agreement of certain territories - has already been dealt with . 
The working of the price fixing system itself was reviewed three times 
(in 1955, 1959, and 1965) on the basis of up-to-date returns. The 
establishment of the Sugar Bogrd on 15 October 1955 had direct implica­
tions for the operation of the CSA*
Up to the end of 1956, the British Government was the sole importer
of sugar from the exporting territories, and the sugar was sold on the
domestic market at prices fixed by the Government. On 1 January 1957,
state trading in sugar came to an end, and the Sugar Board took over
(among other duties) the UK Government’s contractual obligations under
the CSA to buy specified quantities of sugar at prices negotiated by the 
( )Government. The Sugar Board sold the sugar which it had bought at
the best free market price obtainable* When the negotiated price was 
higher than the free market price, the Sugar Board’s transactions resulted 
in a deficit, which was met by a surcharge levied on all sugar domestically 
produced or imported into the country, including the sugar in sugar- 
containing foods* If, however, the world price was higher than the 
negotiated price over any considerable period, the Sugar Board showed a 
surplus, and a 'distribution payment’ could be made wherever a surcharge 
would have been payable.
Finally, it was decided that the issue of Colonial Preferential 
Sugar Certificates would cease on 30 April 1962. A sum equivalent to the
See Timoshenko and Swerling, op.cit., p.331; also ISO, op.cit*,p*209,
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value of the Certificates was then paid by the Sugar Board to the 
territories which enjoyed them, as part of the arrangements for the 
purchase of sugar under the CSA.
Very minor changes were made in the overall agreement quotas (OAQs) 
for the exporting territories; these were fixed at 2,375,000 long tons 
tel quel in 1951, Although there were provisions in the Agreement for 
upward revision in 1953 and thereafter, OAQs remained at the level 
established in 1951. The total basic quota was divided among Common­
wealth exporters as given in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 : Basic Overall Agreement Quotas
Territory Long Tons Equivalent Metr
Australia 600,000 509,628
West Indies and Guyana 900,000 914,422
British Honduras 25,000 25,401
East Africa 10,000 10,161
Fiji 170,000 172,728
Mauritius 470,000 477,542
South Africa (up to and 
including 1961)
200,000 203,210
Total 2,375,000 2,413,112
Sources ISO, The World Sugar Economy, op.cit.. p.2 0 1.
The termination of South Africa’s participation in the Agreement reduced 
the OAQs by 200,000 long tons to 2,175,000 long tons (2,210,002 metric 
tons) from 1 January 1962. But the OAQs were restored to their original 
levels by the accession of Swaziland, India, and Rhodesia to the Agreement,
* Rhodesian quota suspended since 1965*
The CSA therefore represented a long-term arrangement for supplying 
the British market with sugar, for the orderly marketing of sugar from 
less developed Commonwealth producers, and for the development of pro­
duction in these countries. Though the original agreement was designed 
to remain in force until 31.12.1959, with provisions for extensions, it 
finally ran until the end of 1974. The benefits of the Agreement to 
exporting countries were substantial (at least in terms of guaranteed 
levels of foreign exchange), but the advantages that accrued to Britain 
were by no means negligible. Britain was assured regular shipments of 
sugar at the negotiated price, and during tho sugar crises of 1963 and 
1973—74, she did not suffer from the world shortage and was able to keep
(-X-)retail prices comparatively stable. '
From 1951 to 1965, prices were negotiated annually, but in 1965, in 
order to give greater stability to the Agreement and the prices paid under 
it, it was decided to negotiate the price for three years at a time. The 
price for 1966, 1967, and 1968 was then fixed at £43.50 per ton for all 
territories in respect of NPQs. At the same time, the fixed and variable 
elements were introduced for the benefit of the less developed Commonwealth 
exporters on their NPQs, as well as the Commonwealth preference element 
which less developed countries obtained on top of the London Daily Price 
which was paid to them for their Commonwealth ’frees’. Basic NPQ prices 
were revised upwards for 1972 to 1974, and a fixed price of £50 per long 
ton was paid to all exporting countries plus, for the less developed 
countries, an additional spocial payment to be calculated annually, of
The sugar ’shortages’ at the retail level in 1974 were due to stock­
piling and panic-buying rather than deficiencies in supply, as the 
figures for overall 1974 consumption show. Though prices rose to 
nearly 15 pence per pound at one stage, they were still significantly 
lower than in the rest of the developed world.
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between £7 and £11 per ton, related inversely to the world price of
sugar; this was intended to be another step in the policy of stabilising
prices. Thus the minimum payment for the lass developed members became
£57 per ton, and the maximum £61, compared with the 1966-71 minimum of
£45 per ton and maximum of £47*50. This special payment was paid
according to the scale given in Table 3.5. In the event, because of the
extraordinarily high levels of world prices (reaching an all—bime high
of £650 per ton in December 1974), the developing countries all received
£57 per ton, while the Caribbean countries were paid £61, in recognition
of the fact that unit costs of production were higher in the latter 
( -X- )countries,^ ' For the first time since the Agreement was ratified in 1951, 
bilateral negotiations took place in February 1974 between the Caribbean 
representatives and the British Government; these culminated in the NPQ 
price being raised initially to £83 per ton for Caribbean exporters, while 
the remaining CSA members were offered £79 per ton, to preserve the 
previous differential* Finally, negotiations between the United Kingdom 
and all the Commonwealth exporters led to the acceptance of a ’negotiated’ 
price of £140.00 per ton for the whole of 1974 NPQ exports.
Table 3.5 /
The London Daily Price of sugar averaged £21.83 per ton in 1968, 
£72.63 in 1972, £99.46 in 1973, £305.13 in 1974, and £216.47 in 
1975. See ISO, Sugar Year Book, London, 1975,
09.
Table 3.5 : Special Payments under the CSA, 1972-74
World Price (free on board ship) Special Payments
Less than £33 .00 £11.00
£33 but 1ess than £34 £10.20
£34 ti If If £35 £ 9.55
£35 « II If £36 £ 9.00
£36 u 11 II £37 £ 8.55
£37 If II If £38 £ 8.15
£38 If If n £39 £ 7.80
£39 n If II £40 £ 7.50
£40 If If If £41 £ 7.25
Over £41 £ 7.00
Source: Commonwealth Year Book 1973» Commonwealth Secretariat,
London, 1973.
A most important adjustment was made to the Agreement in the 
review year 1960 in respect of its: duration. It was decided that the 
Agreement should be of indefinite duration and should be reviewed once 
every three years with the first review to be held in 1971* It was 
also decided that all provisions of the Agreement should be subject to 
three years' notice, given in the review year, except where they applied 
to the supply and purchase of NPQ sugar from the developing countries, 
in which case the period of notice would be doubled. These periods of 
notice were, however, subject to the overriding provision that, should 
the United Kingdom secure entry into the European Economic Community, 
it "could not consider itself bound to a continuing contractual relation- 
ship" after 1974. Nevertheless, Britain gave official written
assurances that if the Agreement were discontinued, consultations with
See S«Harris and I.Smith, World Sugar Markets in a State of Flux, 
Agricultural Trade Paper No»4, Trade Policy Research Centre, 
London, 1973*
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other members of the CSA would take place to find other methods of 
fulfilling the objectives of the Agreement. ' The other important 
adjustment made to the CSA concerned the allocation of quotas* In 
1957* a clause had been added to the Agreement to the effect that 
NPQs should increase pro rata with increased consumption in the domestic 
market in the United Kingdom, but this arrangement came to an end in 1965 . 
when NPQs were ’consolidated’ at their existing levels, as shown in 
Table 3.6.
A number of reasons have been suggested for the smooth operation 
of the quantitative arrangements under the CSAï the 'sense of cooperation* 
between members of the Commonwealth, the contractual obligation to
sell negotiated price sugar to the United Kingdom and, to a considerable 
extent, the financial advantages enjoyed by the exporting territories. 
Commonwealth exporters received the financial benefit in two ways;
(i) by the United Kingdom's purchase of certain quantities of Commonwealth 
sugar at prices not related to free market levels but calculated to afford 
efficient producers a reasonable return; and
(ii) by the admission of Commonwealth sugar into the United Kingdom and 
Canada at preferential rates of duty.
Table 3.6/
The Lome Convention, signed by 46 ACP countries (African, Caribbean., 
and Pacific) and the Nine members of the EEC, substantially replaced 
the CSA from tho point of view of the less developed sugar exporters 
of the Commonwealth.
ISO, The World's Sugar Economy, op.cit., p.206
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Table 3.6 : Annual Negotiated Price Quotas, 1951-74 
(Thousand long tons, tel quel)
Year Australia West Indies British 
and Guyana Honduras
Mauritius Fiji S Africa Total
NPQs
1951 300.0 640.0 335.0 120.0 150.0 1,545.0
1952 300.0 640.0 - 335.0 120.0 150.0 1,545.0
1953 314.0 670.0 - 351.0 125.0 157,0 1,617.0
1954 314.0 671.0 3.6 351.0 125.0 157.0 1,621.7
1955 314.0 671.0 3.6 351.0 125.0 157.0 1,621.7
1956 314.0 671.0 3.6 351.0 125.0 157.0 1,621.7
1957 300.0 641.1 3.6 335.0 120.0 150.0 1,549.7
1958 300.0 641.1 6.7 335.0 120.0 158.0 1,552.8
1959 307.5 657.1 10.5 343.4 123.0 153.8 1,595.2
1960 316.5 676.3 19.0 353.4 126.6 158.3 1,655.3
1961 315.0 673.1 18.9 351.8 126.0 157.5 1,647.5
1962 313.5 669.9 18.8 350.1 125.4 (a) 1,482.9
1963 315.0 672.0 18.9 351.8 126.0 - 1,488.9
1964 330.0 704.0 19.8 368.5 132.0 - 1,559.8
1965 335.0 725.0 20.5 380.0 140.0 85.0 1,742.5
1966-
1974 335.0 725.0 20.5 380.0 140.0 85.0 1,717.5
Notes: (a) South Africa no longer party to the Agreement since 1962.
The NPQs of 85,000 long tons For the period 1965 to 1974 
were for Swaziland*
(i) All NPQs consolidated in 1965.
(ii) Rhodesian quota of 25,000 long tons granted in 1965 sus­
pended since UDI.
(iii) East Africa had a NPQ of between 5,2 and 5,3 thousand long 
tons p.a, in the period I960 to 1963, It was granted a 
NPQ of 5,500 long tons in 1964 and this was consolidated 
to 7,000 long tons in 1965,
(iv) After the withdrawal of South Africa, India was granted a 
NPQ of 25,000 long tons since 1965.
Sources: ISO, Sugar Year Book, various issues.
Sugar Board, Annual Report, various issues»'
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Since protection in the form of tariff differentials had been granted to 
Commonweolith producers over a considerable period of time before the CSA 
was negotiateds the advantages accruing from it should be clearly 
differentiated from the additional benefits gained from the negotiated 
price guaranteed under the Agreement, A fixed tariff preference cannot 
protect its beneficiaries against low market prices; a negotiated price can.
Though the CSA unquestionably conferred visible benefits on tho 
developing Commonwealth countries (in the sense of providing a guaranteed 
market for specified levels of exports at predetermined prices), it did 
not escape criticism. It can be argued that because the proportions 
between the NPQs allocated to various CSA exporters remained virtually 
unchanged since 1951, the arrangement served to freeze existing patterns 
of production, and retarded the growth of the lowest cost producers who 
were denied the incentive to expand rapidly* It has also been suggested 
that the CSA reduced the incentive to modernise and innovate, and the 
example most often quoted in this connection is the Wost Indies, in 
particular Jamaica.  ^ It is doubtless true that sugar output per acre 
is lower in the West Indies than probably anywhere else in the Commonwealth- 
(considering only net exporters), and a variety of reasons have been put ; 
forward: unfavourable climatic conditions, inadequate research into better 
cane variety, adoption of inappropriate American technology, failure to 
develop an efficient agricultural extension service, lack of adequate 
supervision and control of peasant farming. Such a conclusion is reached
if \by For d Sturrock' , who argues tha the cost of producing best sugar
* See, for example, F.G.Sturrock, "Sugar Beet or Sugar Cane", Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, Vol.XX, No.1, 1969,
-)H(- Soe F.G.Sturrock, "A Policy for British Sugar Supplies", National 
Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, August 1969.
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in Eastern England compares favourably with that of producing cane sugar on ^ 1 
Jamaican estates, regardless of the cost of transporting sugar from Jamaica 
to the United Kingdom. The implication is that this is sufficient justifi­
cation for the expansion of subsidized beet sugar in Britain, From his 
study on comparative costs, Sburrock drew the following conclusionsî-
(a) In 1965, the costs of producing beet sugar in England were approximately 
equal to the costs of producing cane sugar in Jamaica, contrary to what migh 
generally be expected,
(b) over the previous eleven years, costs had increased substantially in 
Jamaica due to higher prices and wage rates. As there had been little 
increase in the yields and only a moderate increase in labour productivity, 
this had led to considerably higher unit costs.
Sturrock’s conclusions have been attacked on the grounds that they ware 
based on an etremely limited empirical investigation; they were also 
subjected to some sound economic criticisms by Belsbaw and Bryden , and 
these will not be repeated here, Jamaica is widely known to be a high-cost 
producer, and using it as a criticism of the CSA is hardly justified, given! 
tho existence of other extremely efficient producers of cane sugar among 
CSA members, notably Fiji and Mauritius. The latter have succeeded in 
achieving a high level of efficiency in sugar production combined with highl 
labour-intensive techniques. Nor is Jamaica a particularly high-cost 
producer when compared with other Caribbean countries like Mexico and Puertc 
Rico. It is also probable that production of beet sugar is most efficient 
in Eastern England, and thus does not truly reflect, but rather overstates,
D.Belshaw and J*Bryden, "Sugar Beet or Sugar Cane; A Comment", 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, May 1971.
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average productivity in the British sugar beet industry; this would make 
Jamaica appear comparatively even more costly than it really is* Finally, 1 
"such international cost comparisons can be very misleading, as the official 
exchange rates for currencies are not necessarily q, suitable measuring rod 
for comparing internal production activities within any two countries, 
especially when these are at such different stages of development as Britain 
and Jamaica."'
An important feature of the CSA is that the proportion of United 
Kingdom sugar consumption supplied "on contract" (i.e. from domestic pro­
duction and imports from CSA exporters) rose steadily over the period 1951-
1974 to the point of reducing free world market imports to insignificant
levels* The proportion supplied on contract rose from 75.6% of domestic 
consumption in 1955 to 8 8.8% in 1962, to 97.6% in 1971, and almost 100% in 
1972.
If the success of the CSA has to be judged on one single criterion,
then it must be judged on the question of price stability. The negotiated .
prices have been relatively stable as compared with free world prices, and 
in fact were lower than the world prices (average) during 1951, 1957, 1963,
ÏI
1964, 1972, 1973, and 1974, Table 3.7 shows the different prices paid 
under the CSA for NPQ sugar over the period 1951-74, The stability of this 
agreed price is conspicuous, especially when compared with the huge 
fluctuations in tho prices which equated supply with demand on the free 
market for those quantities which were not subject to any of the preferenti 
arrangements. In the winter of 1963-64, this free market price temporarily
* See S.Harris and I.Smith, op,cit., p.3,
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exceeded £100 per ton, due to_ the combined effects of a poor crop of beet 
in Europe in 1963 and a devastating hurricane in Cuba, the largest exporter 
of sugar on the world market; in December 1954, the price had fallen to £25 
per ton, and it reached an all-time low point of £13,14 per ton in December 
1966. A study by the International Sugar Organization in 1963 ^
pointed out that the benefit given by the payment of negotiated prices for 
NPQ sugar lay in the facb that in 'normal* years, this price was higher 
than prices obtainable on the free market. (This turned out to be the case 
in 17 years out of 24), The study also observed that in recent years, 
free market prices had been around or bel-jw the cost of production. The 
stability of the negotiated prices and their long-term character assured 
producers that for at least eight years ahead they would be able to sell 
a considerable proportion of their production (at that time almost two-thirc 
of their exports) at remunerative prices.
Table 3,7: CSA Prices for NPQ Sugar, 1951-74 (£ par long ton, 96° polarisât
Year CSA Price Year CSA Price
1951 32.87 1963 46.04
1952 38.50 1964 46.04,
42.00'G1953 42.33 1965
1954 41.00 1966 43.50
1955 40.75 1967 43.50
1956 40.75 1968 43.50
1957 42.17 1969 43.50
1958 42.83 1970 43.50
1959 45.14 1971 43.50
1960 44,44 1972 50.00
1961 45.10 1973 50.00
1962 45.76 1974 140.00
Notes: (a) For developing countries (i.e. all except Australia) there was 
an extra payment of £4,575 per ton in 1965; in the period 1966 
to 1071, the extra payment to developing countries varied /
** ISO, The World's Sugar Economy, op,cit., p.207,
A similar situation can be observed in the 1970s. The all-time peak 
of £650 was reached in December 1974, with the average for 1975 being, 
£216,47 per ton; by the middles of 1977, prices had fallen to about 
£125 per ton. See ISO, Sugar Year book, London, 1975,
.99.
It must be emphasized, however, that the fluctuations in the world free 
market prices were somewhat exaggerated by the existence of several preferen­
tial trading agreements ( the U.K., the U.S.A., and the U.S.5.R. were the 
main importing parties) that 'distorted' the prevailing free market prices.
We have seen that price fluctuations in the free market derive from many 
sources., A large proportion of the world's free market demand for sugar 
arises from the developed countries which have low price and income elasticity 
of demand for sugar. Further more, most of these countries have policies 
which eliminate or greatly reduce the impact of variations in world sugar 
prices on their own domestic sugar prices. Overall, therefore, the total 
demand for sugar from the world free market tends to bo highly price inelastic 
so that small changes in supply tend to cause large movements in the free 
market price. While preferential arrangements between blocks of countries 
serve to stabilise prices for the members of the respective agreements, they 
also leave the free market exporters more vulnerable to price fluctuations.
It becomes difficult, therefore, if not impossible, to compare the stability 
in the prices paid to Commonwealth producers with the instability or other­
wise that would have prevailed on the world merkat had no preferential 
arrangements of any kind existed at all*
Finally, the special supplementary payments to the less developed 
countries are an explicit recognition by the United Kingdom of the dependence 
of the economies of many Commonwealth sugar exporting countries on sugar and . 
the effect on them of unduly depresses world prices.
In this chapter, our main concern has been to examine the principles 
underlying the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, and to analyse the degree of 
success that it achieved in the light of certain objectives contained in the . 
text of the Agreement. In Chapter Four, we move one step ahead, and attempt 
to analyse the economic theory underlying commodity agreements in general, 
the different kinds that exist, and the rationale for commodity agreements 
at all. .'it
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CHAPTER FOUR
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
.101"
International Commodity Agreements
Interest in commodity agreements has existed over a considerable 
period, and was recently boosted by the acceptance by the Plenary Session 
of UNCTAD 11/ of a ’consensus* resolution on Commodities which laid down a 
timetable for the creation of what would effectively be an Integrated 
Programme (IP) for commodities. * The objectiva of the IP is not simply 
to reduce period-to-period price fluctuation but to substantially increase 
commodity prices, and speed the economic growth of developing countries.
The Problem of Export Instability
Export instqbility can refer to a number of situations. It may mean
that a country's export prices are subject to considerable fluctuations,
or the instability may relate to export volume or export earnings. In
fact, whichever of these measures is used, most studies suggest that
export instability is, on average, about twice as great for less developed
( ** )countries as for developed countries. That is, the average annual
variations of export prices, volumes, and earnings for LDCs are twice 
those for DCs. Moreover, the dispersion around the average for LDCs is 
markedly higher than for DCs, which suggests that some LDCs have very 
significant export instability.
* The USA entered a statement that - in effect - disagreed with some 
key features of this resolution, especially, the Common Fund. See 
UNCTAD, Trade and Development Board, 'An Integrated Programme for 
Commodities', TD/B/C.1/196, October 1975, p«8 .
See, for example, A.I.MacBean, Export Instability and Economic 
Development, Harvard University Press, 1966; G .K.Heileinar, 
international Trade and Economic Development, Penguin, 1972, Chs.3 
and 5; and O.D.Coppock, International Economic Stability, McGraw- 
Hill, New York, 1962
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On bhe whole, it seems reasonable to take export earnings as the 
important item. A fall in the volume of exports is not of great
importance if it is offset by an increase in price. On the other hand,
when fluctuations in volume of exports and export prices do not offset 
each other, or when they move in the same direction, the effects on the 
level of domestic activity may be severe.
It is commonly assumed that LDCs obtain most of their export earnings 
by selling primary commodities to DCs; that commodity prices are subject 
to large fluctuations; and that, consequently, the LDCs' export earnings 
are extremely unstable* Table 4.1 presents some summary data on the 
instability of export earnings of DCs and LDCs.
Table 4.1 ; Comparison of the Instability of Exports of Merchandise
plus Services of Selected DCs andLDCs
Index of Instability 1946--58 1954-“66
Characteristics DCs LDCs DCs LDCs
Mean 17.6 23.0 6.2 13.4
Median 18.1 18.3 6.3 12.8
Median of upper half 23.3 32.0 7.8 17.8
Median of upper quartile 26.4 41,3 8.9 21 .5
Standard deviation 7.1 12.8 2.2 6.2
Coefficient of variation
(per cent) 40 0 3 55.7 35.5 46.3
Source: G.Erb and S.Schiavo-Cempa, "Economic Instability, Level of
Development, and Economic Size of Less Developed Countries", 
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol.31, 1969, p.267
The 'index of instability' used is a measure of deviations from trend.
Assuming that these deviations are normally distributed, a value of (say)
15 for the index of instability means that export earnings will be within 
4. 15 per cent of trend approximately two thirds of the time,'
for a definition of this index, see G.Erb and S.Schiavo-Campo, op.cit., 
p»266. The verbal interpretation given here is only loosely correct.
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The mean value of the index of instability for LDCs was about 30% above 
that for the DCs during the period 1946-58, The index of instability 
fell for both DCs and LDCs in the period 1954-66, but the index for 
LDCs was still more than twice that for the DCs,
Many LDCs are very open economies, relying for a large part of their 
total income on export receipts. Table 4,2 provides some data on the
size of the export sector relative to the economy as a whole. For 25 of
these countries, export earnings were at least 40% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in 1972. Most of these countries have classic 'few crop’ 
economies. Not only are their export earnings derived from only a few 
commodities5 but the export sector is also the bulk of the economy, Howe- 
ever, export earnings were less than 40% of GDP for 87 of the LDCs and 
less than 20% for 60 of the LDCs.
Table 4.2 : Distribution of LDCs’ Export Earnings as a Percent of GDP, 1972
Export Earnings as Number of Cumulative
a Percent of GDP LDCs Total
100 - 3 3
80 - 100 4 7
60 - 80 10 17
40 - 60 8 25
20 - 40 27 52
10 - 20 35 87
0 - 10 25 112
Note: in some cases, the average value of exports for 1971 and 1972 were 
used.
Sources: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Commodity 
Trade and Price Trends, 1975 edition; International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics, December 1973.
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Consequently, significant fluctuations in export earnings can lead 
to substantial fluctuations in domestic income, both directly and through 
the operation of the multiplier» Such fluctuations may have adverse 
effects on the rato of economic development for a umber of reasons»
Firstly, export producers are unlikely to be sufficiently well organised 
(or sufficiently foresighted) to be able to offset good years against 
bad years. More likely, there will be substantial activity when export 
earnings are high and large numbers of producers will be driven out of 
business when export earnings are low* Under these circumstances, the •.
development of a stable export industry, on which development hopes can 
be pinned, is likely to be severely handicapped. At the same time, 
fluctuations in export receipts may severely damage development programmes ■ 
undertaken by the public sector. On the one hand, there is a direct effect 
in that there is no continuity in the availability of foreign exchange 
which is necessary to import investment goods. On the other hand, the 
revenue available to governments for domestic expansion will tend to 
fluctuate in line with domestic income. Thus, export instability is likely 
to lead to stop-go development programmes, which may be almost wholly 
ineffective,
A major cause of instability in LDC export earnings is instability 
in the commodity markets.' ' Production of primary commodities is subject 
to inherent uncertainties to a rather greater degree than manufacturing 
or services. Variations in the weather are the principal source of 
uncertainty for agricultural commodities. The supply of metals is reasonably
* For a review and discussion of the causes of instability in export
earnings, see A.MacBean, opocit,, Ch.2; and M.Michaely, Concentration 
in International Trade, North Holland Publishing Co., 1962, Cha.1 & 2^.
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stable but there can be wide swings in demand, in line with the level of 
economic activity in DCs, Furthermore, short-run supply and demand for 
most commodities are price inelastic so that small variations in either 
supply or demand can generate relatively large price changes.
Table 4.3 indicates actual variations in the prices of the 17
commodities covered by the UNCTAD proposals for an integrated programme,
F or the sake of comparison, we have included similar data for the U.S.
prices of several manufactured goods. Comparisons of the 'highs* and
'lows' clearly suggest that commodity prices are much more unstable than
(■•X-) ithe prices of manufactured goods.' ' This impression is confirmed by 
the coefficients of variation. Over the period 1951-1975, the coefficients 
of variation for the commodity prices (with the exception of bananas, wheat 
and rice) were at least twice those of manufactured goods.
Table 4.3/
%-x-
Note that these calculations are based on annual data; if we consider 
day-to-day quotations on the commodity markets, the variations in 
prices are much more pronounced. The high/low ratio for sugar prices 
for the period 1951 to 1975 turns out to be 52.21 when using current 
prices, and 19,26 when using deflated prices.
The coeSficients of variation become somewhat lower if the years 
1973-75 are omitted. Nevertheless, the coefficients remain much 
higher for commodities than for manufactured goods.
' 1 0 6 '
Table 4.3 s Variation in Commodity Prices, 1951-1975^^^
High Low 
(1975=100)
High
Low
Coefficient of 
Variation (b)
Bananas 214.1 100,0 2.14 ,18
Cocoa 190.7 54.9 3.47 .29
Coffee 288.2 100.0 2.88 .25
Tea 274.2 100.0 2.74 .26
Wheat 125.6 72.9 1.72 , 14
Rice 153.5 69.2 2.22 .21 "
Cotton 227.1 100.0 2.27 .22
3ute(c) 166.7 77.4 2.15 .21
Sisal(d) 144.5 41.4 3.49 . 38
Wool 324.7 100,0 3.25 .29
Beef(b ) 129.4 26.8 4.83 .55
Sugar 128.7 16.9 7.62 .61
Rubber 531.6 100.0 5.32 .38
Copper 285.3 100.0 2.85 .33 1
Tin 129.0 67.9 1.90 .20
Iron(c) 157.1 61.0 2.58 .25
Electrical machinery 
and equipment 127.0 100.0 1.27 .06
Mechanical power and 
transmission equipment 103*0 74.3 1.39 .10
New cars 153.2 100.0 1.53 .13(f)
Women's and girls' Apparel 140.8 100.0 1.41 .08
(a) Commodity prices were deflated by the UN world price index for all 
commodities. The prices of electrical machinery and equipment and 
mechanical power and transmission equipment were deflated by the US 
wholesale price index of durable manufactures. The prices of new 
cars and women's and girls' apparel were deflated by the US consumer 
price index.
The coefficient of variation is 
of the series to its mean value 
Series begins with 1954 
Series begins with 1955 
Series begins with 1952 
1953-75
the ratio of the standard deviation(b)
(c)(d)
(e)
(f)
Sources; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Commodity 
Trade and Price Trends, 1976 edition; U.N., Food and Agriculture 
Organisation, Trade Yearbook; U.N,, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics' 
U.S.Department of Labour, Bureau of Labour Statistics, Consumer 
Prices and Price Indices; Bureau of Labour Statistics, Wholesale 
Prices and Price Indices; coefficient of variation obtained from 
D.L.McNicol, Commodity Agreements and the New International 
Economic Order, California Institute of Technology, November 1975*,
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The high degree of export instability in many LDCs is often the result 
of their high degree of concentration on primary product exports, and of 
the concentration of many LDCs on only one or two products. Most of the 
instability seems to be attributable to fluctuations in supply, rather 
than to fluctuations in demand. Climatic conditions may lead to substantial 
variations in supply of agricultural products, whilst for a number of 
products there may be a cobweb relationship between price and volume changes 
which breeds a continuous instability. Even for mining products, substantia, 
fluctuations in supply may arise as a result of strikes, political distur- 
bancBS, wars, etc* Indeed, MacBean'  ^ lays most of the blame for export 
instability in seven of the twelve most unstable countries at the doors of 
these latter factors. To the extent that there are fluctuations in world 
demand for primary products, it is argued that these cannot be quickly 
matched by supply responses. That is, a rise in the world price does not 
lead to any appreciable expansion of output of agricultural produce, without 
some time lag, and even mining output may be determined more by considera­
tions of an optimal output for the existing capacity than by price levels.
If the governments of LDCs have sufficient foreign exchange reserves 
to be able to finance temporary shortfalls of export earnings, the foreign 
exchange constraint on maintaining continuity of development programmes 
is removed. However, the same degree of uncertainty and consequent dis­
incentive would persist in the private sector, unless some stabilisation 
scheme is undertaken to provide continuity of income for export producers. 
But shielding export producers by fiscal methods would place an additional 
strain on government revenues at times when the government was suffering ; 
from a revenue shortfall in any case. Thus, the instability in the private 
sector can only be eliminated if the public sector is to bear the whole
MacBean, op. cit., p.55
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burden of instability* Moreover, it is clear that most LDCs do not have 
adequate foreign exchange reserves with which to finance temporary export 
shortfalls. Such reserves could be built up only at the cost of postponing^ 
purchases of investment goods for numbers of years. The choice, then, is 
between postponing development and proceeding with discontinuous development
The degree of export instability would obviously be reduced by a greater 
diversification of export products* Empirical studies' ' suggest no sig­
nificant relationship between export stability and export diversification, 
but this is partly due to the fact that such studies take no account of the % 
natures of the products involved. For example, it is not obvious that 
having two export goods, rubber and coffee, is better than having one export 
good; tea. However, it seems likely that having rubber and coffee is better 
than having only coffee, (though it may not be if rubber is a very unstable, 
priced commodity). The general point of diversification is that changes 
in one direction for some commodities are likely to be offset by opposite 
changes for other commodities, In any case, no single commodity will have '"'1 
as much influence on the level of domestic activity if there are a large 
number of export goods.
The effect of changes in a commodity’s price therefore depends in part#
r-->
on the extent of diversification of LDCs* exports. LDCs are often regarded 
as ’one crop’ or ’few crop’ economies, i.e. nations which derive the bulk 
of their incomes from the export of only a few commodities. The data 
presented in Table 4.4 indicate that many LDCs fit this description.
it For example, see Coppock, op.cit,
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Table 4.4 ; Percent of LDCs’ 
except Petr oleum
Export Earning 
, 1974
s Derived from Commodities
Percent of Export Largest Commodity 
Earnings from; Export
Largest Three 
Commodity 
Exports
All
1
Commodity
Exports
Number Cumulative No. Cum. No. Cum,
90 - 100 1 1 6 6 12 12
80 - 90 4 5 5 11 12 24
70 - 80 4 9 6 17 15 39
60 70 6 15 11 28 13 52
50 - 60 12 27 15 43 12 64
40 - 50 7 34 10 53 9 73
30 - 40 12 46 11 64 9 82
20 - 30 18 64 11 75 9 91
10 20 15 79 7 82 5 96
0 — 10 35 114 32 114 18 114
Source s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Commodity trade and Price trends, 1975 edition.
A number of LDCs pre literally a one crop/product economy, such as 
Mauritius (sugar), British West Indies (bananas), Cuba (sugar), 
Cameroon (coffee), Chad (cotton), Ghana (cocoa), Liberia (iron ore), 
Zambia (copper),,Nepal (rice), and Sri Lanka (tea). Moreover, approxi­
mately half of the LDCs derive at least 40 per cent of their export 
earnings from three or fewer commodities, and only 18 of the 114 LDCs 
obtain less than 10 per cent of their export earnings from commodities,
In addition, the real prospects of export diversification are 
probably not great without incurring considerable cost. Diversification 
of agricultural products is not likely to reduce instability if the main 
problem is a cycle of droughts and good harvests. Indeed, given that
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the existing products are probably chosen for their abilities to with­
stand climatic variations, the degree of instability might bo increased j 
by diversification. Equally, if the main destabilising influence is the 
business cycle in developed countries, the demand for all primary pro­
ducts is likely to move in line, so that diversification will have no 
marked effect. The real advantage of diversification lies in its shielding 
effect on the economy from supply induced changes in price, when the supply 
variations come from other LDCs. But, assuming that the existing export 
goods are those in which the country has its greatest comparative advan­
tage, diversification of export goods can only be achieved at some cost 
of reduced income. Whether or not diversification can achieve any signifi 
cant increase in export stability without imposing very substantial costs 
is an empirical question which may be expected to produce different 
answers for different LOCs.
International Commodity Agreements
One method of attempting to reduce export instability of primary
producing countries has been to establish international commodity,
(#)agreements. In general, however, these agreements aim at stabilising
the price of the commodity in question, rather than stabilising the ■ 
incomes of producers® That is, either international buffer stocks are 
set up and implemented in order to stabilise price by adjusting inter­
national demand, or quotas, equal to estimated world demand at the
* In this chapter, we will be concerned with analysing the economic 
theory and rationale underlying such agreements rather than 
reviewing the success (or otherwise) of commodity agreements to 
date. A number of studies have alteady performed the latter task: 
in particular, see A.D.Law, International Commodity Agreements, 
Lexington Books, 19755 Marian Radetzki, International Commodity 
Market Arrangements, London: C.Hurst, 1970; and A.MacBean, Export 
Instability and Economic Development, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1966.
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desired price, are allocated to producing and exporting countries.
But stabilisation of commodity prices and stabilisation of export 
earnings may be mutually exclusive objectives, unless the export 
instability is due to fluctuations in demand rather than fluctuations 
in supply.
A pure buffer stock is a means for reducing the magnitude of
price fluctuations. In practice, this involves an International
Commodity Organization (iCO) trading on one or more of the commodity
exchanges in an attempt to stabilise the price® More precisely, a
’target’ price would be established and the managers of the ICO
would be instructed to trade so as to keep price within (say) ± 10
(-!{■)per cent of the target price®' However, a buffer stock tS only 
intended to even out short-term transitory changes in price5 it is not 
intended to alter the average level of prices that would prevail in 
the absence of the buffer stock. In other words, the target price 
should be close to the long-run equilibrium price®
The diagrams below (Figures 4.1(a) to 4.2(b)) illustrate the effects 
of buffer stock policies in cases whore the main destabilising influence 
is, firstly, supply variations, and secondly, demand variations. Figure 
4 .1(a) illustrates the effects of variations in volume of supply in the 
absence of any attempt to stabilise the price of the commodity® Export 
earnings of the producing countries are OP^RQ^ in low supply years, and
An alternative method would be to use a quantity rule, such as the 
ratio of stocks to consumption. The ICO would be empowered to 
purchase when the stock to consumption ratio rose some fraction
above a specified level and to sell when the ratio was some
fraction below target* But the quantity rule may not be feasible
due to lack of adequate data on stocks.
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OPgTQg in high supply years. If the elasticity of demand is equal to 
unity, changes in price will completely offset changes in supply, so 
that export earnings will not vary. Only where the elasticity of 
demand is significantly higher or lower than one wdjI I  supply variations 
produce substantial instability in export earnings.
Figure 4.1(b) illustrates the effect.- of introducing a buffer 
stock scheme. The price is set at a predetermined level P*. When 
supply exceeds the demand that is forthcoming at this price (Q#), the 
buffer stock buys up the excess supply. Thus, when supply is S^? the 
buffer stock will be purchasing When supply is low, as at S.,
the buffer stock releases part of its stocks to meet the excess demand, 
(At , the buffer stock sells Q Q*.) In this case, however, the export 
earnings of the producer countries are made unstable by the operation of 
the buffer stock to stabilise price. That is, in low supply years, 
earnings are only ÜP#RQ^, whereas in high supply years earnings rise to
OPaTQg"
Figure 4.2(a) illustrates the effects of variations in demand in 
the absence of a buffer stock scheme. In low demand years, export 
earnings will be As can be seen, demand variations may lead
to considerable export instability, whether we look at prices, volumes, 
or earnings.
Figure 4.2(b) illustrates the effects of the buffer stock scheme.
The price is set at P*, so that the volume supplied at that price is Q*. 
When demand is low, there will be an excess supply (QgQ*) which is pur­
chased by the buffer stock. When demand is high, the excess demand
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(Q^’Q^) will be satisfied by sales from the buffer stock. Thus, the 
earnings of producers will be stabilised at the amount OP*VQ* in 
every time period.
It can be seen, then, that buffer stock schemes are able to 
stabilise the incomes of primary producers only when the instability %
derives from demand variations. When the instability is supply induced, 
it is extremely likely that the operation of a buffer stock scheme 
will increase the instability of export earnings.
Quota schemes, on the other hand, are able to produce considerably
less price stability, but may operate to stabilise export earnings. In
general, it is true that a quota scheme will reduce earnings instability, 
regardless of whether the instability is supply or demand induced, so
long as the elasticity of demand is less than one.
Consider first supply induced instability as illustrated in Figure 
4.1(at) and 4.1(b). The quota scheme would operate to prevent exports 
exceeding Q*, so that the excess supply of high supply years (Q^Q.) 
would have to be destroyed in order to prevent the price from falling 
below P*. Now, if the elasticity of demand is less than unity^  ^^ the 
quota scheme sets a lower limit to export earnings which is higher than 
the lower limit obtained in the free market (i.e. OP*VQ* in Fig,4,1(b)> 
OP2 TQ2  in Fig.4.1(a)). On the other hand, if the elasticity of demand is 
greater than unity, the quota scheme sets an upper limit to export earnings
which is lower than the upper limit obtained in the free market (OP*VQ* ^
(“K'-K-) 1OPgTQp) In either case, export earnings instability is reduced, but T
* in which case, a price rise would lead to an increase in total proceeds, 
since, in this case, a price rise would lead to a fail in total revenue.
 ^ ■  ' ' 1
■ î
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iunless the elasticity of demand is less than unity, stability is achieved ;
4at the expense of eliminating the higher earnings rather than by élimina- T 
ting the lower earnings, x;
J
i
Obviously, the quota scheme cannot bring forth supply which does not %  
exist so that; in low supply years, the free market will operate and price 
will be forced up as in Fig.4.l(a),
1
Where the instability is demand induced, the quotas are set to match 2 
demand at the desired price P*. At this price, however, quotas will be 
unfilled in high demand years, since suppliers will not supply more than | 
Q* at a price of P*. In high demand years, then, the free market will 
reign and price will rise as in Fig.4.2(A). In low demand years, supply 
will be restricted below Q*, so that total quotas will equal when 
demand is If the elasticity of demand is less than one, the quota
scheme sets a lower limit to export earnings which is higher than the 
lower limit sot by the free market (OP'^TQ^ in Fig.4.2(b) > QP^TQ^ in 
Fig.4.2(A)). In that case, the quota scheme reduces the degree of export 
earnings instability and allows a higher average level of earnings. On 
the other hand, if the elasticity of demand is greater than unity (OP^TQ^ 
in Fig.4.2(a) > OP^TQ^ in Fig.4,2(b)), the quota schema sets a lower limit 
on export earnings which is lower than that obtained in the free market.
SO that export instability is increased and the average level of export
( ^ )earnings is reduced,' ^
-K - Since Q an elasticity value of less than unity results in an
increase in total revenue as a result of the price increase, while 
an elasticity value of greater than unity causes a fall in total 
revenue.
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On the whole, it may be argued that quota schemes are only likely 
to prove satisfactory for products for which the elasticity of demand 
is low. Although it is alleged that this tends to be true of primary 4
products, it is by no means clear that low price elasticity of 
demand characterises those primary products for which there are avail- |
able natural or synthetic substitutes.
So far as the objective of stabilising export earnings is concerned.
then, buffer stock schemes are useful only when the instability is demand | 
induced , whilst quota schemes are only effective when the elasticity i- 
of demand is below unity. Buffer stock schemes require a substantial 4Iinvestment in financial resources and inventories if they are to be 
effective, so that there is a clear cost to be borne by participating J 
countries. Quota schemes are intended to avoid this cost but, in fact, 
they frequently need to be accompanied by buffer stock arrangements in 
each producing country in order to prevent quota variations from impinging 
on levels of employment in the export industry. Also, the allocation of 
quotas among producing countries may be extremely inefficient and may 
bear little relation to their shares of a free market. Consequently, the 
total cost of production of any given world output may be increased. 
Finally, even if all the conditions for stabilisation of total export 
earnings from a given commodity are met, there is no reason to suppose 
that each individual exporting country will share in this stability.
See, for example, R.Nukse, Patterns of Trade and Development,
Oxford, filackwell 1962
’Trade Fluctuations and Buffer** R.Nurkse's calculations (summarised in
Policies of &ow-Income Countries’, Kyklos, 1958-9, pp.141-42) indicate 
quantities fluctuate most, while the UN’s International Compensation 
for Fluctuation in Commodity Trade (New York, 1961, p.4) credits prict 
as the major source. A.MacBean also provides overwhelming evidence tc 
suggest that fluctuations in export earnings are supply-induced rathci 
than demand-induced. See A.MacBean, Export Instability and Economic 
Development, op.cit., 1966, p.57
.118.
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A slight variation in the operations of a buffer stock scheme is 
likely to exist in practice; this relates to the imposition of upper 
and lower limits around a desired price, as shown in Figure 4.3. It 
is assumed that the demand curve (d ) remains stable whule supply varies 
from 5. (bad crop years) to (good crop years). The target price with 
the buffer stock is set at , which can be assumed to be equal to long- 
run average cost, and the lower and upper bounds to be defended are P ’ 
and P"'respectively. When supply is at S., the buffer stock would be 
required to make sales equal to the difference between demand (Qd”) and 
production (Qs”) at price P". When supply is at the buffer stock 
would make purchases equal to (Qs* - Qd*).
Costs of buffer stocks
Discussions of Commodity agreements often seem to assume that the
capital costs of establishing and operating a buffer stock would be 
(•w)modest^ \  This supposition probably reflects the fact that the tin 
buffer stock - the only buffer stock to operate in the post-war years » 
is email and relatively inexpensive. But it can be argued thd:tie tin 
buffer stock has been too small to have a significant effect on the 
price of tin . In many cases, a relatively large buffer stock will 
be required to obtain an acceptable degree of price stability.
* See, for example, 'An Integrated Programme for Commodities',
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and 
Development Board, TO/S/C,1/194, October 1975.
-x-x- A report by the US Treasury, Office of Raw Materials and Oceans
Policy, argues that the success of the tin agreement in preventing 
large price declines seems to have been due primarily to the use 
of export quotas.
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{■X' )A study by McNicol' calculated that the maximum size of a 'properly 
managed’ copper stock for the period 1954-1973 was 4.8 million tons, 
which would have had an acquisition value of approximately /5 billion#
On the other hand, the maximum size of the tin stock was estimated to 
be 384,000 metric tons with an acquisition cost of about /BOO million#
The size of the buffer stock that an ICO must be prepared to hold 
obviously depends on the magnitude of shifts in supply and/or demand 
and the degree of price stability desired. Consider a simple model, 
in which demand remains constant while supply varies. We can derive 
a, formula to compute estimates of the maximum capital requirements of a 
buffer stock. Let the target price be P*, and the upper and lower prices 
to be defended by P" and P ’ respectively# The price boundaries can then 
be stated as;
P" = (1 + V) P* (4.1)
and P' = (1 - V) P* (4.2)
Assume that demand and supply are described, respectively, by
Qd ™ d ( l ± f )  4" gP (4o3)
Qs “ a(l 6 b) 4 cP (4.4)
where f and b are ’shift variables’. A positive value for b shifts 
supply to the right and a negative value shifts supply to the left.
* O.L.McNicol, "Commodity Agreements and the New International 
Economic Order", California Institute of Technology, November 
1976. McNicol obtained both the deflated price of copper and 
the estimated price with a buffer stock from the US Department 
of the Treasury,Office of Raw Materials and Oceans Policy, A 
Review of Past and Prospective Commodity Policy for Selected 
Non-Fuel Minerals, Washington, February 1976, p.74. His results 
assume that the initial stock is zero and that purchases and 
sales are made so as to maintain price within i 7.5 per cent of 
the five-year lagged moving average price.
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Similarly, a positive value for f shifts the demand curve up and a
negative value shifts the demand curve down.
One of the cases contained in this model, is illustrated in 
Fig#4.3. In this figure, it is assumed that f = o, i.e. that demand 
is stable. Supply is assumed to be So under average conditions (b ~ 0), 
and to shift between S. and with variations in, for example, the 
weather. When supply is at S^, the buffer stock must purchase a 
quantity Qd* - Qs’ to maintain price at its lower bound P *.
Assume that, because of shifts in supply and/or demand, the floor
price P ’ - (1 - V)P% must be defended. The total amount demanded by
consumers of the commodity plus purchases by the buffer stock (S*) must
equal supply for P* to be maintained. Therefore
d(l - f) 4- g(l - V)P* -f S* ™ a(1 -h b) + c(l - V)P* (4*5)
Expanding, we obtain; d-df+gP^-gvP^+S* - a+ab+cP*-cvP* (4.6)
and (d 4' gP#) - df - gvP* 4- S* - (a 4- cP-x-) + ab - cvP* (4,7)
Each of the bracketed terms is equal to Q*, so that
S* = (df + ab) + V(g - c)P* (4.8)
Dividing by Q*, we obtain
5* = = (df + ab) + (E - E ) v (4.9)
Q* " Q* ~  ° ^
where s* =% S*/Q* is the maximum annual increment to the buffer stock as
a proportion of base production, and E^ and E^ are, respectively, the
elasticities of demand and supply. The value of the stock i# P*S*.
Note that E - dQ , P == g . JP
dP Q Q
and E = d Q . P  = c . P
® dP Q Q
- t'--’-' • î'f ” ■■ -p iiï'-'y’.;:
- ' . A
4 2 &
Equation (4.9) can be used to compute the estimates of the costs of 
buffer stocks. Different values could be assigned to the 'shift 
parameters' b and f, while the price band operating in existing 
commodity agreements would give some indication about the value of V. 
The values of E , E^, P*, and Q-* can be obtained from a number of
studies, «
The values of the intercept of the demand and supply functions 
can also be derived, using equations (4.3) and (4,4). Consider the 
supply function intercept, a.
Since Q* = a + cP^
a := Q* - cP*
Dividing by Q*,
a = 'i - c
W* Q*
But c P* “ E^ (and g P* E ,)
« a = 1 - E^ and a = Q* (1 - E ) (4.10)
® f ■q-K- ^ ®
Similarly, d - (1 - E.).
I
The elasticities of supply and demand for cocoa, coffee, tea, wool, 
cotton, wheat, rice, and sugar can be obtained from E.G.Adams,
"An Econometric Model of the World Sugar Market", University of 
Pennsylvania, Department of Economics, discussion Paper No,330, 
October 1974, and E.G.Adams and J.Qehrman, Seven Models of Inter­
national Commodity Markets, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, December 1974. Other elasticities can be obtained 
from a number of publications of the Economic Analysis and Pro­
jections Department of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. Comprehensive computations have appeared in 
F „G,Adams and O.R.Behrman, Econometric Models of World Agricul­
tural Commodity Markets - Cocoa, Coffee, Tea, Wool, Cotton, Sugar, 
Wheat, Rice, Ballinger Book Co., 1976; and W.C.Labys (ad.), 
Quantitative Models of Commodity Markets, Ballinger Book Co., 1975.
f
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One interesting question, especially relevant to the UNCTAD 
proposals , is whether pooling buffer stock outlays would reduce 
the amount of capital required. Pooling would not reduce costs if 
the commodity markets move together, as they did in 1973-74. However, 
if the markets move independently, pooling would reduce capital costs 
since the stocks for some commodities would be at a high level (given 
low market prices), while those for others would be IwL (given high 
market prices). Table 4.5 shows the simple correlations between the s
deflated prices of 16 of the most important primary commodities in ■;
trade, It is significant that 64 out of the 120 correlation co-
efficients are either negative or zero. Commodity prices then do not j
move together in the same direction. For example, the price of sugar 
tended to be high when the price of bananas was low. This would suggest; 
that pooling could have substantial advantages. j
Although clearly relevant, capital costs are not the correct Î
measure of the costs of a buffer stock operation. There are four p
components to the total costs of a buffer stock. First, there is the 
interest cost on the funds employed, and secondly, the costs of storage.' 
Third, and ideally the smallest component, are the administrative i
expenses of the buffer stock organization. The last component is |
'trading cost', i.e. the difference between the acquisition cost of the 
stock and the revenue obtained when it is sold plus any brokerage fees. i 
It is quite possible for the buffer stock to make a trading profit.
* 'An Integrated Programme for Commodities', UNCTAD, op.cit.
mir The prices were deflated by the U.N.world price index for all
commodities.
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Benefits of Pure Buffer Stocks
The main argument in favour of buffer stocks is the alleged 
benefit likely to accrue to exporters as a result of a reduction 
in period-to-period variations in prices, A number of studies have 
attempted to compute the effects of price stabilisation on suppliers* 
profits and consumers* surplus. ' The computations rest on measured 
(or adopted) values of elasticities and hypothetical variations in 
demand and supply. Maissell assumes that supply and demand are 
described, respectively, by
”• aP 4- c (4.12)
= -bP + d (4.13)
where c and d are shift factors.
He then computes
and
G-x- = (a -f 2b)rDC - aerdd (4,14)
 —
G"X' = (2a -h W(fdd - bO'cc (4.15)
2 ( a “I- b
where G* and G* are, respectively, the expected gains from price 
stabilisation to sellers and consumers, and cc and dd are the 
variance of the shift parameters c and d.
2Multiplying and dividing by (P/Q) , (4*14) and (4.15) can be 
rewritten as:
GÜ = (E. - 2E^j)«ar(c) - Uar(d) £
2(E,
and G* = (2E - E.)Var(d) i- E Uar(c) P (4.17)c s d' ' d *
~~ - -2(1, -
where E and E . are , respectively, the elasticities of supply and 
demand, and Var(c) cc, Uar(d) =<rdd.
See, for example, B.Maissell, 'Price Stabilisation and Welfare',
n i i P i r t o r l v / .......................................   J.......  "  ---------------—
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Equations (4.16) and (4.17) can be used to compute the expected 
annual gains arising from price stabilisation. Crude estimates of ;
Uar(c) can be obtained by assuming, for example, that supply is 10%
above its base level (as measured by Q*) one third of the time, 10% /:
below base one third of the time, and at its base level one third of ;
the time. Given these assumptions, Uar(c) = («66 x 10 ^)Q#^. A 1
similar method of computation can be used to estimate Var(d). |
Conclusions j
While buffer stocks and production/export quota schemes form the 
core of most proposals for commodity agreements, other schemes do exist.
A third form of ICAs is the multilateral contract variety' in which 
a certain proportion of total trade is conducted on fixed price contracta 
between producing and consuming countries, whilst the remainder is conduct 
on the world free markets. This had the advantage of stabilising export 
earnings for a large part of trade without introducing any price rigidilis 
at the margin. The great problem is that of obtaining an agreed price 
between producing and consuming countries, in a situation where them 
is a long-term upward or downward movement in prices, one of the parties 
will find it desirable to adjust the contract price whilst the other 
will not.
If the main interest is in stabilising the export earnings of LOCs, 
in order to prevent wild fluctuations in their balance of payments %
position which result in stop-go development, the optimal policy may not
See O.E.Meade, ’International Commodity Agreements’, Lloyds Bank 
Review, Duly 1964, and C.D.Rogers, ’International Commodity Agree­
ments’, Lloyds Bank Review, Apri1 1973.
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bo commodity agreements at all, but rather, the provision of foreign
/(■yf \exchange reserves to smooth over fluctuations,' ' Difficulties in 
setting up commodity policies, and their general failure to achieve 
their objectives, have led both DCs and LDCs to look towards the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the instrument for providing a 
solution to export instability. Although compensatory finance is |
provided for LDCs which suffer an export shortfall, this has not so 
far been of very great assistance. In the first place, the amount 
of finance has been limited, so that not all of the instability can 
be compensated for. In the second place, the fixed repayment terms
imposed may mean that the provision of compensatory finance worsens -v;
%the instability. For example, finance borrowed in the first year of „s
Îa five-year cycle of export shortfall may have to be repaid in the
■Sthird year, so that easing the situation in the first year merely ‘f
results in a balance of payments situation that is worse when the
country is in the most adverse part of the cycle.
Clearly, if the main hope, as some would argue, of easing the 
effects of export instability lies in the creation of additional
compensatory finance by the IMF, very little progress can be made
unless more flexible repayment terms can be arranged.
* For details on how this scheme would operate, see R.M.SteCn,
‘International Compensation for Fluctuations in Commodity Trade*, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1963, p.267; 'Purchase 
Guarantees as a Means of Reducing Market Instability of Commodity 
Export Proceeds of Underdeveloped Countries', Kyklos, 1959, 3, 
pp.302-3; G.Lovasy, 'Survey and Appraisal of proposed Schemes of 
Compensation Financing’, IMF Staff Papers, Duly 1965, pp.107-8;
IMF, Compensatory Financing and Export Fluctuations, Washington D.C., 
1963; and IMF and IBRD, The problem of Stabilization of Prices of 
Primary Products, Washington D.C., 1969.
** More recent contributions to the discussion on commodity agree­
ments include: Commonwealth Secretariat, Terms of Trade Policy 
for Primary Commodities, Commonwealth Economic Papers No.4, 1975; 
HMSO/
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In the next chapter, we consider another aspect of the problem 
of primary commodities in international trade. This involves an 
economic analysis of domestic agricultural policies in certain 
developed countries that are held to distort the pattern of inter­
national trade and impede the workings of a freely competitive 
international market on the basis of comparative advantages in 
production.
##conte HMSO, World Economic Interdependence and Trade in Commodities, | 
Cmnd.5051, May 1975; L.St Clare Grondons, *A Built-in Stabiliser $ 
for Commodities*5 National Westminster Bank Review, Mau 1964: i
T.Killick, ’Commodity Agreements as International Aid’, National I
Westminster Bank Review, February 1967; S.Harris & T.Josling, '.j
"'Can World Commodity Prices be Explained?*, National Westminster ,
Bank Review, August 1974, ' .'|
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APPENDIX 4e1 2 Summary of Commodity Agreements and Arrangements in 
Force since World War Two
(a) Commodity agreements achieving global status
(1) International Coffee Agreements 
(1) Date: 1959-62
Membership; Exporting countries (including France, Portugal, and 
Britain on behalf of colonies)
Objectives; Limitation or elimination of price fluctuations: 
promotion of consumption 
(ii) Dates; 1963-68 and 1968-72
Membership : 41 exporting countries and 21 importing members 
Objectives: ’Equitable’ prices and balance between supply and 
demand with adequate supplies for consumers and markets for 
producers. Elimination of excessive price fluctuations and 
surplus production. Promotion of coffee consumption 
Methods; Export quotas, no buffer stock (Brazil main stockholding 
country). Floor and ceiling prices govern cuts and increases 
in export quotas (quarterly). Relative size of quotas reviewed 
annually. ’New consumer’ countries (LDCs) and East European 
imports not counted against quotas. 1968-72 Agreement included 
Diversification Fund to encourage re-use of coffee land 
Present Status; ICA put on standby in September 1973 following US 
refusal to agree to world price increase to compensate for dollar 
devaluation. Diversification Fund wound up. Negotiations con­
tinuing for new Agreement
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(2) International Tin Agreement
Dates; 1956-61, 1961-66, 1966-71, 1971-76, 1976- 
Membership; Producers are Malaysia, Bolivia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Zaire, Australia (totalling 90% of world production). 
Importing members are Britain, Canada, India, Australia, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, France, W.Germany, Ireland, Italy, Dapan, 
Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, S.Korea, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia, U.S.A. not 
a member (though accounting for 23% of world consumption)
Objectives; prevention of 'excessive* price fluctuations; supplies 
at prices ’remunerative’ to producers and 'fair' to consumers; 
importance to producing countries of ’maintaining and expanding 
their import-purchasing power* recognised.
Methods; international buffer stock with floor and ceiling price 
levels. Export quotas reinforce ’floor* price. Maximum stock 
size 20,000 tons, contributed in kind or cash by producing countries! 
(25,000 tons in First ITA), Buffer stock could be enlarged by credit
/■ipurchases. In fact, largest stock amounted to 23,000 tons in 1958 .<|i
when world price was £700 per ton. Floor and ceiling prices have 
been continually raised to keep pace with rising trend in world ;
prices. U.S. stocks have been the crucial factor affecting prices,-/
Present status; Agreement still active. Prices high historically.
(3) International Sugar Agreements
Dates; 1954-59, 1959-63, 1963-68, 1968-73, 1978-82 
Membership; All major exporting and importing countries except the 
EEC and the USA. New Agreement applies to about 13% of world 
production and 55% of world trade (the remaining 45% being traded 
under preferential arrangements).
. 1 3 1 .
Objectives; Maintenance of stable prices, 'reasonably* remunerative 
to producers; better balance between supply and demand; expansion 
of international trade, international co-operation on marketing. 
Methods; Export quotas for main exporters (Cuba, Australia, Taiwan, J
South Africa, Brazil, Poland, Czechoslovakia, India) are increased j
or decreased according to price levels. Importers undertake to %
%■ trestrict production of sugar.
Present status; 1968-73 Agreement abandoned after negotiations in
1973, when world prices were high and rose to an all-time peak. %ÎNo agreement on price levels over period 1974-77, or export quotas, 
or restriction on output (especially in the EEC). New Agreement 4
signed in October 1977 containing roughly the same orovisions and 
objectives (USA and EEC not members).
(4) Internabional Wheat Agreements (Wheat Trade Convention, Food Aid
Convention)
Dates: 1949-53, 1953-56, 1956-59, 1959-62, 1962-67, 1967-71, 1971-
Membership: Exporting members are Candda, the USA, Australia,
Argentina, EEC, Sweden, Greece, Kenya, Mexico, and Spain; importing '
'
members include the UK, Japan, and 22 developing countries. Commercé
Jsales within Convention account for 50% of world trade; all trans- iÿ 
actions (including government ones) account for 85%.
Objectives; Assurance of supplies of wheat and flour to importing, "• 
and markets for exporting, countries at equitable and stable prices";; 
promotion of trade also aimed at.
Methods: Floor and ceiling prices for commercial sales; mandatory 
proportions of purchases from members while world prices remain 
within limits.
Present status: Wheat Trade Convention purely consultative. Under 
Food Aid Convention, Argentina, Australia, Canada, the EEC, Finland,
?
#■fIJapan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA contribute 4 million 
metric tons annually to food aid reserves. f
’-■Î
(5) International Cocoa Agreements
Dates; 1973-76, October 1976-
Membership: 43 countries including, on the exporting side, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Brazil, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, the 
Dominican Republic, Togo, and Mexico, and, on the importing side 
Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Hungary, Rumania, Sweden, Trinidad/ 
Tobago, the UK, and the USSR. The USA is not a member. The Octobe 
1976 Agreement is not fully ratified yet, and the USA is not joinin
Oblectives; price stabilisation within floor and ceiling levels,
expansion of export earnings via increased consumption and product!
Methods ; floor and ceiling prices maintained by export quotas and J
buffer stock, financed by a levy on cocoa traded, by IMF buffer >
stock,facility, or through credit. j
Present status: First Agreement never operative since cocoa price ) 
remained consistently above the Agreement ceiling. Buffer stock 
non-existent, but funds mounting® The 1976 Agreement is active, | 
but cocoa price has been above ceiling level, and some CPA members:' 
may leave if the ceiling price is not raised. Buffer stock again,!; 
non-existent.
(6) International Olive Oil Agreement |
Dates: 1959- %-
Membership. EEC, Algeria, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Greece, Isr 
Libya, Morocco, Panama, Portugal, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey ah 
Yugoslavia»
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Objectives: Olive Oil Council appraises annually overall supplies and 
needs. EEC participates as both exporter and importer.
MethodsÏ Purely consultative.
Present status: In force with purely consultative status.
(b) Informal international commodity arrangements (IICA)
(7) IICA for the stabilisation of tea prices 
Oates: 1970-
Membership: 17 exporting countries (Sri Lanka» India, Indonesia, KenyaaBtfWrtiri^waX.'wiwuunWo-iiHrfiArw t M*»
Uganda, Malawi, Mozambique, Argentina, Zaire, Turkey, Tanzania, 
Mauritius, Taiwan, Rwanda, Cameroon, S.Vietnam, Burundi) and 14 
importing countries.
Objectives; Increased export earnings in real terms from tea. Co­
ordination and regulation of marketing policies. Export promotion. 
Metdiods: Informal export quotas administered by Exporters' Subgroup.
Proposals for minimum floor prices in December 1974,
Present status: operative.
(8) IICA for jute, kenaf and allied fibres
Dates: 1965- /
'1Membership: Exporters are India, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Indonesia;/ 
importers are Belgium, France, W,Germany, Italy, the UK, Japan, and 
the USA,
Objectives: price maintenance and stabilisation.
Methods: indicative price range; intention of phased buying by importe 
possibility of buffer stock.
Present status; not known.
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(9) IICA for sisal, henequen, and abaca
Dates g 1967 (sisal and hehequan)| 1958 (abaca)
Membership; Exporters are Brazil, Mexico, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Comoro Islands, Haiti, Indonesia, and Taiwan; 
the other 12 members are importers.
Objectives; Market regulation and stabilisation.
Methods; Indicative price ranges. Global and national export quotas«««.‘.««ji-njâJWwnaîîMïKrwM'»* '  —'  • I ■'
for sisal and henequ&n, and discussion of buffer stock.
Present status: Sisal/henequen arrangement operative: abaca arranqs^ 
ment inoperative since 1971,
(c) International Study Groups
(10) International Rubber Study Group  ^
Oates: 1944-
Membership : Most major trading countries (30 in all), including
Malaysia, Nigeria, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Australia, Canada, India, 4
the EEC, the USA, and the USSR. 3
1Objectives; Study of international action aimed at stabilising natural I
rubber prices. '
■ '1Methods; Research, Information, and consultation. .
. 1Present status; Active.
(11) FAQ Intergovernmental Group on Meat (FAO IG on Meat)
Date; 1971-
Membership: 54 importing and exporting members.
Objectives: Review of international meat trade and provision of
statistics and information. /
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P r e sent s ta tus; Active
(13) FAQ IG on Bananas 
Date g 1965-
Membership: All interested FAO members
Objectives % Price stabilisation and general information 
Methods g Studies of trade 
Present status; Active
(14) Interna LicmaJ- Load and ^ n c  Study jGroup 
Oates I960-
Methods; Discussion in content of FAO,
Present status; Active
(12) FAQ IG on Oilseeds, oils, and fats 
Date: 1966
Membership: All major countries except the USSR (which is not a %
member of the FAO).
Objectives: Review of trade.
i
Methods: Discussion I
Membership: All major countries, including Australia, Canada, India,
the UK, the USA, the USSR, and most EEC members. EEC has observer | 
status. Financed by members.
Objectives; Statistical information.
Present status; Active.
(d)/
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(d) Exporters' Organisations
(15) Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Dates 1950'“
Membership ; Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. ®
Objectives; to unify members' petroleum policies and safeguard their
interests generally.
Methods: Co-ordination of pricing policies and execution of oligopolist 
power to raise prices. |
Present status; Active !
(16) Organisation o¥ Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) '
Date; 1968-
Membership; Egypt, Kuwait, Algeria, Dubai, Libya, AbuDhabl, Qatar,a
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Bahrain,
Objectives: Co-ordination of members' activities in the oil industry. 
Methods: As in OPEC,
Present status: Active.
(17) Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC)
Date; 1968-
Membership: Chile, Peru, Zaire, Zambia,
Objectives: Co-ordination of measures to expand industry and copper 
exports, and increase in members' development resources. Attempts 
to stabilise and raise copper prices through joint action.
Methods; Sales cut of 10% from December 1974; increasing nationalisatiol 
of mining industries.
Present status: Active.
i
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(18) I n tern a i. i o n a 1 B a ux i te Association ( IBA ) y
Date s 1974—
Membership: Australia, Guyana, Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Surinam, Yugoslav
Objectives: Fair and remunerative returns for bauxite and alumina expor
Methods;^  Co-ordination of taxation and local ownership policies,
sta bus ; Active. :h
(19) Cafe Mondial 
pate: 1973-
Membership: Exporting countri0s,
Objectives: Price support,
Me^odsj Withholding of production. Heavily dependent on Brazilian 
finances,
P r s  B n t s t a t ii s : Active
(2 0) Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UBEC)
Date; 1974-
Membersh^s Mainly Latin America,
Objectives: Price increase and stabilisation.
Methods: Co-ordination of export taxation policies.
Present status ; In its infancy,
(21) Cocoa Producers' Alliance (CP A)
Date; 1962—
Membership: Brazil, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Gabon 
Ecuador,
Objectives: Price stabilisation; promotion of exports.
Methods: Export quotas ; surplus stock control and disposal indicator 
prices. j
Present status: 'Economic' clauses are inactive. Production sales j 
promotion encouraged,
*
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(22) Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries (ANRPC) '9
Dates 1975- “i
Membership: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua-New Guinea, Singapore, |
Sri Lanka, Thailand. i
Objectives; Stabilisation of natural rubber prices.
Methods; Buffer stock and supply control arrangements. J
Present status: First two-year agreement signed in December 1976 by
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Singapore. Members to |
provide finance for buffer stock of up to 100,000 metric tons. F
Sources: Adapted from K.Morton and P^Tulloch, Trade and Developing Countries^ 
GDI. Groom Helm, London 1 9 7 7 7
For a review of agreements operative in the pre-Second World War period,^ 
see J.W.F.Rowe, Primary Commodities in International Trade, Cambridge i
University Press, 1965; B.C.Swerling, ’Buffer Stocks and International Î
Commodity Problems’, Economic Journal, December 1953; Max Gideonse, '
’Commodity Agreements and Methods of Trade’, New Brunswick, N.3.1943; {
B.Wallace and L.Edminster, International Control of Raw Materials, j
Washington, O.C., Brookings Institution, 1930; and S.S.Tsou and 3.0. ,
Black, ’International Commodity Agreements’, Quarterly Journal of I
Economics, August 1944, pp.534-49. ]
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CHAPTER FIVE
AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SUGAR
I
»‘l 40'“
In this chapter, we will adopt a partial equlibrium, comparative
this typo of analysis has proved very useful in the literature, and can 
shed considerable light on important agricultural issues.' * The
«Agricultui^l Policy and International Trade in Sugar JT1
static type of analysis to study the different agricultural policies i
■
operated today and how they influence international trade in commodi- 
ties in general, and in sugar, in particular. Despite its shortcomings,
presentation will assume two countries, an exporter (country e) and an 
importer (country m), both of which produce sugar under free trade con­
ditions and there are initially no transport costs. The first trade \
barrier we consider is the one most commonly used, the tariff,
r FIn Fig.5-1, the free trade equilibrium at price *
* i-implies trade at the level Qp» The imposition of the tariff, T, f
reduces quantity traded to Qy: in the exporting country e, quantity
supplied falls by yz, but quantity demanded increases by wx; in the -t
importing country m, quantity supplied rises by ab, but the quantity 
demanded falls by cd. Assuming that the marginal utility of money is ■
constant across the too countries, and that the income effects of a ;r’
( )change in the price of sugar are negligible' \  the gains and losses 
from the tariff may be summed as follows: consumers in country e gain 
P EilP I, while producers lose f. consumers in country m lose
* The most obvious example is the continuing controversy over the UKs
replacement of the Deficiency Payment Schemes operated since the I
1930s as the means of farm income support by the European Economic 
Community’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). See, in particular, -ü
T.E.Oosling, Agriculture and Britain's Policy Dilemma, Thames Essay I
No.2, Trade Policy Research Centre, 1970; and T.E.Josling et al, j
Burdens and Benefits of Farm Support Policies, Agricultural Trade 
Paper No.1, Trace Policy Research Centro, 1972. 1
** The latter assumption is quite plausible given the relatively small ,
expenditure on sugar by households compared with total income.
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while producers gain f the government in m gains
f»g* K ’l* in tariff revenues. It may be shown that the summation yields 
a "deadweight" loss equal to nrt in the central, trade graph, this loss 
being apportioned nrs to the importer (since consumers now pay higher 
prices) and srt to the exporter ( since the producers now receive lower 
prices)« Note also that transfer payments to the government of the 
importing country m equal the rectangle vntu (quantity traded multiplied 
by tariff rate).
The tariff analysed here could be either an ad valorem tariff or a 
specific tariff. Similarly, transportation costs are analogous to a 
tariff in terms of deadweight loss, although they yield no revenues to 
the government. Figure 5.1 could be used to demonstrate equally well the 
effects of a quota imposed by the importing country. If the quota set 
equals QT, the effects, in terms of price changes from the equilibrium 
free trade situation, are exactly as for the tariff T, The deadweight 
loss is also exactly as before, but the distribution of government 
revenues is different; there are no such revenues. The suppliers in the 
exporting country 0 receive the full sum which previously accrued to the 
government in tn. Should the government in e be the export agent, it 
receives these revenues; should the government in m auction the quota QT 
competitively, then it receives the revenues and the tariff and quota 
become exactly equivalent. Under the United States Sugar Act, quotas 
were allocated to "friendly" foreign suppliers. Since the exporting 
governments were usually also the export agents, the revenues from possess-?
("M" ) -Iion of a quota passed on to them. ' Under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
* It is, therefore, hardly surprising to discover that such governments 
expended large sums of money in lobbying in Washington for the mainte­
nance or expansion of quotas. F.O.Licht reports that Brazil, for 
example, paid /180,000 in 1973 to its agent in Washington. See F.O. 
Licht, International Sugar Newsletter, Ratzeburg, Germany, Dec.1974.
 '^1
i1 # 3"“ 'ï'
the Sugar Boards were,effectively,the export agents of the respective ;
governments, which therefore benefited From holding such sugar quotas, ]
The European Economic Community protects its domestic beet sugar 
industry with a fairly recent type of agricultural policy, a variable -
levy on imports. This is shown in Figure 5.2, where pTH refers to the .1
threshold price, and Qtg is quantity traded under the levy with threshold j
TH Ïprice Pg . The EEC decides upon a minimum import or "threshold" price;
pfH. If this price is less than the free-trade equilibrium price (as ^
happened dur ng the commodity price boom years of 1973 and 1974), it has %
no impact, e.g. in our diagram. Should this price, however, exceed
the equilbrium price e.g. in Fig.5.2, imports are restricted to
that quantity entering at this price, Q^2* The effect may again be
interpreted as being exactly equivalent to a tariff of magnitude pt)
Because the EEC demands competitive bidding on the quantity .to be imported
at price P^^, all of the government revenues accrue to the EEC and none
to tho exporting country's government. In the recent past (before 1973 ^
and from 1975 onwards), the threshold price for sugar was fixed by the
EEC at a level such as at which no imports occurred. Under the Lome ^
Convention, a prohibitive variable levy exists, but export quotas have
been allocated to those countries which were the exporting parties under T
the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.
We will now expand briefly on the operations by any agency in 
intervention buying. The objectives are usually to support farm prices | 
and incomes, and the agencies are generally subsidised. The purchasing 
operations of this type of organisation are shown in Fig,5.3, in which
# For further details on the various prices existing under the CAP, 
see below.
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a hypothetical agency is empowered to purchase any amount oF the commodity i 
at a flow price, P|_» Wo thus obtain a perfectly elastic demand curve at 
Pj_, so that the total demand curve facing farmers becomes the sum of the
agency*3 demand curve and the normal downward-sloping domestic demand %
curve' '; this is shown as the curve FGH. The agency can therefore
expect to purchase the quantity be at the intervention price P , Domestic i
demand falls by bd, domestic output rises by ac, and an export (stored) 
surplus of be is created. Note that 0^$ S^, and are domestic demand, 
domestic supply, and world supply curves ( the last curve is perfectly 
elastic at the world free market price of Py). After the imposition of 
a variable import levy equal to P^Pw, the world supply curve becomes 
%  + I * In comparison with the free world market pricing situation, |
farmers’ incomes increase by (OP, »0„ 0P,,,.0_) « but net incomes increaseL. Lf UJ d
by the amounts in the areas (A 4- B + C + H + 3), Clearly, continuous |
intervention involves a cost to consumers in the form of higher prices 
(Pj_. instead of P^); the loss in consumer surplus is (A -f B 4- H + 3 4- I +
G 4- F 4 5). Since purchasing costs of produce into intervention may not 
be fully recoverable from sales, the liability to the Exchequer is equal
to the amount in the areas (B 4- C 4- D + E 4- F 4 G 4* H 4 L 4 K) ^
The variable import levy is generally associated with the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the EEC, The threshold price set for imported 
produce is the lowest price at which imports can enter the EEC. After 
the addition of transport costs from the ports to different markets, the 
threshold price reaches a target price. The variable import levy that is
For a useful survey of the CAP, see ’The Economics of Agricultural 
Policy’, by D.Colman and 3 .Ficlnerney, in Current Issues in Economic 
Policy, (eds.) P.M.Grant and G.K.Shaw, Philip Allan, Oxford 19^5,
Since consumers pay a higher price, there will be a fall in real 
incomes; the exact effects of this fall will depend on the proportion 
of income spent on sugar, and on the price elasticity of demand for 
sugarI the actual amount spent has changed form Oq.OPy to Ob'OP^»
^47.
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imposed is equal to the difference between the threshold price and |
the world free market price. This levy alone may not be^î enough, 
however, to guarantee that the domestic market price remains at the 
target level; this will be the case only if a country is a net 
importer of the commodity in question. If the country is producing 
a surplus of the commodity, or builds up a surplus as a result of the 
variable import levy, then the excess of domestic output over domestic (
■Idemand will tend to drive down the internal price below the target ":l
Iprice. Tho EEC prevents such a situation from arising by setting an -j
intervention price a little below the target price, at which price the 
intervention agency starts buying market surpluses in order to keep 
the internal price at the target level.
I
The major problem faced by intervention agencies relates to the
disposal of the purchased commodity. In the 1950s and 1950s the United Æ
States donated surpluses as food aid to less developed countries.
Another possibility would be for the agency to dispose of the commodity ;1
on the world market, accepting the trading losses that follow. The EEC if
has recently disposed of vast surpluses of butter, beef, and sugar by 
subsidising their sales on the world market at prices well below inter 
vention prices. When the commodities involved are traded on the inter- |
national market, an obvious method of causing a divergence between 
domestic and international prices is the imposition of taxes or payment 
of subsidies on the traded produce. Both these instruments are employed 
under the CAP, in the form of import levies and export subsidies.'
* Variable import levies are designed to raise domestic prices above 
world free market levels for commodities which the country would 
have to import at the free market price; export subsidies achieve 
basically the same outcome as import levies or tariffs, but for 
commodities which the country exports under a protected domestic 
price.
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free market price,
These two policies are shown in Figs.5.4 and 5,5. Fig.5.4 has already 
been partly explained as it is contained in Fig.5.3. Pyy is the €
threshold price below which no imports are allowed, and is enforced by
charging levies to importers, the amount varying directly according to ■§
the desired level of price support, and inversely related to the world
3There are a number of effects which import levy policies share in 
common with intervention buying and export subsidy policies, but not 
with a policy of deficiency payments which guarantee minimum producer ’4
prices. For example, pushing domestic price from py to raises 
domestic production from Oa to Ob, but reduces demand from Od to Oc; 
imports therefore fall Trorn ad to be. Consumers are forced to pay a 
higher price, causing a reduction in consumer surplus given by the area 
W 4 X 4 Y 4 Z, It is because of these various effects that guaranteed 
prices through deficiency payments are considered more beneficial to 
domestic consumers and overseas producers than import levy and inter- 
vencion buying schemes for supporting farm incomes. The choice of 
policy is not so important for domestic producers since their total 
income will in any case increase by (Oh.OPyu -- Oa,DPy)« Since the 
government receives revenue in the form of levies amounting to (bc.P^Pyu)
Ior area Y , taxpayers in theory also benefit..  ^ ;
Fig.5.5 shows that an export subsidy scheme has almost identical
seffects as import levies, with one notable exception; the taxpayer bears 
the subsidy cost of export given by (ad.PyPg) or the area X 4 Y 4 Z,
"K" This is not the case for the British taxpayer under the CAP, since
of all revenues from food imports into the UK are transferred i
to the Agricultural Fund of the EEC and nob retained by the Exchequer,'
s"w
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Domestic consumers again suffer higher prices, with the loss in con- J
sumer surplus given by W + X , while foreigh producers have to face 1
,1additional competition on international markets against subsidised ;
produce* Producer incomes rise by (Od.OPg - Oc.OP^) while net farm |
incomes increase by the area W + X + Y. The use of export subsidies 
is particularly relevant to the CAP of the EEC, especially as before ^
Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973, the Six was already producing a i
surplus of sugar at target prices well above prevailing world free ?‘f
Imarket prices. The situation under the Lome Convention is more complex; 
Britain imports 1*4 million tons of sugar from Commonwealth countries $
each year and all other sugar exporters are barred entry into tne Nine 
with the use of prohibitive variable import levies« This, however, 
results in a net surplus of sugar for the Nine which is disposed of on 
the world free market with the help of export subsidies at the lower 
free market prices* |
The next trade barrier (in the form of an agricultural policy) we 5 
consider is tho direct subsidization of production of a commodity in the i 
importing country: such a policy is often called a deficiency payments 
scheme. While such payments are not very significant at present in the 
sugar-importing countries, they may be considered as feasible or ‘superior’ 
alternatives to tariffs or quotas. Consider Fig.S.G. We again assume an 
infinitely elastic supply of the commodity on the world market at price P y
If the government guarantees a price equal to Pg to producers, domestic
output will rise by the amount ab. Since domestic supply can be disposed ' 
of only at price in competition with imports, the increase in domestic 
production has the effect of reducing imports by an equivalent amount (ab)*
But the price that households pay and the quantities that they consume
151
§IaiI•H
%Q
W B1
œ
inIfxt
I
Ii
S
10
inICm
(S'
Ck:- Ck
-ill
u
X 3 $ <3
Û - 1 - ^
I
ci Ï
:
i
remain unchanged at Py and c respectively„ Taxpayers as a group, 
however, make a transfer payment (subsidy)' equal to the area X + Y $
to domestic producers via the Exchequer» The total revenue that |
accrues to producers increases from Oa.OPw to Ob.OPg, while net farm ■'Vj
incomes rise by the area X. I-I
i.We can now examine the effects of a deficiency payments scheme on *
trade. This is shown in Fig,5.7. Again, the free trade equilibrium 
price is Pe^ in the exporting country e, which is equal to the price |
Pm^ in the importing country m under prefectly competitive free trade 
conditions. The government in m then guarantees domestic producers 
the price Pg which results in an expansion of output from w to x. The 
Consumer in m is not, however, charged, pm^ for sugar, the original free 
trade equilibrium price, but the new international "equilibrium" price 
Pmr; the government in m pays domestic producers the "deficiency" be-- f';
tween the guaranteed price and the actual market price, i.e. (Pg - Prn^), g 
on the X units of output. In Fig.5.7, the subsidization of producers in 
m is equivalent to a shift in the supply curve from Srn to Srn- and, in 
turn, this shifts the import demand curve downwards from IDm to IDm*.
The distributional consequences of a deficiency payment scheme are' 
different from those of a tariff. From the viewpoint of the importing 
country, both producers and consumers gain directly from a deficiency 
payment relative to froe trade but the government (and hence indirectly 
taxpayers in general) suffers a loss. From the viewpoint of the expor- 
ting country, the deficiency payment is preferable to an equivalent ‘  ^
tariff since both exports and prices received are higher.
# Equivalent in terms of protecting domestic producers in the 
importing country m »
I
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It can be demonstrated that the deadweight loss under a deficiency '# 
payment is likely to be less than under a tariff which affords equivalent % 
protection to producers in the importing county. The right-hand graph /- 
in Figure 5.7 is redrawn in Figure 5.8 to enable us to compare a tariff -I 
and a deficiency payment, both of which result in a price to domestic 
producers of Pg (~ Pm"*). The free trade equilibrium price would be Prn^  '4 
and the price which consumers pay under the deficiency payment scheme is 
PmO. Under a tariff which resulted in price Pg, the price in the exporting 
country necessarily would be lower than PrnO (= PeD), the exporter's price:| 
under the deficiency payment. This is a necessary condition since con- %
sumption in m is higher under the deficiency payment than under the J
■ .%tariff, yet, by assumption of equivalent protection, production in m is 4 
at the same level under both policies. Hence PeJ, the exporter's price 
under the tariff, is marked below PiiP (= PeP) in Figure 5.8. Further, -'4 
since the price to the exporter is higher under the deficiency payment -S 
and exports larger, it follows that the net effect on the exporter of a I 
deficiency payment is a smaller loss relative to free trade than under % 
an equivalent tariff.
Returning to Figure 5.8, and considering now the importer only, 
the losses and gains relative to free trade may be listed as in Table 
5.1. Total gains from the deficiency payment in the importing country 
equal (d + e + f - x), while those under the tariff equal (d + g - x - z).^
A deficiency payment scheme, therefore, increases welfare more than an J
equivalent tariff if and only if (e ~h f -f z) exceeds g. Since g is a f
transfer payment from the exporter, the deadweight loss under a deficiency^ 
payment is shown to be less than under a tariff, but the net effect for 
the importer depends on the size of g , .hence on the elasticity of export 
supply from the exporting country,
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This brief discussion on deficiency payments versus tariffs helps i 
to explain why some importers use a combination of quotas, tariffs, and % 
deficiency payments. An example is the United States Sugar Act under ;#
which deficiency (conditional) payments were made to producers, imports 
were subject to quotas and there was a specific tariff. Similarly, the | 
EEC combines its variable levy on imports with a quota on domestic pro- % 
duction and guarantees certain prices through subsidisation of exports 
and intervention buying. Under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, domestic# 
production in the U.K. was controlled by acreage quotas, imports from |Ithe Commonwealth by negotiated price quotas allocated to various exporters#
and imports from the free market had to face a specific tariff. Clearly #
f
some combination of policies may achieve a given target with a smaller 
"net loss" relative to free trade than a single such policy. In an |
important article on agricultural policy, Oosling writes: "Recent work # 
in the theory of economic policy has indicated that a necessary (but not # 
sufficient) condition for the reaching of a number of quantitative |
objectives is that one employs a similar number of policy instruments... | 
To achieve a satisfactory level of income transfer and at the same time 
use resources wisely as regards import saving requires a policy that -|
combines two of the instruments under consideration - guaranteed price, | 
threshold price, and minimum import price..."'  ^ 4
The final set of policies we consider has gained wide support in , 1  
recent years among exporting countries; it involves various forms of |
export restriction or producer cartels whose objective is to raise the
K- See T.E.Uosling (1969), "A Formal Approach to Agricultural Policy", 
Oournal of Agricultural Economics, 20, 2, May 1969, pp.175—192.
^  ibid., pp.188-9.
 ^ ' -, - T ■ ■ * ■ .  - ' ■•= ■' ' k '■ ■'■ ‘ ^ I
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Ïinternational price of a commodity in order to increase total returns
{*) # to the producing countries. ' The various International Sugar Agree- %
Iments were weak forms of cartel. Assuming that exporters have a 
sufficient community of interest to agree upon, and maintain, restric­
tions on exports, the gains and losses will be very similar to those 
from an import tariff or quota, but the distribution of these gains or 
losses is different. Figure 5.9 is completely analogous to the import 
tariff diagram shown in Figure 5.1, The exporter imposes a tax, equal 
to (N - V) in the central graph, the revenue from which, equal to NRSV,
passes to the exporting country's government. Where there is more than ;•
Tone exporter, agreement upon a uniform export tax is not likely as agree-g
f
ment upon a minimum export price or a given export supply (quota). •
’1Suppose the cartel agrees upon a minimum export price of N or upon |
■Ï
quotas of Qt, on exports: the effects will be exactly as in the case of 
the tax already discussed above. In Figure 5.9 the trade graph also 
shows the marginal return from import demand, which is labelled MRID#.
The exporter than maximises profit by equating export supply, assumed to-f. 
be the marginal cost of production, with the marginal return from exports 
In our diagram, the tax (N - V) - or some other policy - resulting in -y 
exports being equal to maximizes the exporter's profits. The approach 
to the modelling and operation of a cartel presented here has not been 
to impose quotas on exports, but to place a uniform tax on exports which 
leads to the same restriction on output and exports as a quota.
  i
The most successful producer cartel in recent years (and at presen' 
is OPEC »'■ the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
Cartels also exist in primary commodities, raw materials, and
metals, tho best-known being the cartel formed by producers of 
copper - CIPEC.
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A word of caution is in order regarding the limitations of partial, 
comparative static supply-domand analysis employed above. The gains and 
losses described here are in a purely static context. The first qualifi­
cation that must be made is that a partial analysis tends to exaggerate 
the magnitude of the effects of the policy, especially when we are 
analysing single agricultural commodities which are both produced and
{ K- )consumed in competition with close substitutes,  ^ Secondly, agriculture 
has been undergoing a continuous process of adjustment through time, 
involving continuously changing farm structures, methods, prices, and 
technology. Such inter-temporal change must be considered if a complete 
general equilibrium analysis is undertaken. The dynamic gains and
losses from such policies have been discussed elsewhere,' ^
A number of studies have been attempted to assess empirically the
gains and losses from various agricultural policies covering sugar
( n \ (HII ')production and trade, H.G.Oohnaon and R.H.Snape , in separate
studies, estimated the gains to developed countries from free trade in
(  W M  tt 'jsugar, while DvGale Johnson ' undertook s similar study for the USA.
* D.Colman and J.McInerney, op.cit., p.102. 
ibid., p.102.
See, for example, T.Oosling and D.Hamway, "Distribution of Costs 
and Benefits of Farm Policy", in Burdens and Benefits of Farm Support^ 
policies, Trade Policy Research Centre, London 1972. \
" See H,G.Johnson (1966), Economic Policies Towards Less Developed 
Countries, Brookings Institution, New York.
R.H.Snape (1969), "Sugar: Costs of Protection and Taxation",
Economica, 36, 141, February 1969, pp.29-41.
""" O.Gale Johnson (1974), The Sugar Program; Largo Costs and Small 
Benefits, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.
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Review of the Literature
It has been argued that sugar consumption levels per capita vary 
considerably between countries, and dietary habits may account for a 1 
good part of these differences.  ^ But changes in the consumption levels | 
over the past thirty years or so have shown a fairly close correlation 
with changes in real income and changes in relative sugar prices, at 
least up to a certain level - the "saturation point" of consumption.
The importance of estimates of future consumption lies in the fact that 
developed countries represent tho major outlets for less developed 
exporters of sugar, and if the "saturation point" of consumption has 
been reached in many of these importing countries, expanded production 
will result in depressed prices and, possibly, fall in export earnings, 
too. Estimates of future level of consumption will depend on the elas­
ticities of demand with respect to both prices and incomes, and these 
inevitably vary with the level of economic development. Studies have 
established what is, in fact, intuitively plausible; in poorer countrjoo, 
both ttie income and price elasticities of demand tend to be high, with 
the reverse true for richer countries.
1The Uiton-Pignalosa study attempted to examine the trends of world I 
consumption of sugar over the 1940s and thm 195ns, to determine the 
factors affecting sugar consumption and its rates of growth, and, on 
the basis of this analysis, to forecast sugar consumption in the 1960s.^
* See, for example, A.Viton and E.Pignalosa, Trends and Forces of 
World Sugar Consumption, Commodity Bulleting, Series No.32, Food 
and Agricultural Organisation, Rome 1961.
** A.Viton and F.Pignalosa, op.cit., p.1. In this study, the word 
"sugar" refers to refined sugar, and "prices" refers to prices of 
refined sugar at the retail level.
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The key variables analysed were prices and income as well as certain 
exogenous factors such as climatic conditions and tastes. The 
important section and reference point for later studies was concerned 
with the relationship between sugar consumption and prices and income.
The authors observed a rather curious fact:
"The outstanding feature of retail and wholesale 
prices throughout the world is the magnitude of |
variation between countries. Price differences "
are enormously greater for sugar than for any 
other basic food."(*)
How Icould this "enormous" price variation be explained? The explanation
for the "extremo width of the range of prices lies^of course,in the
great diversity of taxes, customs duties, administrative regulations 
and other arrangements which affect sugar pricds". Clearly, this
explanation is not altogether satisfactory because it leaves unexplained 1|
Ïwhy sugar, and not other commodities, had to be regulated by the vast 1 
array of economic and institutional measures.
The authors also observed that government regulation of sugar trade
and prices had become more general in the 1950s than in previous years,
and that the general tendency was to further restrict trade in raw sugar
(a tendency that contrasted with the liberalization of trade in most
commodities during those years). The most significant fact to emerge
was that "since 1938 sugar has become cheaper (in real terms) with respect
(to all other foods in 38 countries out of 50, and more expensive in 11",
This finding, however, contradicts the expectation that trade restrictions
(w)would raise the relative price of sugar in the countries under study.
* ibid.5 p, 17
•5Ht ibid,, p.17
*** ibid., p.19
Î! Unless trade
but there is no evidence to support this.
^61
In order to determine which factors affected sugar consumption 
levels across countries, the authors used a multicountry cross- 
correlation modal that tested the influence of price and income on 
consumption. Viton and Pignalosa were themselves critical of this 
approach because of the statistical difficulties of developing com- |
parable income data for a large number of countries, and because they
were unable to determine the relative price of sugar within each of the
t:( ’H' 1countries.' To test the reliability of their findings, they compared *'
the results of the multi-country analysis with correlations on time 
series data for a small number of countries and correlations on the fIdata from family budget studies,
The general conclusions of the study were that income and prices 
explained (as indicated by the coefficient of multiple determination) 
about 60 to 80 per cent of the inter-country variation in consumption 
(for the 55 to 50 countries studies in 1938, 1951 and 1956), that other 
factors did not significantly affect sugar consumption, and that the 
price and income elasticities of consumption tended to be of about the 
same size for most countries. In the decade of the 1950s, the price
elasticities were between 0,55 and 0,75, and the income elasticity was
(•îfK-)about 0,60.
The results from the time series analyses and family budget studies 
differed from those of the multi-country study, but all the studies 
tended to support the hypothesis that, for most countries, the coefficients
ibid., p,25,
ibid., p.36, Further subdivisions of the data indicate that average 
income elasticities ranged from 1.2 for "low-income" countries to 
0,7 for "medium-income" countries and 0.4 for "high-income" countries*' 
the corresponding price elasticities were —1.1, -0,9, and -0.4 
respectively.
1 6 2 '
of price and income elasticities were less than one and possibly close 
to zero» While the specific value of the elasticities obtained from 
the multicountry cross-correlation model must be called into question 
because of the lack of reliable data for income statistics across 
countries and the difficulties of calculating relative prices, it is 
nevertheless significant that both time series and budget studies suppoiv* 
ted the general conclusion that sugar consumption was price and income 
inelastic. The importance of the Viton-Pignalosa study is accepted 
on the basis of their seminal contribution; their conclusions and the 
specific values they derived for elasticities formed the basis of two 
important subsequent studies, by Snape and Johnson.
( ISnape’s study'  ^ attempted to answer two important questions:
(l) What is the extent of protection of the, sugar industry in different 
countries of the world? and (2) What would have been the effect on 
world consumption and trade in 1959 if all sugar had been available for 
consumption at world free market price levels for raw sugar, allowing 
for refining and distribution costs?' ‘
To answer the first question, Snape compared the price at which 
raw sugar could be bought or sold on the world free market in 1959 with 
the average receipts of sugar producers (millers and cane or beet pro­
cessors) in various countries. He also included any direct subsidy that 
the sugar producers received from their home governments. Snapes measure 
of protection was expressed as a percentage ratio of average receipts to 
the export or import parity price, depending on whether the country under
* ibid., p.36.
** RoH.Snape, "Some Effects of Protection in the World Sugar Industry",
Economics, XXX, February 1963.
ibid., p.63
.X?
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study was a net exporter or importer of sugar; the ratio of 100% 
indicated no protection.
This measure of protection is subject to a number of limitations; 
firstly, it did not provide a measure of the "effective" protection 
given to the various producers of sugar (to the extent that currencies 
are controlled and differ from their "real" competitive values, the 
estimates of protection will be biased in different directions) ' 
Secondly, it did not compare the protection given to sugar producers 
relative to the average degree of protection given to other producers 
in the country. Thirdly, it did not take into account that systems of 
protection employed in different countries are very complex and some 
"hidden" subsidies are difficult to quantify' ', and hence almost 
impossible to include explicitly in the measurements of protection. 
Fourthly, it did not compare the average receipts of sugar producers 
with the (estimated) price which would have ruled in the free market 
in the absence of any protection of sugar production.
The first three limitations mentioned above no more than reflect 
the general and largely unavaoidable difficulties of constructing 
meaningful data series, but the last limitation could have been over­
come if Snape had constructed an empirical model of the world sugar
Cmarket. Of course, there are logi/ol and empirical objections to 
testing any contra-factual hypothesis, but without such a model, one 
cannot evaluate the usefulness or validity of some of the assumptions
F or a discussion of effective, nominal and net rates of protection, 
see W.M.Corden, "The Theory of Effective Protection, Oxford University 
Press, London 1972.
-)Bf See G.Curzon and V.Curzon, Hidden Barriers to International Trade, 
Trade Policy Research Centre, London 1972.
ibid., pp« b4-65 «
64'»
contained in the study. For example, Snape argues, "although price in
the world free market will be lower with protection than without it,
we can do no more than guess by how much it will be lower; and we have
(it \preferred to make no special adjustments." ' Clearly, one important 
factor is the price elasticity of supply in the sugar-exporting countries. 
Such predictions, as the above quotation contains, are based upon static 
models of the world, which leave unexplained how the market's partici­
pants adapt to changing circumstances over time, and assume that the 
market could or would function in a similar manner without restrictions 
as it does with them.
We can, however, briefly examine Snape's study. He used the 1959 
free-along-side ship (f.a.s.) Cuba price of 3 U.S. cents par pound of 
raw sugar as the export parity price, and the 1959 c.i.f. United Kingdom .
price of 3.75 U.S. cents per pound as the import parity price. He then
compared the average receipts of sugar producers with the appropriate
parity price and reached a measure of protection for the sugar industries
of various countries., For all but two countries (the Dominican Republic
(■)m)and Taiwan) his measure of protection exceeded 100%. The awkwardness
of this result is that it is difficult to understand the meaning of a 
"parity" price which is too low even for countries that sell at such a 
price (for example, the measure of protection for Cuba was 130%), Does 
this mean that Cuban producers would not have sold sugar at such a low 
price in the world free market if they had not been subsidized? Snape 
did recognise the problems that his parity price measure posed*
ibide, p.65.
•jHf ibid., p.66,
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the comparisons have been made with import 
and export parity as they were in 1959, while 
preferably they should be made with the) import 
and export parities that would have prevailed 
without any protection at all for sugar.
Though it is impossible to know what these 
would have been, one may guess that in these 
hypothetical circumstances, the long-run 
equilibrium f.a.s. Cuba price might have been 
4 to 4,50 cents/pound and the c.i.f. London 
price about 0.75 cents/pound more. This level 
corresponds to or exceeds the 1959 level of 
average gross receipts of mills in many of the 
major cane producing countries, in most of which 
production was restricted by various controls." (*)
To answer the second question, Snape tried to determine the extent 
of sugar consumption changes if the internal price of sugar in each 
country had been allowed to fluctuate freely, while sugar producers 
were subsidized with deficiency payments (to replace the protection 
granted by tariff and other non-tariff barriers). He first converted 
the import parity price for raw sugar (of 3.75 U.S. cents per pound) 
to an equivalent price for refined sugar at the retail level, and then 
used an average of the price elasticities of consumption calculated by 
Viton and Pignalosa'  ^ to determine consumption changes. '
Snaps estimated that the removal of tariff barriers would have 
increased sugar consumption by 3,882,000 metric tons in 1959 for all 
non-Communist countries, an amount that is "about 30% of total net 
international trade in sugar and more than 70% of the net free market 
trade in 1959."'  ^ Assuming that the expansion in demand was met by 
the net exporting countries, "exporters to the free market would secure
ibid., p,67. This quotation is a significant one; there is absolutely 
no justification whatsoever for "guessing" that the hypothetical 
long-run equilibrium prices would be of the magnitude suggested.
See A.Viton and F.Pignalosa, op.cit., p.29.
*** Snaps, ibid., p.68.
" ibid., p.71
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a substantial increase in receipts, both by way of larger sales and
somewhat higher prices". These results therefore point out some of
the direct benefits of freer trade. Snape concluded that the price of
sugar on the world free market would become more stable, because of the
( )increase in the size of that market,‘ ^
Since Snaps's study made use of elasticity values obtained by 
Viton and Pignalosa, the same limitations apply, a fortiori. Further, 
Snape derived the import parity price from the export parity price 
(f.a.s,Cuba) which he suspected may have been below the long-run equi­
librium price. If this is the case, then the increase in consumption 
would be an overestimate.
The Johnson study is, in a sense, the culmination of the two
/ 'j
previous studies by Viton and Pignalosa, and by Snape.'  ^ From Viton
and Pignalosa, Johnson accepted the retail price elasticities of sugar
consumption, as modified by Snape (who had averaged the coefficients
from the different correlation studies). From Snape, Johnson accepted
as "estimates" that (a) the parity prices of sugar under a system of
deficiency payments would rise by 0.50 U.S.cents per pound above the
1959 price levels, and (b) that the export parity price of sugar under
unprotected free trade would be in the neighbourhood of 4 to 4.50 U.S.
( " )cents per pound. '
* ibid., p.72.
ibid., p.72,
See H.G,Johnson, "Sugar Protectionism and the Export Earnings of 
Less Developed Countries; Variations on a Theme by R.H.Snaps", 
Economica, XXXIII, February 1966.
" Note that none of these prices were "estimated"; they were figures
which Snape had simply "guessed". See snape, op.cit., p.67,
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The aim of the Johnson study was to determine the increase in -#
%revenue and benefits that would accrue to exporters, and the benefits -1and costs that would accrue to importera, under a system of deficiency 4
;
payments and unprotected free trade (again for the year 1959), He 'wf
considered, first, the situation where producers retained their pro­
tection through deficiency payments, but the internal price of sugar 
in each country was allowed to fluctuate with the world free market
1
oneIce. Using assumption (a) above, and the fact that world consumption
'of sugar would expand in this case (as Snape had previously shown), t?
Johnson estimated the new value of trade in sugar. His calculations
showed that the increase in total earnings by exporting countries would 'if 
vary from #442,177,000 (for net total trade) to #357,410,000 (for net 4S;
free trade), Since these extra earnings cost sugar producers real %
resources that were employed in alternative industries, Johnson then
a
calculated the net benefits accruing to the exporting countries by 
assuming different rent estimates accruing to them. The increase in 
exporters* gains from trade was given alternatively as #164,033,000 or 
#185,425,000 for net total trade, and #79,266,000 or #100,662,000 for
net free trade.
The next exercise was to try to determine the consumption costs 
imposed on consumers in various countries by existing protection and 
excises. "These costs", he argued, "... could be thought of as the 
amounts of resources that the protective developed countries could 
release by the relevant policy changes and contribute to the less
* Note that net total trade ingludes trade between preferential
markets, net free trade does not,
** Johnson, op.cit., p.36, The figures given differ according to
different rent estimates. -'é
'0
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developed as additional foreign aid, without making themselves worse ^
off, or that the protective less developed countries could release for i 
!un de 
^  (*)
their ow velopment or increased consumption by appropriate policy %
change; ■I J
3The total value of these resources was calculated to be #192 ,f
Imillion for all the countries studies by Snape; included in this figure 
were #70 to #148 million contributed by the developed countries (the '1
J
figures depending on the definition of "developed country").
The third situation considered by Johnson was one of unprotected
free trade, using assumption (b) mentioned above. He estimated that if
the volume of trade in 1959 had actually remained unchanged under free
trade, the increase in export earnings of the less developed countries
studied by Snape would amount to
#285 million to #425 million had it applied 
to net total international trade, and #116 
million to #174 million had it applied to net 
free market trade... the latter figure being 
the more relevant." (^*)
Johnson considered these figures to be an underestimate because he
expected that if free trade had existed^output in the importing countries
would have contracted while output in the exporting countries would
have expanded.
The final calculation attempted by Johnson related to the net 
benefits and costs that unprotected sugar trade would bring to the seven 
wealthiest importing countries studied by Snape %  and the benefits
* ibid., p.37.
ibid., pp.37—39.
•K-K-K- These seven "major (Western) protectionist" countries were the
Federal Republic of Germany, The United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium-Luxembourg.
that free trade with these countries would bring to the exporting 
countries. The calculations were made on the neoclassical assumption 
that resources in the importing countries were perfectly mobile out 
of sugar production in the long run, so that free trade eliminated 
such production if the country was uncompetitive at the free market 
price. The estimates were obtained by determining the dead-weight 
gains and losses accruing to the different countries.
The resource cost saving to importers plus the net benefits to 
exporters amounted to #437,8 million, and .. the total resources
that restoration of a freely competitive world market in sugar would
release to the less developed countries from these seven countries 
alone would be in the neighbourhood of half a billion dollars
(-X-)(#482,303,000)") * The value of the increased trade by exporters would 
amount to #674«8 million*
Armed with these results, Johnson concluded that free trade in 
sugar was desirable for all countries involved, importers and exporters 
alike. He argued that (a) the prevalence of sugar protection has sub­
stantial effects both in wasting resources and in reducing the earnings ^
of the less developed countries that have a comparative advantage in 3
sugar production; and (b) that a policy of free trade would make additional
resources available (to underdeveloped countries) without cost to anyone, 
as a consequence of the increased efficiency of resource allocation it 
would produce.'
* ibid., pp.41-42,
** ibid., p.43.
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The most significant aspect of Johnson's study is its attempt to 
calculate welfare gains and losses that result from different arrange­
ments of the world sugar market. According to the estimates given, 
replacement of the existing national systems of protection by deficiency 
payments would increase the export earnings of (the exporting)
countries by something in the neighbourhood of half a billion dollars, 
and free trade would increase their export earnings from the seven major 
(importing) countries alono by something in the neighbourhood of three 
quarters of a billion dollars".' *
The main criticism against Johnson's study is that, like Snape, he 
did not consider in his analysis the effects of the process of imposing 
free trade. Ho therefore implicitly assumed that the change from one 
equilibrium situation with restricted trade, to another with freer trade 
could be achieved effortlessly and without costs (as implied in the 
assumption of perfect mobility of resources out of sugar production), and 
that the suggested change in the market would lead straight to the optimal 
equilibrium. Like Snape, Johnson used a static model to reach conclusions, 
about a dynamic market. Though subject to the same limitations as Snapo's 
study, two important conclusions emerge from Johnson's work. First, the 
existence of protection involves a substantial waste of resources and a 
reduction in earnings of developing nations that have a comparative 
advantage in sugar production. In addition, free market exporters would 
greatly benefit in terms of economic welfare resulting from a reduction 
in price fluctuations now associated with the marginal or residual nature 
of their sector of the sugar market. The second conclusion is more teniae 
tivG. He argues that his proposal of abandoning sugar protectionism in
ibid.,p.43,
>
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favour of free world competition in sugar would increase the resources
available to the developing countries by more than would a policy of
(•Yf'S"internationalizing" sugar protection^as advocated by Prebisch.' '
A more recent study by fiaizels' ' partially updated the three 
studies analyzed here. He estimated several regressions of per capita 
consumption of sugar on por capita real income for thirtyfive developed 
and less developed countries. His projections indicated that for the 
industrial countries as a whole, sugar consumption was likely to rise 
by about 1.7% per annum on average between 1960-61 and 1975 on what he 
called a "low income-growth" assumption, and by 2.0% on the "high 
income-growth" assumption. These rates were found to be only marginally 
lower than the 2.1% per annum recorded over the first half of the 1960s, 
when special factors helped to stimulate total consumption (for example, 
significant increases in Japan's purchases from the free market.) Taking 
the industrial countries and the non-sugar exporting primary producing 
countries together, total sugar consumption was projected to increase 
From about 29 million tons in 1960-61 to 39 million tons in 1975 on 
the low income-growth assumption, and to 41 million tons on the high 
income‘^growth assumption. These estimates were obtained on the assumption 
that no significant changes would take place in the taxation on retail 
sugar in the consuming countries. Maizels' conclusion is that the 
potential market for sugar in many less developed countries is substan­
tially higher than at present, given the existence of high taxes on sugar
* See H.G.Johnson, Economic Policies Towards Less Developed Countries, 
Appendix D, pp.257-266, Allen & Unwin, 1968, London. For a detailed 
exposition of Prebisch's hypothesis, see R.Prebisch, Towards a New 
Trade Policy for Development, United Nations, 1964,
-K'* A.Maizels, Exports and Economic Growth of Developing Countries, 1968.
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and high price elasticities of demand. However, no noticeable move has 3
taken place in any country towards lowering taxation on sugar, and the 4
. id"potential" market is of little practical relevance to free market 1
exporters, t
'1
This brief review of the literature has examined four important 
studies on trade in sugar. Though no comprehensive study of the Common­
wealth Sugar Agreement itself exists, it is hoped that the literature 
analysed here provides some indication of the special problems 
regarding sugar exporters in general, and highlights the significant 
empirical results produced to date.
rWi
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PART THREE
MODELS OF RESPONSE 
OF AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY
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CHAPTER SIX
SUPPLY MODELS IN AGRICULTURE: 
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
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Supply Models in Agriculture g A Critical Appraisal
In this chapter, we analyse some general supply models in 
agriculture and appraise their usefulness and relevance in explaining 
sugar supply response in Commonwealth exporting countries. We first 
briefly examine the Cobb-Douglas and Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(ces) production functions, then the cobweb model, and finally models 
of expectations and adjustment. The Cobb-Oouglas and CES production 
functions have been applied most frequently (and with best results) 
when estimating returns to scale in manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s , a n d  
have been relegated to secondary importance in estimating agricultural 
supply functions sines the formulation of expectations! models.
The Cobb-Douglaa Production Function' ^
The generalized version of this function is usually written as 
Q = AK*L^ (6.1)
where A is a positive constant, and a and b are positive fractions.
This function can be shown to be homogeneous of degree (a 4 b); in 
the special case of a + b « 1, it is linearly homogeneous and displays 
constant returns to scale. The isoquants derived from (6.1) are
negatively sloped throughout and strictly convex for positive values
{#-%-#- %of K and L.
* See, for example, R.F.Wynn and K.Holden, An Introduction to Applied 3; 
Econometric Analysis, Macmillan, 1974, Chapter 3; 3.L,Bridge,
Applied Econometrice, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1971; and A.A.Walters, 
^Production an^ Cost Functions* An Econometric Survey", Econpmetrica, 
Vol.31, 1963, pp.1-65.
The results presented here for the Cobb-Douglaa and CES production 
functions are obtained from A.C.Chiang, Fundamental Methods of 
Mathematical Economics, 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill, 1974, pp.403-424, 
and the detailed derivations will not be repeated here.
•M--)» The variables included in equation (6,1) are output (Q), capital 
stock (K), and the labour force (L).
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1Consider the special case in which (a + b) = 1 (the Cobb-Douglaa
function proper). Then the total product, Q, can be expressed ae M
5f;
Q = Aj^Kj^L = LA(K*)* (6
where K* denotes the capital-labour ratio. We can then obtain 
average and marginal products of the two factors in terms of the 
capital-labour ratio alone.
The average products (AP) are*-
AP^ = g  = A(K*)® (6,3)
follows*'
and
I
(wW AT^ = g  a  g L  » A(K*) m A(K*) ~ (6,4)*1
K L K K* j
The marginal prodia&s are obtained by partial differentiation of
MPw * l&Q, « Aa/K^r^^ « Aa(K*)*"^ (6.5)
K ak vT)
MP. « ^ g  » AK^(l—a)L ^
L at %
a
= A(l-s)|^ Kj* = A(l~a)(K*) (6.6) g
Expressions (6.5) and (6.6) enable us to verify Euler*6 theorem,
88 followa*-
Q = K a g  + L A g  (6.7)
0K hL
= KAa(K*)®"1 + LA(l-a)(K*)*
= LA(K#)* f Ka -F 1—a 1
L Lk* j
= LA(K*)^J[a + 1 -  e] « LA(K*)^  ^ « Q 
The Cobb-Douglas production function has been widely used in economic 
analysis partly because the exponents in (6,1) have direct economic 
meanings, in the linearly homogeneous form of Whs function. If 
perfectly competitive conditions prevail, and each factor of production
. . .  ..... . - -  - - • . p ,
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is paid the value of its marginal product, then the relative share 
of total product accruing to labour will be: 4
k  M  = 1 - 8  (6.8) IQ èl- LA(K*)a
Similarly, capital's relative share will be
K &Q m KAa(K*)^~1 = a (6.9)
Q &K LATK*)G
A final important aspect of the Cobb-Oouglaa production function 
has to do with the effect of a change in the factor-price ratio 
(Pk/Pl) upon the least-cost input combination I/k for producing a 
given level of output, Qo (i.e. while we atay on the seme isoquant). Ï
If the factor price ratio Pk/PL (assumed determined exogenously)
risea, we expect the optimal input ratio i/k also to rise, because 
the relatively cheaper input (L) will tend to be substituted for 
input K. The extent of input substitution is measured by the 
elasticity of substitution, given by:-
tr = relative chanoe in
relative change in (PK/Pt)
_ lk £ L _  « (6,10)
(P|</Pl ) (Pk/P l )
The value of cr can lie anywhere between zero end infinity, implying 
fixed proportions of inputs in the first case and perfect substituta­
bility between Inputs in the latter case. It can be shown that the 
generalized Cobb-Oouglas production function is characterized by a 
constant, unitary elasticity of substitution. Note that this deri- 
vation does not rely upon the assumption of constant returns to scale, 
and the elasticity of substitution will be unitary even if (a + b) 
does not equal one.
I
..
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We will now briefly examine the CES production function and show 
that the Cobb-Douglas function is a special case of the general CES 
function.
The CES Production Function'
As the name suggests, this production function is characterized 
by a constant, not necessarily unitary, elasticity of substitution.
The general form of the function can be written ass-
Q = A|[ok"* + (1-c) (6.11)
where A >0; 0 < c < 1 |  r >  -1, end K and L represent two factors of
production. The parameter A is the efficiency parameter and plays 
the same role (i.e. an indicator of the state of technology) as the 
coefficient A in the Cobb-Oouglae production function. The parameter 
c (the distribution parameter), like the parameter a in the Cobb- 
Douglas function, indicates relative factor shares in the product. 
Finally, the parameter r (the substitution parameter) determines the 
velue of the (constant) elasticity of substitution, and has no counter- 
part in the Cobb-Douglas function.
The CES function is homogeneous of degree one, and, like all 
linearly homo#6neoua production functions, displays constant returns 
to scale, qualifies for the application of Euler's theorem, and 
possesses average and marginal products that are homogeneous of degree 
zero in the variables K and L* The marginal products of factors are 
obtained by partial differentiation; using the notation j
as a shorthand for
_CK + (1-c) L .j 
we obtain;
# The CES production function was pioneered by K.3.Arrow, H.B.Chenery, 
B.S.Minhas and R.M.Solow in "Capital-Labour Substitution and 
Economic Efficiency", Review of Economics and Statistics, August 
1961, pp.225-250.
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MP, = ["*'1 f ~  ^ (l-c)(-r)L~*"^L ^ L J
« (1-c) A [...] -(l+r)/r L -<1+?)
= (1-c) a l+ f - ( 1+ r ) /r  L -(1+r)
{ i f
Similarly,
K - If“ 5 a  « £  /a\ >  0 (6.13)A' VKJ
Thus, the slop© of an Isoquant (with L plotted on the horizontal axis 
and K on the vertical axis) is
dK e - # -(1-c) / n (6.14)
dL MP_ o \L/r\
2 9It can also be shown that d K/dL" ^  0, which means that the isoquant 
from a CES production function is negatively sloped throughout, and is 
strictly convex*
To obtain the formula for the elasticity of substitution, we 
start with the condition for the least-cost combination in production:
« (1-c)MP^ P^ c \L / to. lo;K K
Thus, the optimal factor input ratio is
1/(1+r) /PL\1/(1+r) n q 1/(1+r)K « / c \ ' ' ’ ' ' I L\
L I  1 - c )  V \1
where g « / c \)/(ltr)' I oMwertsa»» 1
\1-c)
••• %  ( %  ■ ’
l/(l4c) -1
(6.16)
P.
and I^^L_ »
L'-K
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Therefore, the elasticity of substitution equal
o
W P J  . 1 (6.17)
1+r
PL/P(<
This shows that cr is a constant whose magnitude depends on the 
value of the parameter r as follows;- 
-1 .< 0 \ )> 1 
r » 0 \ < er » 1
Clearly, when r « 0, we obtain the unitary elasticity of substitution 
characteristic of the Cobb-Douglaa function. Of course, when r 0, 
the CES function given in (6.11) is undefined, but it can be shown that 
BG approachee zero, the CES will approach the Cobb-Douglas function.
As already indicated, the Cobb-Douglaa and CES production 
functions have been widely used in explaining production in manufac- 
turing industries. We will not reproduce here the various problems 
that these functions give rise to, in particular concerning data and 
a g g r e g a t i o n . W e  note, however, that the Cobb-Oouglas and CES 
functions estimate supply in terms of the cost of inputs (and their 
availability). In the context of Commonwealth sugar exporting countries, 
the supply of at least one major input (labour) is rarely a constraint.
If we are interested in a behavioural relationship, i.e. the response of 
producers to certain market incentives, the Cobb-Oouglas and CES functions
* For a proof of this, see A.Chlang, op.cit., pp.420-1.
** For details, see R.F.Wynn and F.Holden, op.cit., pp.57-74. See
also F.M.Fisher, "The Existence of the Aggregate production Function", 
Econometrica, Vol.37, 1969, pp.553-77; M.Nerlove, Estimation end 
Identification of Cobb-Oouglas Production Functions, North-Holland,.III rmrmm « v iiTiT ••rfi[fi~iirrit~ii mT-itinrrr n-r ~ r[i 11— m i r—i  - - T~'iTi"“*"'‘ r"riii -•'n' r^rrrr— »—-f-—'■---—-j-— — — Amsterdam, 1965; end P.Zarembka, "On the Empirical Relevance of the 
CES Production Functions", Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.52, 
1970, pp.47-53.
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cannot be used; the latter functions are, essentially, technical 
relationships, and are suitable for deriving estimates of technical 
coefficients, but not 'behavioural* coefficients. We will therefore 
proceed to consider supply models which incorporate behavioural 
assumptions on the part of producers.
The Cobweb Model
In his study of the impact of price movements on acreage, Oharra
*'4Narain' ' observed oscillatory movements of a cyclical character in 
both acreage and relative price of sugarcane in India. "The durations .1
of cycles are not uniform but the tendency for both area and price to 4
trace cycles of approximately four to six years' duration persists ;i,
throughout."'  ^ The cobweb theorem can provide a theoretical |
explanation for such cycles. Dharm Narain himself argued that ha had IIsufficient evidence to suggest that the price-area relationship in ?
sugar cane was closely analogous to the two-way causation noticed in
the cobweb phenomenon. He writes: "Price cycles are, in the main, f
supply cycles and area cycles are, in the main, price inspired. The
phenomenon portrays in essentials the working of the cobweb theorem#"^^*) 
Using the results obtained by Dharm Narain, 3ha and Maji attempted to 
explain fluctuations in North Bihar using a cobweb model' \  and we 
will examine their model briefly in due course.
* See Dharm Narain, Impact of Price Movements on Areas under Selected 
Crops in India, 1900-39, Cambridge University Press, London 1965.
** ibid., Chapter 7, p.86.
*** ibid., p.101.
**** $88 D.Jha and C.C,Maji, "Cobweb Phenomenon and Fluctuations in
Sugercane Acreage in North Bihar", Indian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol.XXVI, No.4, December Î971, pp.415Z42T.
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The original cobweb hypothesis was formulated mathematically 
by Ezekiel, who named three neceaoery conditions for a cobweb*- 
(a) production ia entirely determined by producers# response to price 
under conditions of pure competition; (b) at least one full period 
is required before production can be changed, and (c) Whe price ia 
set by available supply. It is wall-known that government intervention 
has been more pronounced on a world-wide level in sugar pricing than 
in any other agricultural c o m m o d i t y . T h i s  may appear to violate 
condition (c) mentioned above; but Waugh has shown that in spite
of price interferences, the oscillatory movements characterizing the 
cobweb may persist, though in a modified form.
3ha and Maji used two specifications of the cobweb model in their 
study; the first model is the traditional version in which both supply 
and demand functionsare defined in a partially static sense, while the 
second incorporates a dynamic supply relation which, according to 
Nerlove, represents an Improvement both in the theoretical basis of
See M.Ezekiel, "The Cobweb Theorem", Quarterly Journal of Economics 
Vol.LII, No.1, February 1938, p.272.
** See, for example, R.H.Snape, "Sugar; Casts of Protection and 
Taxation", Economic*, 36, 141, February 1969, pp.29-41.
iwwe See F.V.Wauqh, "Cobweb Models", Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.46, 
No.4, November 1964, pp,732-50, For a discussion of further 
conceptual and empirical problems, see G.Akerman, "The Cobweb 
Theorem: A Reconsideration", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol.LXX, No.1, February 1957; Marc Nerlove, "Adaptive Expectations 
and Cobweb Phenomenon", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.LXXII, 
No.2, May 1958; and L.D.McClements, "Note on Harmonic Motion and 
the Cobweb Theorem", Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.XXI, 
No.1, January 1970.
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■ -'.îthe model and in its applicability. The traditional model consists eg
of the following demand and supply equations;—
= a + bP^° (6.18) I
0*t = G + (6.19)
cwhere represents acreage under sugarcane, and P^ is price of 
sugarcane. The equilibrium condition is
A^ = A ^  (6*20) |i
Solving the system, we obtain
P.G a, ama + d P.G (6.21)
b b
which is a first-order linear difference equation. The solution
of (6.21) shows that d determines the nature of price movements.
b
Since we expect d)>0, and b<CO generally, oscillations are indicated.
(h) -1 \ the oscillations are explosive-1 S the oscillations ere continuous-T (but<CO) j the oscillations are dampened.
The dynamic supply version incorporates adjustment lags in the supply 
relation, yielding the following reduced form for the supply functions: 
A^° » eg + dgP^^^ + (l~9)At2l (6.22)
where g is the coefficient of adjustment. The solution of this new 
system of equations gives
Pt!l (G'23)
The condition for a return to equilibrium therefore becomes
( I  » l)g f 1 <  1
a.
Applying these two models to data on sugarcane acreage and prices in 
North Bihar, 3ha and Maji find significant evidence for the existence
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of a cobweb cycle of a convergent type,' '
A more recent attempt at explaining the international supply of 
sugar using the cobweb model was Gemmill's contribution.^^) Hia 
model describes the normal recursive model in which quantity supplied 
depends on lagged prices, and current demand, given supply, determines 
market price, Gemmill modifies the standard cobweb model by incorpo­
rating as asymmetric supply function which is composed of relatively 
long-run and relatively inelastic short-run segments. The long-run 
segment becomes operative only when price reaches a historic maximum.
He assumes that demand is shifting continuously to the right under the 
influence of growing population and income. Under these assumptions, 
Gemmill derives an "asymmetric cobweb model" which generates long 
periods of relatively stable but depressed prices followed by sudden 
and temporary peaks in price, a phenomenon arguably consistent with 
the world sugar market in the post-war period,' *
We can assume for purposes of exposition that the world sugar 
market can be approximated by a single supply and a single demand 
function. Figure 6,1 depicts the supply and demand system, which is 
envisaged for an eight year period. The elastic, long-run supply curve 
is given by E8ÛF, while AB and CD are the inelastic, short-run supply 
curves. The short-run curves operate all the time except when price
* See O.Jha and C.C.Raji, op,cit., p.421.
** See G.Gemmill, "Asymmetric Cobwebs and the International Supply
of Cane-Sugar", Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.XXIX, NO.1, ;
January 1978, pp.9-22,
Gemmill also argues that price may be a poor indicator of the cycle, ■ 
assuming one exists* First of all, only about half of world net 
exports are traded on the free market; secondly, the aggregate 
behaviour of price depends both on the supply of beet, an annual 
crop, and cane, a perennial plant (which will, therefore, have 
different rates of response); thirdly, wealther influences the supply 
of both cane end beet, but these local influences can be offsetting, 
given the worldwide nature of sugar production. Ibid., p,10*
Fig.6.1 ; Price gnd Quantity ■ .t■ft,'ï
Figo6.2 s Priee and Year
■if
.m
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Bxceeds the previous maximum» in which case the long-run curve is 
activated. A series of demand curves, Do» 01, * * D?, is shown, 
the subscripts denoting the applicable years. Assume that a recent 
expansion in capacity has led to position B on the supply curve, 
which pushes price down to P , It is argued that along the short-run 
supply curve, there is a single year's lag in production response and 
hence output in year 1 is , resulting in price Pi, which clears the 
market. In year 2, quantity Q% supplied, resulting in price P2, 
and the 'normal* sequence continues until year 5, whan price Pg 0 2* 
exceeds the previous high price, resulting in a movement along the 
long-run supply curve from B to D in the next year. This large output,
Qgj depresses price to Pg and a new cycle is activated.
Figure 6,2 plots the price from Figure 6,1 over time. It shows 
that price rises steadily from to Pg, falls heavily to pg, and then 
begins climbing once again. How long the cycle lasts depends on a 
number of factors# the slopes of the short- and long-run supply functions, 
for example, the slope of the demand function, and the rapidity with 
which population and income changes shift demand to the right.^ ^
So far we have assumed a lag of a single year between price end 
supply in both the short- and long-runs. It can be argued that short- 
run response is an adjustment within current capacity (possible in a 
one-ysar period), while long-run response is an adjustment of capacity 
(involving investment in extra cane and often in extra factory equipment).
The usual condition for a cobweb model to converge to a stable 
equilibrium is that the slope of the demand curve should exceed 
that of the supply curve. InMg^mmill's asymmetric cobweb model, 
the shifting demand ensures that equilibrium is never attained, 
but the pricG-fluctuations will be dampened under these same 
slope conditions, ibid., p.12.
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If long-run response is expected to extend to at least two years, 
price will climb to a higher level than shown in Figure 6.2 before 
falling. Figure 6.3 demonstrates the outcome in a market which is 
typified by such annual short-run adjustments end two-year long-run ■%
adjustments. As previously, price rises to Pg* which exceeds the 
previous maximum, but the shift in capacity now takes two years to 
accomplish, hence only affects supply in year 7. This results in a 
price of P^ as the new short-run supply eurve CD becomes operative 4
and a new cycle begins. Figure 6,4 plots the price from Figura 6.3 
over time and shows that a two-year investment lag leads to more |
explosive cycles in price. a
4In practice, the world sugar economy consists of many suppliers #
and consumers rather than the extreme case of a single supplier and 
a single consumer analysed by Gemmill, Further, the sugar entering 
the world market is derived both from the annual sugar beet crop 
(about 40^ of total world output in recent years), and the perennial |
sugar cane plant (about 60%). The price cycles described by the 
model are therefore an extreme case and in reality, the cycles, as 
may be observed, are much more complex. Underlying the cycles described 
is the assumption that imperfect knowledge leads to 'irrational* invest­
ment behaviour and the imperfections may be the result of policy* 
induced price distortions in the major exporting countries. It can be 
argued that the continued existence of hog cycles, after many years 
of economic analysis of their cause, demonstrates that knowledge among ^
producers, even within a single country, is far from perfect. At the 
international level, knowledge about the action of others is even less 
likely to be perfect, as is the case with sugar.' ^
* Note that the cobweb model generates conditions for convergence to
or divergence from equilibrium in price cycles; we are not interested
in this dbudy in the determination and time path of prices. We are
more concerned with the response of producers to (exogenously 
determined) prices.
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The next model wa consider attempts to estimate supply in 
developed economies* developing economies, and centrally planned
economies on an aggregate .level.
The Adams-Behrman Sugar Supply Model' *
This modol seeks to estimate supply on a highly aggregated level 
(as well as demand for sugar in each of the three sectors). The 
assumption underlying the supply model is the traditional agricultural 
production response to price. It is postulated that producers attempt 
to maximise expected profit (R*) subject to given production functions, 
past prices, and expected weather conditions* Expected profits depend 
on expected prices of the commodity in question (p%), the expected 
level of output (Q*), the price of tho variable input (or inputs) (P^)s 
the level of variable inputs (v), the price of fixed inputs P^) and the
level of fixed inputs (F)
R* p*Q*
We therefore obtains-
PfF (6.24)
Actual output itself (q) is assumed to depend upon o log-linear pro­
duction functions
ag a^T 4- a^ .W +4'Q = BgV F 8 - ' (6.25)
where \! and F refer to the level of variable and fixed factors res­
pectively, and T represents a time trend "to represent secular shifts 
due to technological change, development of supporting infrastructure",' '
Sea P,G,Adams and B.R.Behrman, Econometric Models of World 
Agricultural Markets, Ballinger Publishing Co., Mass, 1976,
** For a justification end explanation of the distinction between 
fixed and variable inputs, see Adams and Behrman, op.cit., p«11<,
-K-K-M- ibid., p « 7 .
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and y represents the weather (or an index thereof), u is the normal 
stochastic term. For expected supply, the weather index and the 
other disturbances are assumed to have an expected value of zero;
then a, a_T
Q* = a V F e " (6.26)
Substituting Q# into (6,24) and the firet-order condition with 
respect to the variable factor gives the profit-maximising level of
the variable input
M a^P*Q* 
P"
(6.27)
Substitution of this optimal level of V into the production function 
(6.25) yields the solution for the actual level of supply:- 
Q = a V ( 1 ~ a p  /
\ } (6.28) 
The size of the capital stock (F) is then assumed to be a function 
of the expected product price to cost of capital ratio which pre­
vailed n periods earlier, where n depends on the gestation period 
necessary for the relevant capital, e.g. the time between planting
and mature bearing for tree crops
‘^ 5i I (6.29)
Substitution of (6.28) into (6.27) gives the empirical relation 
which Adams and Behrman estimated for each of the relevant supply 
regions under the assumption that the disturbance term followed the 
distribution necessary for the derivation of "good" least squares 
estimatesI
Q = b _ / '/ p \ < 8 " ^ (6.30)•(cr(C
where the b*e ere functions of the a®s in equation (6.28).
I
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Clearly, equation (6.30) cannot be estimated as it stands. 
Nevertheless, Adams and Behrman use the equation as the basic form 
for estimating supply of cocoa, coffee, tea, wool, cotton, sugar, 
wheat, and rice, making the necessary adjustments and modifications 
each commodity market requires. The authors conclude that the 
equations yield "reasonably good" fits, with equalling 0*95 for 
developed economise, o.98 for developing economies, and 0.94 for 
centrally planned economies.
The main problems posed by the Adams and Behrman model are 
those of aggregation and data on explanatory variables. As equation 
(6.30) stands, two variables, P* amd (P/P.)* are not observable. Six 
"rather heroic" assumptions are required before OLS could be applied.' * 
The most Important is that the relevant product to input price ratios 
are assumed to move proportionately to the ratio of the UNCTAD export 
price index for the commodity to the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) GDP (Gross Domestic product) deflator 
(pdf)* In developed countries cost variables could well be represented 
by the deflator PDF, but, as the authors recognise, this is less likely 
in the developing and centrally planned countries*
The mechanism adopted by Adams and Behrman to overcome the problem 
of non-obaervable variables in the estimable equation is quite standard 
in agricultural supply functions; they argue that the formation of price 
expectations and the existence of adjustment processes can be represented 
satisfactorily by combinations of polynomial distributed lags of the 
historical price levels and a geometric (in the logarithms) adjustment 
process for actual s u p p l y . Thus price expectations are assumed to
1
i
* F or details on these six assumptions, see Adams and Behrman,
op.cit., pp.7-8.
ibid., p.7.
be a weighted average of observed prices at various times in the past, 
The Adams-0ehrrnan model yields some useful estimates of supply 
relationships in the three sectors analysed. The model we propose 
to use follows the same distributed lag pattern, but our study is 
focussed on the country—level estimation of supply, and therefore 
involves less aggregation. Two models that pioneered the use of 
distributed lag models are now analysed, ’ The literature on early 
developments in distributed lag models is extensive and will not be 
reviewed here.' ^
Distributed Lag Models' ^
Distributed lag models are models which include lagged values of 
the exogenous variables and/or lagged values of the endogenous 
variables among the set of explanatory variables. Tho influence of
* See P.Cagan, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyper Inflations" in 
M.Friedman (ed.), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money,
Chicago University Press, 1956; and M.Nerlove, The Dynamics 
of Supply: Estimation of Farmers* Response to Price. 3ohn 
Hopkins Press, 1958.
Such earlier works that deal with distributed lag models and 
the estimati problems they can generate include H.8.Mann
and A.Wald, "On the Statistical Treatment of Linear Stochastic 
Difference Equations", Econometrics, Vol.11, 1943, pp.173-220; 
T.C.Koopmans, H.Rubin, and R.B.Leibnlk, "Measuring the Equation 
Systems of Dynamic Economics", in T.C.Koopmens (ed.), Statistical 
Influence in Dynamic Economic Models, Oohn Wiley & Sons, New York, 
19S0; and L.R,Klein, "The Estimation of Distributed Lags", 
Econometrica, October 1958, pp.552-565.
For an excellent review of distributed lag models in general, 
see A.Koutsoyiannls, Theory of Econometrics, Macmillan, London 
1977;,or O.Oohnston, Econometric Methods, McGraw-Hill, New York 
1972.(2^^
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the explanatory variable is therefore assumed to ba distributed over
a number of previous values of X* We will not be concerned here
with the specification and estimation problems posed by distributed
lag models containing only exogenous variables.' '
One of the most populaVdistributed lag models in applied
research using lagged values of endogenous variables among the set
I )of regressors is Koyck's geometric lag scheme.' * This distributed 
lag model assumes that the weights (lag coefficients) are declining 
continuously following the pattern of a geometric progression* Note 
that the original model contains only lagged exogenous variables;
Yt %  ‘’c/t "t (6.31)
where u^ satisfies the usual Goues-Markov conditions* The geometric
lag-echeme implies that the b^s can be expressed in the form of a
geometric progression such that 
ib, X  where 0 /\ 1
Solution of the model contained in (6.31) yields
Y{. = 8g(1 -)\) + (6.32)
where Vt
By applying the Koyck transformation, the "intractable modol" has
been brought into "manageable" form.' '
* For a discussion of these types of models, see O.Oohnston,
F con ometric Methods, op.cit., p.293 ff.; see also F.De Loeuw, 
"The Demand for Capital Goods by Manufacturers; A Study of 
Quarterly Time Series", Econometrice, Vol*30, Duly 1962, 
pp.407-23; P.JoLund and K.Holden, "An Econometric Study of 
Private Sector Gross Fixed Capital Formation in the United 
Kingdom, 1923"d928", Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.20, 1960, 
pp.56—73; S.Almon, "ifiiQ Distributed Lag Between Capital 
Appropriations end Expenditures", Eoonqmetrica, Vol.33, 1955, 
pp.178-196; and Z.Griliches, "Distributed Lags: A Survey",
EGonometrica, Vol.35, 1967, ppo16-49.
•ÎH4 See L»M»Koyc!<9 Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis, 
North-Holland, 1954.
Sea R.D.Wonnacott and T.H.Wonnacott, Econometrics, John Wiley 
& Sons, New York, 1970, pp.145-6. ™
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As aquation (6*32) shows? the final estimable version of Koyck * s 
model includes the lagged value of the endogenous variable (Y^ ^) in 
the set of explanatory variables* The model contains two important 
gdvantegee over aquation (6.31), which is the general form of dis­
tributed lag systems. Firstly, it achieves maximum economy of degrees 
of freedom by meaningfully substituting all the lagged values of X 
by a single variable, Y^^^; secondly, we partially avoid th© problem 
of multicollinearity (or, at least, reduce the degree of the problem) 
since Y^^^ will generally be less correlated with X,j. than successive 
values of tho X 's »
However, the appearance of the lagged endogenous variable, 
among the explanatory variables generates a number of estimation 
problems,' ' The first problem is autocorrelation by specification in 
the residuals, a problem common to all models using the Koyck trans­
formation,
independent of the error term and, therefore, is a stochastic 
variable« The consequence of this is that ordinary least-squares 
estimates are biased in smell samples, and inconsistent in largo 
samples. Finally, the violation of some of the Gauss— Markov assump" 
tions renders the Durbin-Uatson statistic unsuitable for testing for 
serial correlation,
A similar formulation to Koyck'© transformation, whereby
(**) Secondly, the lagged dependent variable, Y^ ., is not
Y^ =: f(X^, ) may be generated by postulating other behavioural
rules, different from K o y c k T w o  such influential and widely-used 
models are Nerloue's "partial adjustment model" and Cagan's "adaptive
“«• For details, see A.Koutsoyiannls, op.cit., pp.296-300.
■îHf The consequences of autocorrelation on the parameter estimators
are explored in Chapter Seven.
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expectations model". We must note, however, that Cagan's model creates, 
essentially, the same estimation difficulties as K o y c k m o d e l .  Only 
the "partial adjustment" model does not generate autocorrelation in 
the residuals through specification, as implied by Koyck's geometric 
lag scheme and Cagan'a "adaptive expectations" model, and hence its 
estimation procédure is leas awkward,
f ^Cagan'a adaptive expectations model' *
Cagan's original model was based on tho following behavioural 
hypothesis on expectations: the value of the dependent variable in 
the current period depends not on the actual value of the exogenous 
variable, X., but on the expected or "permanent" level of X in the 
current period, say, X^^. Probably the best-known application of this 
model is Friedman's' * "permanent income hypothesis", in which the 
level of consumption, C^, depends on "expected" or "permanent" 
income, Y^ . ' %
C; 0 (5.33)
To estimate expectational models, the normal procedure is to substitute 
"expected" variables by actually observed variables, by postulating
specific rules for the formulation of expectations.
In its general form, the adaptive expectation model can be 
written as;
bo bl*t + "t (6 .34)
This modal was originally formulated by P.Cagan in "The 
Monetary Dynamics of Hyper Inflations", in M.Friedman,(ed.), 
Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, Chicago University 
Press, 1956.
Sea M.Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function, 
University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Princeton, N.]., 1957,
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Next; we postulate that expectations concerning the independent 
variable X. are formulated according to the adaptive rule, whereby?
V  ■" (6-35)
where g =» expectation coefficient and 0 <  V  <  1, Equation (6*35)
implies that the change in current expectations (X^^ - ) is only
a fraction of the difference between the currently observed value of 
the variable and last year's expected value, X^^^« Expectations 
are reformulated and updated in each period in the light of actual 
achievements. Equation (6.35) can bo rearranged to yield
V  = + X  (%t - %t!l) (G.36)
which shows how current expectations are based on previous expectations
according to an adaptive rule*
Solving equation (6.34), we obtain
= -2° + 1  - 2  u^ (6,37)
b^ b^ ^ b^
Lagging (6*37) by one period, and substituting in equation (6*35),
we obtain
\  + (1 - (6.38)
We therefore obtain an expression which contains the same variables 
as Koyck*8 model (and the "partial adjustment" modal). This is due to
the fact that all three models assume the same lag-echeme, i.e. a
declining geometric pattern for the lag-coeeficlente. Cagan's model, 
however, suffers from the same drawback as Koyck'a models it induces 
autocorrelation by specification and the appearance of the lagged 
andogonous variable on the right-hand side of equation (6*38) causes 
estimation problems.' '
* It may be more realistic to replace X. by in the adaptive
rule since when expectations are formed in the current period, 
current values of X. are not known. We then obtain a new 
behavioural rule:
(X t^ -  X t i p  = '5 (X t_ l -  X t : i )  (8.35a)
cont»/
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( )Nerlove's Partial Adjustment Model' '
Nerlove's model, also known as the habit persistence model, was
an attempt to overcome the estimation difficulties associated with
Koyck's geometric lag scheme, and Cagan'o adaptive expectations model*
The behavioural hypothesis underlying the modal is the following: there
ciis a desired level of tho endogenous variable in period t, , which 
depends on the actual value of the exogenous variable, X, in period tî-
V  "  ‘’o b l * t  " t  (8.39)
where satisfies all the Gauss-Markov assumptions of ordinary least
squares» Recent formulations of the theory of investment have frequently
been based on the so-called "stock adjustment principle", whereby the
desired level of capital stock (implying no excess capacity or over—
dworking) depends on the level of output,. Since is unobservable, a 
behavioural rule is postulateds the actually realised change in the ■
capital stock, for example, (Y^ -- Y^ , ^ , is only a fraction of the 
desired change. This gradual adjustment is due to technological, financial, 
or administrative/managerial constraints. As Dohnston points out, "the 
reasons for partial adjustment typically include ignorance, inertia, 
and the cost of change", ' The adjustment equation expressing the 
adjustment process can be written as
^  - Yt_1 = 9(Yt^  " Yt_l) '"t (8-40)
where 0 <  g <  1
cont,/The estimable model then involves the variables X. and Y^^^ 
as tho predetermined, explanatory variables, but still
contains the same estimation problems,
•IS" The original formulation is contained in a number of publications 
by M.Nerlove between 1956»»and 1958, See, in particular, M.Nerlove, 
"Estimates of the Elasticities of Supply of Selected Agricultural 
Commodities", Dournal of Farm Economics, \/ole38, 1956, Also 
M.Nerlove, Distributed Laps and Demand Analysis, USDA, Agriculture 
Handbook No,141, Washington, 1958,
See 3.Johnston, Econometric Methods, op.cit*, p.300, Other reasons 
include technological constraints, institutional rigidities, per­
sistence of habit, etc* Griliches has shown how simple cost/
-198.
and Y,^  - Y^  ^ = actual change in capital stock, i.e. actual
investment in period t
dY» - Y. , = desired investmentt U»'* I
9 IS! adjustment coefficient
Clearly, the closer g is to unity, the greater is the adjustment 
made in the current period®
Substituting (5*39) into equation (6.40), and solving, we obtain 
Y^ (gb^) T (gb^)X^ f (l-g)Yt_i -t 4 gu^) (6.41)
Equation (6«41) expresses the capital stock (or the endogenous variable) 
partly as a function of output (or X^) in that period, and partly as a 
function of the existing capital stock at tho beginning of the period 
(or the lagged endogenous variable.)
The final formulation of Nerlove's "partial adjustment" modal is 
obviously similar to that contained in Koyck's and Cagan's models in 
terms of variables included (Y^, X^, Y^.. ), The Important difference 
lies in the fact that the error terra in the partial adjustment model 
does not contain autocorrelation by specification. The disturbance 
term is (V^ ~h gu^), which can bo assumed to be non-autocorrelated as 
a starting-point; tho hypothesis can then bo tested with the relevant 
econometric techniques, suitable for use in distributed lag models.
The estimation problems are therefore less difficult in general, A 
second important feature in Nerlove's model relates to the adjustment 
coefficient? the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable, Y^ 
has a clear economic meaning since it involves the term g, the adjust- 
ment coefficient®' '
cont./considerations could generate an adjustment model like equation 
(6,40). For a more precisely formulated rationale within a 
particular context, see 2.Griliches, "Distributed Lags: %  Survey", 
Econometrica, Volo35, January 1967, p«43«
* Nevertheless, one should not immediately accept Nerlove's approach 
as being more satisfactory than Koyck*s and others on the ground 
that we can allow the disturbances to be uncorrelated and to have/
» 1 9 9 -
Wo conclude this chapter by considering a model which has played 
an Influential role in demand and supply analysis in the past twelve 
years, and the results of which we will use indirectly in Chapter 
Eight of this study* Houthakker and Taylor extended the "stock 
adjustment principle" in an attempt to explain the behaviour of con™ 
sumera regarding demand for non-durable goods*' ' Their main argument 
is that quantity demanded in any one period is a function? among others, 
of quantity demanded in previous periods due to e "habit formation 
procsa", a behavioural hypothesis they termed the "hobit-formation 
principle"«
The usefulness of the Houthakkor-Taylor formulation lies in its 
flexibility and in so far as it allows the "dynamisation" of économie 
relationships; it also allows the estimation of short-run and long- 
run elasticities of demand and supply. Assume that the long-run 
demand relationship is given by equation (6*42);- 
D.tl„
b
bo^t ?t (6*42)
where represents long-run demand, and and price and income
respectively* The problem is to estimate long-run elasticities from 
short-run data since it is the latter that we observe* However, 
Houthakker and Taylor argue that the ratio (D^^/D^^) will he closer 
to unity than the ratio (O. /O, ) "because there will tend to bew L  V —  I , 8  '
greater coincidence between short- and long-run demand in year t than
cont,/constant variance. As Thiel remarks, "what matters is what is
true about the properties of the disturbances of the equation 
that is estimateds and this is a matter to be considered in 
every single instance". See H«Thiel, Principles of Econometrics, 
North-Holland, 1972, p.263.
* See H.S.Houthakker and L.O.Taylor, Consumer Demand in the United 
States, 1929-1970; Analysis and Projections, Harvard University 
Press, Massachusetts, 1966*
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between short- and long-run ciemand in successive years 
can be written as
,, (*)
Dtl
D t—1 ,8'
where 0 •< m 1
This
(6.43)
By substitution into the demand equation (6,42), we obtain
‘"“j l/(1"m) b. b.
tl
0t-1,8
^o^t "Ut (6*44)
so that 
0ts
Dts
(1-rn) b^(1~m) hgfl-m) ra
O t t t-1 ,8 t (6.45)
(6.46)
Equation (6,46) is the short-run demand curve? the estimation of 
which yields both short- and long-run elasticities. From 
m »
b^(1-m)
and bg(l-m)
WG obtain
4 ""
and
1
where the b**3 are the short-run elasticities and the b's are the 
long-run elasticities.
See A.Koutsoyiannls, Theory of Econometrics, op«cit*, p,302. 
See also MiNarlova and W.Addison, "Statistical Estimation of 
Long-Run Elasticities of Supply and Demand", of Farm
Econojrdjcs, Vol.XL? No.4* 1958, pp.861-80; and Ira Horowitz,
"^ An Econometric Analysis of Supply and Demand in the synthetic 
Rubber Industry", International Economic Review, Vol.4, 1963, 
pp,325-45.
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In this chapter, we have appraised a number of models that 
have been used to estimate agricultural supply functions. Wo 
have outlined some of the theoretical and estimation problems 
associated with those models and tried to demonstrate the advantages 
and drawbacks of each model? both in general terms and in the context 
of our own needs in this study* In the next chapter, we proceed to 
analyse very briefly two important estimation problems likely to 
be encountered whan estimating agricultural supply functions by the 
use of distributed lag models; the problems of autocorrelation in 
the residuals and of multicollinearity amongst the regressors in a 
regression model.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
ESTIMATION PROBLEMS
IN AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY FUNCTIONS 
INVOLVING DISTRIBUTED LAGS
.203.
Estimation Problems in Agricultural Supply Functions Involving 
Distributed Lags
In this chapter, we briefly examine two econometric problems 
invariably associated with distributed lag models. The use of time- 
series data always contains the inherent possibility of autocorrelation’ 
among the residuals ? while the inclusion of the lagged endogenous 
variable among the set of regressors renders the traditional tests for 
the existence of autocorrelation unsuitable* A second problem associated 
with time-series data on economic variables is that of multicoliinoarity 
among the explanatory variables* Since the consequences of autocorrelation 
and multicollinoarity are so serious, we will be concerned with testing 
for their existence in every single relationship we are considering. We 
will not? however? be concerned with detailed derivations and proofs of 
tha standard results*' ^
The Problem of Autocorrelation
An important assumption of OLS is that successive values of the 
random variable u are independent of each other, i.e. the value that u 
assumes in one period is independent of the value it assumed in any 
previous period. If this assumption is violated, a number of consequences 
follow which effect the desirable properties of loast-squaros estimators.
For such detailed analysis, see any intermediate textbook, e.g.
3.Johnston, Econometric Methods, McGraw-Hill, New York 1972;
D.Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics, Macmillan, New York 1971; 
AaKoutsoylannis, Theory of Econometrics, Macmillan, London 1973; 
R.J.Wonnacott and fcH.liionnacott, Econometrics* John Wiley, New 
York, 1970; G,S,Maddala, Econometrics, McGraw-Hill, 1977; M.Dutta, 
Econometric Methods;, SouthHÜostern Publishing Co., Ohio 1975; and 
A.S.Goidberger, Econometric Theory, John Wiley, New York, 1964.
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It is true that the parameter estimates of OLS are still statistically 
unbiased? in the sense that their expected value is equal to the true 
value of tha population parameter. The property of unbiasednsss does 
not require the assumption of zero Qorivariance between different values 
of the residual term*
Although the parameter estimates remain statistically unbiased? in 
the presence of autocorrelation, their value in any single sample is not 
correct. There is no available mathematical formula for the computation 
of this "autocorrelation error". Secondly, the variance of the stochastic 
term u may be significantly underestimated if the u's are subject to 
serial correlation; Johnston' has shown that the underestimation of the 
variance of u is more serious in tho case of positive autocorrelation* 
Further, since the variances of the parameter estimates are a function of 
the variance of u, uso of OLS will yield underestimated values of tha 
variances of parameter estimates as well., Thus we falsely overstate the 
reliability of the estimates, and may be led into rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is in fact correct (Type I error). The effect is the 
inclusion of irrelevant variables into the model. In any case, it can bo 
shown that the application of the OLS formulae for the variances of para­
meter estimates is no longer valid, nor are the precise forms of the F and 
t tests used in tho general linear regression model. Finally, if the 
residual term is autocorralated, predictions based on OLS estimates will 
ba inefficient, and contain "needlessly large sample variances" (as opposed 
to predictions based on, for example, estimates from Generalized Least 
Squares)a
The importance of autocorrelation becomes apparent when one considers
See J,Johnston, op,cit., p.247.
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distributed lag models, especially those based on a declining geometric 
lag scheme, as examined in Chapter Six of this study. We saw that the 
Koyck transformation contained in both Koyck*s distributed lag model and 
in Cagan's adaptive expectations model generated autocorrelation in the 
residuals by specification of a given behavioural rule* Accordingly, 
tha estimation problems posed by those two models are compounded by the 
autocorrelation consequences mentioned above®
Koyck*3 transformation generates an estimable equation of the forms 
» bg(1 - 0) + (7.1)
where 1/t ^t ~ G"t-1
Clearly, ex hypothesi, g is not equal to zero, and equation (7.1) suffers 
from autocorrelation,
A second estimation problem associated with equation (7.1) is the 
problem of dependence between an explanatory variable and the error term. 
Obviously, tha lagged endogenous variable, , is not independent of 
the error term Since
E(V^Y^) / 0, it follows that
E(V.Y^ .) / 0 for all t and j.
The result of the violation of this Gauss-Markov assumption is that OLS 
estimates will be biased in small samples. However, autocorrelation in 
the residuals, associated with dependence of Y^  ^ on together render
the OLS estimates of the parameters not only biased, but also inconsistent
t+j 
(^)
in large samples. This asymptotic bias, duo to E(V.Y. ,) / 0, does nott J
approach zero as the sample size approaches infinity
Finally, it has been shown that the combined violation of two of the 
Gauss-Markov assumptions impairs the reliability of the Durbin-Watson
For a proof of this result, see J,Johnston, ibid., p.247.
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statistic in detecting autocorrelation. The asymptotic bias can be 
calculated to equal
g(i-bi^)
1 -f b^g
The bias therefore depends on the value of the autoregressive term, and 
if g >  0? we obtain an overestimate of b^. A Monte Carlo type study by 
Griliches' * has supplied some evidence that the bias can be very large, 
especially if the b's are small and the g's are large. Because of these 
very serious consequences, detection of autocorrelation is crucial in 
the Koyck type distributed lag models.
Detection of autocorrelation is? however? more complex in distributed 
lag models, Nerlove and Wallis' ' have shown that the conventional 
Durbin-Wataon statistic tends to be biased towards a value of.2 (reflecting 
a valuo of g of zero, i.e. no autocorrelation) when the lagged endogenous 
variable? is used as an explanatory variable. Malinvaud' ' has
shown that such a bias is serious only for models containing  ^ as tha 
only regressor, and if there are other exogenous variables in the model, 
the bias tends to decrease. Finally, Taylor and Wilson' ' •' have carried 
out an elaborate exercise in which they explored the power of the Durbin- 
Watson statistic in detecting autocorrelation in various models, in which
* See Z.Griliches, "A Nota on the Serial Correlation Bias in Estimates 
of Distributod Lags", Econometrica, Vol.29, 1961, pp.65-73.
See M,,Nerlove and K.Wallis, "Use of the Durbln-Watson Statistic in 
Inappropriate Situations", Econometrica, Vol.34, 1966, pp.235-8.
See E.Malinvaud, Statistical Methods of Econometrics, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam, 1966, pp.460-5.
***# Sea LoD.Taylor and T.AoWilson, "Three Pass Least Squares: A Method 
for Estimating Modela with a Lagged Dependent Variable", Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vole46, 1964, pp,329-46*
' 2 0 7 .
they experimented with various values of and various autoregressive
schemes, e.g. first and second—order schemes, etqble and explosive schemes, 
etd. Using an "amended" form of the Durbin-Watson statistic, they concluded 
tliat the statistic performed well (i) the larger the size of the sample,
(ii) the larger tho value of (iii) the larger the absolute value of "g, 
and (iv) in stable second-order autoregressive schemes* However, tha 
statistic performed badly in small samples, in models with low R^, when g 
was small, and in cases of unstable first- and second-order schemes.
To remedy the defects of the Ourbin-Watson statistic, Durbin^*) has
suggested another test for models involving lagged values of the endogenous 
variable and for large samples (sarnplo size exceeding 30). Assume tha 
original model is:
" '’d + ^ Vl + Vt Vt-1 + (7-2)
Applying OLS to equation (7.2), we obtain the residuals, a.'s. We then 
regress on its own lagged value, and aJJ.^  the other variables on
the right-hand side of the original model:-
°t = ^0 + + f2Yt-1 + ^3*t +
We than conduct the traditional tests of significance on the coefficient
of f^, in equation (7.3), If f^ is significantly different from
zero, wo accept the alternative hypothesis of autocorrelation in equation 
(7,2). One must remember, however, that this Durbin test is a large sample 
tost and its small-sample properties are not as yet determined. As Johnston 
points out, a great advantage of the Durbin test is that "’the statistics
( -.Hi-1required for its computation are generated routinely in OLS application".' ^
^ See ].Durbin? "Testing for Serial Correlation in Least-Squares 
Regression when Some of the Regressors are Lagged Dependent 
Variables", Econometrics, Vol.38? 1970, pp,410-21.
** See J,Johnston, op® cit., pp,312-3,
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If we allow 8. to denote the OLS residuals from estimating equation (7.2), 
we can define tha autocorrelation coefficient as
n—1 «
r  e /t=1
Wo need not compute r afresh since it can be approximated by the conven­
tional Durbif>-ii/atson statistic, d? where
r 1 — 1 , g and2
n 2 n „d = Z  (G. -8 ) / Z  e/t=2 t=1 ^
As already indicated? the Durbin-Watson statistic is unsuitable as a
test for autocorrelation for a model such as the ana contained in
equation (7*2). Instead? Durbin has computed an h statistic from r :«
h r % / i'i (7.4)
V 1-nV(a,^)
where ^(a^) is the estimate of the sampling variance of , the coefficient 
of ^, in the simple least-squares model® We can then test the h 
statistic as a standard normal variate; for example? if h >  1.645, one 
would be led to reject the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation at the 
5% significance level, Tho adjustment in r that leads to tho h statistic 
involves only the estimated variance of a. (and the sample size). The h 
statistic is quits general; no matter how many exogenous variables we 
have in tho model or other lagged values of the endogenous variable (such 
as Y^ 2 ? Yt_?# etc®), what is required for the h statistic is only the 
sample variance of the coefficient of There are two major drawbacks
to the application of the h statistics firstly, it is strictly a large-
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sample test? with iinknown small-sample properties; secondly, the test 
breaks down if nV(a^) ^  1.
As we saw in Chapter SiR, the Koyck geometric lag scheme and 
Cagan's adaptive expectations model produce serial correlation in the 
residuals by specification, and are therefore subject to the estimation 
difficulties and drawbacks examined above. This is the major advantage 
that a partial adjustment-type model contains. The relation generated 
by the habit persistence mechanism can bo expressed by;-
where 4- gu^ is a normally distributed random variable with
zero mean and constant variance. This specification of the partial 
adjustment model does not lead to any further restrictions on e^, which 
renders the estimation procedure much simpler than in the adaptive 
expectations model. If it can be assumed that [(e.e ) ~ 0 for all t / s, 
then WG can use ordinary least squares and obtain consistent and asymp­
totically efficient estimates of the parameters of equation (7.5).
The model presented in Chapter Eight of this study to estimate 
sugar supply response in Commonwealth exporting countries follows the 
partial adjustment behavioural hypothesis. The model avoids autocorrelation 
in the residuals by specification, and therefore the undesirable conse­
quences of autocorrelation. However, other causes, besides specification, 
can be responsible for autocorrelation? and we cannot simply rule out the 
existence of serial correlation in the residuals merely by assumption.
The Durbin-liiatson test cannot be used to detect autocorrelation in our 
modal (which contains the lagged endogenous variable as one of the 
regressors) nor can tho h statistic be relied upon (our sample size is 
less than 30), Instead? we estimate the autocorrelation coefficients of 
various autoregressive schemes, and choose amongst these according to
.210.
'•”2standard statistical criteria (t values, F ratio, and R )« In particular, 
for each regression wo estimâtes
St = ^ V l  ''t (7-6)
and + “t ^7.7)
etc., and test the statistical significance of the autocorrelation 
coefficients» If those turn out to be statistically significant, a 
number of possibilities exist. The first step to consider is the 
possibility of inisspecification of the function, and inclusion of 
omitted relevant variables» It is only if this step fails to remove 
auto correlation that ue seek new estimation techniques* A number of 
such techniques exist, which have been widely covered and criticised 
in the literature, and need not be examined here. Two such methods are 
the Cochrana-Orcutt iterative procedure' and the Wallis method'  ^ of 
estimation of the autoregressive coefficient» The objective is to apply 
Generalised Least Squares instead of OLS to yield consistent and asymp­
totically efficient parameter estimates. Since the autocorrelation 
coefficient is unknown, it needs to be estimated before the structural 
model can be transformed into:
(7t -
-1- (7'8)
where is the new non-autocorrelated error term.
See Cochrane, C, and Orcutt, G«H», "Application of Least-Squarss 
Regression to Relationships Containing Autocorrelated Error Terms", 
Journal of American Statistical Association, Vol.44, 1949, 00,32-61,
** See K,F,Wallis, "Lagged Dependent Variables and Serially Correlated 
Errors: A Reappraisal of Three-Pass Least-Squares", Roview of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol®49, 1967. pp.555-67*
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It may, however, be argued that transformation of the observable
variables is unnecessary if the objective of the research is not 
primarily to estimate the structural parameters, but rather to make 
forecasts from the model, further, the new parameter estimates do 
not lend themselves to straightforward economic interpretation in the 
way that OLS estimates do. In Chapter Ten, we present estimates of 
various autoregressive coefficients and test their statistical signi­
ficance, which will help us determine whether the results are more 
useful for structural parameter estimation or for forecasting.
The Problem of flulticollinearity
In this section wo briefly analyse the estimation problems p©sed 
by the existence of multicollinearity among the regressors in multiple 
regression analysis*'  ^ Though the exact effects of multicollinearity 
are not as yet theoretically established, the existence of multicollinearity 
is known to impair the accuracy and stability of the parameter estimates. 
Consider a regression model of the general linear form:
Yt = + ... + b^X^^ + (7.9)
Let ue define
Yi = 7% - Y
X * — X , — X , i  j 1,  2 5 o o *  k jJ ^ J ^ J
and r - correlation coefficient between X. and X.»x.x, 1 JJ
An important assumption for the application of OLS is that the
explanatory variables are not perfectly (or near perfectly) lineqrly
correlated, i.e* r , 111. Multicollinearity exists when theXj^ Xj ^ ' S'
* The analysis given here is quite general, and not specific to 
distributed lag models.
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explanatory variables are highly correlated (not necessarily perfectly)
with each other. In the case of perfect collinoarity between a pair of
regressors, the parameter estimates become indeterminate, and it is
impossible to obtain separate estimates for each parameter. At the
other end of the spectrum, if the variables are orthogonal (i.e. 'perfectly*
independent of each other in the sense that r o)« each parameterxiXj
can be estimated by a simple linear regression of Y on each X»
Consider the consequences of multicollinearity for estimation by 
least-»squar0s. In the case of perfect intorcorrelation between the 
regressors, not only are the parameter estimates indeterminate, but the
standard errors of these estimates also become infinitely large. '
Johnston, in his well-known text book, lists three main consequences of 
multicollinearity
(i) The precision of estimation falls as multicollinearity rises so that 
it becomes difficult (if not impossible) to disentangle the relative 
influences of the various explanatory variables. There are three aspects 
to this loss of precisions specific estimates may have very large errors; 
these errors may be highly intercorrelated; and the sampling variance of 
the parameters will be overestimated.
(ii) We may sometimes be led into dropping variables from our model 
incorrectly because their parameters are found to be not significantly 
different from zero, when the true situation may be not that a variable is 
not an important regressor, but simply that the set of sample data has 
failed to pick it up. This induced misspecification is the result of a 
type II error (accepting the null hypothesis when it is in fact false)*
For a proof of this, see J.Johnston, op.cit., pp,160-1* One must 
remember, however, that perfect multicollinearity is rarely encountered 
in practice (except when we hove a "dummy variable trap"). "The 
question is how strong these interrelationships have to be to cause a 
problem. Thus, with multicollinearity, the problem is not one of 
existence or nonexistence but of how serious or problematical it is." 
See G.SoMaddala, Econometrics, op,cit., p.183®
■}Hî- See 3.Johnston, op.cit., p.160.
(iii) Estimates of parameters may be vary sensitive to particular sets 
of data, and the addition of observations and/or new variables can 
produce sharp changes in some of the estimates, indication instability. ' 
When the explanatory variables are less than perfectly correlated, 
the consequsnceo are by no means certain. The evidence from both theoretical 
and applied econometric studies is rather inconclusive. Some studies have < 
shown that the values of the coefficients become unstable as the sample 
size increases or as additional collinaar variables are introduced into 
the function, whilst other studies have not revealed such instability. 
Similarly, the standard errors of parameter estimates have been shown to 
increase considerably under the same conditions in some studies, whilst 
remaining unaffected in other studies.
One must emphasise that even in the presence of severe multicollinarity 
the parameter estimates remain statistically inbiased.  ^ But the existence 
of multicollinoar X's in individual samples may render tho parameter esti­
mates imprecise and unstable. Though no firm rules exist for assessing 
the seriousness of these imprécisions, the instability may be so serious 
as to even cause a change in the sign of the parameter estimates as multi- 
collinoarity increases. Fox ' has argued that the evidence suggests 
that increasing multicollinearity causes various changes in the values of 
the parameters, depending on the importance of each regressor; "importance"
i'" For example, see 3.Johnston, "An Econometric Model of the United
Kingdom", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.29, 1961, pp.29-39.
4rK- The property of unbiasednass does not require the assumption of
orthogonality between the explanatory variables*
"M"** See K.A.Fox, Intermediate Economic Statistics, John Wiley & Sons,
Mew York, 1968, pp.259-265; sea also D.E,Farrar and R.R.Glauber, 
"Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Re-Visited", 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.49. 1967. pp.92-107.
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can be measured by the simple correlation coefficient between Y and 
each of the X's (r^xj)» One can therefore argue that the effects of 
multicollinearity depend partly on the severity of interdependence 
and partly on the importance of tho collinear variables. If the most 
crucial regressors are collinear, the conséquences of multicollinearity 
are moro serious than if "secondary" variables are collinear, since the 
latter can be dropped from the model without inducing serious misapeci- 
fication of the relationship.
The effect of multicollinearity on the standard errors of the 
parameter estimates is generally assumed to be an overestimation, 
Koutsoyiannis' * has argued that this need not always be so because 
"both the numerator and the denominator of the formulae of the variances 
will usually be affected by terms involving sums of cross products of 
the X's so that the final size of the variance of the b's may not be 
large." A large number of studies have attempted to establish guidelines 
regarding when multicollinearity becomes a serious problem* For example, 
Klein argues that multicollinearity is not necessarily a problem unless 
it is high relative to the overall explanatory power of the regression,
i.e., Gollinearity is harmful if
X|^ x j —" y.x^g %2 f 9 SI «, X|(
2where r i s  the simple correlation between any pair of regressors,
2 ^ (-K4S-1and R ' is the overall multiple coefficient of determination.'  ^ This
approach was later criticised by Farrar and Glauber.'  ^ On the other
* See A.Koutsoyiannis, Theory of Econometrics* op.cit., p.229.
^  See L.Rc.Klein, Introduction to Econometrics, Prentice-Hall
International, London, 1963, pp.64 and 101.
*** See Farrar and Glauber, op.cit. See also Chapter Mine of this 
study 9
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hand, iheil' ' has shown that even when intercorrelation between more 
than two regressors is small, we may obtain insignificant parameter 
estimates due to overestimated standard errors. Finally, Roger Frisch'  ^
showed, as far back as 1934, that the standard errors are not always 
large when multicollinearity is present. To summarise, we may argue 
that, in general, the existence of multicollinearity leads to an increase 
in tho values of the standard errors, and thus to possible misspecification 
of the function, since we may be led to reject important variables because 
of their apparently large variances.
Tests for the Existence of Multicollinearity
A simple method for testing for the existence of multicollinearity
w.ich is frequently used in applied work, in an implicit rather than an
\Qxplicit way, is based on Frisch's confluence analysis method*'  ^ This 
method estimates all possible regressions between the variables present 
in a relationship, taking each variable successively as the dependent 
variable, and computing all possible regressions of each variable on all 
others which are gradually introduced into the analysis. Clearly, this 
method involves a large number of computations and comparisons of results.
Frisch's appraoch is more comprehensive than the individual tests of 
multicollinearity often applied, Fo.r example, since the effects of multi­
collinearity depend partly on the degree of intercorrelation between the 
2regressors (r ) and partly on the overall coefficient of determination 
2(R might be argued that the standard errors^ the partial
2correlation coefficients, and the overall R may ba used for testing for 
multicollinearity. But a number of studies'  ^ have shown that none of
* See H.Theil, "Specification Errors and the Estimation of Economic 
Relationships", Review of International Statistical institute,
Vol.25, 1957,pp.41-51.    ~ ~
** See R.Frisch; Statistical Confluence Analysis by Means of Complete 
Regression Systems, University Economics Institute, Oslo, 1934.
See R.Frisch, op,cit.
See for example L.R.Klein, op,cit., 1963,p.101 for evidence on
Cobta-Oouglas production functions.
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these criteria is a sufficient test by itself, whereas a combination of
all three criteria may help to detect the existence and seriousness of
multicollinearity far moro conclusively,
In applied work, therefore, the following experimental approach is
frequently adopted. The dependent variable is regressed against each
explanatory variable individually, yielding all the elementary regressions
possibleI these are then analysed on theoretical and statistical criteria.
Additional variables are then inserted gradually, and we examine their
2effects on the overall R*, the individual parameter estimates, and on their 
standard errors. Frisch classifies a new variable as being useful, 
superfluous, or detrimental as follows:
(i) A variable is considered useful and is retained as a regressor if
2it improves R and does not render the individual coefficients unacceptable 
on theoretical grounds*
(ii) A variable is considered superfluous and is rejected if it does not
2improve R and does not seriously affect the individual parameter estimates.
(iii) A variable is considered detrimental if it affects the sigqo and/or
values of the individual coefficients "seriously". It is not always clear
how one proceeds in this situation. Ws cannot merely drop the variable,
if it is important, since this will induce misspecification through tho
omission of an important variable, and cause the violation of an important
assumption of OLS, i.e. E(u.X.) is no longer equal to zero if X, is^ J j
correlated with the variable dropped from the relationship*
Aside from Frisch's confluence analysis, other approaches to the nature 
and the causes of multicollinearity exist, e.g. in studies by Silvey, and
(vF)by Farrar and Glauber.  ^ In this study, we will rely on a modification
See S.D.Silvey, "Multicollinearity and Imprecise Estimation", 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, Vol.31» 
1969, pp.539-52; see also Farrar and Glauber, op,cit., 1967*
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of Frisch's approach, and on the Farrar-Glouber tost to determine the 
existence, severity, and locat on of multicollinearity* The latter test 
is examined in detail in Chapter Nine of this study where it is applied 
to our data sample®
Briefly, Farrar and Glauber test the severity of multicollinearity 
by comparing too different correlation coefficients : the first of these 
is the overall correlation coefficient. , obtained from the multiple 
regression modal contained in equation (7,9), and the second is the 
correlation coefficient for the regression of one regressor, say , on 
the set of all tl'ie other regressors, X^, X.^ , X. , which will be denoted
by , In general, to test whether X^ is seriously collinear with the 
other explanatory variables, we form the ratios
Ry (7*10) r
and check whether it is greater than unity. Although multicollinearity 
is essentially a property of the set of independent variables alone, the 
test given in (7,10)dBpends partly on the multiple correlation coefficient 
between Y and the given sat of X*8 , indicated by The test then judges
not in terms of the existence of multicollinearity, but in terms of its '
severity in relation to a given case,
A rather better test of multicollinearity has been suggested by
( it )Haitovsky' ^, which involves replacing the multiple correlation coefficients 
between the set of explanatory variables in the numerator (R^  ^) by "the 
partial correlation coefficients between all pairs of the explanatory 
variables" (not zero-order pairwise correlation), defined as
or simply, rX ^ X J 0 X g Xg p « s o ,
See Y.,Haitovsky, "Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis; 
A Comment"; Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol*51.
Nov. 1969, pp*486-*9.
Thus, the test becomes2-
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or *11.1,2,3 ...,k
R. >  1 (7.11)
where 1 / j, and 1, j 1 k.
However, even this test still leaves open the question of when multi- 
coilinearity becomes harmful, Dutta' ' suggests that "the econometrician 
follows the rule of thumb and is satisfied if the t test applied to the 
estimates of the regression coefficient (other than the constant) is 
found to be significant at the 95 per cent confidence level."
Since multicollinearity is essentially a drawback in the available 
data, some econometricians have argued that the solutions to the problem 
are very limited* ' A number of such solutions have been suggested, 
however, based largely on theoretical considerations; these are:-
(a) dropping "detrimental" variables, (b) using extraneous estimates, 
e.g. by poling cross-section and time-series data, (c) using ridge 
regression, (d) using ratios or first differences, (e) using the method 
of principal components, (f) substitution of lagged variables for other 
explanatory variables in distributed lag models, and (g) increasing the 
sample size. These methods have been discussed in the literature and their
shortcomings already pointed out. In particular, the ridge-regression
^ See fUDutta, Econometric Methods, op,cit., pp.153—4.
•K"if See, for example, R.F.Wynn and K.Holden, An Introduction to Applied
Econometric Analysis, Macmillan, Londoru1974j, pp.14-16.
See, for example, G.S.Maddala, Econometrics, op.cit., pp.190-94.
F or further details, see M.S.Foldstein, "Multicollinearity and the 
Mean Square Error of Alternative Estimators", Econometrica, March 1973; 
3 «Tobin, "A Statistical Demand Function for Food in the USA", Journal 
of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 1950, pp.113-41; J.Meyer 
and E.Kuh, "How Extraneous are Extraneous Estimates?", Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol*39, 1957, pp.380-93; A.EaHoerl and R.W. 
Kennard, "Ridge Regression: Biased Estimation for Non-Orthogonal 
Problems", Technometries, 1970, pp.55-82; and W«F,Massy, "Principal 
Components Regression in Exploratory Statistical Research", JmiTml^QZ the American Statistical Assoc,, Vol.6O 9N0.309,March 1965,pp.234—56 .
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method has been criticised because it is a "purely statistical solution" 
and hence might not "appeal" to many economists; similarly, it has been 
argued that the method of principal components, though often suggested 
as a remedy for multicollinearity, has very limited applied uses because 
of the difficulty of economic interpretation of the new variables.
The above discussion suggests that strict orthogonality between the 
regressors im multiple regression analysis is rare indeed. Since some 
degree of multicollinearity is generally bound to exist, we are then faced 
with two questions in applied works firstly, how much coilinearity can we 
tolerate before it seriously affects the stability and precision of our 
parameter estimates? Secondly, if the various tests have established the 
existence of "severe" multicollinearity, what solutions can we apply?
Since the answers to neither question are conclusive on a theoretical level, 
we have preferred to adopt a comprehensive approach in this study, involving 
Frisch's confluence analysis (in amended form), the simple Klein test, and 
the Farrar-Glauber test. By experimentation, we may hopefully isolate 
relationships which are stable from those which suffer from imprecise and 
unstable parameter estimates. Bearing in mind the enormous estimation 
difficulties posed by the existence of both autocorrelation in the residuals 
and multicollinearity among the regressors we proceed in the next chapter 
to derive a model to study sugar supply responses which will obviate these 
problems as far as possible, without generating misspecification of tho 
relationships.
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Review of' the luiteratiire on Distributed Lags
In this section we review very “briefly some of the contributions 
to the estimation of distributed la^ models, and assess some of the 
important empirical results produced* Among the early contributions 
to the study of supply response of primary producers in less developed
countries, reference may be made to the works of Bauer, Bauer and Yamey, 
and Stem.^*^ An early econometric study is that of Ady on cocoa 
production in the Gold Coast (now G h a n a ) . A d y ' s  work, however.
See P.T. Bauer, The Rubber Industry; A Study in Competition and london School of Economics and Political Science, London, 1948; P.T* Bauer and B.S. Yamey, "A Case Study of Response of Price in an Underdeveloped Country", Economic Journal, Vol* 69, December 
1959, PP* 800-805? and R.M. Stem, "The Price Responsiveness of Egyptian Cotton Producers", Rylclos, Vol. XEI, 1959, Fasc. 3, pp. 575-84.
See P. Ady, "Trends in Cocoa Production", Bulletin of the Oxford 
University Institute of Statistics, Vol. II, 1949, pp. 375-404.
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was completed before the contributions of Koyck and Nerlove on the 
specification of distributed lag functions were available.^*) More 
recent econometric studies of supply in less developed countries have 
been undertaken by Stern, Krishna, Dean, Bateman, Welsch, and Williams.^ '
We can now present a critical review of some important related 
studies in order to make it possible to place the present study in 
its proper context. The review here will necessarily refer to studies 
of commodities other than sugar since no distributed lag model of sugar 
cane supply of major significance had appeared to date. This therefore 
also precludes any review of econometric studies of the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement.
Empirical research dealing with supply analysis has been limited
and historically more recent in comparison with demand analysis, both
on a macro and a micro level. Examples of some important studies on
demand analysis are by Garten, Houthakker and Taylor, Lavell, Nerlove,
(***)Pearce, Schultz, Uiton and Pignalosa, and Wold and Jureen.  ^ In
* See L.M.Koyck, Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis, North
Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1954; and M.Nerlove, "Estimates 
of the Elasticities of Supply of Selected Agricultural Commodities", 
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.38, 1956, pp.496-509.
** See R.M.Stern, "The Price Responsiveness of Primary Producers",
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.44, May 1962, pp.202-7;
R.Krishna, "Farm Supply Response in India-Pakistan; A Case Study of 
the Punjab Region", Economic Journal, Vol.73, September 1963, 7^ %
pp.477-87; E.R.Dean, "Economic Analysis and African Responses to 
Price", Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.47, 1965, pp.402-9; M.J.Bateman, 
"Aggregate and Regional Supply Functions for Ghanaian Cocoa, 1946-52", 
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.47, 1965, pp.384-401; D.E.Welsch, 
"Response to Economic Incentive by Abakaliki Rice Farmers in Eastern 
Nigeria", Journal of F arm Economics, Vol.47, 1965, pp.900-14; and 
R.L.Williams, "Jamaican Coffee Supply, 1953-1958: An Exploratory 
Study", Social and Economic Studies, Vol.21, 1972, pp.90-103.
*** See A.P.Barten, "Estimating Demand Equations", Econometrica, Vol.36,
No.2, April 1968, pp.213-51; M.S. Houthakker and L.Taylor,
Consumer Demand in the United States, 1929-70: Analyses and Projections, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966: Robert J.Lavell,
"The Household Market for Sugar and Other Sweets", National Food 
Situation, No.83, February 1958, pp.36-48; M.Nerlove, Distributed 
Lags and Demand Analysis for Agricultural and Other Commodities, 
Agricultural Handbook No.141, U.S.Department of Agriculture, 1958:/
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recent years, several different methods of supply analysis have been 
suggested by different economists. Amongst these, Heady^ 'suggested
an approach through production function and cost function analysis.
(***)
Day^  ^ suggested an approach through recursive programming, while
Working suggested an approach through multiple regression analysis 
More significantly, Koyck developed the distributed lag method, which 
was later extended and modified by Nerlove and Hildreth and Jarrett,
/cont.M.Nerlove,"The Implications of Friedman's Permanent Income Hypothesis 
for Demand Analysis", Agricultural Economic Research, Vol.X, No.1, 
January 1958, pp.1-14; I.F.Pearce, A Contribution to Demand Analysis, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964; H.Schultz, Statistical Laws of Demand 
and Supply with Special Application to Sugar, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1928; H.Schultz, The Theory and Measurement of Demand, 
University of Chicago press, Chicago, 1938; A.Viton and F.Pignalosa, 
Trends and Forces in World Sugar Consumption, Commodity Bulletin 
Series No.32, FAQ, Rome, 1961; H.Wold and L.Jureen, Demand Analysis, 
Wiley, New York, 1953.
* E.O,Heady, "Uses and Concepts in Supply Analysis", in E.O.Heady et al 
(eds). Agricultural Supply Functions; Estimating Techniques and 
Interpretations, Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa, 1961 pp.3-24.
** R.H.Day, "Recursive Programming and Supply Prediction", in E.O.Heady 
et al (eds), op.cit., pp.108-24.
*** See E.J.Working, "Appraising the Demand for American Agricultural 
Output during Rearmament", Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.XXXIV,
No.2, May 1952, pp.206-224; also E.J.Working, "How much Progress 
has been made in the Study of the Demand for Farm Products?",
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.XXXV, No.4, December 1955, pp.968-74.
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amongst others.' ' As already explained, in this study we have followed 
the two latter approaches with some modifications in each of them; 
hence this discussion will henceforth be mostly limited to the studies 
that have directly or indirectly used these methods, particularly the 
distributed lag model containing the lagged dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable.
Distributed lags, as we have seen arise in theory when any economic 
cause produces its effect only after some lag in time, so that this 
effect is not felt in any particular period, but distributed over a 
period of time. This is the background of the distributed lag method. 
Most of the studies that have used this type of approach have obtained 
supply elasticities by measuring acreage response to price. Nerlove also 
adopted this procedure in most of his econometric work. Olman Hee added 
to this proposition by postulating that the elasticity of supply with 
respect to price is- an additive function of the elasticity of acreage 
and the elasticity of yield.' ' In defence of this proposition, Hee
argued that since total output is a product of acreage and yield and 
these are two separate and distinct functions, a considerable quantity 
of information regarding farmers* behaviour may be lost when only one 
supply function (in terms of acreage response only) is considered.^***^
* See L.M.Koyck, op.cit., also M.Nerlove, The Dynamics of Supply; 
Estimation of Farmers* Response to Price, John Hopkins press,
Baltimore, 1958; M.Nerlove, "Distributed Lags and Estimation of 
Long-Run Supply and Demand Elasticities; Theoretical Considerations", 
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.XL, No.2, May 1958, pp.301-11;
M.Nerlove and W.Addison, "Statistical Estimation of Long-Run Elasticity 
of Supply and Demand", Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.XL, No.4,
November 1958, pp.851-80; and C.Hildreth and F.G.Jarrett, A Statistical 
Study of Livestock Production and Marketing, John Wiley and Sons,
New York, 1955, pp.112-3.
** See Olman Hee, "The Effect of Price on Acreage and Yield of Potatoes",
Agricultural Economics Research, Vol.X, No.4, U.S.D.A., October 1958, 
p.132.
*** ibid., p.133.
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Like Nerlove, Clman Hee directed his analysis to seek the coefficient 
of expected price with a similar hypothesis that farmers adjust their 
expectations of price by a linear function of the margin of error 
which they have made in predicting the previous year's price. Hee * s 
approach, however, appears to run the risk of overestimating the supply 
elasticity (which is an additive function of the elasticity derived 
through the acreage function and the yield function), all the more so 
because Nerlove *s studies have shown that the expected price approach 
tends to obtain higher elasticities of supply than those obtained from 
analyses based simply on the previous year's price.
It is in the nature of the distributed lag model to include lagged 
price and lagged quantity (lagged dependent variable) as explanatory 
variables. This is often misunderstood as the simple assumption that 
last year's quantity and price have been the basis of price expectations 
for the next harvest year. Farmers are believed to gauge the prospective 
price for the current crop from an evaluation of past prices to form 
some sort of a "normal" price. Modifications are made every year in 
the prospective or expected price by the knowledge that the farmers have 
gained from the actual price in the market place. The "partial adjust­
ment" models clearly illustrate this point. Nerlove argues that 
producers and consumers do not react instantaneously to the fullest 
extent to changed conditions ; therefore, current quantities, both 
supplied and demanded, are positively related to lagged quantity. He 
further argues that the failure to incorporate lagged quantity as an 
explicit explanatory variable leads to positive autocorrelation in 
the calculated residuals.' ' This is quite
* See M. Nerlove and W. Addison, op, cit., pp. 876-9.
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understandable because the residual terms in the economic relations 
estimated arise, in part, from the omission of relevant variables, 
thus inducing misspecification. Since these omitted variables are 
themselves autocorrelated, they generate serial correlation in the 
calculated residuals.
The distributed lag method, however, is not free from limitations. 
First, Nerlove, has overly simplified the supply relationship by not 
including some of the relevant variables that can be observed in 
practice to be potentially important explanatory variables, such as an 
index of technological change and alternative crop prices.' ' It may 
also be argued that his approach involves the development Of a dynamic 
model of producer or consumer behaviour that implies a distributed lag 
only "incidentally"; but it has already been shown that Nerlove's hypothesis 
is equivalent to a system of declining weights in the adjustment coefficient 
and-therefore contains a distributed lag system implicitly. Second, the 
very nature of the formulation advocated by Nerlove leads to criticism 
of the model. The coefficient of adjustment (or expectation) is subject 
to specification bias to a greater extent than any of the other parameters. 
This has been shown successively by Brandlow, Halverson, and Griliches, 
and later recognised by Nerlove himself.' ' This specification bias
* Krishna remedied this deficiency in his work on firm supply response
in the Punjab region. See Raj Krishna, op.cit., pp.477-487.
** See G.E.Brandow, "A Note on the Nerlove Estimate of Supply Elasticity",
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.XL, No.3, August 1958, pp.719-22; 
H.W.Halvorson, "The Response of Milk production to Price", Journal of 
Farm Economics, Vol.XL, No.3, December 1958, pp.1101-1113;
Z.Griliches, "Distributed Lags, Disaggregation, and Regional Demand 
Functions for Fertilizer", Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.XLI, No.1, 
February 1959, pp.90-102; M.Nerlove, "On Nerlove Estimate of Supply 
Elasticity: A Reply", Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.XL, No.3,
August 1958, pp.719-28; and M.Nerlove, "On the Estimation of long-Run 
Elasticities; A Reply", Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.XLI, No.3,
August 1959, pp.632-40.
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rendars the adjustment coefficient subject to underestimation. In fact, 
Griliches succeeded in showing that the coefficient of adjustment will 
be underestimated consistently. But both Griliches and Nerlove agreed 
that this does not necessarily lead to overestimation of the long-run 
elasticities. It has also been pointed out by Griliches that a low 
coefficient of adjustment may be due to the presence of multicollinearity 
among the independent variables. He was able to derive the adjustment 
coefficients that are consistent with the data by using the covariance 
of the respective parameters. Nevertheless, the estimate of the long-run 
elasticities was not altered very much even in this case.
In another examination of the distributed lay model. Ironmonger 
expressed some reservations about Nerlove*s findings.^*) His criticism, 
howeverwas mainly concerned with demand relationships. He argued that 
lagged quantity should be used to represent changing tastes rather than 
what it means in the distributed lag model, by hypothesizing that there 
had been changing tastes during the period covered by Nerlove in his 
demand and supply studies. Therefore, the reason Nerlove derived 'good* 
estimates was that the lagged quantity accounted for changing tastes more 
than anything else. A similar argument, he suggested, could be made for 
the supply studies. Nerlove acknowledged that the purpose of inclusion of 
the variable in the demand function was to account for changing tastes.
But Brandow and Griliches pointed out that the estimate of the adjustment 
coefficient could be biased because of the inclusion of lagged quantity 
as an explanatory variable.
* O.S.Ironmonger, "A Note on the Estimation of Long-Run Elasticities", 
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.XL, No.3, August 1959, pp.626-32.
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Another criticism raised by Ironmonger concerned the relevance 
of the time period covered. He stressed that if the time series 
involved an interval of less than one year, seasonal behaviour might 
bias the adjustment coefficient. He also implied that if the period 
covered by the analysis involves little or no disturbance, and if the 
seasonality can be removed from the data, then the estimate of the 
parameters, particularly the adjustment coefficient, may not be biased. 
None of the users, however, triad to dispute the applicability and 
usefulness of the distributed lag model, but only to find means of 
overcoming the problems which accompany such models.
It is well known that autocorrelated disturbances occur most fre­
quently while estimating relationships using time series data. Nerlove 
was quite aware of this problem and tried to show that the very nature 
of the distributed lag model tends to minimise and in some cases 
eliminate autocorrelation in the calculated residuals. To support 
this thesis, he used the Durbin-Watson statistic in his empirical 
analysis to test for the presence (or absence) of autocorrelation. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic does not seem to be a very appropriate measure 
of autocorrelation for the distributed lag model, since the latter 
model includes the lagged dependent variable as one of the explanatory 
variables, Durbin and Watson state in their original paper that
"It should be emphasized that the tests described 
in this paper apply only to regression models in 
which the independent variables can be regarded as 
'fixed variables'. They do not, therefore, apply 
to autoregressive schemes and similar models in 
which lagged values of the dependent variable 
occur as independent variable." (*)
J.Durbin and G.S.Watson, "Testing for Serial Correlation in 
Least Squares Regression, II", Biometrika, Vol.38, 1951, 
pp.159—177.
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Even if we agree that serial correlation in the residuals are minimum 
in the distributed lag model, the statistic used by Nerlove to measure 
serial correlation in the residuals does not provide any conclusive 
evidence in defence of his thesis. Surprisingly, none of the previous 
studies have been concerned with the applicability of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic to the distributed lag model or with the problem of auto­
correlation in general. We hope to remedy this omission when presenting 
our results in Chapter Nine.
The question does arise, however, about the appropriate statistics
we can use to overcome the problem mentioned above, if we are dealing
with a predictive model, and do not require the estimated values of the
structural parameters, then we are not primarily concerned with this
problem. This is considered justifiable if we expect these disturbances
to continue in the future according to the same pattern. Johnston states
that intercorrelation of the explanatory variables may not be a serious
(*)problem if one can reasonably expect it to continue in the future.' '
At the same time, he implies the same thing for autocorrelation in the 
residuals.^ ' Hogg provided empirical evidence by pointing out that 
for prediction purposes the ordinary least-squarea-estimats provided a
better estimate than the itsrative-least-squareft estimate which he had
I Martii 
(****)
estimated by following Johnston's procedure.(***^ Tweeten and tin
also provided further evidence in support of this proposition,
* See J,Johnston, Econometric Methods, 2nd edn., McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., 1972, p.207.
** ibid., p.196.
*** ibid., p.195-99. See also H.C.Hogg, The Diversified Crop Demand 
for Molokai Irrigation Project Water, 1950-1970. Agricultural 
Economics Report No.72, Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station, 
University of Hawaii, December 1966.
**** See L.G.Tweeten and J.E.Martin, "A Methodology for Predicting
US Farm Real Estate Price Variation", Journal of Farm Economics, 
Vol.48, No.2, May 1966, pp.378-393.
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In a recent study of rice and corn in the Philippine Islands, 
Mangahas, Recto, and Ruttan obtained some illuminating results by 
following a rather similar approach, particularly the simple supply 
model, outlined previously in this study.' * Though these authors 
wese very pessimistic about the role of price as a development tool,
"at present levels of technology", they seem to have exercised 
sufficient caution in selecting the variables and interpreting them.
But it is still open to question whether the supply elasticities 
presented by them represent true supply elasticities, since they have 
depended almost entirely on acreage response functions. This leaves. 
a possibility that the supply elasticities have probably been under­
estimated in their study,
Mangahas, Recto, and Ruttan estimated acreage response functions 
for rice and corn for the Philippines as a whole and for nine major 
regions by means of both "simple" regressions and distributed lag 
models. The short-run supply elasticities they calculated from the 
acreage response functions typically fell in the 0.10 to 0.30 range, 
although estimates as high as 0.60 were recorded. Their general con­
clusions were:-
(a) Supply elasticities for rice were higher than for corn;
(b) The elasticities for both rice and corn were highest in
the commercial areas characterised by proximity to urban centres and/or 
relatively high levels of irrigation development.
They argued that the price-elasticity estimates for the Philippines 
were comparable with estimates obtained for the same crops, and for
See M.Mangahas, A.E.Recto, and V.W.Ruttan, "Price and Market 
Relationships for Rice and Corn in the Philippines", Journal 
of Farm Economics, Vol.48, No.3 (part I), August 1966, pp.685—703.
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other subsistence crops, in other Asian countries. Significant price 
parameters were obtained for most response functions. But although 
prices of rice and corn in the Philippines have apparently been fairly 
effective in allocating resources, they argued that "there is little 
evidence to indicate that price changes are an effective device for 
influencing aggregate agricultural output".' ' Their conclusion was, 
therefore, that one must envisage a much less optimistic outlook for 
the role of price as a development tool, at existing levels of tech­
nology, than if price changes induced yield as well as area changes.
The model used to describe the Philippine rice and corn economies- 
follows that of Krishna', ^in which the distinguishing feature is that 
the market supply is not the total amount produced but rather the 
residual of current output of the crop after a significant portion of 
it has been deducted for home consumption. This is expressed as follows:—
"t = "t - 
where M is the actual marketed surplus,
Q is actual output, and
C is actual home consumption by subsistencs-crop producers.
The model relies heavily on existing models of supply and market- 
surplus relationships in subsistence economies.(***^ Given the crop- 
production function, depends on the quantities of inputs applied 
during season t and on the climatic conditions. It is hypoihesized
* op.cit., p.685.
See Krishna, op.cit.. Economic Journal, Vol.73, September 1963, 
PP.477-487.
*** See, for example, R.Clark, "The Economic Determinants of Jute
Production", FAQ Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and 
Statistics, 6, pp.1-10, September 1957; V.Oubey, "The Marketed 
Agricultural Surplus and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped 
Countries", Economic Journal, 73, December 1963, pp.689—70-2.;/
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that farmers* demand for inputs depends, in part, on the expected 
prices of these inputs and on the expected farm prices of rice and 
corn relative to the prices of alternative crops* It is unlikely, 
however, that the amounts of inputs actually employed will equal 
the amounts that farmers desire to employ. The basic output-response
function then becomes 
't
where
Q** = f (p/, r/, T *)
* is the output desired in production period t
* is the expected harvest price of the subsistence crop 
is an index of expected factor prices
* is an index of the expected prices of alternative crops 
and T^ is a measure of the expected technological response of
the subsistence crop relative to alternative crops.
The parameters of the output-response function were then estimated both
(a) under the assumption that actual output equals desired output and
(b) under the assumption that actual output adjusts to desired output 
over a number of periods* In either case, actual output is related to 
past relative crop prices, which are assumed to determine price expec­
tations, and is independent of the current price of the subsistence crop.
Two types of linear models were used: a "simple" supply model and a 
distributed lag model. In first-trial regressions, the lagged product
cont./W.P.Falcon, "Factor Response to Price in a Subsistence Economy:
The Case of West Pakistan", American Economic Review, 54, May 1964, 
pp.580-591; S.M.Hussain, "A Note on Farmer Response to Price in East 
Pakistan", Pakistan Development Review, 4, Spring 1964, pp.93-106; 
A.S.Kahlon and H.N.Dwivedi, "Inter-relationship between Production 
and Marketable Surplus", Asian Economic Review, 5, August #963, 
pp.471-87; A.R.Khan and A.H.M.N.Chowdhury, "Marketable Surplus 
Function: A Study of the Behaviour of West Pakistan Farmers",
Pakistan Development Review, 2, Autumn 1962, pp.354-76; M.H.Khan,
"Real Effects of Foreign Surplus Disposal in Underdeveloped Economies; 
A Comment", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78, May 1964, pp.348-9;/
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ppica and the lagged index of prices of all alternative crops
sntered as separate variables* In a set of second trials, 
the lagged product price and the lagged price of a single major alter­
native crop were entered as a ratio (P^-l^^t-l^* ^ trend variable was
also included "in an attempt to test how introduction of a single 
variable designed to pick up the effects of technological change and 
other autonomous forces, such as those leading to transmigration and 
the opening up of new land for cultivation, might affect the precision 
and the stability of the price coefficient - the coefficient on which 
interest in this study was primarily focused".^*) The authors argue 
that the failure to obtain statistically significant yield response in 
their study is consistent with the results of other studies which indi­
cated that changes in the output of rice and corn have been due almost 
entirely to changes in area harvested, and that differences in yield 
among different regions have been due primarily to variations in environ­
mental factors such as season and irrigation*
cont,/R.Krishna, "A Note on the Elasticity of the Marketable Surplus 
of a Subsistence Crop", Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics* 
17, July-September 1962, pp.71-84; R.Krishna, "The Marketable 
Surplus Function for a Subsistence Crop", Economic Weekly, Annual 
Vol., 1965, pp.309-320; P.N. Mathur and H.Ezekiel, "Marketable 
Surplus of Food and Price Fluctuations in a Developing Country", 
Kyklos. 14, 1961, pp.398-407; G.Mohammad, "Some Physical and 
Economic Determinants of Cotton Production in West Pakistan", 
Pakistan Development Review. 3, 1963, pp.491-526; R.O.Olson, 
"Discussion: Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal 
in Underdeveloped Economies", Journal of Farm Economics. 42, 
December 1960, pp.1042—5; and R.M.Stern, "The Price Responsiveness 
of Primary Producers", Review of Economics and Statistics. 44,
May 1962, pp.202-207.
* op.cit., pp.690-1.
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The main conclusion of this study is that the short-run acreage 
response elasticities for rice are usually larger than those for corn. 
The fact that marketing ratios for rice are greater than those for 
corn would seem to lend further support to the hypothesis that the 
price response of output in the Philippines is greater for crops pro­
duced under conditions where farmers are relatively market—oriented.
The Price-elasticity estimates for the same crops and for other sub­
sistence crops in other Asian countries (for example, India, Pakistan, 
East Pakistan/Bangladesh, Indonesia, etc.). In those regions where 
production of rice and corn is highly market-oriented, Philippine rice 
and corn producers are at least as responsive to price changes as pro­
ducers of commercial or cash crops in India and Pakistan. Hence changes 
in relative prices are to some extent effective in determining the allo­
cation of land among the several agricultural commodities.
Our own study of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement differs from 
that of Mangahas et al. in at least two respects. Firstly, the 
existence of substitute crops for sugar in all the countries under 
study (and this excludes India) is very limited for agronomic, climatic, 
and institutional reasons. For example, tea is such a poor second to 
sugar cane in so far as contribution to gross domestic product, total 
employment, and foreign exchange earnings in the context of the Mauritian 
economy, that we were compelled, on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds, to ignore it as a serious possible substitute. The situation 
is not very different in Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, 
and even in Australia, where the possible competing crops could have been 
corn, wheat, and rice.' * Secondly, most of the sugar produced in these
* Note, however, that over 95^ of Australian sugjar output comes from
one province, Queensland, where there is no other serious competitor 
for land apart from sugar cane.
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countrles is intended for exports, again with the exception of India.
The domestic market is relatively insignificant, accounting for anything 
from 5^ of total output for the island economies to around 20^ for 
Australia. Hence, the relevant price is not the domestic price, but 
rather the price paid by the importers of this sugar, or preferably, 
the price actually received by producers (if data on this variable can 
be made available). The basic similarity between the two studies is 
that both are based on a Nerlovian "partial adjustment#' type model, 
and both make use of distributed lag systems.
One important piece of work that estimates short-run and long-run 
elasticities of supply exclusively from data on acreage is Krishna's 
study of farm supply response in the Punjab region, and we briefly 
examine this study.
The basic model used by Krishna was the standard Nerlovian type 
of adjustment m o d e l . T h e  objective of his study was "to put to a 
test the widely prevalent notion that peasants in poor countries do not 
respond, or respond very little, or negatively, to price movements".^***) 
While Nerlove used only relative price and lagged acreage as explanatory 
variables, Krishna included other variables in the estimating equation 
of a given crop which were found, on "preliminary analysis", to be 
important factors determining:the acreage of that; particular crop.^****^
* R.Krishna, op.cit.. Economic Journal, 1963, pp.477-487.
** See M.Nerlove, The Dynamics of Supply, John Hopkins Press, 1958,
op.cit.
*** Krishna, op.cit., p.477.
N-XNM As Krishna observes, "Mr Nerlove and Mr Venkataraman used only
relative price and lagged acreage as determining variables, while 
we have used other relevant variables as well. But the elasticities 
may still be compared, as they are computed from "net" regression 
coefficients — net of the effects of other relevant variables. The 
"relative price" is relative to an index of the relevant "substitute" 
crop or other prices in each case." See R.Krishna, op.cit., p.487.
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Such variables would be yield, irrigation, and rain amongst others.
Yield would be included in an estimating equation as an explanatory 
variable if the yield of a particular crop has registered a signi­
ficant upward trend during the period under study (due, for example, 
to varietal improvements or the expansion of irrigation as a result 
of government policy). Rainfall would be an important factor deter­
mining acreage planted for crops grown largely in unirrigated areas. 
Krishna also used lagged irrigated acreage in all crops as one of 
the determining variables for those crops whose acreage recorded a 
long-term upward trend over the period undersstudy due to the allocation 
of a substantial part of newly irrigated land to them. In this study, 
Krishna was fortunate enough to be analysing a region where relatively 
reliable long—period data were available for a number of crops especially 
cotton, maize, sugar cane, rice, bajra, jowar, wheat, barley, and gram. 
However, the dependent variable chosen was acreage planted, and not 
output produced. The justification given was that "the elasticity of 
planned output with respect to price can be supposed to be at least 
equal to the elasticity of acreage planted if it is reasonable to assume 
that inputs other then land are varied at least in proportion to acreage 
and returns to scale are not diminishing."^*^
Krishna lists a number of reasons for choosing a Nerlovian "partial 
adjustment" type of model in preference to an expectational model (of 
the "adaptive" form)^**^ He argues that the choice between different lag 
models depends, in the first place, on "whether the different lags
*  ibid., p.479; see also M.Nerlove, The Dynamics of Supply, op.cit.,
pp.67-68.
** op.cit., pp.479-80.
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postulated in them are plausible formalisations of the institutional, 
technological, and expectational facts of the sector concerned 
Secondly, it depends on the estimation difficulties likely to be 
generated by the use of different distributed lag models.
As has been discussed before, the estimating equation derived 
from the "adaptive expectations" model is the same as that generated 
by the "partial adjustment" model except that the former model induces 
serial correlation in the residuals. Suppose that these residuals are 
given by » u^ -  (1 -  B) u^_^ in the expectational model (using 
Krishna*s notation)1**^ The essential difficulty can be briefly illus­
trated. If the above is assumed to be serially uncorrelated, then 
the in the estimating equation of the expectational model is auto­
matically serially correlated since —  (1 - 8) u^_^. If, on the
other hand, is taken to; ber serially uncorrslated,. u^ is serially 
c o r r e l a t e d K r i s h n a  therefore chose the partial adjustment model, 
the advantage being that if the estimated residuals of the estimating 
equation generated by the model are found to be serially uncorrelated, 
then, since a  Bu^, the u^*s are also serially uncorrelated,(****) 
And, therefore, the estimated coefficients are not automatically affected 
by serial correlation.
* op.cit., p.479.
* *  The difficulties due to serial correlation peculiar to distributed- 
lag models have been variously discussed by, amongst others, Koyck, 
Klein, Nerlove, and Griliches. See, for example, L.R.Klein, "The 
Estimation of Distributed Lags", Econometricm, 1958, pp.553—65;
Z.Griliches, "A Note on Serial Correlation Bias in Distributed Lag 
Models", Econometrica. January 1961; and Z.Griliches, "Distributed 
Lags, Disaggregation, and Regional Demand functions for Fertilizers", 
Journal of Farm Economics. February 1959.
*** See L.R.Klein, op.cit., p.560.
**** See Krishna, op.cit., p.560.
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TZhe general conclnsion of Krisna*s study is that a priori beliefs 
about the responsiveness of the output of individual crops to price 
movements and other factors cannot be accepted at their face value. ^ ' 
îlo general presumption in favour of the irresponsiveness of crop output 
to prices in poor economies can be upheld. The responsiveness, however, 
varies as between different crops and regions, and what is required is 
an increase in studies of responsiveness in other poor regions (and 
countries} to enable inter-regional and international comparisons of 
responsiveness to be made. Indeed, the coefficients of adjustment 
estimated by Krishna indicate that the rapidity of adjustment of the 
acreages of crops by the peasants in response to changing circumstances 
are not very different from those estimated by Nerlove for the United 
States. "The Punjab peasants were evidently not unusually tardy in 
adjusting fairly "rationally" to changes in their economic environment".
m  this chapter we have discussed the use of distributed lag models 
in determining sugar supply response in Commonwealth exporting countries 
and discussed the theoretical problems associated with estimating such a 
model. We have also reviewed some applied econometric studies which are 
most closely related to the type of analysis undertaken in this 
particular study. In Part Pour, we proceed to examine in detail a case 
study under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, Mauritius. Mauritius 
displays all the characteristics of a truly mono-crop economy, and the 
.development of the sugar industry has been closely linked with the 
availability of guaranteed markets for at least a part of its sugar 
output. In Chapter Eight, we assess this development and analyse the 
various aspects of sugar production in Mauritius before moving on, in 
Chapter Nine, to develop a siraultaneous-equation model to explain sugar 
production and exports for the period of duration of the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement.
op, cit. p. 487*Krishna, op. cit., p.487•
PART POUR
A CASE STUDY UNDER THE COMMONWEALTH 
SUGAR AGREEMENT
THE MAURITIAN SUGAR INDUSTRY
CHAPTER EIGHT
AN ECONOMIC STUDY OP THE SUGAR 
INDUSTRY IN MAMITIUS
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Introductory Remarks
In this chapter, we examine in detail the sugar economy of 
one major exporter under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, Mauritius. 
The choice of Mauritius as a case study can be justified on at least 
two grounds firstly, most studies have shown that Mauritius has the 
highest commodity concentration index with respect to exports in the 
world (*}, and the commodity involved is sugar. The high rate of 
dependence on sugar for employment, industrial output, and foreign 
exchange earning appears to justify our selection for a case study. 
Secondly, under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, Mauritius was con­
sistently allocated the largest negotiated price quota amongst all 
exporters, mainly in recognition of her dependence on sugar exports, 
and also consistently depended on the United Kingdom market for a 
significant proportion of its exports. For these reasons, a case study 
of the sugar economy of Mauritius is expected to shed considerable 
insight into the implications for a mono-culture economy of various 
multi-lateral and bi—lateral commodity agreements.
Geography and History
Mauritius, together with Reunion and Rodrigues,forms part of 
the 31ASCAREHE] Archipelago in the South Indian Ocean. The island covers 
an area of 720 square miles (1,840 sq. lün) — the size of Surrey — and 
measures 38 miles long and 29 miles wide. It is situated near the 
intersection of latitude 20° South and longitude 57° East. It lies 
approximately 550 miles (880 Em) east of Madagascar and 1 ,250 miles 
(2,000 Em) off the coast of Africa,
* See, for example, M. îîichaely, Concentration in International Trade, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1962.
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Significant evidence exists that the island was known to early 
Arab navigators  ^^, but it was not until the beginning of the sixteenth 
century that the Portuguese discovered it. The island was first 
named DOMINGOS FERNANDEZ but this was later changed to CERNE. The 
Portuguese, however, did not establish any permanent settlement, and 
in 1598 the Dutch colonized the island and named it Mauritius, For a 
number of reasons, the Dutch occupation was unsuccessful, and they left 
the island in 1710, In 1715» the French occupied the island, and named 
it lie de France, French occupation, however, ended in 1870 during 
the Napoleonic Wars when the British captured the island and renamed 
it Mauritius, The island remained under British rule until ^$68 when 
it became a fully independent member of the Commonwealth,^**^
Sugar cane itself was first introduced into Mauritius in the 
early days of the Dutch occupation when, in I659, the plant was 
brought from Batavia by Governor VAN DER STEL, At that time, it was 
used mainly for the production of "arrack" ^ ***^, but the Dutch built 
two sugar mills, one at Grand Port and the other at FLacq, and sugar 
was first produced in Mauritius around I696, Production on a commercial 
scale, however, did not start for another fifty years, under the 
administration of the French Governor, Mahe de La Bourdonnais, who 
encouraged and developed the industry. By 1755» sufficient sugar was
^ See Georges de VISDELOU-GUir'IBEAU, La découverte des Iles Mascareignes, General Printing & Stationery Go. Ltd., Port Louis, 1948.
See Barclays Bank Ltd,, Mauritius : An Economic Survey, Port Louis, 1971» for further details,
iWHe See the Public Relations Office of the Sugar Industry, Sugar in Mauritius, Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Mauritius, December 1978. "Arrack" is the eastern name for spirituous liquor.
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being produced to satisfy domestic consumption requirements, as 
well as the needs of the neighbouring island of Bourbon (now Reunion), 
and of the many sailing ships which called at the island. By 1801, 
cane plantations covered 4,220 hectares (10,428 acres), and about 
60 mills were producing almost 3,000 tonnes of s u g a r . However, 
towards the end of the French occupation, the area under cane had 
been reduced to only 1 ,055 hectares (2,607 acres), in an effort to 
increase the island*s production of foodcrops at the expense of sugar. 
The economic importance of sugar as a commercial cash crop was 
emphasized by the first British Governor, Sir Robert Farquhar, whose 
impetus gave rise to 106 sugar mills by 1820, Sugar production reached 
10,800 tonnes by 1825, and total area under cane cultivation increased 
to 10,975 hectares (27,120 acres). Mechanization of the sugar industry 
had already begun, and around 1820, vertical cylinders in the sugar 
mills were replaced by the more efficient horizontal cylinders, and the 
use. of steam power gradually replaced draught animals to work the mills • 
But the most important event of that period, from an economic viewpoint, 
was the abolition of the special import duty on Mauritian sugar entering 
the United Kingdom from 1825 onwards. One could argue that the removal 
of this duty made competition with West Indian Sugar possible, and was 
the real starting point for the industry's development and evolution.
By 1858, there were 259 factories operating in the island, the highest 
. number ever reached, and cane cultivation covered 46,450 hectares 
(114,751 acres) of land; by I860, Mauritius was producing 130,000 tonnes 
of sugar per year.
* Note that "tonne" is the metric ton which is called the Megagramme in the international system of units ( s , I . )  = 1000 Kilogrammes (Kg.).
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Between 1860 and 1890, the sugar industry remained rather stagnant, 
with sugar production continuing at around 130,000 tonnes annually, 
while the number of sugar factories dropped from the peak figure of 
259 iu 1858 to 124 in 1891. Coombes' ' has shown that the main reason 
for this reduction was an outburst of malaria in 1866 which resulted 
in the abandonment of whole estates situated within the coastal belt. 
Other reasons have included competition with beet sugar and damage 
caused by various pests and diseases of the sugar cane and by a number 
of violent cyclones. These setbacks, however, induced millers and 
planters to improve cultural methods and manufacturing techniques, 
which consisted mainly in the introduction of new varieties, the use 
of chemical fertilizers, the production of white sugar iy^  1868, the 
introduction of chemical control in sugar factories and the setting up 
of an agricultural research laboratory, the Station Agronomique in I893, 
The following 25 years witnessed a rapid growth in technical 
developments both in the field and the factory; various new research 
institutions came into existence, such as the Société des Chimistes 
in 1910 and the College of Agriculture in 1925 . The work of the
Station Agronomique was continued as from 1915 by the newly created 
Department of Agriculture and, in 1955, the l^ Iauritius Sugar Industry 
Research Institute was set up.
* See A.N. Coombes, The evolution of sugar cane culture . in Mauritius, General Printing & Stationery Co. Ltd.,Port Louis, Mauritius.
-x-x- Now the Société de Technologie Agricole et Sucriereand the School of Agriculture of the University of Mauritius respectively.
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The development of the sugar industry would not have been possible^ 
without the part played by a number of other institutions; the two most 
prominent ones are the Mauritius Chamber of Agrioulture, which was 
founded as early as 1855 under the name of Société d* Agriculture and 
has played a leading part in increasing efficiency in production, and 
the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate, established in 1919, which is the sole 
agency for the sale of all sugar produced in the country.
'In spite of its long history of success and efficiency, the sugar 
industry in Mauritius has experienced many temporary setbacks due to 
both natural and economic causes - cyclones, droughts, pests and diseases, 
labour unrests, reduction of the acrea^ under cane to allow for the 
production of foodstuffs in war time, world surpluses and low prices, 
and, more recently, world-ifide inflation; despite these setbacks, the 
industry has survived and becowae one of the most efficient cane producers 
amongst less-developed countries, with production in the country's 21 
factories reaching an all-time record of 761,000 tonnes in 1975* The 
figure has not been exceeded since for a number of reasons, in particular 
due to prolonged drought in 1974 and to the occurrence of tv/o cyclones
in 1975*
A report by the Mauritius Chamber of Agricultureconcludes that;
"IVhile technical progress and good management have enabled the 
industry to expand, such expansion would not have been justified 
without the assurance of outlets and reasonably remunerative 
prices. This assurance was provided for the first time in 1951 
by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which, since the beginning 
of 1975, has been replaced by the Lome Convention between the 
countries of the ACP (Africa-Caribean-Pacific) group, to which 
Mauritius belongs, and the nine countries of the European 
Economic Community, of which Great Britain is a member".
See Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Sugar in Mauritius op. cit. p. 14.
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Role of Agriculture
Three climatic zones are commonly recognised in Mauritius^ ^.
(1) The sub-humid zone, which is the coastal belt, has an annual 
rainfall of 35'* - 50'* with mean temperatures of 23°C to 25°C and mean 
maxima and minima of 30°C (June) and 16°C (August), About 10% of the 
cane lands are found in this belt, and sugar cane is grown mainly with 
the help of irrigation.
(2) The humid zone or middle belt has an annual rainfall of 50" to 100", 
Mean temperatures vary from 21°C to 23°C with extreme means of 30°C, 
(January) to 15°C (August), The bulk of the cane lands are found in 
this zone.
(3) The super-humid zone of the central plateau has a rainfall exceeding 
100" and may reach 200", Mean temperatures are about 20°C to 22°G in 
January and drop to a mean minimum of 14,5°C in August. Some 25% of the 
cane lands occur in this zone.
The soils were classified-in 1946 by Halais and Davy^**^^ into two 
main groups of laterite according to the age of the parent rock;-
(1) the mature or older soils being deep clays or clay loams; and
(2) the immature or younger soils being shallow and characterised
by the presence of varying amount of stone and gravel.
The natural fertility status largely depends on the extent of 
leaching, this being severe in the high rainfall areas.
* See J.E, Meade, The Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London, 1961.
** Note that rainfall figures given here are in inches.
See P. Halais and E.G. Davy, Notes on Agro-Climatic Map of I'feuritius, Mauritius Sugar Industry Research Institute Occasional Paper No. 23, 1946, Mauritius.
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The utilisation of land in the post-war period has emphasized 
the importance of the sugar cane industry. Tables 8.1(a) and 8.1(b) 
compare the situations in 1958 and 19^9 and they show that over half 
the total land area now available is under sugar cane cultivation* 
Table 8.1(a). Land Utilisation in Mauritius, 1958
Acres % of Total Island Area
Agriculture 213,600 46.3
Sugar 197,400(92.4%) 42.8
Aloe fibre (effective area) 3,700( 1.7%) 0.8
Tea 5,6oo( 1,7%) 0.8
Tobacco i,ooo ( 0.5%) 0.2
Foodcrops 2,900( 1.4%) 0,6
Vegetables 5,ooo( 2.3%) 1.1
Arable land potentially productive 1,200 0 .3
Private forest lands 5,800 1.3
I#adow8, grassland, scrub, grazing grounds and waste lands 140,100 30.3
Crown forests 67,700 14.7
Natural reserves 15,500 3*4
Built-up areas 14,200 5.1
Inland water bodies 2,700 0.6
Total island area 460,800 100.0
Source : James Meade, op. cit., p.73» Table XXIX, adapted.
The proportion of the total island area under agriculture has 
risen from 0.463 in 1958 to O.56O in 1969, while the proportion under 
sugar cane cultivation rose from 0.428 to 0.525 over the same period. 
Even within the agricultural sector, the proportion of land under sugar 
cane rose from 0.924 to 0.939* Acreage under tea increased threefold 
over the period, but tea is still a very poor second in terms of net 
contribution to gross domestic output and employment.
-245-
A brief analysis of the importance of the sugar industry - 
Table 8.1(b). Total Area Classified by Utilisation, 1969
Acres % of Total land Area
Agriculture 257,900 56.0%
Sugar 242,100(93.9%) 52.5
Tea 1Q,800( 4.2%) 2.3
Tobacco, vegetables & other crops 5,000( 1.9%) 1.1
Forests, scrub areas, grass­lands, & grazing lands 163,900 35.6%
Forest plantations 23,900(14.6%) 5.2
Forest natural 5,900( 3.6%) 1.3
Savannah, grasslands, meadows, etc. 18,400(11.2%) 4.0
Scrub and other forest lands 115,700(70.6%) 25.1
Reservoirs and ponds 2,900 0.6
Swamps and rock 3,500 0,8
Roads (Main thoroughfares) 3,300 0.7
Built-up areas 29,300 6 .4
Total Island Area 460,800 100.0
Sources Adapted from Barclays Bank, Mauritius; An Economic Survey op. cit., p.7.
to the Mauritian economy might be useful at this stage. The. growing 
and manufacturing of sugar has consistently accounted for over 33% of 
gross national product since the Second World War, Moreover, the 
output of many other industries is part of the sugar industry's activités; 
for example, some of the construction in the island is on behalf of the 
sugar industry; output of the transport industry includes the transport 
of sugar, and so on. No estimates exist to account for the total direct 
and indirect contribution of the sugar industry to the gross domestic 
product ; Meade suggests that "it is certainly well over a half of 
Mauritius's output".'' ^. Table 8,2 gives a breakdown of gross national 
product for 1958, at factor cost.
* J. Meade, op, cit., p.44.
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Table 8.2. Gross National Product at Factor Cost, 1958
Rs. MillionElements
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishings 
Sugar Cane 
All other 
Mining and quarying 
Manufacture :
Sugar 
All other 
Construction
Electricity, water & sanitary services 
Transport, storage & communications 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Banking, insurance and real estate 
Ownership of dwellings 
Public administration and defence 
Other services
Gross domestic product
plus net factor income from rest of the world
Gross national product
Source: J.E. Meade, op. cit., p.44*
147
59
1
78
43
30
11
76
67
12
45
24
61
634
4
658
22.3
9.0
0.2
11.9
6.5
4.6
1.7 
11.6 
10.2
1.8 
6.8 
5.7 
9.3
99.4
0.6
100.0
More recent evidence suggests that the dependence of the economy 
on agriculture, and in particular sugar, remains undiminished^ ^.
Shares of sugar in gross national product over the period 1951-1974 fell
below 33% only once — -in 196O , when two—thirds of the sugar crop were
decimated in one of the worst hurricanes to hit'the island.
The two other major areas of contribution of the sugar industry
relate to employment and foreign exchange. Table 8.3 below produces
some evidence for the period 1966-1977 regarding employment of the 
labour force.
•K' See, for example. Bank of Mauritius: Annual Report, various issues, Port Louis, Mauritius.
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Table 8.3. Employment in the sugar industry, 1966-1977
Agriculture and Fishing Total labour, force (i) (2) 0 )Period Total Sugar Tea (20 (20 w
1966 57.1 53.5 2.3 125.0 93*7 45.7 42.8
1967 57*0 53.3 2.6 139.0 93.5 41.0 38.3
1968 61.7 57.4 3.1 126.6 93*0 48.7 45*3
1969 58.7 54.5 2.9 125.9 92.8 46,6 43.3
1970 60.6 55.-5 3*6 129*6 91.6 46.8 42.8
1971 59.8 54.8 3.3 141.7 91.6 42.2 38.7
1972 61.9 54.0 6.1 147.5 87.2 42.0 36.6
1973 62.1 54.1 6.2 157.8 87.1 39*4 34*3
1974 63.0 55.7 5.7 167*3 88.4 37*7 33.3
1975 64*5 57.8 4.7 173*3 89.6 37*2 33*4
1976 64.2 57.8 4.7 184.9 90.0 34.7 31*3
1977 61.1 54*3 6.8 193*3 88.9 51.6 28.1
Source; Bank of Mauritius; Annual Report. 1977, Mauritius,
Notes; Period refers to September of each year, except for 1977 when 
the March figure was used.
All numbers (except proportions) are in thousands.
Total labour force represents the number actually employed, not the 
total labour available.
Column (1) represents the proportion of agricultural labour employed 
by the sugar industry.
Column (2) represents the proportion of the total labour force employed 
in agriculture.
Column 0) represents the proportion of the total labour force employed 
by the sugar industry.
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Clearly, employment in agriculture has increased very slowly over 
the period, the small increase being mainly due to the increasing 
importance of tea as a second agricultural base# Employment of labour 
in the sugar industry can only be described as having remained fairly 
stagnant, reaching a peak of 57,800 in 1975 and 1976* The labour force 
(actually employed) increased markedly over the period 1966-1977, rising 
by 54*6%* and at an average annual rate of 4*22%. The bulk of agricultural 
employment naturally is to be found in the sugar industry (ranging from 
87% to nearly 94%)* But agricultural employment as a share of total 
employment fell dramatically over the period, by 50*9% between I966 and 
1977, or an average annual fall of 5*03%* Consequently, the share of 
total employment contributed by the sugar industry fell significantly, 
given the fairly constant level of employment generated by the industry.
The share of total employment by the industry fell by 34*3% between I966 
and 1977, with the average annual fall amounting to 3*45%. The main 
reason for the reduced relative importance of agriculture to the Mauritian 
economy was the creation of a number of export processing zones in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. The result was a dramatic rise in employment 
in manufacturing, from 7,000 in September I966 to over 31,000 in March 
1977, representing an increase of 342.9%, or an average annual increase 
of 13*226 over the period. The other large sector which witnessed signifi­
cant increases in employment was the "Services" sector (see Table 8.2 for 
sectors of the economy not included under this heading). Employment in 
"other services" rose from 2,600 in September 1966 to 25,000 in March 1977, 
representing an increase of 861.5% over the period, with an average annual 
rate of increase of 20.8%.
One must conclude that agriculture, and especially sugar, is likely 
to remain an important employer of labour for the foreseeable future.
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Whilst diversification would appear to be helpful in terms of future 
employment levels, a hard-core total of about 60,000 employees in 
agriculture as a whole, and 55,000 in the sugar industry, is likely to 
continue*
In terms of foreign exchange, agricultural exports have consistently 
accounted for over 95% of exchange earnings over the period 1951-1974*
Sugar is by far the most important export item* Together with molasses, 
a by-product of sugar manufacture, sugar accounts for over 90% of the 
island's total exports (the percentage share falling to around 87% 
in the 1970s), and this percentage is unlikely to change very significantly 
in the near future in spite of the many steps taken to diversify the 
island's economy. Sugar in Mauritius is produced mainly from domestic 
resources. The labour employed and the financial resources used are of 
local origin* Fuel for the manufacture of sugar is provided by bagasse, 
the cane fibre which, as molasses, is obtained as a by-product in the 
manufacturing process. Apart from fuel, most of the other supplies of 
inputs are imported and so is a large proportion of the plant and machinery 
used in the sugar factories.
However, as the imported items account for only a relatively small 
proportion of the sales revenue, the domestic value added in sugar pro­
duction is about 8526 of the value of the finished product, in particular, 
between 1971 and 1974, the value added by the sugar industry to the gross 
national product experienced aci unprecedented rise mainly because of the 
high sugar prices prevailing on the world market in those years* During 
that period, the contribution of sugar to GNP at factor cost actually 
increased by nearly five times, from Rs. 321M to Rs.l ,563M., the latter 
figure representing 53% of total GHP for 1974*
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' Since sugar is the main source of income, the prosperity of 
Mauritius as a whole is closely linked to rises and falls in the total , 
proceeds from sales of sugar* For example, in 1974 and 1975» when a 
recession was taking place in most of the rest of the world, Mauritius 
was experiencing an unprecedented period of economic boom due to the high 
sugar prices she obtained from her exports to the United Kingdom and the 
rest of the EEC*
The earnings from sugar have also enabled the diversification of the 
island's economy, and more particularly of the sugar industry itself.
The importance of these extenualities becomes evident when one examines 
the impact of the various programmes of diversification on employment and 
savings through import substitution. Over the years, the sugar industry 
has diversified not only in other agricultural productions such as aloe 
fibre, tea, foodcrops, and animal husbandry, but also in the trading and 
manufacturing sectors, and in fishing and tourism. As land for agriculture 
is becoming increasingly scarcer due to the small size of the island and 
the extent of sugar cane cultivation, vegetables and other foodcrops are 
being increasingly gro\«i by inter-row cultivation, i.e. by cultivating 
between rows of sugar cane. Diversification in the manufacturing sector 
started by a process of vertical and horizontal integratixsn. Thus local 
industries were established to manufacture from sea corals the lime re­
quired in manufacturing sugar; from iron and steel, some of the plant and 
machinery and spare parts required by the sugar industry; from molasses, 
such alcohol products as rum, refined spirit and perfumes ; and from #
the rocks and boulders in the sugar cane fields, such construction materials 
as macadams, bricks and concrete.
In the late sixties, the sugar industiy diversified into the 
manufacture of particle board from the excess bagasse not used as fuel 
in sugar manufacture and in other industries such as the production of
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broilers and complex fertilisers. The high earnings from sug^ in 
recent years have enabled investments on a much larger scale in the 
field of industrial diversification with the result that industrialisation 
in Mauritius has proceeded at a much more rapid pace than would otherwise 
have been possible.' ^
Recent developments in the field of diversification have resulted 
in a situation in which the sugar industry has substantial interests 
not only in trade and agricultural diversification, but also in fishing 
and tourism, and in manufacturing industries such as textiles, food 
processing, and electronics. The figures given below provide evidence 
of the increasing contribution of the sugar industry to the programme 
of diversification; they relate to the net capital employed by sugar 
estates, with factories in non-sugar activities during the years 1971-1974:
1971 1972 1973 1974
Millions of Rupees 66.1 82.0 111.4 223.9
Index (1971 = 100) 100.0 124.1 168.5 338.7
Thus the capital employed in diversification has more than trebled 
over the period 1971-74, and the additional investments were largely 
responsible for helping the country to achieve the main objective of 
the last Four-Year Plan (1971-1975), which was to create 55,000 extra 
jobs by mid-1975 #
A pamphlet '  ^produced by the Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture
concluded that:
X- ibid., p.115, 1975.
** See Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Sugar in Mauritius op. cit., p.74.
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"The sugar industry contributes directly to the welfare of 
the whole population as it is the export earnings from sugar 
that enable the import of our requirements in the way of food, 
clothes, housing, fuel, medical and personal care". Also, as 
the price of sugar for domestic consumption is amongst the 
lowest in the world, the sugar industry is making available a 
cheap source of high energy food for the population at large - 
leading to one of the highest per capita consumption levels 
of sugar in the developing world.
It can be argued that the sugar industry also "contributes to 
the welfare of the population through taxation which is the source of 
Government revenue for financing its recurrent expenditure to run the 
essential administrative, economic and social services of the country." 
Between the financial years 1972/73 a^ id 1975/76, the country's budget 
increased by about RS.700M, including the Rs.l6lM spent on subsidizing 
the prices of rice and flour, ©f the Rs.700M increase, more than half 
was provided by the sugar industry in the form of increases in the export 
duty on sugar and in the income tax paid by sugar companies and by their 
employees and shareholders. We can only conclude this section by re­
emphasizing the vital importance of the sugar industry to the Mauritian 
economy:
"The sugar industry is, undoubtedly, the backbone of the economy 
of Mauritius and will continue to play a predominant role in the island's 
economy in the foreseeable future. Its importance has not been a matter 
of choice but has been mainly dictated by the comparative advantage of 
producing sugar in Mauritius over other countries, and by the ability 
to find reasonably remunerative long-term markets for the sugar which 
i8 produced . "
* ibid., p.77' 
^  ibid., p.81,
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Area of Cultivation of Sugar Land
Sugar cane is grown in all parts of Mauritius by a large number 
of independent growers (about 26,000 in I96O) and by 21 mill estates.
During the period 1929-1948, the average area under cane was 157,000 arpents 
(142,891 acres), with a high of 150,000 and a low of 117,000 arpents 
(156,450 and 122,051 acres respectively). Since 1949, when 156,000 
arpents (l62,708 acres) were under cultivation, the area has increased 
each year up to 1959 when the total area under cane was estimated at
190,000 arpents (198,170 acres), representing nearly 45% of the island 
area.
Of the total of 190,000 arpents (198,170 acres), 97,000 arpents 
(101,171 acres) — 51% - were owned and cultivated by millers, 9,000 arpents 
(9,589 acres) - or 5% - were owned by millers but cultivated by tenant 
planters (metayers), and the remaining 84,000 arpents (87,612 acres) - 
or 44% - were owned and cultivated by freehold planters, large and small. 
Table 8 .4 below gives a breakdown of sugar producing land by category 
and size for 1959*
Table 8.4 Distribution of Sug^ Producing Land by Category and Size (Arpents),
m 2
Category 10 10-99 100-199 200-499 ^ 9 ^  Total
Miller- (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) "(2)"Tl)' (2) (1) ( 5 Tplanter - — - — — — — - 25 97,000 25 97,000
Tenantplanter(metayer) 2,622 6,000 92 2,000 4 1,000 - 2,718 9,000
Freeholdplanter 17,829 31,000 903 23,000 73 11 ,000 37 12,000 9 7,000 18,851 84,000
Total 20,451 37,000 995 25,000 7311 ,000 41 15,000 54 104,000 21,594 190,000
Source; J.E. Meade, op. cit., p.75-
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Notes: 1 arpent = 1.043 acres
Column (1) refers to the number of planters in the relevant category 
Column (2) refers to the aggregate area for the relevant category 
and size group.
As expected, the table shows that most freehold planters owned less 
than 10 arpents (IO.43 acres) - in fact, over 94*5% of all planters fall 
in this category, while only 9 planters cultivated over 499 arpents 
(520.5 acres).
Apart from the control of the varieties of cane which may be grown, 
there are no restrictions on the production of sugar cane or the 
manufacture of sugar in Mauritius, The small increase in the acreage 
under cane during the last decade has been mainly in the area cultivated 
by the mills, so that by 1974 over one-half of the area under cane was 
on estates cultivated direct by the mills. The acreage accounted for by 
individual freehold planters has fallen from 45% of the total in 196O 
to less than A1% in 1972. However, the number of individual planters 
rose from less than 27,400 iu 1963 to nearly 29,100 in 1972, resulting 
in a decline in the average area cultivated by them from 3*25 arpents
(3.39 acres) to 2.87 arpents (2.99 acres). Moreover, on average over
96% of the area held by individual planters of cane is harvested each
year whereas on the mill estates the percentage is somewhat less than 90%.^
Although the area under cane has increased very slowly, there are 
substantial year-to-year variations in the output of cane reflecting 
fluctuations in the yield per acre as a result of climatic factors, 
particularly the damage caused by cyclones. While there was an average 
increase of nearly 1% a year in the yield of cane over the period I96O- 
1972 as a whole, there were wide fluctuations in the annual figures, the 
high level recorded in 1972 being more than two and a half times that 
in the cyclone-affected year I96O. The yield per acre cane produced by
^ üee International Sugar Organization, The World Sugar Econom?^: 
Sjrpcture and Policies, National Sugar Eoonomi AR a.nH j rj r-
Vbl. 1 . 1976. u.T-9
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individual planters consistently remained about 30% less than that 
on mill estates while that of metayers has been little over half of the 
mill average.'  ^ Table 8.5 below reproduces some of the relevant data 
over the period 1960-1972 for the various categories of growers with 
respect to acreage, production, and yield. It shows that owner planters 
normally harvest most of the area under cultivation, while mill estates 
consistently harvest a smaller proportion of the planted area. The data 
on yields suggest significantly higher productivities in mill estates, 
followed by owner planters, while the few tenant farmers are consistently 
least productive. Note, however, that when average yield rises for 
whatever reason (e.g. exceptionally favourable climate), all three cate­
gories experience a rise, and a similar situation is evident when average 
yield is low (e.g. in I96O).
* The Balogh Report further pointed out in 1963 that among individual planters the larger consistently obtained the higher yields while among the smaller the higher yields were recorded by members of the Co-operative Societies. See T. Balogh and C.J.M. Bennett, Commission of Enquiry, Sugar Industry. Government Printer, Port Louis,Mauritius, I963.
-256-
Table 8.5. Acreage, production, and yield in Mauritius. By Category of Growers. 1960-1972
Area under cane Area of cane harvestedpOGO hectares) (*000 hectares)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3). (4)
i960 85.1 43.5 3.3 38.3 79.5 39.1 3.1 37.2
1961 84.9 44.3 2.9 37.7 79.1 39.7 2.8 36.5
1962 86.5 45.5 2.9 38.1 81.8 41.7 2.8 37.3
1963 86.2 45.9 3.0 37.4 81.9 42.2 2.8 36.9
1964 87.3 46.3 2.9 38.1 82.5 42.1 2.8 37.6
1965 86.8 46.8 2.9 37.1 82.3 42.8 2.9 36.7
1966 87.8 46.6 3.2 37.8 82.7 42.9 3.1 36.7
1967 86.7 46.7 3.2 36.8 81.1 42.7 3.0 35.4
1968 85.9 46.5 3.2 36.0 79.9 42.1 3.1 34.7
1969 85.8 46.5 3.2 36.2 79.5 41.7 3.0 34.8
1970 86.5 47.5 3.3 35.7 80.4 42.7 3.1 34.6
1971 86.4 48.1 3.1 35.2 79.9 43.0 3.0 33.9
1972 86.6 48.5 
(oontinued overleaf)
3.0 35.1 80.2 43.4 2.9 33.9
Notes: 1 hectare = 2.47105163 acres
1 tonne = 1 metric ton = 1000 kilogrammes 
Column (l) refers to the total from all categories
Column (2) refers to mill estates (directly cultivated)
Column (3) refers to tenant farmers on mill estates
Column (4) refers to owner planters
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Table S.5 (contd.K Acreage, production, and yield in Mauritius, by Category of Growers, 1960-1972
Year Volume of cane crushed Yields per harvested(*000 tonnes) hectare (tonnes cane)
(1) (2) (3) & (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1960 2593.5 1418.0 975.5 30.1 36.2 21 .1 24.4
1961 4943.0 3031.4 1911.6 62.5 76.3 32.7 49.8
1962 4624.5 2966,8 1857.7 . 56.6 66 .3 39.8 46.7
1963 5746.7 3514.6 2232.1 70.1 83.2 42.4 57.3
1964 4380.5 2615.5 1764.9 53.1 62.1 33.6 44.5
1965 5984.5 3619.2 2365.3 72.7 84.6 46.2 60.9
1966 4843.0 3003.7 1839.3 58.5 69.9 37.4 46.9
1967 5814.5 3568.7 2245.8 71.8 83.6 50.0 59.2
1968 5152.2 3113.5 2038.8 64.4 73.9 41.9 55.0
1969 5824.2 3564.0 2260.2 73.2 85.5 45.3 61.1
1970 5120.0 3181.3 1938.7 63.7 74.6 41.0 52.4
1971 5255.6 3433.2 1822.3 65.9 79.8 44.5 49.8
1972 6314.8 3902.9 2411.9 78.7 90.0 55.2 66.3
Source: Internati onal op. cit. Vol. Sugar Organization, The World 1, 1976, adapted from Table 1,Sugar Economy, P2.
While ratooning is continued on mill estates up to and including 
the seventh year, less than half of the cane cut is of sixth or later 
ratoon. Individual planters are reported to ratoon cane up to the eigth
or tenth year, giving an overall island average of seven to eight ratoons, .
The Sugar Industry Research Institute, financed by a levy on exports 
of sugar, breeds varieties of cane adapted to local conditions and carries 
out research into the use of fertilizers and the control of diseases and 
pests. On the recommendations of a Cane Release Committee, the Central 
Arbitration and Control Board regulates the varieties of cane which may 
be planted. As a result, there has been in recent years a marked 
replacement in the types of cane planted on mill estates, stimulated by 
the need to develop varieties immune to diseases such as gummosis. Of 
the total area under cane in 1971, over half was under varieties introduced
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after 1559* - Of the varieties kpreh in Mauritius, M95/48 (the most 
popular) and M202/46 were released in 19^0, M442/51 in 19&4 and Ml 5/56 
in 1966; of the foreign varieties Si7 was introduced in 1970*^*^ Most 
of the fertilizers imported into the island are intended for sugar cane; 
of these nitrogenous fertilizers, almost all in the form of sulphate of 
ammonia, account for nearly one-half•
In 1971, over 15% of the area under cane was under irrigation.
On mill estates, the proportion was in excess of 20%, of which nearly 
one—half was by overhead irrigation while on individual planters* holdings 
the proportion was less than 8%,. of which nearly four-fifths was surface 
irrigation. A feasibility study has been completed of an irrigation 
scheme in the Northern plains, and this is expected to raise yields by 
60% over an area of some 4,000 hectares (9,884 a c r e s ) W e  examine 
the role of irrigation in more detail below.
Sugar Cane Cultivation and Manufacture
The first cane variety introduced in Mauritius was OTAHSITE, known 
under the names of GANNE BJCtANCHB or GAME JAIINE DTJ PAYS and elsewhere as
Itand LAHAINA. The Gtaheite was universally cultivated until I85O 
when it showed signs of disease (probably gummosis) and was replaced by 
varieties of the GHEEIBON type, known in Mauritius under the names of 
BEL3æUGT3ET, DIÆB, BAMBOU, GUINGHAN, and the PENANG Gane, all introduced 
from Java. Evidence exists to suggest that the laige scale importation 
of innumerable varieties from the Orient and the Pacific area in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century was probably responsible for the intro­
duction of many diseases and pests.
* See below for further details on cane varieties, pests, and weed control.
A fertilizer factory was constructed in the island and became operational in 1974
■>5^  See International Sugar Organization, The World Sugar" Economy, 
op. cit., Vol. 1, 1976, p.5*
See, for example, Mauritius Ghamber of Agriculture Annual Report, 
/^ •n- 1Q76.
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Production in seedling canes in Mauritius was first discussed in 1871 
but was not achieved until twenty years later. A number of those 
seedlings — all derived from selfing noble canes - proved of commercial 
value. Systematic hybridization only started in I950 after the creation 
of the Sugar Cane Research Station which scored an early success by pro­
ducing the variety Ml 34/32 which occupied 92% of the cultivated area in 
1952. Table 8.6 shows the variety trend for the period 1965-1975. The 
most important varieties recently released by the Cane Research Committee 
aies Ml24/59, M438/59, 317, M356/53, and B51129. o f these, oniy the 317 
variety has had time to establish an important influence, occupying nearly 
one third of all estate land under sugar by 1975. As the table indicates, 
cane varieties are subject to frequent changes as new hybrids are found; 
of the earlier varieties, only the M93/48 (1959) occupied a significant 
proportion of land (12% in 1975), but its share of total acreage was 
declining continuously after reaching a peak of 21% in I969 and 1970.
Two other important varieties were the Ml 3/56 (1966) and the M377/56 (1966), 
both experiencing an increasing share in total area, occupying 22% and 
13% respectively in 1975*
As far as field operations are concerned, sugar cane cultivation in 
Mauritius is largely conditioned by the rocky nature of the soil. iLarge 
stones and boulders, usually found in all regions, are normally bulldozed 
and piled up in heaps or walls of varying width and at varying intervals 
according to the degree of rockiness of the fields. On large estates, 
cane fields vary in area from 2 to 4 hectares (5 to 10 acres) with furrows 
five feet apart. However the layout of fields before replanting is being 
redesigned in view of possible future mechanization of field operations. 
Areas of 30 to 50 arpents (3I to 52 acres) are treated as one block, the 
stones being removed to the border of the field for later removal, roads 
and drains strengthened and the land surface levelled by means of heavy 
scrapers.
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Table 8.-6. Pane Varieties in Mauritius. 1965-1975
(Year of approval for release by Cane Release Committee given in brackets)
Cane Variety
% area cultivated (estate lands) 
Years
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1 971 1972 1973 1974 1973
Ml 34/32 (1937) 5 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Ebene 1/37 (1951) 11 9 6 4 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
B371/72 (1953) 9 8 6 5 3 2 1 1 0 0 0
Ml 47/44 (1955) 29 26 23 19 15 12 7 3 1 0 0
M31/45 (1955) 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 5 5 4 3
M202/4S (1959) 11 13 14 14 15 12 11 10 7 5 3
M93/48 (1959) 12 16 17 19 21 21 20 18 16 13 12
M253/48 (1962) 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0
Ebene 50/47 (1962) 6 6 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 .0
M442/51 (1964) 2 5 7 9 10 10 10 9 8 6 3
M99/48 (1965) - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
M 409/51 (1966) — — - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Ml 3/53 (1966) - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ml 3/56 (1966) - - - 3 6 8 11 15 18 21 22
M377/56 (1966) - - — — 1 3 8 8 9 9 10 13
M351/57 (1970) - - - - - 2 4 4 4 5 4
SI 7 (1970) — — - - - 4 10 16 23 28 31
Ml 24/59 (1971) . - — - — — — m m 1 2 2 2
M438/59 (1971) - - — m m mm mm' 0 1 2 2
H356/53 (1974) - - - - - — — a. 0 0
351129 (1974) - 0 0
Source: Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Sugar in Mauritius, on. citp.127. --------------
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The planting season extends from the beginning of the year to 
September and about one third of the planting is done during crop time. 
Virgin cane is harvested after 14 to 18 months following planting and 
ratoons every 12 months* Trashing is generally carried out immediately 
before harvesting in order to obtain cleaner canes and to facilitate 
harvesting operations. For the same reason in the dry irrigated regions 
where the trash canopy is thick, the fields are burnt prior to being 
cut (since it is possible to irrigate immediately after harvesting).
Under special circumstances, however, canes are sometimes trashed during 
the summer months.
In less developed sugar cane growing countries, cultivation is usually 
highly labour-intensive. In Mauritius, until very recently, cane cutting 
and loading were done exclusively by hand. However, as a result of the 
shortage of labour which affected the 1972 sugar cane harvest, exploratory 
work for the (assumed) eventual necessity of mechanizing harvesting 
operations was started. Mechanical loading which relieves the manual 
worker of the harder job of loading, was considered as a first step towards 
offsetting the manpower shortage. Thus several mechanical loaders have 
been introduced since 1973* However, it should be pointed out that field 
conditions are generally unsuitable for either mechanical loading or 
mechanical cutting and even in those fields where such operations would be 
possible, extensive land preparation would be required before they could be 
effected smoothly.
In the early days of the industry, canes were transported to the 
factory by means of carts drawn by mules, horses, or oxen. In 1902, when 
the SURRA disease took a heavy toll on draft animals, light railways 
(introduced in 1895) became increasingly popular, and by 1947 were used 
for 80^ 6 of the total cane crop transported. From that time, however, for 
economic reasons, rail transport gradually gave way to road transport by
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motor lorries* and tractor-trailer units* In 1955, a self-loading system 
adaptable to both lorries and tractor-trailer units was first tried* By 
1968, 80^ 0 of estate canes delivered to factories were carried by vehicles 
equipped with this device; about 15% of estate canes were still being 
transported by light railways* In 1973, about 14% of estate canes were 
still being transported by light railways* The remaining 86% were 
transported mainly by lorries and tractor-trailers, both equipped with 
the standard self-loading devices. It should be pointed out that some 
rear-loading trailers have been in use for many years now. Although this 
latter means of transport is comparatively economical, it is restricted to 
private roads on account of the fact that the cane bundle carried trans­
versely across the trailer exceeds the limits allowed on public roads, 
thereby limiting its use on a large scale* A few side-loading trailers 
have also been tried for the first time in 1973*
Another important aspect of cane cultivation is weed control; weeding 
is done partly by hand and partly by chemioalherbicides. In any efficient 
sugar industry, the control of weeds by means of herbicides is an 
established practice* In dry regions of the island, MOPA and 2,  4~I> 
derivatives are used in combination with sodium chlorate and TGA, but in 
wet localities pre-emergent long residual herbicides such as Atrazine and 
BGMV are more effective* ^  In order to improve the efficacy of week 
control in sugar cane fields, new herbicides are regularly imported and 
tested against local conditions. In 1974, for example, over Rs15M were 
spent on imported herbicides.
* For further details, see E. Rochecouste, Weed Control in Sugar Cane. Port Louis, Mauritius, 19&7*
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In addition to weed control, fertilizer requirement g for the 
sugar industry are also closely monitored* At planting time available 
phosphate, potash and silicon, and the degree of soil acidity are 
determined by soil analysis* Requirements in nitrogen, phosphate, 
and potash in ratoon canes are determined by foliar diagnosis. The use 
of calcium silicate in soils which are deficient in silicon is now common 
practice on the large sugar estates.
Sulphate of ammonia is the main "straight" nitrogenous fertilizer 
used, the average application being 95 Eg of nitrogen per hectare 
(40 E^ per acre) in one or two doses in both virgin and ratoon canes.
Water insoluble phosphates such as "guano phosphate" and rock phosphate 
are applied only at planting time, at a rate varying from 3OO to 6OO Eg 
^5 P®^ hectare (125 to 250 Eg 0^ per acre). Soluble phosphate 
in the form of triple or single superphosphate is also used in the furrows 
as a booster. When required, phosphate is used in ratoons in the form of 
compound fertilizers.
Potash is used as muriate of potash mainly at planting time, and 
in the form of compound fertilizers in ratoons, the annual rate of 
application ranging from 95 to 180 Eg E^O per hectare (40 to 75 Eg E^O 
per acre). There has been a spectacular increase in the consumption of 
nitrogen, potassium, and phosphate since the end of the Second World War.
By 1974, a domestic fertilizer factory was producing the entire requirements 
of .the industry in complex fertilizers (in particular, of the formulae
17-2-27 and 17-8-25).
The harvest season in Mauritius usually starts at the beginning of 
June and ends in December. Sucrose content in the cane gradually increases 
from June to October (the winter period), and then declines; the rate of 
decline appears to be correlated with weather conditions prevailing in
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November and December. In order to supply mills with canes having a 
relatively high sucrose content throughout the crop season, early and 
late maturing varieties have been selected for early and late harvest 
respectively.
As far as cane pests are concerned, over forty species of insects 
feed on sugar cane in Mauritius; nearly all of them are foreign species 
accidentally introduced before the need for a strict control of plant 
imports was realised and appreciated. Fortunately, only a few are-chronic 
pests, others cause sporadic damage, and some are unimportant. At present, 
no single insect species is a threat to sugar production, but it is argued 
that the aggregate loss caused by insects, although impossible to assess 
accurately, is appreciable.Control methods for the variety of 
existing cane pests are of a cultural, biological or chemical nature,
It may be noted that insecticidal control of most pests is not very 
practicable and insecticides are used only to a limited extent.
The most important cane diseases present in Mauritius are gummosis, 
leaf scald, chlorotic streak, and ratoon stunting. Gummosis has been 
responsible for the disappearance of several varieties in the past. The 
disease had been completely eradicated by a systematic, programme of 
variety selection when a new and virulent strain of pathogen attacking 
commercial varieties was discovered in I964 following the occurrence of 
two cyclones. A strict programme of replacement of susceptible varieties 
by-resistant ones has brought the disease under control again. In the 
production of new varieties strong emphasis is placed on the selection 
of clones showing high resistance to disease. Strict quarantine measures 
are also in force to guard against the introduction of diseases that do
For more details, see J.R. Williams, JJl. Metcalfe, R.W. Mungomery, and Ro Mathes (eds.). Pests of Sugar Cane, Elsevier, ’Amsterdam, I969,
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not occur in ‘the island. In this connection, mention must be made of
the Fiji disease which exists in Madagascar, and against which special
Mprecautions are taken, ^
One important cause of increased acreage under sugar cane in Mauritius 
has been irrigation, which has been practised in the dry regions of the 
island since the second part of the nineteenth century. In the early days, 
the required water was obtained from natural springs, streams, or rivers 
in the proximity of the plantations, and few cane growers had dams for 
storing their irrigation water. Two reservoirs - La Ferme (1921) and La 
Nicoliere (1926) — were constructed with the specific object of providing 
irrigation water for the sugar industry. Extensive systems of feeders 
were also constructed for the supply to reservoirs and distribution of 
water on large areas.
The various steps towards increasing irrigation in sugar cane 
plantation can be outlined as follows:—
(i) In 1957, the Mauritius Sugar Industry Research Institute 
(M.S.IJI.1.} started experimentation to compare overhead with surface 
irrigation. Water saving proved to be so important (about sixfold in the 
gravelly soils) that estates lying in the dry regions did not hesitate 
to extend overhead irrigation.
(ii) In 1965, the M.S.IJl.I. put down a lysimeter experiment to 
sttdy évapotranspiration of sugar cane under local conditions. The results 
obtained were to allow further studies on the economical aspects of over­
head irrigation on larger scales.
* For more information on cane diseases, see J.P, Martin, E.V. Abbott, and G.J. Hughes (eds.). Sugar Cane diseases of the World, Vol. 1, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 196I; and C.G. Hughes, E.V. Abbot, C.A. Wismer, Sugar Cane diseases of the World, Vol. 2, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1964*
** See Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Annual Report, op. cit., 1975, Port Louis, Mauritius.
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(iii) The introduction, from Hawaii, of a new giant sprinkler 
known as "Targetmaster", in I968, marked an improvement on the existing 
equipment, thus allowing still larger areas to be cultivated under sugar 
cane in the drier regions of the island.
(iv) The establishment at the M.S.I.R.I. of a Soil Physics 
Section in I968 enabled basic information on soil-water relationships, 
viz. the moisture characteristics of the different soil groups, to be 
obtained and thus led the way to more accurate recommendations on irrigation 
rate and interval.
However, in 1974, Raingun and Nelson Big Gun Sprinklers became popular 
on account of their lower prices, and their ease of operation and maintenance, 
so that by the end of 1974, the equipment in service on estates and large 
planters’ lands was composed of 32 "Boom-o-rain*, 19 Targetmasters, I4 
Rainguns, and 11 Nelson Big Guns, while the areas under irrigation were as 
follows2—
Surface irrigation:
Estate
4,792 hectares 
(11,841 acres)
Overhead irrigation:
. Estate
6,423 hectares 
(15,872 acres)
Total irrigation;
Estate
11,215 hectares 
(27,713 acres)
Planters
2,011 hectares 
(4,969 acres)
Planters
1,303 hectares 
(3,220 acres)
Planters
3,314 hectares 
(8,189 acres)
Island
6,803 hectares 
(16,810 acres)
Island
7,726 hectares 
(19,092 acres)
Island
14,529 hectares 
(35,902 acres)
-267-
Mauritius now produces annually about 700,000 tonnes of sugar 
of which approximately 40,000 tonnes are plantation white sugar and 15,000 
tonnes refined sugar. The difference is standard raw sugar of 98.5° 
polarization. Of the four factories producing white sugar, three use 
straight phospho-defecation of raw remelt. The fourth one uses the Talofloc 
clarification process and decolonisation of clarified syrup by vegetable 
c a r b o n . T h e r e  are 21 factories in the island, with a capacity varying 
between 55 and 250 metric tonnes of cane per hour (average being 115 TCH) . 
Table 8.7 shows the milling capacity of the various factories, together 
withtthe acreage served, and total production by each factory for 1974*
As the table shows, annual cane production varies significantly amongst 
the 21 factories, ranging from a low of 15,629 tonnes (Saint Felix) to 
a high of 92,004 tonnes (F.U.E.L.) in 1974.
To reduce production costs and improve efficiency, the sugar industry 
in Mauritius has in the past followed a policy of centralizing the milling 
of cane.^**^ The 53 sugar mills in operation in Mauritius at the end of 
the Second World War (with an average production of 8,000 tonnes a year) 
had been reduced by 196O to 23 (with an average in a normal year of nearly
25,000 tonnes). This policy of centralizing factory production raised a 
number of problems including the level of employment and the transport of 
cane, and since 196I Government permission has to be obtained before a
* For further details on the technical aspects of cane manufacturing, see R.P. Humbert. The Growing of Sugar Cane. Elsevier Publishing Co., New York, I963. See also, Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Sugar in Mauritius, op. cit., pp. 56-58.
** See International Sugar Organization, The World Sugar Economy, op. cit.. Vol. 1, p.5.
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factory can be closed down. By 1972, the number of factories had been
(if)reduced to the present number of 21 in the island' ^; it might be useful 
to briefly study the structure of the industry in terms of the crushing 
capacities in 1972. Table 8.8 examines the distribution of factories 
according to milling capacity in 1972. About 'JO per cent of the factories 
have a crushing capacity of between 80 and 150 tonnes of cane an hour with 
an average output in 1972 of 27,000 tonnes of sugar; the largest factory 
has a crushing capacity of 275 tonnes of cane an hour, and produced 85,668 
tonnes of sugar in 1972.
Over the last decade, factories have been crushing cane at over 90 
per cent of capacity. The recovery of sugar, from cane, which is among the 
highest in the world, has been above 11 per cent in almost all years and 
reached 11.95% in 1965. Prior to 1971, white sugar production was almost 
entirely for the domestic market and represented less than 4% of total 
production (except in I96O when domestic production accounted for a larger 
proportion of the small, cyclone-affected crop). In 1972, however, 
substantial exports of white sugar were made and white sugar production 
rose to 8% of total production. Most of the white sugar produced is still 
plantation white sugar.
* Note that the area from which individual factories draw cane is determined by the Sugar Millers* and Planters* Central Arbitration and Control Board, which also registers the contracts of sale of 
cane by growers to the millers.
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Table 8.'8. Structure of the Sugar Industry, 1972
Milling Capacity Tonnes of cane per hour
Number of factories Cane Crushed (l) Sugar produced (2)
Under 50 - - —
50 — 60 1 148.7 15.9
60 - 70 - - -
70 - 80 1 194.9 20.5
80 — 90 2 452.2 49.8
90 - 100 3 678.9 74.2
100 - 110 4 1,097.0 117.7
110 - 120 1 285.6 28.1
120 - 150 3 792.9 92.1
130 - 140 - - -
140 - 150 3 ■ . 514.5 33*4
150 - 160 3 1,121.1 117.9
175 1 436.0 51.1
275 1 793.2 85.7
Total • , 21 6,314.8 686.4
(1) Thousand tonnes. Values include cane of metayers and individual planters
(2) Thousand tonnes, tel quel
Source; International Sugar Organization, The World Sugar Economy, Vol. 1, op. cit., p.5.
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The three most important by—products of the sugar cane are molasses, 
bagasse, and filter scums. Most of the molasses produced is exported 
as such, whilst a small proportion (about 6% annually) is put to 
various domestic uses. For example, in 1974, out of a total production 
of 172,797 tonnes of molasses, 169,028 tonnes were exported. The 
difference was used to produce 1,498,157 litres of rum, 123,585 litres
of power alcohol, 330,162 litres of denatured spirit, 3,948 litres of
*
vinegar, 62,713 litres of drugs and perfumes, and 283,537 litres of 
alcohol for export.
The major part of the bagasse resulting from the crushing of cane is 
used for raising the steam necessary for the proper functioning of the 
factory. In some factories, part of the excess bagasse is burnt for 
generating additional electricity for sale to the public grid.^*^ The 
erection of a particle board plant was completed in 1971, with a capacity 
of 15 tonnes per day, using excess bagasse. The boards that are produced 
are primarily intended for the domestic market, but are also available 
for export. Finally, about 200,000 tonnes of filter scums are also 
produced annually. As they contain a small amount of phosphoric acid, 
they are applied in the fields at the time of planting. Table 8 .9 summarises 
the position regarding manufacturing losses in sugar production for selected 
years.
* - The bagasse has helped most factories to have one or more turbo—alternators to generate their power, and, very often, a stand-by set which produces surplus energy sold to the public grid. In 1974, 15 factories sold a total of about 24 million units to the public grid, a figure equivalent to 11.5% of the electrical energy sold by the Central Electricity Board,
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Table 8.9. Manufacturing Losses in Sugar Bcoduction
CropYears
Sucrose 
% Cane
Sucrose Recovered 
% Sucrose in Gane
Total
Sucrose
FilterCake
Losses — 
Molasses
% Sucrose 
Bagasse
in Gane
Unde-
termined
1920 13,64 — — — — — w m
1930 12.97 82.81 17.19 — - 5.63 m m
1940 13.29 84.80 15.20 — — 4.82 -
1950 14.14 85.22 14.78 - - 5.30 —
1960* 11.83 82.14 17.86 0.68 9.21 5.71 2.26
1965 12.50 87.61 12.39 0.49 6.87 4.10 0.92
1966* 13.20 86.87 13.13 0.46 7.23 4.30 1.13
1967 12.46 87.02 12.98 0.43 7.15 4.07 1.33
1968* 13.10 87.27 12.37 0.43 6.71 4.32 1.27
1969 13.01 87.13 12.87 0.43 7.36 4.02 1.06
1970* 12.86 86.34 13.66 0.41 7.30 4.50 1.45
1971 13.41 87.10 12.95 0.41 6.69 4.34 1.51
1972 12.33 87.10 12.95 0.40 7.07 4.19 1.29
1973 15.05 87.00 12.97 0.40 7.11 4.14 1.32
1974 13.26 87.10 12.93 0.41 6.99 3.99 1.54
1975* 12.55 85.30 14.69 0.42 7.44 4.60 2.23
^refers to cyclone years
Source: Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Sugar in Mauritius, op. cit. p.120.
The table shows that total losses have decreased considerably 
over the past 40 - 50 years, allowing for the effect of cyclones on 
recovery rates. The "undetermined" losses range from 0*92% to 1.54%, if 
we ignore the two years in which the sugar crop suffered the most heavy 
losses due to cyclones (196O and 1975). Note that any surplus bagasse can 
either be compressed in special presses and stored for use as fuel in the 
next sugar season, or can be mixed with other vegetable waste (including 
cane leaves and tops) in the preparation of compost.
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Sugar Policies and Institutional Factors
We have seen that, up till now, it has not been necessary to limit 
sugar production, and planters are therefore free to grow as much cane as 
they wish. The fact that the crop is harvested during the second half of the 
year makes it possible to carry over any unsold sugar to the next calendar 
year, and thus to even out fluctuations betweeen crop years.
The Meade Commission^**^, appointed in I96O to inquire into the 
economies of the staple agricultural industries of the island and to establish 
priorities for development, recommended that alternative activities to the 
growing of sugar should be developed, especially the production of food crops, 
and that no further large scale expansion of sugar production should take 
place. As the main instrument for controlling the output of sugar, the 
Commission recommended a 5 per cent ad valorem tax on the production of sugar. 
In May I96I, the Government announced that a 5% ad valorem tax would be 
imposed on exports of sugar for revenue purposes but that it was not its 
policy to impose any limit on the production of sugar or to limit new 
investment in the sugar industry.
The Balogh Commission^ \  appointed in October 1962 to inquire into 
the system of apportioning the sugar accruing to planters and millers, 
emphasized that restriction of sugar production would contribute to the 
prosperity of the island only if the resources released, especially land, 
could and would immediately be used for more profitable outlets.
While the capital expenditure in the I96O-I966 Development Programme 
for the economy was mainly on infrastructure such as roads and electricity 
and on social services, the 1966-1970 Development Programme concentrated on 
promoting additional employment opportunities for the island’s growing 
labour force. Emphasis was placed on industry and on agriculture other 
than sugar. However, provision was made for assistance to small sugar planters
* See J.E. Meade, et al., The Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius.Report to the Governor of Mauritius, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London, 196I,
** See T. Balogh and C.J.M. Bennett, Commission of Enquiry (Sugar Industry),
Mauritius Legislative Council, Sessional Paper No. 4, Port Louis, Mauritius,!96;
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for mechanically des toning some 200 hectares of land (494 acres} a year 
and for short term credit to buy fertilizers.
The 1971—1975 Four Year Plan considered that an increase in sugar 
production of 2% per year during the 1970s was feasible. This was to 
be achieved mainly by raising the yields per acre on smaller holdings, 
where the potential increase in productivity was greater. The area 
under irrigation was to be doubled, to reach a total of nearly 30,000 
hectares (74,132 acres} by 1975* Under the Travail pour Tous programme, 
provision was made to finance the replanting between 1971 and 1974 of 
the varieties of cane on smaller holdings found susceptible to disease. 
By the more extensive use of tractors, the area on small holdings from 
which rocks were removed was to be stepped up from some 1,000 hectares 
(2,471 acres) a year to over 4,000 hectares (9,884 acres). These 
measures, with the provision of medium and long term credit for small­
holders, are expected to raise cane production by an aggregate of 
1 million tonnes, by the end of the 1970s, and to give on average a 
sugar output of 770,000 tonnes tel quel a year, with a level in cyclone- 
free years of 835,000 tonnes of sugar. Unfortunately, in the last 
year of the 1971-1975 Four Year Plan, the sugar crop was again devasted 
by cyclonic conditions, and production for 1975 could only reach 468,000 
tonnes, which is well below average for the nineteen sixties and 
seventies.
The marketing of sugar is carefully controlled in Mauritius, the 
Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, an association representative of the 
interests of millers, planters, and others connected with the sugar 
industry, and the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate, which sells the sugar 
produced on behalf of the producers, are jointly responsible for imple­
menting the island's obligations under the various agreements (the
* See International Sugar Organization, The World Sugar Economy. 
Vol. 1, op. cit., 1975, p.10.
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Conmionwealth Sugar Agreement, the International Sugar Agreements, the 
Lome Convention, etc*). The 1971-75 Four Year Plan contemplated the 
establishment of a sugar authority to negotiate higher prices and larger 
quotas. All sugar produced on the island becomes the property of the 
Mauritius Sugar Syndicate as it enters the central warehouses in Port 
Louis, the capital and main harbour; the Syndicate is also responsible 
for all sales both to the domestic market and to overseas buyers.
Until 1970, sugar exports were subject to the following taxes and levies^*^:-
(1) Annual ad valorem tax of 5% payable to the island’s Treasury 
(resulting from a recommendation of the Meade Commission),
(2) Variable annual levy to cover the expenses of the Mauritius Sugar 
Industry Research Institute,
(3) Variable annual levy to cover administration expenses of the 
Central Arbitration and Control Board,
(4) Contribution of one rupee per metric ton for the Sugar Industry 
Reserve Fund set up to defray administration expenses of certain 
organisations of the industry and for the better development of the 
industry,
(5) Levy of one shilling (now five new pence) per cwt, on negotiated 
price exports for rehabilitation and capital development fund.
(6) Levy of 6d. (now 2.5 new pence) per cwt, on negotiated price 
exports for the Labour Welfare Fund set up in 1947 to provide housing 
and social amenities for workers in the sugar industry.
Note that the 5% ad valorem export duty imposed in 1961 was 
increased to 6% with effect from July 1970, when an export duty of 5% 
was also imposed on molasses. The other taxes and levies have remained 
largely unchanged,
* See International Sugar Organization, The World Sugar Economy, op, cit.. Vol. 1., 1963, p.280.
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As already explained, Mauritius was one of the founder members 
of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (since its inception in 1951).
From 1965 onwards, when negotiated price quotas were consolidated,
Mauritius had an overall agreement quota of 470,000 long tons (477,545 
tonnes), and a negotiated price quota of 380,000 long tons (386,100 tonnes). 
The Overall Agreement Quota became inoperative when Britain joined the 
European Economic Community (January 1973), while the Negotiated Price 
Qpota expired in December, 1974, along with the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement•
Mauritius became a fully independent member of the International 
Sugar Agreement (1968), with a basic export tonnage of 173,000 tonnes.
In addition, it was granted in I969 an allocation of 55,000 tonnes from 
the Hardship Relief Fund. In 1970 an allocation of 23,000 tonnes was 
made to Mauritius from the Hardship Relief Fund. Mauritius served on 
the Executive Committee of the International Sugar Agreement in 1969,
1971, and 1972* The Economic Clauses of the 1968 Agreement were not 
renewed in 1975, but Mauritius remained a member of the ISA which was 
established in 1975 for a period of two years, and which was subsequently 
extended to 1976. The Agreement was of an administrative nature 
and had no economic provisions; its objectives were to further inter­
national co-operation in sugar matters and to provide a framework for 
the preparation of negotiations for an agreement having objectives 
similar to those of the I968 Agreement ; such an Agreement came into 
existence in 1978.
* A further allocation of 20,000 tonnes did not become effective since the prevailing price did not thereafter in 1969 cease to be below 
3,50 cents a pound.
** For further details on the various International Sugar Agreements, see Chapter Two above.
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\'/hile’ negotiating for an allocation in the Unites States quota 
market, Mauritius exported a significant amount of sugar to that market 
in 1962 and 1963 (11,800 and 57,800 tonnes respectively) at the world 
price. In the allocation for 1965, based on actual shipments during the 
previous two years, Mauritius was given a quota of 16,008 short tons 
(14,522 tonnes). From I966, Mauritius was allocated quotas which, with 
prorations, totalled around 18,000 tonnes annually; in 1972, the basic 
quota was raised to 22,000 tonnes bringing the total, with prorations, 
to 28,000 tonnes. By the end of 1974, under the provisions of the United 
States Sugar Act, Mauritius had a quota of about 30,000 tonnes per year. 
Even though the U.S. Sugar Act expired in 1974, "the United States 
remains an important market for Mauritius, which is anxious to maintain 
its export performance to the United States”.'  ^ Out of a normal year’s 
production, about 50,000 tonnes are earmarked for the American market.
Domestic sales represent about 40,000 tonnes of sugar, or approxi­
mately 6% of a normal year’s production in the early 1970s, Of this 
tonnage, about 3,000 tons are raw and 37,000 tonnes are whites. In 1974, 
the Syndicate sold local consumption sugar mainly to wholesalers at 
a price of Rs. 287.80 per ton for rav/s and Rs. 412,80 per ton for whites, 
which represent the lowest retail prices for sugar anywhere in the 
world. The Syndicate has also to deliver 2,000 tonnes of sugar to 
Seychelles under the terms of a three year contract (1975-1977) at a 
price related to the price obtained from the European Economic Community, 
In 1971, Mauritius became a member of the African Malagasy Common 
GTganization (OCAM), which became the Afro-Asian and Mauritius Common 
Organization. In March 1972, Mauritius acceded to the Convention of
See Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Sugar in Mauritius, op. cit.
p.77.
-278-
Yaounde, which gave it associated status with the European Economic 
Community. The trade provisions of the Convention, however, specifically 
excluded commodities such as sugar, which were the subject of a common 
market organization within the E.E.C. (the Common Agricultural Policy).
When the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (operative since 1951)
expired in December 1974, the Mauritian sugar industry (as well as the
sugar industry in the other exporting countries of the CSA) was left
in a state of uncertainty about future marketing arrangements. However,
it was not long before the CSA was replaced by the AGP Protocol on sugar
, (*)annexed to the ACP/EEC Convention of Lome,, which was signed on 28th 
February 1975-
Under the ACP Protocol on sugar, the European Economic Community 
undertakes for an indefinite period to purchase and import at guaranteed 
prices specific quantities of cane sugar from ACP states, with a 
corresponding undertaking by ACP countries to deliver these quantities. 
Apart from possible quota adjustments as a result of failure to deliver 
on the part of individual ACP states, the provisions of the Protocol 
cannot be changed until a period of five years has elapsed.
The aggregate tonnage which the ACP countries have agreed to 
deliver in each of the twelve month delivery period (l July to 50 June),
* ACP/EEC Convention refers to the Agreement bet^ «/een the then 46 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries and the European Economic Community.
** The fact that these provisions and conditions are so reminiscent of the recently-expired Commonwealth Sugar Agreement is testimony , to Britain's efforts to protect the interests of the less-developed sugar exporting countries of the CSA (with the notable e:®eption of India).
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starting from 1 July 1975 and. ending on $0 June 1980, is about 1.3 
million tons white value* Individual quotas have been assigned to 
each of the 13 ACP countries, roughly in line with their negotiated 
price commitments under the CSA for Commonwealth countries; the quota 
assigned to Mauritius for each delivery period is 487,200 tonnes white 
value, which is equivalent to approximately 500,000 tonnes tel quel 
(landed weights),
ACP cane sugar is marketed in the Community at prices freely 
negotiated between buyers and sellers; but the Community undertakes 
to purchase at the guaranteed price, through the mechanism of inter­
vention, any ACP sugar which cannot find a market at the guaranteed 
price,'  ^ The guaranteed price, expressed in units of account, is 
payable for bulk sugar of standard quality C.I.P.F.C, European ports.
It is negotiated annually within the price range obtaining in the 
Community, before 1 May in each year.
The ACP Protocol on sugar also provides that, if for reasons of 
"force majeure", an ACP country fails to deliver its quota in full, 
the EEC Commission will allow an additional period for delivery. But 
the quantity involved, or the shortfall, will be allocated to the other 
ACP countries if the shortfailing country does not wish to take advantage 
of the additional delivery period. Shortfalls not due to "force 
majeure" will entail a corresponding reduction of the country's quota 
in subsequent years and the quantities involved may be reallocated 
by the EEC Commission.
The provisions of the Protocol on sugar secure for Mauritius 
and for the other signatory parties advantages similar to those they 
enjoyed under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, particularly as far as
* This practice qf buying guaranteed quantities of sugar atpredetermined prices from ACP countries and from domestic EEC producers has led to the much-criticised "sugar mountains", which could only be disposed of by dumping on the international 
"Free Market",
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long-term outlet and remunerative price are concerned. "They thus 
ensure the continuance of the conditions necessary for the orderly 
marketing and production of sugar in Mauritius where sugar contines 
to provide a livelihood for a very large number of people and where the 
sugar industry is the biggest employer*,"'  ^ Fulfilment of the 500,000 
tonnes yearly quota which it has undertaken to supply under the terms 
of the Protocol becomes, therefore, the priority commitment for Mauritius,' 
just as the $86,000 tons quota was the priority commitment under the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.
For a number of years, Mauritius has been exporting about 150,000 
tonnes of raw sugar per year to Canadian refiners. However, in view 
of the increased commitments to the EEC (500,000 tonnes against $86,000 
tonnes previously), exports to Canada will have to be reduced by about 
75,000 tonnes per year. Over and above these commitments, there may 
be a surplus available for exports to the world market at prices ruling 
at the time of availability; this surplus is sold by occasional tenders 
among international sugar brokers, subject to limits imposed by 
existing International Sugar Agreements. Mauritius has thus exported 
sugar to Iran, Indonesia, Iraq, Russia, and a number of other countries.
The price paid to producers per metric ton of cane is related 
to the average net returns per metric ton of 98.5° (polarisation) sugar 
and to the commercial sugar content of the cane as determined by analyses 
made by the Central Board. The grower receives a stated percentage 
of the value of the sugar recovered from his cane (not less than two-thirds) 
together with two-thirds of the value of by-products. Consider first 
the period before the Balogh Report. Table 8.10 shows the cane payments 
for the period 1954 to I96I; the prices shown are calculated on the
-Æ Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Sugar in Mauritius, op, cit.,
P.97.
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basis of the above procedure, and take no account of certain services
performed by the miller for the grower. such as the bagging and transport
of the grower 's sugar.
Table 8.10. Cane payments, 1954 to I96I
(Rupees per metric ton)
Year Net average price to producers per m.t.. of 98.5 sugar
Average sugar recovered as % of cane
Average price per m.t.: 
of cane
1954 458.75 11.65 56.52
1955 448.56 12.61 58.58
1956 480.48 12.95 42.20
1957 475.57 12.94 42.27
1958 462.55 12.15 58.86
1959 468.95 12.24 59.68
i960 505.87 9.85 54.60
1961 458.25 11.19 54.00
Source: ISO,, The World Sugar Economy, op. cit.. Vol. I., 1965,London.
Two-thirds of the cane crushed by the sugar factories comes from 
their own estates. The price for cane paid to individual growers is 
determined by Government legislation. The prices paid by the Mauritius 
Sugar Syndicate for the sugar it takes over are based on the average 
net returns obtained from sales on the domestic and export markets, 
after insurance, marketing, and freight expenses and all taxes and 
levies have been deducted. In the case of sugar produced from planter's 
cane, the factory's share normally amounts to one-third of the average 
basic price per metric ton of 98.5° sugar. Factories which produce 
plantation white receive an additional premium for such sugar.
The factories undertake the full cost of transporting the sugar 
produced from their own cane to the central warehouses in Port Louis, 
and, in the 1950s and early 1960s, paid 65% of the transport costs for
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planters* sugar. However, some millers began to pay the full cost of 
transporting individual producers* sugar, and the whole matter was 
reviewed by the Balogh Commission of Enquiry. Since 1946, a Cyclone 
and Drought Insurance Fund has been in operation; it is financed by 
an annual premium amounting to 6.2% of the average value of the crop 
payable by all mills and growers through the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate, , 
and its object is to compensate millers and planters for damage caused 
by cyclones and drought.
On the recommendation of the Balogh Commission the Government 
raised the planters* share of the returns from sugar manufacture in 
June 1964 from two-thirds to 68% of the sugar which their canes might 
be expected to yield, basing this on the island average or that of the 
factory where the canes were crushed, whichever was higher. A similar 
proportion was fixed for molasses and filter cakes, planters being 
subsequently allowed to take the value of the former if they wished. 
Millers were also made liable for the transport of canes to the factory 
if the distance involved exceeded four miles.
We have seen that the amounts disbursed each year to producers and 
millers depend on the amounts realized from the total sales of the 
crop. It has been the function of the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate since 
1919 to dispose of the crop according to the various domestic and foreign 
commitments contracted. As the harvest progresses and sales of sugar 
■ are made by the Syndicate, ad vane e-payments ("dividends") are made 
to planters and millers according to their respective entitlements, 
the final dividend being made in the June or July following the crop.
Table 8.11 below gives a breakdown of the various prices received 
by the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate from various export markets for the 
period I96O to 1972.^*^ The high average price paid by the Syndicate
-X- Unfortunately, the author has been unable to obtain a similar breakdown 
for the years 1975 and 1974. Note that the net price paid to producers was Rs .790 and Es.1878 per metric ton in 1975 an^ 1974 respectively.
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for the 1960 crop reflected the reduced level of exports which meant 
that the whole amount was sold at the negotiated price to the United 
Kingdom, with a small amount exported to the free market (from 
accumulated stocks)* The rise in world prices in I963 (and also in 1973 
and 1974) raised the average for sales to the free market during that 
season above the negotiated price. Prom 19&7, the average price 
realized for sales to the United States quota market was above the 
negotiated price in the United Kingdom (though the American market 
remained small throughout the period), but the negotiated price remained 
above the average for world free market sales until the sharp rise of 
world sugar prices at the end of 1972. Sales to the domestic market 
have remained fairly stable as a proportion of total sales proceeds, 
but these took place at "static" prices substantially below prices 
obtained on the average from exports.
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Table 8.11. Breakdown of Average Sug^ Prices Paid by the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate, 1960-1972 (Rs,)
UK Negoti- US Quota Other World Domes- Bre- Netated Price Prefer- Market tic mium ProducerQuota Market ehtial Market price
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a> (b) (a ) (b) (a) (b)
i960 99.5 n.a. - — — - 0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 60 5041961 76.0 525 - - 18.7 293 0.2 305 5.1 312 32 4381962 65.2 536 2.2 . 282 23.9 412 3.8 268 4.9 312 34 445
1965 55.9 545 — - 28.8 802 11.4 788 3.9 311 44 591
1964 65.2 545 — — 26.4 378 3.2 380 5.2 3O8 48 433
1965 63.8 546 2.1 528 18.8 249 10.6 195 4.7 310 32 4091966 66.9 556 2.6 556 25.2 236 n.a. H • 3#« 5.3 3O8 39 422
1967 65.3 553 2.5 690 27.3 238 n.a. R* * 4.9 387 34. 4241968 66.2 552 2.6 725 24.3 245 1.9 195 5.0 306 35 428
1969 62.5 552 2.3 735 30.5 328 n.a. n.a. 4.7 302 31 445
1970 63.1 542 2.7 734 28.5 457 0.1 506 5.6 300 38 472
1971 59.2 550 5.5 776 24.5 584 5.7 586 5.1 299 37 5231972 56.9 658 5.5 841 .23.0 767 9.6 758 5.0 301 43 642
Source: ISO, The World Sugar Economy, op. cit.. Vol. I, 1976, p. 12
Notes: 1. Sugar prices ex-Syndicate refer to sugar polarizing
98.5°, the figure on which planters' cane contracts are based. The 
average sugar price ex-Syndicate is net of deduction for (l) freight, 
marine insurance, and brokerage ; (ii) lighterage, warehousing, etc. 
and Syndicate general expenses; (iii) export levies, export tax, and 
contribution to Labour Welfare and Rehabilitation Funds. The deduction 
for Cyclone and Drought Insurance is shown separately under "Premium".
2. Other preferential markets refer to shipments to the United 
Kingdom as part of the overall agreement quotas, and also some shipments 
to Canada and New Zealand.
3. Premium refers to the amount deducted for the Cyclone and 
Drought Insurance Fund.
4* i960 was a cyclone year, with heavy losses encountered and
the crop reduced by 62%.
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If we consider the price paid by the Syndicate in 1972 to sugar 
growers (Rs . 642 per metric ton of sugar), we can obtain a breakdown 
of the various components by examining Table 8.12.
Table 8.12 Structure of Pricest 1972 Crop
Rupees per tonne of sugar 
price received by sugar growers 641.67
A1Premium to Cyclone and drought Insurance Fund/.. \Average net price''  ^paid by Syndicate 684.67
Export levies, dock charges. Syndicate
expenses and contributions to Funds 99.46
Average price received by Syndicate 784*13
of which from exports 805.13 (94*97%)from domestic wholesales 587*56 ( 5.05%)
Whites Raws
Rs, per 100 Kg. Rs. per 100 Kg. 
Syndicate's price to wholesales 41.28 28.78
Trade margin 4.72(11.4%) 3.22(11.2%)
Price to consumer 46.00 32.00
Price to consumer per Kg. O .46 0.32
(1 )' ''Excluding returns from molasses and filter cake
Source : ISO, The World Sugar Economy, op. cit.. Vol. I, 1976, p.13*
In the context of cane prices, an important body that needs to 
be mentioned is the Cane Planters and Millers Arbitration and Control 
Board (Act No. 46 of 1973). This Board is a statutory body which was 
originally set up in 1939 to arbitrate any disputes arising between 
millers and planters and to control the sale of canes. It determines 
the boundaries of the factory area of each factory, and assesses the 
quantity of sugar and by-products which planters receive in payment 
for their canes. There is a right of appeal to the Supreme Court 
against decisions of the Board.
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Until-the 1975 crop, the apportionment of sugar proceeds between 
planters and millers would be as follows: every planter was entitled 
to receive for his canes -
(a) 71% of the quantity of sugar (raised from 68%) which his canes; 
if delivered at the factory over the crop year, might normally be 
expected to yield according to
(i) the average efficiency of all factories; or
(ii) the efficiency of the factory where the canes had been 
milled,
whichever was the higher; and
(b) two-thirds of the amount; if any, by which the value, calculated 
at sugar price, of the sugar remaining from the total sugar produced 
from the planters* canes, after deduction of the planters* entitlement 
under paragraph (a) above, exceeded the value, calculated at basic cost, 
of the total sugar produced from planters* canes.
In addition, every planter was entitled to receive in respect 
of each tonne of canes supplied to a factory in any crop year:
(a) the average quantity of scums produced by the factory per tonne 
of canes milled during the preceding crop year; and
(b) 71% of the molasses produced by the factory per tonne of canes 
milled by the factory during that crop year.
Where any bagasse produced at a factory in a crop year, other 
than bagasse used for the specific purpose of manufacturing sugar at 
that factory, was sold or otherwise transferred or utilized in the 
production of any goods, every planter was entitled to receive out of 
the value of the bagasse so sold, transferred or utilized, an amount 
equivalent to the fraction represented by the quantity of canes supplied 
by him over the quantity of canes milled at the factory in that crop year.
-287-
With effect from the 1976 crop, the above formula was modified 
and every planter is now entitled to 74% of the quantity of sugar 
extracted from his canes. The efficiency benefit is maintained. The 
planter’s share of molasses has also been increased from 71% to 74% while 
the position as regards scum and bagasse remains unchanged.
Conclusions and Prospects
We must conclude this chapter by stressing that the sugar industry 
is likely to play a most prominent part in the economic development of 
Mauritius for the foreseeable future. The 1977/1978 Annual Report of the 
Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture contains a copy of a press conference 
given by the Chamber on 20 May 1978, informing the public of the effects 
which the adverse financial situation of the sugar industry might have 
on the economic and social development of the country and of the best 
ways to defend the sugar industry, which is the backbone of the Mauritian 
economy. '  ^ It was pointed out that the industry must realise surpluses 
over its production costs in order not only to maintain its efficiency 
by renewing its plant and machinery, but also to remunerate the invest­
ments of shareholders, and to provide the Government with the funds 
necessary to finance its recurrent and capital budgets. As far as possible, 
it was argued, the sugar industry had to invest in other activities so 
as to help the development of sectors other than sugar and the creation 
of new employment.
However, in 1977» the revenues of the sugar industry had on the 
whole, barely exceeded its production costs with the result that the 
industry had not been able to play the role incumbent upon it. In view 
of the consequences of such a situation for the economy of the country.
* Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, The President’s Report, 1977/1978, Port Louis, Mauritius, 1978, pp.7-8.
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a solution'should he found to the financial problems of the industry.
As the industry cannot exercise much control over the selling price 
of sugar or over imported inflation, the solution to its problems would 
appear to be found locally. "Strict control should be exercised over 
production costs, and measures taken to reduce absenteeism and the 
number of non—working days, and to improve the productivity and efficiency 
in the harbour" (for improved handling facilities for exports).
In this chapter, we have examined in some detail various aspects 
of the Mauritian sugar economy, and shown how vital sugar production 
is in terms of employment, output, and foreign exchange. We can 
argue that, on grounds of efficiency and comparative advantage, Mauritius 
would benefit more by concentrating on sugar production than on a policy 
of diversification which is at the expense of further expansion in sugar. 
However, rising production costs in the sugar industry in the late 1970s 
would appear to cast some doubt on the desirability of further 
specialisation in sugar production. In Chapter Nine, we develop a 
simultaneous equation model which will seek to explain the response of 
the major economic variables in the Mauritian sugar industry, and hope­
fully shed some light on the policy implications that arise.
* ibid., p.9.
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Appendix VIII - A - Development of the MauritianSugar Industry
Dutch Period
1659 Sugar cane introduced in Mauritius from Bataviaby Dutch Governor Van der Stel
1696 Sugar manufactured for the first time in Mauritius
French Period
1743 First sugar estates established by Governor Mahe de LaBourdonnais at Villebague and Port Sud Est (Femey)
English Period
1819 First horizontal-roiler mill introduced by Charles Telfairat Bel Ombre factory
1822 First steam-driven mill introduced by Adrien d’epinay atBelle Mare factory
1834 Arrival of first Indian immigrants (who today constitutethe majority of sugar cane planters and workers)
1853 Foundation of the Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture
1887 Establishment of chemical control in a factory (Alma)
1893 Opening of the Station Agronomique
1913 Creation of the Department of Agriculture
1919 Creation of the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate
1925 Opening of the College of Agriculture
1930 Opening of the Sugar Cane Research Station
1939 Creation of the Central Board
1946 Creation of the Cyclone and Drought Insurance Fund
1948 Creation of the Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Fund
1951 Signature of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
1953 Creation of the Mauritius Sugar Industry Research Institute
1965 Creation of the University of Mauritius
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Independent Mauritius
1974 Expiry of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
1975 Signature of the AGP Protocol on sugar annexedto the ACP/EEC (African - Caribbean Pacific countries/European Economic Community) Lome Convention.
1975 Refined sugar manufactured for the first timein Mauritius (Belle Yue-Mauricia S.B.).
Source: Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Sugar in Mauritius, op. cit., pp.14-16.
Appendix VTH.- B. Organization and Structure of the Mauritian Sugar Industry
Ownership
The Mauritius Sugar Producers* AssociationThe Mauritius Cane Growers' AssociationThe Mauritius Sugar Cane Planters* AssociationThe Mauritius Co-operative Agricultural Federation Ltd.
Manpower
The Ministry of LabourThe Permanent Arbitration TribunalThe Industrial Relations CommissionThe National Remuneration BoardThe Mauritius Sugar Producers* AssociationTrade UnionsThe Industrial Courts
Training and Welfare
The University of Mauritius The National Council for Industrial Training Technical Schools The Industrial Trade Training Centre The Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Fund The Sugar Industry Pension Fund
Research
The Mauritius Sugar Industry Research Institute The University of Mauritius Government Agricultural Services Le Comité de Collaboration Agricole La Société de Technologie Agricole et Sucriere
supplies
The Mauritius Jute & Textiles Industries itd. (Saok factory) The Sugar Planters* Mechanical Pool 
Road Transport Companies ImportersLocal Manufacturers
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FLnance
The Sugar Industry Reserve FundThe Sugar Industry Development FundsThe Bank of MauritiusThe Development Bank of MauritiusInsurance CompaniesCommercial BanksThe Mauritius Co-operative Central Bank The Sugar Insurance Fund
Marketing
The Mauritius Sugar Syndicate Sugar Brokers
Export
Sugar Shippers Dock Companies Stevedoring Companies
Source: ibid,, pp 23-26.
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CHAPTER NINE
A mUSL TO ESTIMATE SUGAR PRODUCTION 
IN MAURITIUS
-293-
The following notations have been used in the presentation of 
the model and the results
X = total exports
XSUG = exports^ugar
XOG = exports of other goods
XCSAQ = exports of sugar to the U.K. under the CSA
XPM = exports of sugar to the free market
g ss total production of sugar (*000 metric tons)
DC = domestic consumption of sugar
STKB = stocks of sugar (*000 metric tons)
STKSL = stocks of sugar at the beginning of the period
DSTKS = change in stocks of sugar
A = acreage
Y = yield per acre
GNP/N = per capita income
T = time trend
EPS = retail price of sugar
PP = producer prices (i.e. prices received by producers)
PPM = price of sugar on the free market
PC SA = price of sugar under the CSA
Z = sugar cane crop
D = dummy variable (in Z function)
DUM = dummy variable (in XPM function)
L after a variable denotes one lag, e.g. ÀL, XPML, etc.
L1, L2 ...... LS after a variable denotes lags of one period up to
and including S periods 
VC denotes virgin crop
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In this chapter, we attempt to specify and estimate a model to 
explain sugar production in one important exporting member under the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement * As we have already seen, Mauritius 
exported more sugar to the United Kingdom under the CSA than any 
other member, in terms of "negotiated price quotas", and only Australia 
had a larger "overall agreement quota". By taking the CSA explicitly 
into account in this model, we might gain some insight into the useful­
ness or otherwise of "bilateral" commodity agreements in general, in 
terms of their impact on output and exports in exporting countries.^ '
A Sub-model for Sugar Cane Production and Exports 
In this section, we break down total export earnings (x) for the 
Mauritian economy into two components, only one of Which will concern 
us. We can write
X = XSUG + XOG 
and we may wish to argue that exports of other goods (xOG) depend on 
some index of world trade (in volume terms), and an export price index 
of other goods deflated by an appropriate index (e.g. the exchange rate). 
Our concern here is with the other component of export earnings, XSUG, 
the earnings from the export of sugar; the ratio of XSUG to X has varied 
from 88.5% to 97*4% during the period of operation of the CSA, and is 
likely to remain in this region until at least 1985.^**^
* Extrapolation of this sort, on the basis of empirical evidence for one country in relation to one commodity, is needless to say^fraught with difficulties, and the limitations must be stressed.
** See Mauritius Legislative Assembly, The Policy of the Government of Mauritius Toward the Encouragement of Industry, Mauritius Leg. Seasonal Paper No, 22 June 1973.
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Exports of sugar can essentially be broken down according to their 
destinations, which will determine the price paid. Therefore,
XSUG = XCSAQ + X m  (9.2)
where XCSAQ = XCSAQ is the negotiated price quota under the CSA to be 
sold to the United Kingdom at a predetermined price. There is no 
behavioral equation to explain XCSAQ since it is institutionally 
determined and allocated to all exporting members on a fixed price- 
quantity basis. Therefore, export revenue from this portion of sugar 
output is known in advance.
Sugar exports to all other destinations (XM) take place on the 
"free market" at "free market" prices. These sales are therefore a form 
of "residual" from output after other commitments have been satisfied.
In particular,
XFM = S - XCSAQ - DC - USTKS (9.3)
The share of domestic consumption (UC) in output has always been small 
(less than 6%)• Since total domestic expenditure on sugar consumption 
is only a small proportion of aggregate expenditure, and since there are
r*)no substitutes for sugar in consumption in Mauritius^ we could argue 
that domestic consumption is a function of the retail price cf sugar (in 
real terms), per capita income, and a trend term. Identity (9*3) is 
completed by including changes in stocks (USTKS) to compensate for 
responses of XFM to various forces. The variable USTKS is therefore 
determined "residually" if the other four variables in (9.3) can be 
explained•
There is no production of noncentrifugal sugar (e.g. gur, khandsari, etc.) in Mauritius, and consumption per head is amongst the highest for less developed countries.
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One final identity needs to be stated; output is simply the 
multiplication of acreage and yield per acre, i.e.
S = A.Y, (9.4)
Clearly, if both S and A can be explained by the model, Y is also 
determined.
Structural Estimable Equations
An important feature of agricultural supply models is their 
recursiveness; for example, demand is hypothesized to depend on current 
price, output on lagged price (or a combination of such lags), and both 
demand and supply functions are identified. Cobweb models are the most 
obvious example. An important advantage of this type of specification 
is that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation technique is still 
appropriate.
While recursiveness is a useful property in an econometric model, 
it bypasses the existence of simultaneity in economic relationships. We 
have seen that the price received by producers of sugar in Mauritius (PP) 
is a combination (or a mark-down on a weighted average) of three prices 
relating to three distinct markets; the domestic market, the British 
market under the CSA, and the international "free market". We wish to 
examine the impact of this price on production and exports, but producer 
prices themselves are endogenous to the system. The simultaneous-equation 
model we derive is, however, essentially recursive for reasons given 
below. The endogenous variables we are interested in, following the above 
discussion, are output (s), acreage (a), domestic consumption (UC), and 
exports to the free market (XTTM).
(a) The domestic demand function for sugar can be stated as follows:
UC = a + a. EPS + a GNP + a. T + U. (9.5)' ^ 2 I
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On a priori grounds, we would expect to be negative, and ag
and a^ to be positive (assuming sugar is not an inferior good). The 
linear relationship contained in equation (9*5) appears to restrict 
the specification; in many empirical studies, however, the linear 
specification has yielded highly acceptable r e s u l t s O u r  own 
results (presented below) amply justify this constraint on the mathe­
matical form of the relationship.
A more usual specification for demand posits that per capita 
demand (DC/N) is a log-linear function of relative prices (RPS in real 
terms), per capita "permanent" income (GDP/N), and a disturbance term (v)
bDC = b^ RPS (GNP)  ^e'' (9*5a)T  ° ('N )
The advantage of the specification contained in equation (9.5a) 
is that it can be used to generate short-run and long-run price and 
income elasticities of demand, Adams and Behrman argue that a
combination of a geometric distributed lag for the dependent variable 
and - polynomial lags in the right-hand side variables can be used to 
represent the adjustments to the relative price term and to the permanent 
income considerations. In certain cases, first differences of the 
logarithms of these variables can be utilized to represent part of the 
expectation, formation process. The lag structure that results for the 
price responses in many cases means that the demand relationships are 
recursive within the commodity market model.
* See, for example, A.I. Medani, "Elasticity of the Marketable Surplus of a Subsistence Crop at Various Stages of Development", Economic 
Development and Cultural Change. Vol. 25, 1974-75» PP* 421-29.Medani argues that ".... preliminary investigations of the data used in this study and subsequent analysis indicate that the linear form provides a satisfactory fit to the data used in the study." ibid., p.422.
** See E.G. Adams and J.R. Behrman, Econometric Models of World Agricultural Commodity Markets; Cocoa, Coffee, Tea, Wool. Cotton, Sugar. Wheat, Rice, Ballinger Publ. Co., Mass., 1976, pp. 8-10.
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(b) We now proceed to the specification of the export to the free 
market function. We postulate that exports are subject to a "partial 
adjustment" formulation. An optimum level of exports exists and we 
assume that the desired level of exports depends on the price prevailing 
on the free international market,
XFM* = PFM + Ü2 (9.6)
We can then postulate, following the "stock adjustment principle", 
that the actually realised change in exports in any one period is only 
a fraction of the desired change. In other words, the adjustment of 
exports to the desired level is only gradual due to administrative, 
financial, managerial, institutional, and other constraints,^*^ We can 
express the gradual adjustment process with the following "adjustment 
equation":
(XM - XML) = ^  /XPM* - XPML/ + (9.7)
Rearranging, we obtain
(XM - XPML) = V /'(C^  + 0^ , PPM + Ug) - XPML/ + (9.8)
or (XPM - XPML) = (VG^) + (VG^) PPM -^XPML
+ ^ ^2 (9.9)
We finally derive the equation that can be used to estimate the export 
function:
XPM = { \ Q )  + ( Y G j  PPM + ( 1 - V  )XPML(YC q) y c R p m
Rewriting equation (9.10) more concisely, we obtain
(9.10)
XPM = dg + d^  PPM + (1- Y  )7PML + W (9.11)
where d = YC o Û o
and W = Y  Ur, + V
* For details on the nature of the constraints, and the stock adjustment principle, see M. Nerlove, "Estimates of the Elasticities of Supply of Selected Agricultural Commodities", Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 38, 
1956. See also, M. Nerlove, Distributed Lags and Demand Analysis. USDA, Agriculture Handbook No, I4I, Washington, 1958.
-299-
Two comments are in order before equation (9.11) can be estimated. 
Firstly, it is reasonable to suggest that an important argument in tie 
export function is the variable stocks: this variable could be included 
either in terms of the actual volume of stocks that existed at the #
beginning of each year (STKBL), or in terms of the change in stocks 
between successive years (dsdKS) . Secondly, we need to examine whether 
the distributed lag model presented above generates econometric problems 
that undermine the accuracy and efficiency of the parameter estimates 
obtained. In particular, the use of time series data which these models 
invariably involve can lead to the presence of serial correlation between 
the residuals. One could argue, for example, that a partial adjustment 
model of the type used here does not generate autocorrelation by 
specification (as does, for instance, an "adaptive expectations" model), 
but autocorrelation can arise for other reasons.^*^ In our model, the 
error term is W = ( ) • If we include subscripts for time,
then + V^) where refers to and refers to , If
we make the. important assumption that the original stochastic terms, 
and V^, are themselves nonautocorrelated, then it follows that is also 
free from serial correlation. Thus, if
E %t_i) = °
and E (V^ V^_^) = 0
then E (W^ = E V l  + ^ t_1 ^
Expanding, we obtain
■ E(Wt W^ _^ ) = E Ut_1 V i  + ^  Vt_1 + Vt-1 -7
But E (U. U.) = E (V. V.) = E (TJ. 7.) = 01 J 1 J X j
i ^  j i j
. . E ) = 0
* Note that although one can establish the existence or otherwise of "autocorrelation by specification", it may not be possible to dis­tinguish between the various distributed lag hypotheses empirically,
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(c) We have already established that if we can explain acreage and 
output, the determination of yield per acre follows logically from 
our model* Agricultural models estimating acreage response have 
normally obtained a good fit because of trend factors.'  ^ Most of 
these models normally include lagged acreage (AL) or lagged output (SL) 
as one of the explanatory variables; this can be done either by 
structural specification or by derivation from a specified distributed 
lag structure*
Theoretically, distributed lags arise when any economic cause 
generates its effects only after some lag of time, so that this effect 
is not felt all at a single point of time, but, rather, is distributed 
over a period of time. Hence, distributed lag models represent a 
dynamic approach* As will be shown later, this approach also supplies 
a..basis for distinguishing between short-run and long-run effects*
The first assumption we make is that the actual acreage under sugar 
cane depends on the expected price in the year of harvest, rather than
( N N ^on last yearns price*' ' We can express this assumption as equation (9*12) 
below:
PP® + (9.12)
Where A^ » acreage under sugar cane in period t
PP° S» expected price received by producers per ton in period t
U. » random error term satisfying the usual Gauss-Markovassumptions of normality, zero mean, no autocorrelation and homoscedasticity
* See, for example, P.O. Joshi, "The Sugar Cycle; A Diagnosis",ÉanMiya: The Indisin Journal of Statistics, Series B , May 1973,
pp. 427-449•
** Of course, in a geometrically declining lag scheme, last year’s price is an important determinant of this year’s expected price*
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Equation (9.12) cannot be estimated directly because the variable 
PP° is not observable. We require to know how expectations are 
formulated before estimation is possible. We can rewrite equation (9*12) 
as follows:-
pp® = - ^  + (9.13)
As can be observed, equation (9.13) expresses expected price of the
current period as a function of actual acreage of the current period.
By the same token, we can express last year’s expected price as a
function of last year’s actual area planted. We then obtain;
PH.® = - 1  Ht-I (5.14)
Where PPL® =. expected price of the previous period
A^ = actual acreage of the previous period
We can now resort to a mathematical formulation of expectations 
before making a further manipulation to find an equation that can be 
estimated statistically.
The second assumption we make is that sugar cane growers adjust 
their expectation of price in the year of harvest by a proportion of 
the shortfall between actual price in the current year and price expected 
in the previous year. This is expressed as equation (9.15) below:
(PP® - PPL®) = • S  (PP - PPL®) (9.15)
Where PP = actual (observed) price of sugar in the current period 
(crop year)
^ = coefficient of expectation.
This formulation implies that expectations are adaptive. That is,
current expectations are formed by modifying (ad.apting) previous
expectations in the light of the actual achievements, the current
experience. Expectations are subjected to reformulation in each period;
(pp® - PPL®) is the change in current expectations. The change is only
- 3 0 2 -
a fraction of the difference between the currently achieved or realised 
value of the variable PP and the previous expectations, PPL®. Thus, 
current expectations, PP®, are partly determined by past expectations, 
PPL®, and partly by the fact that economic agents want to close the 
above gap, by adapting their expectations in the light of current 
experience, i.e.
PP® = PPL® + "b (PP - PPL®) (9.15a)
where 0 <  since adaptation can only be gradual * “^bis, of
course, reduces to the formulation contained in equation (9.15).
It can be shown that the behavioral hypothesis given in equation
(9.15)» that producers revise the price they expect in proportion to the
error they have made in prediction, is equivalent to one in which expected
price is represented as a weighted moving average of past prices, where
the weights are functions solely of the coefficient of expectation,^**^ 
Mathematically, the result is obtained by;-
PP® = SpP + (1 -  S) PPL + (1 - 5 )^  PPL2 + ... (9.15b)
Since the coefficient of expectation, ^ , is between zero and one, the 
weights will decline toward zero as we move backwards in time. In theory, 
all past prices must be included, but the fact the weights decline means 
that, in practice, we can safely ignore very remote observations on 
prices. As a rule, the closer the coefficient of expectation is to zero, 
"the greater the tenacity with which farmers cling to their previous
expectations, the greater will be the number of past prices we cannot
(***) _Ignore"' ' "
* See, for example, M. Nerlove, "Estimates of the elasticities ofsupply of selected agricultural commodities", in Karl A. Fox et al*, (éd.). Readings in the Economics of Agriculture, ASA Series, 1969/70*
** M. Nerlove has shown that this result may be easily derived byrecognising that equation (9.15) is a first-order difference equation in expected price. On the assumption of the appropriate initial conditions,the solution to the difference equation can be found to be the same as that given in equation (9.15b) above. See M. Nerlove,ibid., p.69.
* * *  i b i d . ,  p . 70 .
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Rewriting equation (9.15) as
PP® = gpp + PPL® - S PPL® (9.15c)
and substituting (9.14) into (9.15), we obtain
PP® ^P P  + r /  -  £o _ 1  7
1 ^ 1 1 
- oTTf- A^_^ - o - 1  u 7  (9.16)
' 1 1 t-1
= ^pp + ^£o — £o 4- i_ A “* S' A
^t-1 f., 4 - 1
V l  - 1  V i  (9.17)
1r. pp® = ?pp + (S - 1) + (1 -S) + (S - 1)
R  ^1 ^1
. . ( 9 .18)
Rearranging, we obtain
= C % J _ )  + (pp + ( 1 ^  A,_^ + ( ^ U t - 1  (9.19)PP®
^1 4  ^1
Equation (9.19) expresses expected price, PP®, as a function of lagged 
acreage, and current producer prices, which are both observable. 
Substituting equation (9.19) into equation (9.12), we obtain:
At = fo + 1^ ( i - - - i )  +Spp + Cbi.)A^_i + C o- I ) y 7
+ n,  1 1 1 . . ( 9 .20)
or It = fo + fo (S - 1) + fl 't pp + C  --b) A^_t
+ ( ^ -  1) + Ut (9.21)
In a rearranged form, this equation can be rewritten as:
At = «0 +  ®1 ^  %  A^_^ + (9.22)
Equation (9.22) can be estimated statistically and we can derive the
parameters of the structural equation (9.12) and the adjustment coefficient 
as follows;-
since go = fo + (f- D  =
®1 “ R  ^
gg = (1-S) 
and = ( ^  -1 )
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it follows that
&  = (1 - gg)
= go (since >
«  , ■= g^ (since g^  = f ^ Ç )
T
and e^ =  - (1 “  o ) V l
This mathematical formulation will reveal, subject to the assumed lag 
mechanism, the extent to which current year prices influence producers’ 
price expectations.
Due to nonavailability of information concerning expected price, 
the structural parameters could not be estimated directly. The above 
method, however, enables us to estimate the parameter of expected price 
if the simplifying assumptions are accepted. Statistical estimation of 
the adjustment factor *9 (often called the coefficient of expectation) 
makes it possible to isolate f^  (coefficient of expected price) from 
(coefficient of current year’s price). Thus % tells us the degree of 
relative contribution made by various years' prices in forming the price 
expectation of the current harvest year.
This formulation of an estimation procedure also makes it possible 
to estimate sg^arately the short-run and long-run supply elasticities 
of sugar. By expressing equation (9.22) in logarithms, g.^ becomes the 
short-run elasticity of supply, and g.| ■( f  becomes the long-run elasticity.
One major estimation problem, however, remains with the present 
specification of the model. While the original structural equation 
contained an error term which was free from serial correlation (or, at 
least, autocorrelation could be tested for by various methods), the . 
transformed model contains autocorrelation by specification. Consider 
the new error term, e^ = U^-(1 T o test whether the covariance
of e^ and e^_^ is equal to zero, we set;
-305-
- V  V  - V  + ^ - 2 ^
= E nt_i - ^t_2 V
- %t!l + ^t_1 %t_2 - ^ V  '^ t-2
- " b V  V  + s' %t_i %t_2 7
By assumption, E (U. U.) = 0 for i=t j,1 J •
Therefore,
E(e^ e^-l ) = E 7  ^  7t—1
But E(U? ) = u
•• E (e^ = Ç s - \  - = r j S -  1 ) # =  0
unless Ç  = 1, which is ruled out by assumption in our present model.
An alternative formulation of the behavioral rule, however, 
enables us to avoid autocorrelation in our transformed model, and this
we examine briefly. We can postulate, for example, that desired
acreage in period t is a function of expected price in that period.
The desired acreage itself is determined according to the partial 
adjustment hypothesis, while expected price is a linear function of 
last year’s price.
Symbolically, this becomes;
= a + bEP® + (9.23)
PP® = 0 + d PH. + (9.24)
Desired acreage is formulated according to equation (9.25);
(4 - At_i) = J (At - At_R + @t (5*25 )
solving for A^, we + «t (9.25a)
a /  =  ^A^ - i ^
Rearranging,
a /  " ^  At - ( l ÿ D  A^_^ - ^  «t (9.26)
Substituting equation (9*24) into equation (9.25), we obtain;
= a + b /c + d PPL + Y ^ J  + (9.2?)
•• A^b _ a + bo + bd PPL + bV^ + (9.2?a)
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Equating (9*27a) with equation (9.26) gives
a + bo + bd PPL + ^  - (— ) A^_^ " ®t (5.28)
1  At = a + bo + bd PEL + bV^ + 0^ + At_^ (9.28a)
Rearranging, we obtain
At = + bo<^ + bd-^ PEL + (1 - p  At_^
(5-25)
More concisely, we can write (9.29) as
A. +YV\ PEL + M  A. + w (9.30)^ o 1 2 t
Where W^ = b 7^ + ^ 4  + ®t
bd'^
and (1 -"^) =
If we assume that the Gauss-Markov assumptions hold for the original 
error terms, U^, V^, and e^, it can be shown that the new error term,VI^, 
is also free from serial correlation.
E (Wt Wt_i ) =E + ®t)(^l$ V  *Vt.^ +
= \  V  ^t-1 ®b-1
+ 6^ ' V  +/ V  ®t_i 
+ V i  V  + = °
since, by assumption, E (v. V.) = E (U. Ü.) = E (e. e . )1 J i J J
=0, for i j , and the 7, Ü, and e random terms are independent of 
each other. Therefore, VsJ ^  is serially uncorrelated.
One defect of this approach is that it may not be possible to recover 
estimates of the parameters of the original structural equation fi?om
the transformed model.
In fact, since
M  Q = a V  + b o V
W\, = bdY
andA^2 = 1-
we obtain = 1 ~'^2*
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By substitution, we also obtain
W\^ = a  (1 -Mg) 4- bo (1 -w\g) (9.31a)
andWN^ = bd (1 -w\g) . (9.31b)
Equations (9.31a) and (9.51b) contain four unknowns, a, b, c and d, 
in two equations, and it is not possible to obtain separate estimates 
for these parameters, However, if we are interested only in the para­
meter estimates of the final estimable equation (9.30), estimates of 
a, b, 0 and d become unnecessary.'  ^ It is, nevertheless, still possible 
to obtain estimates of long-run and short-run elasticities. The short- 
run elasticity of supply is given byM^, and the long-run elasticity by
While equations (9*22) and (9.30) appear to possess the same 
mathematical form, an important estimation problem can be avoided by 
using formulation (9«30), based on the two behavioral rules of equations
(9*23) and (9.24). However, it may not be possible to distinguish 
between these two hypotheses empirically, and, at all times, the 
residuals should be examined carefully to determine the existence and- 
the nature of autocorrelation.
(d) The final major variable we wish to explain is output of sugar 
in Mauritius, An understanding of the special characteristics of sugar 
cane production is essential for the specification of the supply function, 
and, in particular, the differences between production of sugar beet and 
production of sugar cane must be emphasized. The points of contention 
between beet and cane sugar are based primarily on the nature and 
conditions of cultivation of these two crop plants. These differences 
in cultivation arise mainly from the fact that, while beet is a 
rotational crop, cane is a perennial grass from which a number of 
successive harvests can be obtained.
* It should be pointed out that equation (9.38) is generally the focusof attention in applied work, and not the original structural equations.
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As far as crop yields and sugar content are concerned, however, 
it has been argued' ' that the efficient cultivation of both beet and 
cane requires practically similar land preparation, comparable quantities 
and composition of fertilizer, similar weed, pest, and disease controls, 
a sustained effort to improve their yielding capacities, and their 
adaptation to the soil and climatic peculiarities in each producing 
area* The average fertilizer application in Queensland, Australia,
amounts, for e x a m p l e i n  Kgs per hectare of ratooned cane, to 100-135N,
( # #  \  ,45— 70 0^ and 100-135 » These are the levels of mineral
fertilizer also generally applied in beet cultivation in Western Europe*
The main advantage of beet production is that sugar beet is mostly
grown under non—irrigated conditions and is more easily mechanised
throughout the different stages of its cultivation. There exists a
significant amount of evidence (***) that the growing use of monogerm
seed and the mechanisation of land preparation, sowing, thinning,
harvesting and loading in the advanced countries of Western Europe and
North America have resulted in a reduction in their labour requirements
per hectare of beet by over 60 per cent between 1950 and 1970.
* See, for example,. A. ORISSA, Structure of the International Sugar 
Market and its Impact on Developing Countries. Development Centre 
Studies, OECD, 197^.
** M. LAMUSSE and A* NOEL-, "Mechanisation and Sugar Cane Cultivation 
in Queensland and Taiwan"* Revue Agricole et Sucrière de l#Ile 
Maurice, Vol* 47» No* 3, 1968* The composition of fertilizer 
varies with the mineral quality of the soil* In Taiwan, the high- 
yielding csme farms use up to 300Kg of nitrogen per hectare, and 
only 60Kg o r ^ ’due to potash— rich soils"*
*** See H« CAYRE, "Vingt ans d*economie Betterave sucre en Europe",
Société d*Edition et Documentation Agricole. Paris, 1966, pp. 167— 190» 
and P.O. STCRROCK and M.C. THOMPSON, Sugar Beet; A Study of Sugar 
Production in the U.K. and the Feasibility of Expansion, Agricultural 
Economics Unit, Department of Land Economics, University of Cambridge, 
1972, pp. 21-22*
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Inevitably, this has had a considerable limiting effect on the growth 
rate of real costs - in terms of constant factor prices - of sugar 
production in these countries.^ ^
Compared with sugar beet, sugar cane has no "particular pretensions 
to secondary effects on farm productivity". Instead, it has the major 
drawback of occupying the soil, depending on the ratooning practices 
being followed, from five (a virgin crop plus three/four ratoons) to 
over twenty years. The evidence suggests that the number of ratoons 
harvested in Cuba often exceeds 20. Because of the practice of ratooning, 
cane does not permit rapid adjustments in its production. Generally, it 
is produced on a mono-culture basis (even in advanced countries where, 
for example, production becomes concentrated in certain regions, ie. 
Queensland in Australia, Hawaii, Louisiania in the United States, etc.) 
and mostly unrotated with other crops. Where fertilizer application is 
limited, however, the soil would be allowed to rest (i.e. fallow) for 
short periods, or green fertilizer crops could be grown in order to be 
ploughed in in preparation for the next planting of cane. Moreover, as 
a tropical plant, sugar cane requires a steady flow of water, and is 
therefore extensively grown with the use of irrigation. In addition, it 
needs an elaborate system of drainage in order to drain off excessive 
rainfall. Water excess, especially at the ripening periods, reduces 
quality, while water deficiency reduces both cane yield and sugar content
•* For a discussion of "other questionable virtues" of sugar beet,see A. GRISSA, op. cit., H. CAYRE, op. cit., and S. QUIERS-VALETTE, "Comptabilité interrégionale et secteur agricole", Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques. Service d'Etude de l'Activité 
économique, Pari s, 19^6,
See International Sugar Council, The World Sugar Economy;Structure and Policies, Volume II, London, 1965» PP* 6I-64.
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The highest cane yields and sugar extraction rates are obtained along 
the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn, where the annual average temperature 
and humidity are lower than along the Equator, and where it can take up 
to six months longer for the crop to ripen.
There exists a considerable degree of variation among the cane- 
growing countries in the average number of ratoons that are harvested. 
Ratooning is generally associated with a decline in yields. Since it 
dispenses with land preparation and planting, it results in a marked 
reduction in production costs relative to the virgin crop. However, since 
the cost of land preparation and planting once incurred becomes a fixed 
cost, the ratooning schedule to be followed is therefore determined by the 
(variable) production costs of the successive ratoons and their gross 
revenue yields. The cost per acre of ratooning consists, apart from the 
overheads for land, of fertilizer, restoration of cane banks and forking, 
weeding and cleaning, and harvesting. The gross sales revenue is 
determined by cane yields, and if we assume that the price of cane is 
determined independently of this yield, we can argue that sales revenue 
will fall from one ratoon to the next at a declining rate. If we further 
assume that (real) costs per acre of the first few ratoons is constant 
(approximately), we can derive a relationship between ratoon costs and 
gross revenue per acre. This is shown in Figure 9*1 below.
Figure 9*1. Cost and Gross Revenue per Acre of Ratoon Crop
Cost}Revenue
Cost
Gross Revenue
Humber of Ratoons
* This would include sugar-growing areas like Queensland in Australia, Hawaii, and Mauritius, amongst others.
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In this diagram, B is the point at which total net revenue from 
the ratooned cane is equal to zero. To the left of B, it is profitable 
to continue ratooning, and to the right of it, the producer makes losses 
measured for each successive extra ratoon by the vertical distance 
between the cost and gross revenue curves.
We have seen that the practice of ratooning is subject to 
considerable variations between countries. In Java, for example, the 
extreme position of no ratooning at all exists. The main reason for 
this is that the price of sugar has been kept relatively low and, as a 
result, the decline in yields of ratooned cane pushes gross revenue per 
acre below the revenue obtainable from alternative crops.^  ^ The sugar
mills rent cane plots from private farmers on the basis of 16 month 
contracts during which the land is converted from rice growing to cane 
and back to rice. This conversion of land between the two crops is 
carried out at the expense of the mills, a practice which often leads to 
late planting and early harvesting, resulting in lower yields of less 
mature cane. It is argued that this has been the main reason for the 
decline of sugar yields and production in Java. The average yield dropped 
from 6*61 tons per acre in 19$6—40 to tons in 1963-6 7 Before
1940* Java had the second highest cane yield in the world (after Hawaii).
The opposite extreme position to Java is occupied by Cuba, which 
has the highest average number of ratoons harvested. This explains Cuba’s 
relatively low average cane y i e l d , I n  areas where intensive and 
'advanced techniques of cane cultivation are practised, such as Hawaii,
* S. MÜBIARTO, "The Sugar Industry", Bulletin of IndonesiaEconomic Studies, July 196?, p.42.
^  ibid.. Tables 1 and 6. Figures given in hectares converted intoacres at the rate 1 hectare = 2,47105 acres,
-x-iHe Cuba has the lowest cane yield among the important sugar caneexporting countries, averaging 16,?9 tons of cane per acre in 1966-70, or 2,14 tons of sugar.
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Australia, South Africa, and Taiwan, the number of ratoons is generally 
restricted to not more than three. These, however, are highly efficient 
and high-yielding producers. Table 9.1 compares the extraction rates 
in the above four countries with the situation in a less mechanised 
country, such as Mauritius, over the period 19^6-70.
Table 9.1 Average yields in tons per acre harvested. 19^6-70
Country Cane per Sugar per ExtractionAcre Acre Rate
Hawaii 89.84 9.79 10.89#
Australia 30.76 4.53 14.73#
Taiwan 31.97 .. 4.01 12.54#
South Africa 29.14 5.28 11.26#
Mauritius 26.84 3.05 8.79#
Sources: Commonwealth Secretariat, Plantation Crops.
Various issues, London.
We can illustrate the ratooning process and the associated yields 
by referring to Figure 9.2. This graph shows the virgin and ratoon 
yield in Mauritius over the period 1965-1969 (average).
The above discussion should now enable us to specify the production 
function for sugar in Mauritius. Clearly, the price that is relevant 
is the one received by producers, as opposed to the export price or the 
domestic price paid by consumers. However, because of the ratooning 
process, we can argue that the decision to plant sugar cane today depends 
upon expectations regarding the prices that will prevail over successive 
harvests up to and including the (last ratooned crop. Therefore, output 
of sugar cane today will be a function of various prices that have pre­
vailed in the past and the exact weighting to be attached to each year’s 
price cannot be determined a priori.
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*îlgure 9«2 Virgin and Ratoon Yield in Mauritius 
1965-1969 averages (in metric tons per hectare)
Yieldm*t
1.00
6th5th4th3rd2nd1 st
*In Mauritius there are 22 large estates which cultivate around 52% 
of the cane planted area and harvest on the average 6-8 ratoons before replanting. As to the very small planters, they may practice from 18 to 22 ratoons.Note: 1 hectare = 2,.47105 acres
Source ;Mauritius Sugar Industry Research Institute,Annual Report-, 1970, Table XIV, page XI.
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We can write,
= f (PP, PPL1, PPL2, .....  PPLVC) (9.32)
Where PPL refers to producer prices lagged by the number of periods 
indicated, and PPLVC refers to producer prices lagged to the period when 
the virgin crop was planted.
In the next section, we will examine the econometric problems that 
estimation of the above structural equations will raise, and the 
econometric techniques that we will select as being most suitable for 
our purposes.
A Note on Specification and Econometric Estimation
Before examining the econometric problems, it may be helpful if we 
explained briefly some econometric "conditions" of the model. It should 
be clear that all the estimable equations are overidentified; the order 
condition for identification states that for an equation to be identified 
the total number of ((variables excluded from it)but included in the other 
equations of the model must be at least as great as the number of 
equations of the system less one. The rank condition for identification 
states that in a system of g equations, any particular equation is 
identified if and only if it is possible to construct at least one non­
zero determinant of order (g-1) from the coefficients of the variables 
excluded from that particular equation but contained in the other equations 
of the model. Of course, the problem of identiflability does not arise 
in a recursive equation; if at least one equation in the model is 
overidentified, then the whole system can be said to be overidentified.
The appropriate estimation technique would therefore appear to be the 
two-stage least squares method.
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Econometric Problems and Techniques
Before we examine the econometric problems that are likely to 
arise in the estimation of the structural equations of the model, it 
might be helpful if we summarised the model. We then obtain- the following 
systems
X = XSUG + XDG (SI)
XSÜG = xcsaI + x m ( 32)
xm = 8 - XCSAQ-BC-BSTKS (S3)
s = A.Y
laF) + a, T + Pi
(84)
DC = &o + a^  EPS + ag( (85)
*x m = Cg + 0^  PPM + Ug (86)
(xm--XBMi) = V (x m * - XPML) + T-. (87)
x m = cl + o d^  PPM + (1 XPML + W (38)
= ^0 + 4 (89)
(PP® - PEL®) = "b (PP - PEL®) (310)
At = + g-j PP + gg ^t-1 + ®t (811)
^t =' bo + hl1 PP + hg PPL1 + h PPL2 +... h (812)
PELTC + U,3
In addition, we can postulate the following technical (or quasi- 
technical) relationships:
%t = jo + At + JgD + %4 (813)
and SCU^ = (l - (S14)
where = sugar cane crop in terms of cane
D = dummy variable taking the value 1 in "normal years,
and the value 0 in "abnormal" years
SCIJ^  = sugar cane utilisation (by factories)
o4 = average portion of the sugar cane crop used up for
chewing, planting, and other "non-factory" purposes.
NFS = "nonfactory" use of sugar crop for production of non- 
centrifugal sugar, e.g. gur, khandsari, etc.
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Starting with the "quasi-technical" relationships, we make 
two observations regarding data limitations. The production of non- 
centrifugal sugar in Mauritius is quite insignificant, and observations 
on NFC are unavailable so that this variable can be safely ignored. 
Secondly, the data referring to sugar cane crop in terms of cane (z^) 
in fact relate to sugar cane crushed by factories (SCU^), and without 
knowledge of <x (and NFG^), we cannot extrapolate Z^. The most appropriate 
step in the circumstances would therefore appear to us to ignore 
equation (814), and to estimate equation (S13) by using SCU^ as a proxy 
for Z^ (which is a justifiable step if cxI can be assumed to have been 
reasonably stable over the period, and there seems no a priori reason to 
dispute this assumption).
We can now proceed to the sub-model of estimable equations. This 
sub-model consists of five estimable equations, but contains seven 
endogenous variables. We have left out the identities, and equilibrium 
conditions from this sub-model, which explains the apparent indeterminancy 
of the system. The model as a whole is clearly determinate since the 
number of equations exceeds the number of endogenous variables. Re­
writing the sub-model, we obtain the following system with the endogenous 
variables indicated by an asterisk superscript;
DC = a^+a-jHPS + a g ( ^ )  + a^ T + TJ^ (B^)
8
xm = d^ + d^  PFM + (1 - g) XFML + W  . (Eg)
^t ~ ^ o 1^ ^2 \-1 ®t
= h^ + h^  PP + hg PPL1 + h^ PPL2 4hy (S )
PPLVC + b,
h  = jo + \ *  + jg D + (Eg)
All the relations in the subnmodel satisfy the order condition 
of identifiability as the number of predetermined variables excluded 
from any one of them exceeds the number of endogenous variables included
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in the model less one. The sub-model can be written more concisely 
in the following manner;
1 -^1 0 0 0 0 0
—  —
DC
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 EPS
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 XFM
0 0 0 1 "^1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 PP
0 0 0 0 1 0 St
0 0 0 ~j1 0 0 1 ^t
= BX-A-U
Where X, A, and IT are column vectors of predetermined and dummy 
variables, constant terms, and random disturbances respectively, and B 
is the coefficient matrix associated with X.
Referring to the model as a whole, we can make the following 
observations relating to the model for the sugar economy as a whole; 
Number of equations in the model =13 (S2 to S14)
Number of identities = 3 (S2, S3» and S4)
Number of behavioral/technical relationships =10
Number of estimable equations = 5
Number of endogenous variables =10
Endogenous variables: XSÏÏG, DC, EPS, XFM, A^, PP, S^, Z^, Y, DSTKS.
Note that Y and DSTKS are determined "re si dually" from the model.
Number of predetermined variables = at least 10
Predetermined variables: GNP/N, T, PPM, XFML, A^ ^, PPL1, PPL2,
PPL3» ....» PPLVC, XGSAQ.
We can now examine the estimation problems associated with
estimating the equations in the sub-model of estimable equations
(E1 to B5). We can argue that the estimation difficulties are similar
for equations El, E3» and E5 in at least one respect; application of
ordinary least squares (OLS) will give rise to simultaneous equation
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bias. Each of these relationships contains a variable, which is 
endogenous to the system, as one of the explanatory variables; EPS 
in the case of the DC function, PP in the case of the function, 
and A^ in the case of the function. To overcome the problem of 
biased and inconsistent estimates that OLS obtains, we propose to use 
the method of two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate equations El,
E3f and E5* Estimates obtained from the 2SLS technique are still biased, 
but consistent, and more efficient compared with OLS estimates.
The most obvious difference in terms of estimation between equation 
E3 on the one hand, and equations El and E5 on the other, is the 
presence of the lagged endogenous variable in equation BJ. The con- 
sequences of this are numerous and can be serious.'  ^ One particularly 
important consequence, as we have seen, is that the Durbin Watson 
statistic becomes an inaccurate test for autocorrelation in that it 
becomes biased towards the value 2 (thus falsely tending to uphold 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation). One remedy for this problem 
would be to combine the two—stage least squares technique with the 
Goehrane-Orcutt iteration procedure, and perform the relevant trans­
formations on the data.
Equation E2 presents a similar problem to equation E$ in that it 
contains the lagged endogenous variable as one. of the regressors (XML), 
thus giving rise to corresponding undesirable consequences for the 
estimates. Equation E2 does not contain a (current) endogenous variable 
on the right-hand side, and therefore does not give rise to simultaneous 
equation bias. The best approach to estimating equation E2 would appear 
to be to apply ordinary least squares in combination with the Cochrane— 
Orcutt procedure.
* See, for example, J. Johnston, Econometric Methods. McGraw-Hill, 2nd edition, 1972, pp. 300-521. See also Chapter Seven above.
-319-
The final equation to be estimated is the supply function given 
by equation E4* Given the small sample of data available (24 observations), 
degrees of freedom are very much a premium, and the most appropriate 
technique would seem to be the Almon scheme of polynomial lag. Since 
this approach is rather "cumbersome computationally", we digress briefly 
to examine the method proposed by Almon for estimating the parameters 
of the lagged variables.
The Almon Scheme of Polynomial Lag
Almon’s original work related to estimation of a system containing, 
only lagged exogenous variables. Nevertheless, an examination of this 
study is very useful for our present purposes. We begin by assuming 
that the lagged model is finite and includes only lagged exogenous 
variables;
^1 ^t-1 + • • • •  ^t-s + (9.33)
Instead of applying OLS directly to equation (9.33) in order to 
estimate the (s+l)  b ’s, Almon suggests an indirect method. As equation 
(9*33) stands, if S is very large, we may lose a prohibitively large 
number of degrees of freedom; in addition, we are likely to find the 
presence of severe multicollinearity amongst the regressors.
We assume that the b ’s in the lagged model can be approximated by 
some function b fb: f ( z ) .  The function f ( z )  is itself unknown, in the 
absence of any a priori assumptions about its form. Almon’s method is 
"based on WEIERSTRASS'S theorem: which states that a function continuous 
in a closed interval can be approximated over the whole interval by a 
polynomial of suitable degree which differs from the function by less
* S. Almon, "The Distributed Lag Between Capital Appropriations and 
Expenditures", Eoonometrica, Vol. 53, 1965» PP. 178-196.
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C X* ^than any given positive quantity at every point of the interval" ^ ' 
Unfortunately, Weierstrass’s theorem gives no indication of the degree 
of polynomial required for a given level of accuracy.
The usual assumption, therefore, is that the function f (z) may 
he approximated by a polynomial in Z of the rth degree,
f (z) Z + a^Z^ + a^Z^ + ... +a^Z^ (9. 34)
Equation (9*54) then becomes known as the "approximation polynomial". 
We can see that f ( z )  yields the values of the b ’s (approximately) if we 
know the a’s and the degree of the polynomial (r). The general method 
developed by Almon for estimating f ( z )  is highly complex and, arguably, 
contains several d i s a d v a n t a g e s . I n  practice, a simpler approach is 
adopted and this we develop briefly.
Firstly, we specify the number of lags, S, and the degree of the 
approximation polynomial, r (usually assumed low, for example, r = 3 ar 4). 
If the degree of polynomial is specified to be high, the exercise becomes 
self-defeating as we do not succeed in achieving the intended reduction 
in the number of parameters to be estimated from the model.
Secondly, we express the b ’s in terms of the a’s of the 
approximation polynomial, by assigning to Z the successive integer 
values Z = 0, Z = 1, Z = 2, ...., Z = S. We then obtain the following 
systems
= f(o) =
= f(l) = + + 3^2 + a^ + .... • a^)
^2 =i f (2) — 2a^ + 2 a^ + 2^ a^ + ..... +2 a^)
= f(3) = ( %  + 3»! + 3 a2+3^3,^ + ... *3 9>p)
^8 = f(s) = (.% + Sa^ + 8 a^ 4- S^a^ 4- ... 4-S a^)
(9. 35)
* See J. Johnston, op. cit., p. 294# For further details, see B.R. Morton, Numerical Approximation, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1964, P.4.
** See J, Johnston, op, cit., pp. 296-7.
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In the above system, the h ’^s are expressed as function (linear) 
of the a*s. We can call the system contained in (9*35) the "b-system". 
If we knew the a's, we could solve for the b*s by substitution into 
the "b-system"* Table 9#2 reproduces the numerical pattern of the 
coefficients of the "b-system" in a more useful manner.
Table 9*2 Numerical Coefficients of the "b-system"
>1
(i=0,1,2...S)
(j = 0, 1, 2 .... r)
%  1^ ^2 ^3 ... ... s-r
b^ 1 0 . 0 0 ... ... 00
1 . 1 1 1 ... ... 1
1 2 2^ 2? ... ... 2^
1 3 .. f
1 s s2 ... sF
In general, we can write;
^  3^ a. (j = ^  J = 0, 1, 2, ....r) (9.36)j=0
Thirdly, we can obtain estimates of the a's by applying OLS to the 
following transformed model;
t^ “ ^ o 0^ ^^1 + 2^ 2^  ^ r^ t^ (9*37)
where the W’s are linear combinations of the lagged X's, with the 
weights as indicated in Table 9.3 below.
Table 9.3 Weights in an Almon Lag Scheme
t-1 t-2 t-5 ‘t - 3
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To derive the W's, we proceed by substituting the b's from the "b-system" 
(9.35) for the a*s in the original function (9*33)• This gives uss-
^t = %  ^t + ( %  + ^1 + ^2 + ...... ^r) ^t-1
+ (a^ + 2a^ + 2^ ^2 + .... 2^a^)
+ ( %  + 3&1 + 3^ &2 + .............. ^t-5
■}■...
+ (a^ + Sa^ + 8 ag + . . , + S a^) X^_g 
+ (9.38)
Rearranging, and grouping the a's, we obtain:
^t %  (%t + %t_•1 + ^t-2 + h-3  + "
+ (^t-1 + 2X^_2 + 3X^_3 + . SXt_s)
+ ®2 (^t-1 + 2^ X^_2 + 3^ Xt_3 + * . . + S % _ 2 )
+ 2? x^_2 + 3^ Xt_3 + . • • + s^Xt-s)
+ • • ♦
+ 2^ ^t-2 + ^t-3 + . • • +s%_g)+ (9.39)
Clearly, this is equivalent to
^ t  = %  ^o + '^1 + '''2 + •• -^ ®r '^r + ^ t
given by equation (9.37) using the weights in Table 9.3*
We can make two observations about the W variables we have con­
structed: there will be as many constructed W ’s as the arbitrarily chosen 
degree of the polynomial plus one (i.e., number of the W's = r + I); 
secondly, the W ’s are linear combinations of all the X values (both 
current and lagged X ’s). '
The final step involved in the Almon estimation technique is to 
substitute the OLS estimates of the a ’s from equation (9.37) into the 
"b-system" (9.35), and solve to obtain the parameters of the lagged 
model, .
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As Johnston points out'* ^, the above simplified version of the 
Almon method has a number of advantages. Firstly, it is computationally 
simpler. Secondly, it yields a direct test of the ’’approximation 
polynomial"; tests of significance on the a ’s in equation (9«37) would 
determine the relevant degree of polynomial. Thirdly, changing the 
degree of the polynomial involves adding extra W explanatory variables, 
leaving the previous variables unchanged (see equation (9*39)).
In the context of our model, the Almon approach seems particularly 
appropriate for our supply function (E4), given the practice of ratooning 
in sugar cane production. We can hypothesize that the number of lags 
relevant, S, will vary between 6 and 10 on the basis of evidence available 
from the sugar industry. The value of the degree of polynomial r, cannot 
be determined a priori.
The only problem that arises regarding estimation of equation (E4) 
concerns the presence of the endogenous variable, PP, as an explanatory 
variable. The remaining regressors in the equation are all predetermined 
since they are producer prices lagged various periods. We might be able 
to overcome this problem by using an "instrumental variable" for PP; 
the most obvious possibility would be the estimated value of PP obtained 
after regressing it against all the predetermined variables in the 
complete model. In any case, the seriousness of the simultaneous equation 
bias posed by the presence of PP on the right hand side remains an 
empirical issue.
* J, Johnston, op, cit., pp. 294-7.
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In the next section, we present the results obtained from applying 
the various estimation techniques to equations (El) to (E5), The 
statistical significance of the t-statistios is indicated by asterisks 
as follows;
* denotes significance at the 10% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
D,W* indicates the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic.
ESS indicates the size of the residual sum of squares
SEE indicates the value of the standard error of the estimate,
^ is the autocorrelation coefficient in a first-order linear 
autoregressive scheme.
Analysis of Results
The results given below are presented in the order the functions
to be estimated have been discussed above. We begin with the domestic
consumption of sugar function for Mauritius; the best fit to the data
was. obtained by applying a logarithmic transformation on total consumption,
(as opposed to consumption per head  ^ We then obtained;
in (DC) = 0.914 - 0.233 tn (EPS) + 0.228 tn (GNP/N)
(2.903) *** (1.923)* (2.586)**
+ 0.658 In (DCL)
(13.944)*** (9.40)
E^ = 0.9791 = 0.9758
P-statistic (3, 19) - 296, 277 
Pq .Oi (3. 19) = 5.01
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1,809 (no autocorrelation)
ESS = 0,0156 SEE = 0.0287
* One could argue that consumption per head was fairly stable over the period for a country like Mauritius, which has reached itsnear—saturation level in sugar consumption, and that there is morevariation in total sugar consumption to be explained than in consumption per head.
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The above results were obtained by using the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimation technique. The coefficient estimates all have 
the correct sign and are significantly different from zero (though the f
retail price coefficient is significant only at the 10% level). t
The coefficient of multiple determination is highly significant, as f
shown by the P-statistic, resulting in a low SEE. The presence of the f
lagged endogenous variable, tn (TCL), is useful in that it helps to %
provide estimates of the short-run and long-run elasticities with respect 
to both price and GEP/N; but it also implies that the Durbin-Watson i
statistic is an unreliable test of serial correlation among the residuals, 
being asymptotically biased towards 2. ^
The price elasticities of demand are estimated to be -0,233 in the 
short run, and -0,681 in the long run; the corresponding income elasticities ' 
are 0,228 and 0,667* I
Application of the COCHRAME-ORGUTT iterative procedure together 
with 2SLS to deal with the possible existence of autocorrelation yielded ;
the • following results ;— îi
in (DC) = 1.027 - 9.271 in (EPS) + 0.249 in (GHP/N) i
(2.927)*** (1.965)* (2.637)** :
+ 0.627 in (d c l) (9.41) ;
(9.850)
R^ = 0,974 R^ = 0,9697
P-statistic (3, 18) = 225*13
^0.01 <5, 18) = 5.09
D.W* = 2,0445 (No autocorrelation)
Pinal value of Ç = 0,197 
Number of iterations = 6
T-statistic for = 0,941 (not significant at 10% level) 
RSS = 0,0170 SEE = 0,0307
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The price elasticities of demand are then estimated to be -0,271 
in the short run, and -0,727 in the long run; the corresponding income 
elasticities are 0,249 and 0,668 respectively.
Clearly, the application of the iterative technique does not 
produce significantly different results, and the final iteration generates 
a vELlue of ^  which is not significantly different from zero. This 
indicates the absence of a first order linear autoregressive scheme, and 
extension of the iterative procedure upholds the null hypothesis of no­
autocorrelation in a second order autoregressive scheme.
It may be useful to compare the above results with, for example, 
those obtained by Adams and Behrman , by applying ordinary least- 
squares. They obtain the following results for less developed countries 
as a whole:—
in(DC/N) = -0.048 in (RPSL) + 0,779 in (GNP/n)(2.1)* (21.2)***
-0.965
(4.0)*"^ (9.42)
= 0.98 D.W, = 2,4 ■ SEE = 0,018
The sample period used was 1955-1973* based on annual data; the 
price elasticities obtained were -0,05 for both the short and long run 
(since the lagged endogenous variable is not being used as an explanatory 
variable), while the income elasticities were 0,78 in both cases again. 
The specification of the above function is different from ours in that it 
includes the lagged retail price of sugar (RPSL) as an explanatory 
-variable instead of the current value. It is difficult to justify the 
functional dependence of current demand on lagged retail price on purely 
economic grounds.
* See F,G, Adams and JJl. Behrman, op, cit,, pp. 58-41.
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Our specification also differs from that of Medani^*^ in a 
recent cross-section study of marketable surplus of a subsistence crop 
at various stages of development. Medani postulates that consumption 
depends on market price, family size, and on expected income. Again, 
on purely economic grounds, it is difficult to justify the inclusion 
of expected income (as opposed to current or last period's income) as 
an explanatory variable in a demand function for one good (as opposed to 
an aggregate consumption function). Clearly, current demand for sugar 
depends on current price and current income, not on last year's price, 
or on expected income. Economic rationalisation has to take precedence 
over statistically significant fits,
Medani's estimates of short and long run elasticities of demand with 
respect to both price and incçme indicate very low levels of responsiveness, 
in line with our own results, and those obtained by Adams and Behrman.
The short-run price elasticities he obtained range from -0,02 to -0,28, 
while the long-run elasticities range from -0,08 to -0,32 for the various 
"stages of development"; the corresponding short-run income elasticities 
range from 0,18 to 0,72, Note that these estimates relate to demand 
for a Sudanese "staple food crop".
Regarding the price and income elasticities for sugar, Adams and 
Behrman argue that they are in line with our expectations. Sugar
is an essential commodity used primarily as an input (or as a complement) 
to other products. It is hardly surprising that we obtain estimates of 
"price coefficients which are barely significant at the 10% level in the 
Mauritian context; the development of sugar-related products (chocolate, 
biscuits, alcoholic drinks, etc,) is not very advanced so that per capita
* See A.I. Medani, "Elasticity of the Marketable Surplus of a Subsistence Crop at Various Stages of Development", Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 23, 1974-1975» PP* 421-429.
^  P,G, Adams and J,R. Behrman, op, cit., p, 41,
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consumption of 36 to 38 Kg of sugar in Mauritius is equivalent to per 
capita consumption of 50 Kg of sugar/sugar-related, products in Western 
Europe and North America* In other words, Mauritius has nearly reached 
saturation levels in consumption of sugar and elasticity values of less 
than one for both price and income are very much in line with a priori 
expectations*
Since our sugar exports function contains only predetermined variables 
as regressors, the application of ordinary least-square appears reasonable 
as a starting-point* The OLS results obtained were as follows:—
XEM = 1.609 + 0.214 PEM + 80.12 DBM + O.44O XEML
(1.563) (I.807)* (4.071)*** (2.648)** (9.43)
= 0.856 = 0.833
E-statistio (3, 19) = 31*59
^0.01 (3' 19) = 5.01
D.W. = I.7I8 (No autocorrelation)
RSS = 28,215.7 SEE = 38.536
The equation explains 83% of the variation in exports, with all 
coefficients statistically significant (export price significant at the 
10% level, lagged exports at the 5' % level, and the dummy variable at 
the 1 % level). The inclusion of the dummy variable (to account for 
abnormally low levels of exports in certain years due to cyclonic 
weather) appears to be justified by the statistical results. Since 
DIIM: = 0 in "poor" export years, and DBM = 1 in normal export years, the 
function has a higher intercept in normal years. The P-statistic is 
highly significant (at the 1 %  level).
We can again obtain short and long run elasticities of exports with 
respect to price: the short-run value is 0 ,214, and in the long-run, it 
-rises to 0,382, indicating poor responsiveness of exports even in the 
long-term. Again, however, the Durbin-Watson value of 1,718, reflecting
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the non-existence of serial correlation amongst the residuals, is 
unreliable due to the presence of the lagged endogenous variable on 
the right-hand side.
Applying OLS together with the OOCHRAKE-ORCUTT iterative procedure 
to the export function, we obtained the following results :-
XPM = 6.362 + 0.115 PPM + 78.74 PBH + 0.296 XPML
(1.607) (0.775) (4.345)*** (1.989)* (9.44)
E® = 0.912 _ 1  2 = 0.897
P-statistic (3, 18) = 52.25
F0.01 (5. 18) = 5.09
D.W. = 1.824 (No autocorrelation)
Pinal value of ^  = 0,556
Number of iterations =15
T-statistic for = 3*139 (significant at the 1% level)
RSS = 26,295.6 SEE = 38,221
The most obvious result to emerge is that there is highly 
significant evidence of positive first-order autocorrelation, with an 
estimate of Ç  equal to 0,556. , Applying the relevant transformation 
on the variables, we obtain the more efficient generalised least-squares 
estimates given in equation (9.44). The GLS coefficients all have 
reduced statistical significance, with the exception of the dummy 
coefficient; in particular, the price coefficient is only significant 
at the 50% level, and has significantly fallen in value. The short-run 
price elasticity of exports is 0 ,115, and the corresponding long-run 
elasticity is 0.163, which indicates even less responsiveness than the 
OLS estimates. We must therefore conclude that the appropriate estimation 
technique for. the export function is the GLS method, and the estimates 
obtained tend to indicate insignificant elasticities.
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It might he argued that an important argument in the export 
function is the level of stocks (STKS), or the level of stocks at the 
beginning of the period (sTKSL), or the change in stocks (DSTKS) .
Inclusion of these variables does not yield any significant improvement 
in fit, nor are the coefficients of the stocks variables themselves 
statistically significant. Another possibility would be to estimate the 
function in its first difference form, i.e. assume a perfect positive 
first order autoregressive relationship in which ^  = 1. It is not 
surprising that first differencing results in rather poor estimates (with 
wrong signs attached to the price and lagged exports coefficients) since 
the Cochrane-0routt procedure gives an estimate of 0.556 for ^  ^ and a 
statistically insignificant estimate for ^
We next consider the acreage function. As already indicated, this 
function was estimated by the 2SLS method because of the presence of 
producer prices as an explanatory variable. The 2SLSlestimates obtained 
were as follows
A^ = 1.327 + 0.132 PP + 0.943 Ah
(1.765) (4.8O3)*** (23.43)*** (9.45)
= 0.971
P-statistic (2, 20) = 328,51
F0.01 (2, 20) =5.85
D.W. = 1.895 (No autocorrelation)
RSS = 254.99 SEE = 5.571
The equation explains nearly 97% of the variation in aOreage over 
the period, and yields highly significant estimates of the coefficients 
of price and lagged acreage (both at the 1 % level). This is reflected 
by the high numerical value obtained for the P-statistic, The short-run 
elasticity of acreage with respect to price is 0 .132, but because of the 
very large estimate obtained for the coefficient of adjustment (0.943), 
the long-run elasticity is estimated to be 2.316. The evidence of elastic
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response in the long-run must therefore be placed in this context.
We again attempted to test whether the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable (AL) as a regressor rendered the Durbin-Watson test 
unsuitable. Application of the 2SLSL method with the Cochrane-Orcutt 
iterative technique yielded the following results :-
A^ = 0.8769 + 0.091 PP + 0.967 AL
(1.097) (3.336)*** (22.62)*** (9.46)
R^ = 0.969 R^ = 0.966
F-statistic (2, 19) = 299.71
^0.01 (2, 19) = 5.93
D.W. = 2.057 (No autocorrelation)
Final value of ^  = 0.006
Number of iterations = 2
T-statistic for = 0.026 (not statistically significant)
RSS = 234.16 SEE = 3.511
Clearly, there is no evidence of serial correlation among the 
residuals. Equation (9.46) yields values of 0.091 for the short-run 
price elasticity, and 2.758 for the long-run elasticity, due to a higher 
estimate for the coefficient of adjustment, and a lower estimate for the 
price coefficient. But the autoregressive coefficient is not statistically 
significant, and we can accept the straightforward 2SLS results of (9.45) 
as being reasonable.
We next present the results for the sugar cane crop function, again 
estimated by the 2SLS'. method.
= 2673.55 + I65O.6D + 30.84 A^
(2.553)** (4.797)*** (6.096)*** (9.47)
R^ = 0.857
F-statistic (2, 20) = 53*69
%.01 (2, 20) = 5.85
D.W. = 1.909 (no autocorrelation)
RSS = 0,432 X  107 SEE = 464,806
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The equation explains more than 84% of the variation in sugar 
cane crop over the period, and the coefficient of. multiple determination 
is highly significant, as shown by the F-statistic* All the parameter 
estimates are significantly different from zero, with the acreage and 
dummy coefficients significant at the 1% level. The inclusion of the 
dummy variable, D, as in the export function, is justified on the grounds 
that it accounts for the shift in the intercept arising from cyclonic 
weather. Again, we assume that D = 0 in "poor" crop years, and D = 1 in 
normal crop years. We can compare our result with those obtained by,
for example, JO SHI in his study of the Indian sugar cycle; Joshi
estimates a sugar cane crop function and obtains:—
= 12.486 + 17.169 A^
= 0.897 (14.456)*** (9.47a)
The results were obtained by using the OLS method. It is not 
surprising that a higher cane-yielding country like Mauritius should 
have a high acreage coefficient (30,84) compared to India, where cane 
yield per acre is known to be relatively low.
The final equation to be estimated is the supply function. Supply
is hypothesised to depend on producer prices (PP) lagged up to the period 
the virgin crop was planted. Estimation of this function was performed 
by use of the Almon scheme of polynomial lag. The best fit was obtained 
by assuming a polynomial of degree two (r=2), and the appropriate lag 
structure was one of seven years (s=7) .  These results are presented 
below;-
Alpha 1 Alpha 2
Coefficient 0,104 0.215
Standard error 0,066 0,007
T-statistic (1. 565) (2, 914) * * *
* See P.O. Joshi, Sankhya. May 1973, op. cit., p. 44O
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= 0.965 = 0,9627
P-statistic (1, 15) = 414*01
^0.01 8*^8
imrbin-Watson = 1,605
RSS = 226, 081 SEE = 122.768
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic
RP 0,1040 0.0664 1.565
PPL1 0.1198 0.0467 2.567**
PPL2 0.1557 0,0275 4.980
PPL5 0.1516 0.0099 15.500^ *
PPL4 0.1675 0.0157 10.670***
PPL5 0.1855 0.0545 5.320***
PPL6 0.1992 0.0541 5.686***
PPL7 0.2151 0.0758 2.914***
Mean lag = 4.0225 Standard error = O .7505
Sum of log coefficients = 1.276 Standard error = O.O684
These are very encouraging results, and the only suspicion relates 
to the fact that the coefficient estimates conform to our a priori 
expectations so closely I The explanatory power of the regression is 
very high, exceeding 96%, and is highly significant. The results tend 
to suggest that the usual pattern of ratooning consists of seven crops, 
in addition to the virgin crop. It is tempting to interpret the values 
of the price coefficients as reflecting a greater importance being 
attached to price prevailing 8 periods ago when the crop was first 
planted, and less importance being attached to prices in successively 
-more recent periods up to the present. The coefficients of producer 
prices lagged from two periods to seven periods are all significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level; the coefficient of price lagged one 
period is significant at the 5% level, and that of the current year's 
price at the 20% level.
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The mean lag is equal to 4*0225; the formula for this average 
lag is derived by the use of the "lag operator",where
1=0
i.=o P S
(Average lag = 0  ) =
Where s = number of lags 
and ^ = price coefficients
The average lag is a summary statistic that enables comparison 
between several distributed lag schemes) of course, in our case, we 
are interested in only one specific lag scheme (polynomial),
We attempted to re-estimate the supply function by increasing 
the degree of polynomial fVxm%r=2 to r=5> and r=4; the results obtained 
were significantly poorer, yielding negative and insignificant price 
coefficients in many cases. Similarly, we tried to vary the number 
of lags, S, by estimating the function for fewer than, and more than, 
seven lags; again the results could not be improved upon. A test for 
first-order autocorrelation generated a very low value for ç (0.209), 
and an insignificant t-statistic (0.857); so, clearly there exists no 
justification for applying the GLS method to estimate the supply function. 
One final point needs to be cleareds the presence of the variable, PP, 
on the right-hand side can lead to simultaneous equation bias; we 
replaced PP by the estimated value of PP (obtained after regressing it 
against a set of predetermined variables from the whole model), but 
found that no significant gain could be achieved.
* See Z. GRILICHES, "Distributed Lags: A Survey", Econometrica.Vol. 55j No. 1, January 19&7, PP* 1-5-49*
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In this chapter, we have derived a simnltaneous-equation model 
to describe sugar production in Mauritius, one of the leading sugar- 
exporting members under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. We have 
examined the problems that estimation of the model poses, and assessed 
the relative merits of various estimation techniques for each estimable 
equation.
Finally, we have presented the empirical results and appraised 
their significance and usefulness. In the next chapter, we will present, 
a summary of our findings in this study, the shortcomings of the study, 
and the conclusions that we can reach on the basis of our results.
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APPENDIX 9A
VARIABLES DETERMINED RESIDUALLY
We have allowed two variables in our model to be determined "residually" 
by making use of identities and definitions- These‘variables are stocks 
and yield per acre.
Let us consider stocks first- We start with the identity:
XFM = S - XCSAQ - DC - DSTKS (9-3)
Total earnings from sugar have usually exceeded 90% of total exports- It 
appears that the relevant policy variable for a country under balance of 
payments and foreign exchange constraints is XFM and not STKS- Total
production each year is allocated in such a way that CSA commitments and
domestic requirements are met first; of the remainder, exports to the
Cfree market will depend on the price prevailing/On that free market, amongst
other factors, subject to existing ISA provisions. It seems reasonable on
this basis to allow the level of STKS to be determined "residually"-
Another problem would relate to the (non-) existence of data to estimate
a stocks function- One obvious argument in such a function would be
storage capacity, and the data are not readily available^certainly not for
a long time series sample- On both counts, it seems sensible to estimate
the XFM function- However, an attempt was made independently to estimate
a stocks function- . The dependent variable can be either the absolute level
of stocks at the end of the current period or the change in stocks between
the current and the previous period, depending on the object of the exercise,
Let STKS = level of stocks at the end of the current period 
DSTKS = change in stocks
PPM = price of sugar on the free market in current period 
DPFM = change in price of sugar
STKSL = level of stocks lagged one period
DSTKSL = change in stocks lagged one period 
DS =■ change in output of sugar 
DUMSTKS = dummy variable affecting level of stocks 
=1 when weather conditions are favourable 
=owhen weather conditions are adverse
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Then, using the level of stocks as the dependent variable, the best fit
we could obtain was;
STKS = 0.870 - 0,0205 PPM + 0.0227 DPPM 
t-values (0.048) (0,818) (0,706)
+ 0,Vl4 STKSL + 0.174 DS + 50,368 DUMSTK (5.619)*** (4,018)*** (4,l47)*** (9A-1)
= 0.8415 R^ = 0,7949
P(5,17) = 18.050*** Po.o5 (5,17) = 2.81Po.Ol (5,17) = 4.34
D.W. statistic = 2,255 (inconclusive)
RSS = 9443,26 SEE = 23.569
The above equation produces a good fit, with the explanatory variables 
in the model accounting for nearly 80% of the variation in the dependent 
variable. The P-statistic shows that this fit is statistically significant 
(at the 1% level). Both price variables are insignificant (even at the 40% 
level), though the coefficient of PPM has the correct sign. As one would 
expect, the level of stocks lagged one period and the change in sugar output 
are both extremely important variables, with coefficients in both cases 
highly significant (at the 1% level). The dummy variable is also statistical!? 
significant at the 1% level, justifying the inclusion of this variable as a 
proxy for weather conditions in the absence of more direct observations.
Using the change in the level of stocks as the dependent variable (DSTKS), 
we could not improve upon the fit. The best result obtained is produced below 
as equation (9A-2):
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DSTKS = -0.342 - 0.0539 PPM + 0.0542 DPPM'(0.0225)(2.461)** (1.859)*
- 0.484- DSTKSL + 0.0991 DS + 46.104 DUMSTK (9A-2)(3.717)*** (2.202)** (4.447)*** j
= 0.8420 R”^ = 0.7926
P (5,16) = 17.049*** P^ ^ (5,16) = 2.85
P^ . (5,16) = 4.44O.Ox
D.W. Statistic - 2.255 (inconclusive) 1
RSS = 6313.36 SEE = 19.864 !
Equation (9A-2) produces an equally good fit; the explanatory variables 
explain nearly 80% of the variation in DSTKS. The merit of using change 
in stocks lies in the fact that we obtain statistically significant parameter 
estimates for the sugar price variables; in particular, the coefficient of 
PPM has the correct sign and is significant at -the 5% level, while "that of 
DPPM is significant at -the 10% level. The overall regression is also 
statistically significant at -khe 1% level. The lagged endogenous variable, %
DSTKSL, is again significant at the 1% level, as is the dummy variable which '•
again accounts for the influence of weather condi-bions. The value of the 
coefficient of DS has fallen quite dramatically (from 0.174 to 0.0991) and 
it is now only significant at -the 5% level (compared with 1%).
Next consider -fche variable •^ jield. The identity in question here is
S = A.Y (9.4)
We have decided to estimate the S and A functions, and allow •the Y function )
to be determined "residually". S is estimated according to an Almon lag ischeme whereby
5^ = f (PP, PPLl, ..., PPL7) ‘1
and A^ is estimated according to an adaptive expectations formulation, vhereby,
&t = 9o + 9l PP + 92 At_l + :
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The basis of this formulation is that individual farmers first decide on the 
level of output they wish to produce, since sugar output is the main source of 
their income. This output is held to depend on prices producers receive, !
lagged various periods. j
They thei decide on the combinations of acreage and yield that will 
satisfy this output; in other words, decisions on acreage and yield are 
made jointly. Since they have limited capital to invest, they could increase 
output by using more land, i.e. increase acreage, but at the same time they i
have less capital -left to invest in increasing yields. Therefore, we need 
to explain either acreage or yield since increasing one is in some sense 
at the expense of an increase in the other.
In the model presented, we have chosen to explain acreage (since these 1
give better fits) and output, and allow yield to be determined "residually" 
by the model. *
An attempt has also been made, however, to estimate a yield (YT) function 
for sugar in Mauritius. The specification of this function is, unfortunately, |
a victim of lade of data on important cost variables, e.g. cost of labour 
inputs, cost of capital, etc. The most notable result obtained was the 
statistical insignificance of the coefficients of the fertilisers variable j
(whether this refers to price or quantity used per acre). The best fit i
obtained from using a Nerlo.vian adjustment type of specification was; I
YT = 1.379 + 0.0002 PPL + 0.172 YTL(2.545)**(0.0483) (1.043) ^
+- 1.002 DUMY" + 0. Ol42 TTVE Î(4.776)#** (1.249) (9A-3) j
2 - 2R = 0.5960 R = 0.5062 i
P (4,18) = 6.639 P (4,18) = 2.93CIl = 4.58 !
D.W. statistic = 1.761 (inconclusive)
RSS = 1.8355 SEE = 0.3193
-340-
5,
Though the overall regression is statistically significant (at the 1% 
level), the equation explains little more than 50% of the variation in yield 
over the period. Only the dummy variable used to account for cyclonic 
weather and droughts (DUMY) has a statistically significant coefficient; 
producer prices (lagged one period) - PPL - hardly affect yields in the 
current period. The use of time as a proxy for technology turns out to be 
unjustified, with a coefficient estimate barely significant at the 25% 
level* Even the lagged endogenous variable, YTL, fails to provide a 1
significant coefficient. As in equations (9A-1) and (9A-2), the Durbin- 
Watson statistic is inconclusive re^rding the existence of serial correlation I 
among the residuals; but it must be emphasised that this test is not reliable  ^
in any of the above three equations since they contain the lagged endogenous 
variable as one of the regressors.
One may argue, however, that having committed a given acreage of land to 
the growing of sugar cane, a producer can maximise output only if he can
imaximise yield per acre. The number of ratoons practised in Mauritius, as 
we have seen, varies from six to nine, excluding the virgin crop. It appears 
reasonable to suppose that yields in the current period depend on producer 
prices over various periods in the past. This argument is based on the ,
assertion that higher producer prices in the past allow producers to 
increase their inputs in the current period, and thus increase yield. Ideally,,?
we would use net price (i.e., price net of variable costs) as the explanatory 
variable, but no such data exist. The lag profile we are seeking should be 
flexible enough to allow for comparisons between alternative ratoon profiles.
It has not been possible for the author to conceive or obtain such a model.
We were therefore obliged to fall back on the Almon polynomial lag scheme to 
estimate a yield function, and to generate a lag profile (albeit, a rather
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rigid one).' The results for the yield function (yield regressed against 
producer prices), using such a scheme, are given below. The best fit was 
obtained by again assuming a polynomial of degree two (r=2), and the 
appropriate lag structure was one of seven years.
Alpha 1 Alpha 2
Coefficient 3.39735E - 04 1.20941E - 03
Standard error 2.95534E - 04 3.28490E - 04
T-statistic 1.14956 3.6817♦* *
R = 0.9699 
P (1,15) = 482.645***
Durbin-Watson statistic 
RSS = 4.478
Variable
PP
PPLl
PPL2
PPL3
PPL4
PPL5
PPL6
PPL7
Coefficient 
0.3397E-03 
0.4640E-03 
0.5882E-03 
0.7125E-03
0.8367E-03
0.9609E-03
0.1085E-02
0.1209E-02
R^ = 0.9678
= 4.54 
=  8.68
2.0827
SEE = 0.5464
Standard error 
0.2955E-03 
0.2078E-03 
0.1213E-03 
0.4408E-04
0.6986E-04
0.1534E-03
0.2405E-03
0.3285E-03
T-statistic
1.150
2.233**
4.850***
16.160***
11.980***
6.266***
4.511***
3.682***
Mean lag = 4.34209 Standard error = 7.51737
Sum of lag coefficients = 0.619657E-02 Standard error = 0.304548E-03 i
As we can see, these are useful results. The Almon scheme of polynomial
lag, when applied to the yield function, helps to explain over 96% of the
variation in yields over the 1951-74 period; the coefficient of multiple
determination is again highly significant (at the 0.1% level). The coefficients
of all the price variables lagged from two to seven years are statistically
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significant'at the 1% level, while price lagged one period is significant 
at the 5% level, and current year's price is significant only at the 25% 
level. A test for autocorrelation yielded a final value of rho (from the 
Cochrane-Orcutt iterative technique) of -0.0853, with a t-value of only
0.3424, vihich is highly insignificant (even at the 50% level). We can 
therefore conclude that, notwithstanding the rigidity imposed on the lag 
profile, in the absence of a more flexible scheme, the Almon schane does 
generate quite acceptable results.
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Summary aad Conclusions
The purpose of this study has been to analyse systematically 
the operation of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement between the United 
Kingdom on the one hand, and the sugar-exporting countries of the 
Commonwealth on the other, over its operating life from 1951 to 1974*
For a number of reasons, it has been necessary to narrow down the 
study to an economic examination of the sugar industry in one important 
sugar-exporting economy, Mauritius* A simultaneous-equation model has 
been devised to explain a number of variables in the sugar industry, 
but we must be very careful before attempting to apply the results 
for one case study to make general policy statements about the other 
sugar-exporting members of the Agreement* Since the Agreement has now 
been substantially replaced by the Lome Convention of the European 
Economic Study, the study can, however, be useful in providing certain 
quantitative and/or qualitative results for the quota decisions that 
need to be made in the future.
Summary of Results and Policy Implications
Econometric analysis of the time series data for the Mauritian 
Sugar industry indicates a significant response to price insofar as 
acreage, output, and exports are concerned. Clearly, supply responses 
to price changes will be diverse and varied for different countries 
(and different commodities), which would militate against generalisation 
of any results based on one commodity for one country. A number of 
factors would be responsible for this lack of uniformity amongst 
countries:- (1) evidence exists that in some countries, producers may 
increase production when prices are low in an attempt to maintain their
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previous levels of income  ^; (ii) there are large disturbances 
(and errors of measurement) in the time series data employed; (iii) 
the prices of many products and inputs in many cases are not determined 
exclusively by the interplay of economic forces; (iv) there is strong 
evidence of institutional forces on a national and/or international 
level;, (v) the opportunity cost of agricultural land is very low in 
the short run; (vi) the nature of the response may itself be subject 
to variations over time, and the profile of lags may differ for different 
countries and different commodities.
A selection of the important econometric results is presented 
in Table 10*1» This shows the level of significance of responses of 
various endogenous variables in the Mauritian sugar economy with respect 
to corresponding price variables. Also shown is the coefficient of 
multiple determination (adjusted for degrees of freedom), to show the 
goodness of fit of the regression* It can be seen that the response 
of domestic demand to retail price of sugar and the response of exports 
to free market prices.are both moderately, significant (at the 10% level). 
The response of both acreage and output, however, to prices actually 
received by producers is highly significant (at the 1% level); in 
particular, the use of the Almon polynomial lag scheme to take account 
of the ratooning practice in sugar can production throws up interesting 
and significant results. The best result obtained enables us to conclude
* This gives rise to the well-known phenomenon of the backward—bending supply curve. For further details, see J.R. Behrman» Supply Response in Underdeveloped Agriculture ; A Case Study of Four Mahor Annual Crops in Thailand, 1937-1963. North-Holi and, I.968, pp. 4-6. See also studies reported in Behrman by 8.D. Neumark, P.N. Mathur, H. Ezekiel, D.R. Khatkhate, S. Enke, R.O. Olson, and T.N. Krishnan, op. cit.,pp. 422-439.
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that on average, seven ratoons are practij^sed in the sugar industry 
in Mauritius, excluding the initial virgin crop. Further, the coefficients 
of all the lagged producer price variables are highly significant (at the 
1% level for prices lagged two to seven years, and at the 5^ level for 
prices lagged one year).
A separate exercise showed that the level of stocks did not 
significantly respond to prices on the free market, but the change in 
stocks was found to respond both to the level of free market prices (at 
the 5% level), and to the change in free market prices (at the 10% level). 
The response of the yield variable to producers prices was also found to 
be insignificantbut when the Almon scheme was applied, the response was 
again highly significant for the lagged producer price variables (at the 
5% level for prices lagged one year,, and at the 1% level for prices 
lagged two to seven years).
In general, one could argue that the simultaneous equation model 
devised, to explain sugar production in Mauritius works reasonably well.
We obtain economically meaningful parameter estimates (both in terms 
of signs and in terms of numerical magnitude), and the goodness of fit 
for all the equations tested proves to be highly significant, as judged by 
the F—statistics (at the 1% level). Out of eight results presented in 
Table 10*1, in four cases the equations explained over 96% of the variation 
in the dependent variable and in three cases, they explained approximately 
% of the variation.
—348—
Table 10*1. Summary of Results showing Response to Priceand Levels of Significance
Price Variables
DependentVariable Domestic Price of Sugar (RPS)
Free market price of sugar (PFM)
Producerprices(PP)
DomesticConsumption (DC/n ) * 0.9758***1
Exports to the free market (XFM) * 0.8330*** 4
Acreage under sugar (a ) *** 0.9710*** J
Sugar output (S) ***(for PPL2-PPL7) **(for PPLl)
0.9627*** j
Level of stocks (STKS) n.s# 0.7949*** ;
Change in stocks (DSTKS)
Yield per acre (YT)
**(forPFM)*(for DPFM)
n.s. 0.5062*** .
Yield per acre (Almon scheme—YT) ***(for PPL2- PPL7)**(for PPLl)
I
* Significant at 10% level .X
** Significant at 5% level
Significant at 1% level
n.s. not significant
t
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Table‘10,2 shows a selection of the short-run and long-run 
elasticities obtained from the various functions which were estimated 
for the Mauritian sugar industry* As the table indicates, significant 
elasticity values were obtained for most of the functions estimated, with 
the notable exceptions of stocks of sugar and yield per acre. Note that 
all the elasticities are computed with respect to the relevant prices, 
except for the domestic consumption function where the income elasticity 
of demand-is also computed* All the elasticity values (both short-run 
and long-run) appear to be significantly below unity, indicating poor 
response even in the long term. The one exception to this is the long- 
run elasticity of acreage with respect to producer prices, which turns out 
to be 2.316; this result must, however, be seen in the context of a high 
coefficient of adjustment (O.943) which would give rise to a high long- 
run elasticity.
Taken together. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 suggest that producers are only 
moderately responsible to changes in the price of sugar, even in the long 
run. We have seen that the guiding principle of the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement was to provide "reasonably remunerative prices to efficient 
producers"; it is difficult to extend our results to raise policy 
implications or make policy prescriptions for other sugar-exporting members 
of the CSA* One can tentatively argue, however, that the above results 
imply that changes in sugar prices are potentially an effective means of 
determining allocation of land to sugar cane. Furthermore, producers are 
more likely to respond to stable prices if these are known beforehand; 
in this sense, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement satisfied both these 
requirements: prices under the Agreement were known beforehand, and prices 
were generally stable, even more so in real terms. While prior information 
on prices is useful, we must remember that a' producer planting a crop today,
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Table 10,2, Selection of Short-Run and Lon^-Run " Elasticities with respect to price
Function Short—Run Elasticity Long-RunElasticity
Demand (price) (income) -0,2330*228 —0•681 0.667
Free market exports 0.214 0.382
Acreage under sugar 0.132 2.316 
(-^= 0.943)
Stocks of sugar —0.0205(n.s.) -O.ÛÎ16(n.s.)
Change in sugar stocks -0.0539 —0 « 104
Yield per acre 0.0002(n.s.) 0.0003(n.s.)
Notes; n.s. = not significant
^  = coefficient of adjustment
and planning to harvest 7-9 ratoon crops, is unlikely to have much 
information on prevailing prices in, say, two years* time. Nevertheless, 
a guarantee of stability of prices in real terms (or, at least, near­
stability) can only increase certainty and incentive in production.
Appendix 10-A and 10-B underline this point by presenting some 
interesting results regarding the stability of the five relevant prices
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for the Mauritian sugar economy. The tables show the correlation 
matrix of these five prices, and a measure of their volatility or 
instability (by using the coefficient of variation). Appendix 10-A 
presents the results obtained from using current values, and 
Appendix 10—B shows the results obtained from using real values.
These results provide a simple but effective demonstration of the use­
fulness of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement as a mechanism to promote 
production of sugar; We can safely ignore the effect of the domestic 
retail price of sugar (RPS) in Mauritius sofaras producer prices are 
concerned* Considering the other four main prices, it is quite clear 
that the mean values are quite similar for PSA, APX, and PFM for the 
period 1951— 1974* However, the coefficient of variation shows a 
different picture: the value for APX is 31.47% greater than that for 
PSA, and the value for PFM is greater by 182.76%. The low coefficient 
of variation for PSA helps to underline the stability that the Commonwealth 
Sugar ilgreement provided* But the coefficient of variation also hides 
one important element of the Agreement:— the prices paid to exporting 
members were in general steadily rising, to keep pace (to some extent) 
with increasing costs in production. So, although we obtain a value of 
40.72 for the coefficient of variation for PSA, the variation takes place 
along a steadily rising trend? which cannot be regarded as a form of 
instability. The low coefficient of variation for PSA helps to reduce 
the instability in the prices received by producers themselves, leading 
to a value of 55*67 for the coefficient of variation for PP.
When we consider Appendix 10-B, where the results are presented in 
real terms, we find that the coefficient of variation for PSA is very low 
indeed, at 16.79 (even lower than the value for RPS). This again results 
in a lowering of the variation for PP (now at 27.10). The coefficient of
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APX is now,51«76% higher than the coefficient of variation for PSA, 
while the coefficient for PPM is now 330,91% higher! There is little 
donht., therefore, that the price stability objective of the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement resulted in a situation of greatly reduced uncertainty 
for cane growers and manufacturers. As one would expect, the matrix 
of correlation coefficients shows that producer prices are highly cor­
related with prices prevailing in the more important markets (the United 
Kingdom, and the free world market),, and not so strongly correlated with 
prices prevailing in the domestic market. One would expect these results 
to hold for other sugar^-exporting members under the CSA,
The hypotheses postulated at the beginning of this study were two­
fold:
(i) Price changes induce significant supply response in the sugar- 
exporting countries of the Commonwealth; hence, prices play an important 
role in producers' decisions. We further hypothesize that price responses 
are reflected in acreage allocation, rather than in yield changes, because 
of the difficulties of closely controlling the latter,
(ii) The sugar-exporting countries will tend to continue to maintain
or even increase supplies of sugar to any country in response to a stable 
price and a premium offered by that country.
Does the present study lead us to accept or reject the hypotheses? 
Unfortunately, the econometric results obtained are specific to the 
experiences of one country, and it may not be possible to generalise these 
results to relate to the experiences of the five other major sugar exporters 
under the Agreement, given the different sizes, the different levels of 
economic development? the different degrees of dependence on this one 
export crop, the different geographical, social, and institutional back­
grounds, and the different behaviour patterns and speeds of adjustment
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on the part of producers in different countries. Nevertheless, one 
could reasonably expect producers of cash crops to respond positively 
and rationally to price changes and adjust supply by operating on either 
acreage or yield or both? when the relevant incentives of stability and 
high prices are forthcoming* The econometric results obtained for Mauritius 
would certainly appear to uphold the hypotheses we have postulated. The 
obvious? and quite general? policy implication of our results would be 
that international commodity agreements that embody the objectives and 
similar mechanisms of operation as the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement could 
potentially confer substantial benefits to both exporters and consumers 
in the importing countries.
Of course, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement expired in 1974» and the 
new Lome Convention of the EEC does not include a major member of the CSA, 
Australia, (as well as India). As Ian Smith”'*' pointed out, "... the under­
lying strength of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement was undoubtedly due to 
the presence .of -Australia? much the largest producer in the CSA group and 
a reliable supplier,, capable of taking up short—falls and to ship when 
required"# The Lomé Convention also includes an additional group of sugar 
exporters, viz» Malawi? Madagascar? Congo (Brazzaville), and Surinam, whose 
performance, under the. Convention in the future cannot be assessed in the 
light of this study for obvious reasons# As far as the remaining members 
of the CSA who are parties to the Lome Convention are concerned, one would 
expect a similar sort of positive response, given the long-term nature of
* See Ian Smith, The European Community and the World Sugar Crisis,Trade Policy Research Centre, Staff Paper No* 7» 1974» London. Note that India is now the largest producer of the ex-CSA group of countries, but her role in the CSA was inhibited by low NPQs and OAQs, having joined the Agreement in I965# Australia remains the largest overall exporter.
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the Convention? which also embodies stable and high price levels 
(in relation to the world free market). The only major doubt concerns 
the market potential of the EEC: under the CSA? the United Kingdom 
deliberately planned domestic output to satisfy approximately 33% of 
domestic consumption? while the EEC Six were already exporting over
1. million tonnes of subsidised beet sugar before the UK joined the EEC 
on 1 January 1973* Whether the EEC Nine can continue to produce a 
substantial surplus of subsidised beet sugar and at the same time import 
1*4 million tonnes of sugar- from the exporting members of the Lorn/ 
Convention without seriously disrupting the world free market remains 
to be seen. One must? finally? remember that the stability of the free 
market is an important consideration not only for non-Lom^ members, such 
as Australia,. Cuba? Brazil, and others? but also for those Lomé members 
who rely on the free market for a substantial level of their exports.
In this connection, the International Sugar Agreement of 1977» the first 
after five years? may find it extremely difficult to maintain prices 
within the negotiated and agreed bounds.
One of the main objectives of the Agreement is to "stabilize conditions in international trade in sugar at price levels which would be remunerative and just to producers and equitable to consumers by promoting equilibrium between supply and demand". The price stabili­zation mechanism under the new Agreement is based on a combination of a quota system and nationally held but internationally co-ordinated special stocks. The mechanism is designed to maintain the free market price of sugar within an agreed range of 11 to 21 cents per pound. The prices in the Agreement are subject to periodic reviews by the Council, which may adjust them provided that the difference between the minimum and maximum prices remains 10 cents per pound. In 1977» the highest ISA daily price was reached on the 22nd April (at 10.81 cents), and the lowest daily price was reached on the 9ih of November (at 6.11 cents), which were well outside the price ranges specified in the Agreement. Between 1 January 1977 end 30 April 1979». the daily price failed to reach the minimum ISA price of 11 cents per pound on any occasion. In 1977t the EEC (a non-*»member of the ISA) exported no less than 2,698,841 tonnes of sugar to the world free market, which was greater than any single ISA member*s exports on the free market, with the exception of Australia (2,965».249 tonnes). For further details, see International Sugar Organization, Annual Report for the Year 1977, London.
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Limitations of the Study
Like all economic research? this study is not free from certain 
Limitations. The limitations can he broadly divided into two categories;
(i) data limitations? and (2) technical limitations. The data used for 
this study were obtained from a number of national and international 
sources* It was very often the case that no two sources indicate^é 
identical information about a particular series. It is not always 
possible to make correct judgements of comparative accuracies between 
secondary sources of data? and a compromise between different sources is 
sometimes the only possible solution. This is not to imjiy that the sources 
of information are unreliable* Indeed? differences in data will arise 
given the inherent complexities of the situation being reported. The 
most obvious example relates to the variable yield; as a general rule, 
total output of sugar divided by total acreage harvested should be equal 
to yield per acre* But this is not exactly so in most of the published 
data, because the period of crop maturity varies within a country (say, 
from: 9 months to’ 15 months between planting and^harvesting). Hue to 
this variation in crop yield,, we may obtain some differences in yield data.
The problems regarding the accuracy and derivation of other series of 
data have already been discussed where necessary, and in using the results 
produced in this study, one must accept these inevitable limitations.
Among technical problems, the methodology and scope of the study may 
contain certain limitations* Firstly, because no study of the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement has been undertaken before, it is impossible to perform one 
essential task in research! we cannot compare our results with other results 
obtai^^frora? possibly? different models and techniques of estimation.
As it is^ in any research project, a methodology has to be adopted, at some 
stage, as being suitable for the particular economic phenomenon being studied.
—OOO"*
and it may have to be framed to suit the information available.
Though a different model (say? one which does not incorporate a geometri­
cally distributed lag scheme or an Almon scheme of polynomial lag) would 
not necessarily have guaranteed superior results, further exploration and 
experimentation is the essence of research.
The other technical limitation of a study of this type is the difficulty 
posed by non-quantifiable non-economic forces. Oneûmay well start by 
assuming rationality in price response on the part of producers in the 
decision-making process? but numerous studies have shown that the decisions 
of growers can be seriously influenced by purely- institutional factors.
This means that any inference and resulting prediction based on economic 
factors alone can be inadequateand even seriously misleading. Neverthe­
less^ if one assumes that no major institutional changes take place in the 
countries studied? the results of this study can still be valid for policy 
decisions,’? at least in the ease of Mauritius? if not for the other CSA 
exporting countries#
Finallythe estimation techniques could have been refined, given 
sufficient time and computing facilities.. In particular, a more flexible 
profile of lags to explain the ratooning process could have been incor­
porated into the model. The technical and computational problems posed 
by a  flexible lag profile are likely to be quite complex, but the results 
could have been more illuminating. Though superior results are not always 
guaranteed) the objective remains one of obtaining the "best" results 
possible; this suggestion could therefore lend itself to further research.
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Appendix 10-A*. Correlation matrix of various
PP RPS PSA APX PPM
Producer prices (PP) 1*0000 ,
Retail price of sugar (RPS) 0*6716 1.0000
CSA price (PSA) 0*9783 0*6554 1*0000
Average earnings from exports (APX) 0.9929 0.6567 0*9845 1.0000
Free market price of sugar (PFM) 0.9803 0.6507 0.9462 0.9817 1.0000
Mean 536*7617 48*6250 655.1619 636.6641 672*0593
Standarddeviation 298.8350 5.8071 266.7629 338.3162 768.0989
Coefficient of variation 55.67 11.94 40.72 53.14 114.29
•"OOO"»
' Appendix 10-B. Correlation matrix of varions prices (in real termed, and coefficients of variation
PP EPS PSA APX PPM
Producerprices (PP) 1.0000
Retail price
of sugar (EPS) 0.7279
CSA price
(PSA) 0.8891
Average earningsfrom exports (APX) 0.9654
Free market price
of sugar (ppm) 0*9151
Mean 565*^843
Standarddeviation 153*3028
Coefficient ofvari ati on 27*10
1.0000
0.6370 1.0000
0.6995 0.9182 1.0000
O.77O6 0.7549 0.9226 1.0000
45*3582 7OO.7O6I 673*3477 667*3254
14*5605 117.6375 171.5378 482.8132
32.10 16.79 25*48 72.35
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APPENDIX A
DATA AND DATA SOURCES: MAJOR COMMONWEALTH 
SUGAR AGREEMENT MEMBERS
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Table A.1: Sugar and Related Statistics for Australia, 1951-1974
Year
Sugar Cane 
Acreage 
(*000 acres 
(1)
Sugar 
Output 
i) (*000 m. 
(2)
Sugar Yield 
Per Acre 
t.) (tons)
(3)
Import Price 
of Fertilizers 
(£ per ton)
(4)
Fertili; 
Per Acrt 
(cut)
(5)
1951 272 936 3.4 10.30 1.61
1952 282 757 2.6 17.23 2.21
1953 290 964 3.4 21.46 2.62
1954 340 1274 3.7 23.27 2.29
1955 374 1348 3.6 25.70 2.36
1956 373 1190 3.1 29.72 2.44
1957 370 1227 3.3 26.95 2.57
1958 378 1314 3.4 28.07 2.68
1959 370 1435 3.8 22.26 3.17
1960 314 1270 4.1 26.58 3.29
1961 341 1283 3.7 18.13 3.72
1962 387 1900 4.7 16.68 3.06
1963 402 1771 4.2 15.86 2.91
1964 418 1970 4.2 20.32 3.27
1965 470 2040 4.1 22.49 3.89
1966 503 2408 4.3 20.37 3.78
1967 558 2401 4.3 19.54 4.21
1968 554 2756 4.9 17.80 4.52
1969 569 2233 3.9 17.87 4.67
1970 576 2467 4.3 17.24 4.73
1971 585 2689 4.6 18.11 4.55
1972 609 2869 4.7 19.23 4.98
1973 614 2583 4.2 26.26 5.03
1974 637 2938 4.6 32.13 5.09
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Table
Year
A.1 (contd) 
Total
Exporta of 
Sugar
(*000 m.t.) 
(6)
Sugar 
Exporta td 
UK
(•000 m.t.)
(7)
Sugar Exporta 
to World 
Markets 
(*000 m.t.) 
(8)
Sugar Exporta 
to UK as %age 
of Total Xi % )
(9)
Total Exporta 
as ^age of 
domestic 
output (56) 
(10)
1951 294 175 119 59.5 31.4
1952 246 118 12tf 48.1 32.4
1953 738 496 242 67.2 76.6
1954 662 443 219 66.9 52.0
1955 645 409 236 63.5 47.8
1956 750 299 .451 39.9 63.0
1957 905 459 446 50.7 73.7
1958 700 333 367 47.6 53.2
1959 656 270 386 41.2 45.7
1960 806 337 469 41.8 63.5
1961 829 332 497 40.0 64.6
1962 1161 436 725 37.6 61.1
1963 1135 415 720 36.6 64.1
1964 1255 459 796 36.6 63.7
1965 1126 402 724 35.7 55.2
1966 1375 413 926 30.0 57.1
1967 1819 433 1386 23.8 75.8
1968 2185 533 1652 24.4 79.3
1969 1531 362 1169 23.6 68.6
1970 1642 434 1208 26.4 66.6
1971 1762 496 1266 28.1 65.5
1972 2298 451 1847 19.6 80.1
1973 2103 361 1742 17.2 81.4
1974 1808 383 1425 21.2 51.5
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Table A.1 (contd)
Year Sugar Exports 
as #age of 
World Sugar 
Exports 1%) 
(11)
Sugar Output 
as %age of 
World Sugar 
Output {%) 
(12)
Value of Value of 
Total Imports Total Exports 
(c.i.f.) (f.o.b.)
(A M^) (A M/)
(13) (14)
Value of
Total Exports J 
of Sugar(f.o,b.) 
(A M^) 1 
' (15) j
1951 2.4 2.8 1482.8 1963.6 29.8
1952 2.0 *2.1 2100.4 1336.0 13.8
1953 5.1 2.8 1021.0 1701.8 43.4
1954 4.9 3.3 1357.2 1629.2 63.2 ' '
1955 4.5 3.5 1682.0 1520.9 62.2
1956 5.3 3.0 1636.7 1547.1 49.4
1957 5.9 2.9 1433.4 1957.4 57.6
1958 4.5 3.0 1578.6 1623.2 70.0 4
1959 4.4 2.9 1588.8 1616.4 64.4
1960 4.8 2.5 1849.1 • 1855.0 53.4
1961 4.2 2.3 2147.3 1834.3 70.1
1962 6.6 3.7 1738.3 2100.2 67.8
1963 6.0 3.5 2128.3 2102.4 91.0
1964 6.7 3.3 2329.6 2725.6 156.5
1965 6.4 3.1 2841.3 2579.2 112.7
1966 8.0 3.8 3225.1 2831.2 93.9
1967 9.9 3.6 3505.7 3105.4 99.5 :
1968 13.1 4.1 3897.2 3148.4 97.6
1969 10.1 3.2 4054.0 3768.1 122.2
1970 9.1 3.4 4514.1 4258.5 116.1
1971 10.2 3.6 4610.8 4598.6 149.7
1972 12.1 3.8 4309.8 5421.5 223.0
1973 10.9 3.3 5381.5 6718.6 260.0
1974 9.2 3.7 8640.6 7687.3 619.2 i
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Table A.1 (contd)
Year Value of Average price Stocks Consumer
Sugar Exports of Total of Sugar Price
as a ^age of Exports of Index .
total exports(%) Sugar (A/) (*000 m.t.) (1970=100)
(16) (17) (18) (19)
1951 1.5 101.4 111 53.5
1952 1.0 56.2 94 62.8
1953 2.6 58.8 113 65.4
1954 3.9 95.5 163 65.9
1955 4.1 96.5 122 67.2
1956 3.2 65.9 141 71.4
1957 2.9 63.7 177 73.2
1958 4.3 100.1 145 74.2
1959 4.0 98.2 162 75.6
1960 2.9 66.3 346 78.4
1961 3.8 84.6 411 80.4
1962 3.2 58.4 426 80.1
1963 4.3 80.2 501 80.6
1964 5.7 124.7 523 82.5
1965 4.4 101.1 626 85.8
1966 3.3 68.3 731 88.3
1967 3.2 54.7 799 91.1
1968 3.1 44.7 987 93.6
1969 3.2 79.8 1026 96.2
1970 2.7 70.7 1147 100.0
1971 3.3 85.0 1281 106.1
1972 4.1 97.0 1083 112.4
1973 3.9 123.6 786 122.9
1974 8.1 342.5 1132 141.5
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Table A.2; Sugar and Related Statistics for Fiji* 1951-1974
Year Sugar Cane 
Acreage 
(#000 acres) 
(1)
Sugar 
Output 
(#000 m.t.) 
(2)
Sugar Yield 
Per Acre 
(Tons)
(3)
Import Price 
of Fertilizers 
(£ per ton)
(4)
Fertilizers 
Per Acre 
(cut)
(5)
1951 45 98 1.9 10.30 4.10
1952 42 115 2.6 17.23 3.29
1953 53 132 2.1 21.46 2.87
1954 61 194 2.9 23.27 3.12
1955 58 135 2.1 25.70 2.92
1956 61 166 2.4 29.72 3.09
1957 58 137 2.1 26.95 3.98
1958 64 199 3.1 28.07 2.99
1959 77 201 2.5 22.26 2.89
1960 88 287 3.2 26.58 1.07
1961 88 147 2.7 18.13 2.54
1962 88 249 2.8 16.68 3.60
1963 88 291 3.3 15.86 5.25
1964 88 317 3.1 20.32 8.10
1965 103 311 2.9 22.49 6.70
1966 106 300 2.8 20.37 5.37
1967 109 312 2.8 19.54 4.45
1968 153 375 2.5 17.80 4.34
1969 157 357 2.3 17.87 3.56
1970 158 344 2.2 17.24 2.86
1971 159 367 2.3 18.11 2.53
1972 159 321 2.0 19.23 2.66
1973 160 303 1.9 26.26 2.96
1974 162 298 1.8 32.13 2.63
Tabla A*2 (contd)
Year Total Exports 
of Sugar 
('000 m.t.)
(6)
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Sugar Exports Sugar Exports Sugar Exports 
to UK to World Markets to UK as 
('000 m.t.) ('000 m.t.) ^age of total
Sugar Exports 
{%)(7) (8) (9)
Total Exports 
as #age of 
domestic ! 
output(%) 5
(10)
1951 74 16 58 21.6 75.6
1952 135 9 126 6.7 117.4
1953 181 51 129 28.2 136.9
1954 139 80 59 57.5 71.7
1955 158 46 112 29.0 117.3 '
1956 132 25 107 18.9 79.6
1957 176 82 94 46.5 128.8
1950 188 84 104 44.7 94.5 ^
1959 187 105 82 56.1 93.0 j
1960 218 84 134 61.5 76.0
1961 136 95 41 69.9 92.5
1962 200 96 104 48.0 80.3
1963 271 145 126 53.5 93.1
1964 311 144 167 46.3 . 98.1
1965 305 167 138 54.8 98.1
1966 239 131 108 54.8 79.7
1967 331 144 187 43.5 106.1
1968 361 130 131 36.0 96.3
1969 331 196 135 59.2 92.7
1970 343 152 191 44.3 99.7
1971 349 151 198 43.3 95.1
1972 290 156 134 53.8 90.3
1973 276 151 125 54.7 91.1
1974 266 128 130 48.1 89.3
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Table A.2 (contd)
Year Sugar Exports Sugar Output Value of Value of Value of Total
as ^age of as #age of Total Imports Total Exports Exports of
World Sugar World Sugar (c.i.f.) (f.o.b.) Sugar (f.o.b.)
Exports 1%) Output (%) (M F^) (M F)!f) (M F0)
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
1951 0.6 0.3 18.74 12.03 5.2
1952 1.1 0.3 24.02 19.66 11.2
1953 1.3 0.4 21.09 24.37 15.4
1954 1.0 0.5 23.28 20.32 11.0
1955 1.1 0.4 28.69 23.47 12.4
1956 0.9 0.4 32.86 20.65 10.0
1957 1.1 0.3 30.42 29.28 15.6
1958 1.2 0.4 35.18 26.82 15.6
1959 1.3 0.4 33.70 25.66 14.8
1960 1.3 0.6 32.80 29.02 17.4
1961 0.7 0.3 34.43 23.85 11.8
1962 1.1 0.5 34.76 29.11 17.0
1963 1.4 0.6 40.41 41.22 28.8
1964 1.7 0.5 55.24 49.46 34.4
1965 1.7 0.5 58.16 39.41 25.0
1966 1.4 0.5 50.54 35.88 21.8
1967 1.8 0.5 56.28 39.51 23.8
1968 2.2 0.6 68.39 45.67 24.8
1969 2.2 0.5 77.89 49.87 28.7
1970 1.9 0.5 90.50 58.96 32.3
1971 2.0 0.5 111.55 59.09 33.3
1972 1.5 0.4 131.55 61.60 34.9
Î973 1.4 0.4 174.65 68.30 35.1
1974 1.4 0.4 217.68 115.12 68.3
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Table A.2 (contd)
Year Value of Sugar Average Price Stocks 
Exports as a of Total Exports of
of Sugar Sugar
(F 0) ('000 m.t.)
(17) (18)
#age of Total 
Exports (#)
(16)
Consumer
Price
Index
(1970 = 100) 
(19)
1951 43.2 70.2 27 66.5
1952 57.0 83.0 18 70.9
1953 63.2 85.2 25 70.2
1954 54.1 79.1 16 73.8
1955 52.8 78.3 16 73.9
1956 48.4 75.6 20 76.2
1957 53.3 88.4 12 76.8
1958 58.2 83.0 19 76.1
1959 57.7 79.1 35 76.1
1960 60.0 79.8 42 76.2
1961 49.5 86.8 39 76.8
1962 58.4 85.0 41 78.4
1963 69.9 106.3 37 79.2
1964 69.6 110.6 31 81.6
1965 63.4 82.0 26 88.1
1966 60.8 91.2 32 87.7
1967 60.2 71.9 33 89.0
1968 54.3 68.7 36 92.3
1969 57.6 86.8 39 96.1
1970 54.8 94.2 15 100.0
1971 56.4 95.5 5 106.5
1972 56.7 120.4 10 116.2
1973 51.3 127.1 10 129.2
1974 59.3 256.7 11 147.8
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Table A«3: Sugar and Related Statistics for Guyana, 1951-1974
Year Sugar Cane Sugar 
Acreage Output 
(*000 acres) (*000 m.t.
(1) (2)
Sugar Yield 
Per Acre 
) (tons)
(3)
Import Price 
of Fertilizers 
(£ per ton)
(4)
Fertilizers 
Per Acre 
(cut)
(5)
1951 70 221 3.1 19.31 5.76
1952 74 247 3.3 21.73 4.91
1953 72 244 3.3 20.86 3.33
1954 82 243 3.0 22.09 3.84
1955 74 254 2.9 17.63 6.61
1956 78 268 3.4 21.85 7.16
1957 76 290 3.8 20.01 6.73
1950 87 311 3.5 22.41 6.38
1959 89 289 3.2 17.99 6.35
1960 99 338 3.4 16.38 5.05
1961 108 325 3.4 14.76 6.21
1962 100 326 3.3 15.27 6.99
1963 97 317 3.3 16.18 7.32
1964 95 258 3.0 17.62 5.07
1965 106 309 3.0 19.60 5.42
1966 104 289 2.7 21.27 5.95
1967 98 361 3.3 19.63 7.59
1968 102 333 3.1 18.75 6.97
1969 120 383 3.2 20.03 5.63
1970 124 328 2.6 19.33 5.79
1971 132 388 2.9 21.17 5.56
1972 134 335 2.5 22.26 5.64
1973 136 280 2.1 27.44 5,82
1974 141 353 2.5 36.21 5.94
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Table A.3 (contd)
Year Total Exporta Sugar Exporte Sugar Exporta Sugar Exports Total Exports
of Sugar to UK to World Markets to UK as #age as #age of
( * 0 0 0  m.t,) ( * 0 0 0  m.t.) ( * 0 0 0  m.t.) of Total Sugar domestic 
Exports (jg) output (5 6)
(6) (7 ) (a) (9) (10:
1951 183 83 100 45.3 82.9
1952 238 132 106 55.5 96.3
1953 215 129 86 59.9 88.2
1954 238 144 94 60,5 97.9
1955 246 142 104 57.6 97.0
1956 250 124 126 49.6 93.2
1957 260 174 86 67.0 89.5
1958 305 204 101 66,9 98.1
1959 259 168 91 64.8 89.7
1960 309 177 132 57.3 91.4
1961 313 130 183 41.5 96.3
1962 313 145 168 46.3 96.0
1963 281 137 144 48.8 88.6
1964 235 96 139 40.9 91.1
1965 267 119 148 44.6 86.4
1966 279 59 220 21.1 96.5
1967 327 141 186 43.1 90.6
1968 311 166 145 53.4 93.4
1969 343 197 146 57.4 89.6
1970 303 171 120 56.4 92.3
1971 356 258 148 72.5 91.8
1972 320 228 89 71.3 95.5
1973 238 209 29 87.8 85.0
1974 312 132 180 42.3 88.4
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TablB A.3 (contd)
Year Sugar Exports Sugar Output Value of Value of Value of Total
as #age of as #age of Total Total Exports Exports of
World Sugar World Sugar Imports (c.i.f.)(f,o.b.) Sugar (f.o.b.)
Exports 1%) Output {%) (n W.I.X) (N W.I.#) (M W.I.#)
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
1951 1.5 0.7 66.9 58.4 27.3
1952 2.0 0.7 82.7 81.2 41.9
1953 1.5 0.7 72.2 82.7 38.3
1954 1.8 0.6 80.2 84.8 41.4
1955 1.7 0.7 94.8 90.1 40.3
1956 1.8 0.7 100.2 94.7 41.6
1957 1.7 0.7 118.9 108.1 53.6
1958 2.0 0.7 116.0 , 96.6 54.7
1959 1.7 0.6 110.7 103.5 46.4
1960 1.8 0.7 147.3 126.8 . 57.5
1961 1.6 0.6 146.6 148.3 56.9
1962 1.8 0.6 126.3 164.2 59.3
1963 1.5 0.6 118.5 174.8 73.6
1964 1.2 0.4 149.8 162.8 53.9
1965 1.5 0.5 178.8 166,7 44.5
1966 1.6 0.5 202.0 186.4 48.5
1967 1.7 0.5 225.3 197.5 54.6
1968 1.9 0.5 219.3 216.3 59.3
1969 2.3 0.6 235.8 242.0 90.4
1970 1.7 0.4 268.2 266.9 76.2
1971 2.1 0.5 267.6 298.4 80.7
1972 1.7 0.4 299.0 292.8 102.5
1973 1.2 0.4 349.2 288.3 89.1
1974 1.6 0.4 563.6 594.9 236.1
Table A.3 (contd)
Year Value of Sugar 
Exporte as a 
#age of Total 
Exports {%)
(16)
Average Price 
of Total Exports 
of Sugar 
(U.I.^)
(17)
Stocks of 
Sugar
(*000 m.t.) 
(18)
Consumer 
Price Index 
(1970 = 100)
(19)
1951 45.7 149.0 39 67.1
1952 51.6 176.1 14 72.7
1953 46.3 178.2 37 73.8
1954 48.8 174.1 16 75.9
1955 44.7 163.4 8 76.4
1956 43.9 166.6 6 75.9
1957 49.6 206.4 7 76.9
1958 56.6 179.4 3 77.6
1959 44.8 178.9 14 79.6
1960 45.3 186.2 16 80.2
1961 38.4 181.8 17 81.0
1962 36.1 189.5 17 83.8
1963 42.1 261.8 12 85.5
1964 33.1 229.2 13 85.8
1965 26.7 166.6 22 88.1
1966 26.0 173.9 19 89.9
1967 27.6 166.9 13 92.6
1968 27.4 190.7 16 95.4
1969 37.4 263.6 25 96.7
1970 28.6 251.5 24 100.0
1971 27.0 226.7 25 101.0
1972 35.0 320.3 9 106.1
1973 30.9 374.4 16 114.1
1974 39.7 756.7 24 133.9
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Table A.4; Sugar and Related Statistics for Jamaica, 1951-74
Year Sugar Cane Sugar Sugar Yield Import Price Fertilizers
Acreage Output Per Acre of Fertilizers Per Acre
(*000 acres) (*000 m.t.) (Tons) (£ per ton) (cut)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1951 112 272 2.4 24.63 3.82
1952 122 270 2.2 26.74 2.83
1953 129 336 2.4 24.28 2.56
1954 154 369 2.4 21.05 2.67
1955 148 403 2.7 22.28 2.55
1956 139 368 2.6 24.13 3.24
1957 141 365 2.6 22.05 2.66
1958 115 35:1. 2.2 19.92 4.18
1959 128 382 2.1 18.48 2.66
1960 128 433 2.3 16.18 2.67
1961 143 440 3.1 14.65 3.80
1962 140 434 3.1 15.16 3.42
1963 140 484 3.3 16.43 4.08
1964 151 474 3.2 20.44 5.14
1965 148 489 3.0 23.76 3.68
1966 164 500 3.0 22.73 2.63
1967 156 458 3.0 22.00 4.80
1968 155 454 2.9 21.24 3.83
1969 153 391 2.5 21.79 4.12
1970 152 376 2.5 19.74 4.82
1971 150 393 2.6 20.57 4.20
1972 153 387 2.5 22.37 4.46
1:973 156 339 2.2 27.36 4.76
1974 156 378 2.4 36.47 4.62
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Tabla A.4 (contd)
Year Total Exports Sugar Exports Sugar Exports Sugar Exports Total Exports
of Sugar to UK to World Markets to UK as ^age as ^age of
( • 0 0 0  m.t.) ( ' 0 0 0  m.t.) ( ' 0 0 0  m.t.) of Total Sugar Domestic 
Exports (%)(6) (7) (a) (9) (10)
1951 216 103 113 47.5 79.4
1952 203 134 69 66.2 75.0
1953 279 158 121 56.6 83.1
1954 327 210 117 64.3 88.5
1955 294 212 82 72.1 73.0
1956 379 235 144 62.0 103.0
1957 308 188 120 61.0 84.4
1958 272 212 60 77.9 77.5
1959 318 204 114 64.2 83.1
1960 353 196 157 55.5 81.5
1961 380 152 228 40.0 86.4
1962 379 209 170 55.1 87.3
1963 394 266 128 67.5 81.4
1964 417 240 177 57.6 90.0
1965 424 258 166 60.8 86.7
1966 408 211 197 51.7 81.6
1967 360 199 151 55.3 78.6
1968 391 214 177 54.7 86.1
1969 304 220 84 72.4 77.7
1970 298 242 56 81.2 79.3
1971 305 239 66 78.4 77.6
1972 286 243 43 85.0 73.9
1973 271 271 0 100.0 79.9
1974 278 157 121 56.5 73.5
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Table A.4 (contd)
Year Sugar Exports 
as ^age of 
World Sugar 
Exports 1%)
(11)
Sugar Output 
as #age of 
World Sugar 
Output (#)
(12)
Value of Value of 
Total Imports Total Exports 
(c.i.f.) (f.o.b.)
(M W.I.4) (M W.I.#)
(13) (14)
Value of 
Exports 0 
Sugar (f. 
(M W.I.#)
(15)
1951 1.8 0.8 . 61.40 35.66 12.6
1952 1.7 0.7 72.70 37.16 14.1
1953 1.9 1.0 71.04 51.74 20.1
1954 2.4 1.0 74.62 62.74 22.6
1955 2.0 1.1 91.32 68.70 22.9
1956 2.7 1.0 116.60 80.32 25.1
1957 2.0 0.9 133.38 102.82 25.1
1950 1.7 0.8 129.30 95.74 20.7
1959 2.1 0.8 137.30 96.32 23.2
1960 2.1 0.9 155.00 117.72 26.0
1961 1.9 0.8 150.80 127.38 28.5
1962 2.2 0.8 159.20 132.94 29.2
1963 2.1 0.9 161.08 145.66 42.5
1964 2.2 0.8 206.66 156.76 39.2
1965 2.4 0.8 206.48 157.30 31.4
1966 2.4 0.8 233.70 160.38 32.8
1967 1.9 0.7 252.58 186.76 32.7
1968 2.3 0.7 320.35 207.08 37.1
1969 2.0 0.6 369.40 240.87 27.7
1970 1.7 0.5 435.22 283.09 29.4
1971 1.8 0.5 459.75 282.70 30.6
1972 1.5 0.5 489.26 300.76 35.4
1973 1.4 0.4 604.50 354.72 35.4
1974 1.4 0.5 850.78 664.45 79.4
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Table A.4 (contd)
Year Value of Sugar Average Price 
Exports as a of Total Exports 
of Sugar (W.I.^ )^age of Total Exports {%)
(16) (17)
Stocks
of
Sugar
( » 0 0 0  m.t.) 
(18)
Consumer
Price
Index
(1970 = 100)
(19)
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
35.3 
37.9
38.8
36.0
33.3
31.3
24.4 
21.6
24.1
22.1
22.4 
22.0 
29.2
25.0
20.0
20.5
17.5
17.9
11.5 
10.4 
10.8 
11.8 
10.0  
12.0
58.3
69.6
72.0
69.2
77.9
66.2
81.4
76.1
73.0
73.7
75.0
77.0
107.9
94.0
74.1
80.4
90.9
94.8 
91.0
98.5
100.4
123.9
130.5 
285.7
11
17 
12 
24
31 
27 
29 
16 
14
32 
37 
42 
29
18 
21 
16 
19 
14 
26 
35 
27 
41 
14 
10
52.4
56.3 
56.9
56.8
57.4
58.6
59.7
62.9
64.8
66.8
71.5 
72.4
73.6
75.1
77.2
78.7 
80.9
85.7 
91.1
100.0
106.7
112.9
135.4
171.1
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Table A.5 ; Sugar and Related Statistics for Mauritius, 1951-1974
Year Sugar Cane 
Acreage (*000 acres)
(1)
Sugar 
Output (*000 m.t.
(2)
Sugar Yield 
Per Acre 
) (Tons)
(3)
Import price 
of Fertilizers 
(£ per ton)
(4)
Fertilizers 
Per Acre 
(cut)
(5 )
1951 158 457 2.9 26.12 4.9
1952 167 484 2.9 28.31 4.3
1953 172 468 2.7 24.08 3.4
1954 174 512 2.9 25.29 3.1
1955 176 499 2.8 26.32 3.9
1956 175 533 3.0 26.08 4.5
1957 175 593 3.2 26.73 4.7
1958 175 562 3.1 25.15 4.1
1959 184 562 2.8 21.41 5.4
1960 191 232 1.2 19.30 5.4
1961 196 544 2.8 19.24 5.1
1962 194 525 2.6 17.83 6.5
1963 202 675 3.3 18.45 6.6
1964 202 . 511 2.5 21.00 6.9
1965 204 654 3.2 23.76 5.7
1966 214 553 2.7 25.30 4.8
1967 216 664 3.1 24.16 5.5
1968 214 622 3.2 25.27 5.4
1969 217 697 3.2 22.42 5.3
1970 219 601 2.9 23.78 5.2
1971 220 657 2.9 24.55 5.4
1972 220 727 3.3 25.72 5.4
1973 223 761 3.4 27.89 5.2
1974 226 738 3.3 38.26 5.4
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Table A*5 (contd)
Year Total Exports 
of Sugar (*000 m.t.)
Sugar Exports 
to UK(*000 m.t.)
Sugar Exports 
to World Markets (*000 m.t.)
Sugar Exports 
to UK as #age 
of Total Sugar 
Exports {%)
Total E 
as %age 
domestd 
Output
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1951 506 260 246 51.4 110.6
1952 470 251 219 53.4 97.0
1953 482 250 232 51.9 103.0
1954 502 321 181 63.9 98.1
1955 476 440 36 92.5 95.3
1956 540 414 126 76.7 101.3
1957 586 453 133 77.4 98.8
1958 523 390 133 74.6 93.0
1959 507 376 131 74.1 90.2
1960 295 222 73 75.3 127.2
1961 498 355 143 71.3 91.5
1962 507 401 106 79.1 96.6
1963 565 444 121 78.7 83.7
1964 567 422 145 74.4 110.9
1965 560 405 155 72.3 85.6
1966 571 437 134 76.5 103.3
1967 555 370 185 66.7 83.6
1968 603 479 124 79.4 96.9
1969 617 424 193 68.7 88.5
1970 607 428 179 70.5 101.0
1971 593 409 184 69.0 90.3
1972 650 418 232 64.3 89.4
1973 739 409 330 55.3 97.1
1974 726 431 295 59.4 98.4
Table A.5 (contd)
Year Sugar Exporta Sugar Output Valus of Value of Value of Total
as % a g e of as #age of Total Imports Total Exports Exports of
World Sugar World Sugar (c.i.f.) (f.o.b.) Sugar (f.o.b.)
Exports (%) Output {%) (M Rs) (M Rs) (M Rs)
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
1951 4.3 1.4 203.1 238.3 227.5
1952 3.9 1.3 230.8 251.8 240.1
1953 3.4 1.3 251.1 274.2 267.0
1954 3.7 1.3 214.4 267.0 252.1
1955 3.3 1.3 254.5 251.3 241.6
1956 3.8 1.4 224.1 298.1 287.3
1957 3.8 1.4 263.8 330.3 314.7
1958 3.3 1.3 299.2 288.9 276.2
1959 3.4 1.1 286.9 289.6 270,9
1960 1.8 0.5 331.9 185.0 167.7
1961 2.6 1.0 324.0 294.2 271.6
1962 2.9 1.0 322.7 305.9 286.2
1963 3.0 1.3 333.1 427.8 409.6
1964 3.0 1.0 388.9 366.9 346.1
1965 3.2 1.0 367.3 313.4 291.8
1966 3.3 0.9 333.2 337.6 308.0
1967 3.0 1.0 371.1 306.8 280.9
1968 3.6 0.9 421.1 354.0 332.6
1969 4.1 1.0 376.0 365.2 335.9
1970 3.4 0.8 419.9 384.6 350.7
1971 3.4 0.9 461.6 361.7 321.6
1972 3.4 1.0 635.8 573.8 520.1
1973 3.8 1.0 922.5 716.1 645.4
1974 3.7 0.9 1756.4 1771.8 1568.1
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Table A.5 (contd)
Year Value of Sugar Average Price Stocks Consumer Price of
Exports as a of Total Exports of Price Substitute Crop
of Sugar Sugar Index (tea)(London)
(Rs) (»OOQ m.t.) (1970=100) per lb.)
(17) (10) (19) (20)
% a Q Q of Total 
Exports {%)
(16)
1951 95.5 4,500 74 79.1 0.18
1952 95.3 5,111 68 83.6 0.15
1953 . 97.4 5,541 40 85.1 0.18
1954 94.4 5,018 54 84.7 0.26
1955 96.1 5,080 39 83.6 0.25
1956 96.4 5,321 96 82.2 0.24
1957 95.3 5,375 76 81.6 0.22
1958 95.6 5,285 25 82.2 0.23
1959 93.5 5,343 92 81.6 0.23
1960 90.6 5,684 41 82.9 0.23
1961 92.3 5,454 56 82.2 0.22
1962 93.6 5,645 79 83.6 0.22
1963 95.8 7,250 108 83.1 0.21
1964 94.3 6,104 35 84.7 0.22
1965 93.1 5,211 96 86.1 0.21
1966 91.2 5,394 56 88.3 0.20
1967 91.6 5,061 138 90.0 0.21
1968 94.0 5,516 126 96.2 0.20
1969 92.0 5,444 174 98.4 0.18
1970 91.2 5,778 135 100.0 0.21
1971 88.9 5,423 155 100.3 0.20
1972 90.6 8,002 196 105.6 0.19
1973 90.1 8,733 181 119.9 0.26
1974 88.5 21,599 158 154.8 0.23
Table A.6; Sugar and Related Statistics for Trinidad and Tobago, 1951-1974
Year Sugar Cane Sugar Sugar Yield Import Price Fertilizers
Acreage Output Per Acre of Fertilizers Per Acre
(*000 acres) (*000 m.t.) (Tons) (£ per ton) (cut)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1951 60 143 2.4 24.83 4.00
1952 52 140 2.6 26.79 5.38
1953 60 155 2.4 22.08 3.90
1954 74 176 2.3 21.69 4.59
1955 70 196 2.8 23.15 5.40
1956 76 163 2.0 23.80 6.05
1957 80 170 2.1 20.93 5.23
1958 86 191 2.2 21.13 4.84
1959 89 184 2.0 19.32 4.63
1960 99 221 2.2 22.37 4.78
1961 110 246 2.5 21.72 4.27
1962 100 201 2.0 20.83 3.97
1963 105 227 2.2 20.47 4.73
1964 102 227 2.2 23.19 4.83
1965 104 251 2.8 23.94 5.29
1966 91 211 2.4 23.27 5.31
1967 103 202 2.1 25.31 5.06
1968 97 245 2.6 22.67 4.82
1969 95 244 2.6 22.89 4.97
1970 93" 218 2.3 23.42 5.22
1971 93 217 2.3 23.61 5.29
1972 97 238 2.5 24.25 5.43
1973 98 186 1.9 26.69 5.62
1974 98 187 1.9 35.44 5.49
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Tabla A.6 (contd)
Year Total Exporta 
of Sugar (*000 m.t.)
Sugar Exporta 
to UK(*000 m.t.)
Sugar Exports 
to World Markets (*000 m.t.)
Sugar Exports 
to UK as jSage 
of Total Sugar 
Exports {%)
Total E: 
as JÉage 
Domestii 
Output
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1951 119 64 55 54.1 83.2
1952 116 84 32 72.2 83.1
1953 132 129 3 97.9 85.0
1954 152 134 18 88.0 86.5
1955 172 156 16 90.6 87.8
1956 140 116 24 83.0 85.8
1957 145 125 20 86.5 85.0
1958 161 128 33 79.6 84.2
1959 154 129 25 83.9 83.5
1960 188 129 59 68.6 85.1
1961 215 119 96 55,3 87.4
1962 168 128 40 76.2 83.6
1963 193 141 52 73.1 85.0
1964 225 130 95 57.8 99.1
1965 212 140 72 66.0 84.5
1966 156 123 33 78.8 73.9
1967 157 143 14 91.1 77.7
1968 200 130 70 65.0 81.6
1969 198 135 63 68.2 81.1
1970 168 147 21 87.5 77.1
1971 166 142 24 85.5 76.5
1972 183 156 29 85.2 76.9
1973 142 133 9 93.7 76.3
1974 136 69 67 50.7 72.7
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Table A«6 (contd)
Year Sugar Exports Sugar Output Value of Value of Value of Total
as %age of as %age of Total Imports Total Exports Exports of
World Sugar World Sugar (c.i.f.) (f.o.b.) Sugar (f.o.b.)
Exports 1%) Output {%) (W.I.M^) (W.I.Mj^) (W.I.Pî;^ )
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
1951 1.0 0.4 218.6 214.5 18.7
1952 1.0 0.4 243.6 229.8 19.5
1953 0.9 0.4 236.0 256.5 25.5
1954 1.1 0.5 249.5 261.6 28*1
1955 1.2 0.5 294.4 285.3 31.3
1956 1.0 0.4 301.5 330.2 25.7
1957 0.9 0.4 355.8 392.6 30.6
1958 1.0 0.4 412.0 424.9 29.6
1959 1.0 0.4 448.1 449.1 30.9
1960 1.1 0.4 504.0 491.3 36.4
1961 1.1 0.4 584.0 593.5 42.4
1962 1.0 0.4 605.6 592.0 33.5
1963 1.0 0.4 646.4 640.7 46.6
1964 1.2 0.4 730.6 699.0 44.7
1965 1.2 0.4 817.0 690.5 40.8
1966 0.9 0.3 777.7 735.1 35.5
1967 0.8 0.3 711.2 760.8 37.9
1968 1.2 0.4 . 835.4 939.2 48.5
1969 1.3 0.4 966.4 947.9 52.4
1970 0.9 0.3 1084.8 960.7 49,2
1971 1.0 0.3 1326.7 1038.6 47.9
1972 1.P 0.3 1471.1 1071.6 67.5
1973 0.7 0.2 1556.8 1375.7 50.9
1974 0.7 0.2 3814.5 4118.3 123.3
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Table A.6 (contd)
Year Value of Sugar Average Price Stocks of Consumer
Exports as a of Total Exports Sugar Price Index
#age of Total of Sugar (*000 m#t.) (1970=100)
Exports {%) (W.I.#)
(16) (17) (18) (19)
1951 8.7 157.0 2 59.9
1952 8.5 167.7 6 61.4
1953 9.9 193.5 3 62.4
1954 10.7 184.6 1 62.8
1955 11.0 181.9 4 65.9
1956 7.8 183.4 4 66.6
1957 7.8 211.8 6 68.0
1958 7.0 184.1 7 71.0
1959 6.9 201.0 3 72.8
1960 7.4 193.6 8 74.3
1961 7.1 197.2 3 75.4
1962 5.7 199.4 2 77.6
1963 7.3 . 241.5 1 80.6
1964 6.4 198.7 2 81.3
1965 5.9 192.5 6 82.7
1966 4.8 227.6 9 86.1
1967 5.0 241.4 7 87.9
1968 5.2 242.5 6 95.2
1969 5.5 264.6 3 97.5
1970 5.1 292.9 4 100.0
1971 4.6 288.6 3 103.5
1972 6.3 368.9 5 113.1
1973 3.7 358.5 1 129.8
1974 3.0 906.6 5 158.5
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Table A.7: Sugar and Related Statistics for the United Kingdom* 1951—1974
Year Acreage 
under Beet (*000 acres)
(1)
Sugar Sugar Yield 
Output Per Acre 
(*000 m.t.) (Tons)
(2) (3)
Total Domestic Domestic Output 
Consumption as a %age of 
(*000 m.t.) Consumption (%)
(4) (5)
1951 407 740 1.9 2144 34.5
1952 395 657 1.6 2037 32.3
1953 403 622 1.6 2384 26.1
1954 417 786 2.0 2571 30.6
1955 404 634 1.5 2690 23.6
1956 409 681 1.7 2813 24.2
1957 405 761 1.8 2938 25.9
1958 414 611 1.5 2620 23.3
1959 411 799 1.9 2836 28.2
1960 415 855 2.0 2850 30.0
1961 410 965 2.4 2912 33.1
1962 409 797 1.9 2846 28.0
1963 409 773 1*9 2927 26.4
1964 428 875 2.0 2763 31.7
1965 455 958 2.2 2893 33.1
1966 446 921 2.1 2845 32.4
1967 457 961 2.1 2825 34.0
1968 465 922 2.0 2841 32.5
1969 457 991 2.2 2890 34.3
1970 463 911 2.0 2892 31.5
1971 471 1038 2.2 2863 36.3
1972 468 1124 2.4 2925 38.4
1973 480 823 1.7 2901 28.4
1974 482 758 1.6 2877 26.3
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Table A.7 (contd)
Year Consumption Net Imports Total Imports Imports from Imports from
Per Head as %aga of from Common- Australia Fiji as
(lbs, r.v.) Domestic wealth as ^age as %age of %age of
Consumption of Consumption Consumption Consumption
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1951 94 68.8 40.2 8.2 0.7
1952 89 63.4 43.6 5.8 0.4
1953 97 96.3 60.4 20.8 2.1
1954 105 64.4 58.4 17.2 3.1
1955 108 53.9 56.7 15.1 1.7
1956 109 60.4 48.9 10.6 0.9
1957 112 69.8 57.6 15.6 2.8
1958 116 78.6 58.4 12.7 3.2
1959 113 69.0 51.2 9.5 3.7
1960 111 61.9 50.3 11.8 2.9
1961 113 67.1 46.5 11.4 3.3
1962 111 63.7 56.0 15.3 3.4
1963 112 70.6 62.4 14.2 5.0
1964 108 64.8 62.8 16.6 5.2
1965 119 62.7 63.6 13.9 5.8
1966 116 65.2 61.2 14.5 4.6
1967 115 64.0 62.3 15.3 5.1
1968 115 63.2 61.4 18.8 4.6
1969 116 69.0 68.7 12.5 6.8
1970 116 67.3 62.3 15.0 5.0
1971 115 67.2 68.6 17.3 4.7
1972 116 69.0 64.2 15.4 5.3
1973 115 68.1 60.7 12.4 5.2
1974 115 68.4 53.1 13.3 4.4
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Table A»7 (contd)
Year Imports from 
Guyana as 
%age of 
Consumption
Imports from 
Oamaica as 
^age of 
Consumption
Imports from 
Mauritius as 
^age of 
Consumption
Imports from 
Trinidad and 
Tobago as %aga 
of Consumption
Total Imp 
of Sugar (*000 m.1
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
1951 3.9 4.8 12.1 3.0 2281
1952 6.5 6,6 12.3 4.1 2045
1953 5.4 6.6 10.5 5.4 3032
1954 5.6 8.2 12.5 5.2 2420
1955 5.3 7.9 16.4 5.8 2236
1956 4.4 8.4 14.7 4.1 2334
1957 5.9 6.4 15.4 4.3 2874
1958 7.8 8.1 14.9 4.9 2666
1959 5.9 7.2 13.3 4.5 2544
1960 6.2 6.9 11.3 4.5 2287
1961 4.5 5.2 12.2 5.2 2302
1962 5.1 7,3 14.1 4.5 2153
1963 4.7 9.1 15.2 4.8 2517
1964 3.5 8.7 15.3 4.-7 2270
1965 4.1 8.9 14.0 4.8 2136
1966 2.1 7.4 15.4 4.3 2180
1967 5.0 7.0 13.1 5.1 2156
1968 5.0 7.5 16.9 4.6 2016
1969 7.3 7.6 14.7 4.7 2213
1970 6.3 8.4 14.8 5.1 2153
1971 9.0 8.3 14.3 5.0 2180
1972 7.8 8.3 14.3 5.3 2347
1973 7.2 9.3 14.1 4.6 2323
1974 4.6 5.5 15.0 2.4 2140
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Table A.7 (contd)
Year Total Imports 
from Common­
wealth
Proportion of Total Net 
Total Imports Imports of 
from Common- Sugar
Proportion of Total 
Net Imports Exports of: 
from Common- Refined
( * 0 0 0  m.t.,r.v.) wealth {%) ( * 0 0 0  m.t.,r.v.)wealth {%) Sugar(*00g 
m.t.,r.v.)
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20 ;
1951 861 37.7 1475 58.4 . 725
1952 888 43.4 1291 68.8 676
1953 1439 47.5 2296 62.7 662
1954 1501 62.0 1656 90.6 703
1955 1525 68.2 1451 105.1 722
1956 1375 58.9 1700 80.9 584
1957 1691 58.8 2051 82.4 677
1958 1530 57.4 2060 74.3 565
1959 1452 57.1 1957 74.2 540
1960 1434 62.7 1763 81.3 482
1961 1355 58.9 1953 69.4 321
1962 1595 74.1 1813 88.0 313
1963 1826 72.5 2066 88.4 402
1964 1734 76.4 1790 96.9 437
1965 1841 86.2 1813 101.5 323
1966 1742 79.9 1856 93.9 324
1967 1759 81.6 ■ 1807 97.3 349
1968 1743 86.5 1795 97.1 221
1969 1985 89.7 1995 99.5 218
1970 1801 83.7 1946 92.5 207
1971 1964 90.1 1994 98.5 256
1972 1879 80.1 2018 93.1 329
1973 1761 75.8 1976 89.1 347
1974 1527 71.4 1968 77.6 272
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Table A.7 (contd): Sources of Imports of Sugar into the United Kingdom,
1951-1974
Year Australia Fiji
Total Imports (21) as jSage (21) as #age Total Imports (24) as ^age 
('000 m.t.) of (18) of (16) ('000 m.t.) of (18)
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25)
1951 175 11.9 20.3 16 1.1
1952 118 9.1 13.3 9 0.7
1953 496 21.6 34.5 51 2.2
1954 443 26.8 29.5 80 4.8
1955 409 28.2 26.8 46 3.2
1956 299 17.6 21.7 25 1.5
1957 459 22.4 27.1 82 4.0
1958 333 16.2 21.8 84 4.1
1959 270 13.8 18.6 105 5.4
1960 337 19.1 23.5 84 4.8
1961 332 17.0 24.5 95 4.9
1962 436 24.0 27.3 96 5.3
1963 415 20.1 22.7 145 7.0
1964 459 25.6 26.5 144 8.0
1965 402 22.2 21.8 167 9.2
1966 413 22.3 23.7 131 7.1
1967 433 24.0 24.6 144 8.0
1968 533 29.7 30.6 130 7.2
1969 362 18.1 18.2 196 9.8
1970 434 22.3 24.1 152 7.8
1971 496 24.9 25.3 151 7.6
1972 451 22.3 24.0 156 7.7
1973 361 18.3 20.5 151 7.6
1974 383 19.5 25.1 128 6.5
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Table A.7 (contd)
Year Fiji
(24) as ^age 
of (16)
(26)
Guyana Jamaica
Total Imports (27) as % a g e (27) as % a q e Total Imports! 
( # 0 0 0  m.t.) of (18) of (16) ( # 0 0 0  m.t.)
(27) (28) (29) (30)
1951 1.9 83 5.6 9.6 103
1952 1.0 132 10.2 14.9 134
1953 3.5 129 5.6 9.0 158
1954 5.3 144 8.7 9.6 210
1955 3.0 142 9.8 9.3 212
1956 1.8 124 7.3 9.0 235
1957 4.8 174 8.5 io.3 188
1958 5.5 204 9.9 13.3 212
1959 7.2 168 8.6 11.6 204
1960 5.9 177 10.0 12.3 196
1961 7.0 130 6.7 9.6 152
1962 6.0 145 8.0 9.1 209
1963 7.9 137 6.6 7.5 266
1964 8.3 96 5.4 5,5 240
1965 9.1 119 6.6 6.5 • 258
1966 7.5 59 3.2 3.4 211
1967 8.2 141 7.8 8.0 199
1968 7.5 166 9.2 9.5 214
1969 9.9 197 9.9 9.9 220
1970 8.4 171 8.8 9.5 242
1971 7.7 258 12.9 13.1 239
1972 8.3 228 11.3 12.1 243
1973 8.6 209 10.6 11.9 271
1974 8.4 132 6.7 8.6 157
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Table A.7 (contd)
Year Jamaica Mauritius
(30) as a %aqe (3) as a %age Total Imports (33) as a #age (33) as a %ag#
of (18) 
(31)
of (16) 
(32)
('□00 m.t.) 
(33)
of (18) 
(34)
of (16) 
(35)
1951 7.0 12.0 260 17.6 30.2
1952 10.4 15.1 251 ■ 19.4 28.3
1953 6.9 11.0 250 10.9 17.4
1954 12.7 14,0 321 19.4 21.4
1955 14.6 13.9 440 30.3 28.9
1956 13.8 17.1 414 24.4 30.1
1957 9.2 11.1 453 22.1 26.8
1958 10.3 13.9 390 18.9 25.5
1959 10.4 14.0 376 19.2 25.9
1960 11.1 13.7 222 12.6 15.5
1961 7.8 11.2 355 18.2 26.2
1962 11.5 13.1 401 22.1 25.1
1963 12.9 14.6 444 21.5 24.3
1964 13.4 13.8 422 23.6 24.3
1965 14.2 14.0 405 22.3 22.0
1966 11.4 12.1 437 23.5 25.1
1967 11.0 11.3 370 20.5 21.0
1968 11.9 12.3 479 26.7 27.5
1969 11.0 11.1 424 21.3 21.4
1970 12.4 13.4 428 22.0 23.8
1971 12.0 12.2 409 20.5 20.8
1972 12.0 12.9 418 20.7 22.2
1973 13.7 15.4 409 20.7 23.2
1974 8.0 10.3 431 21.9 28.2
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Tabla A*7 (contd)
Year Trinidad and Tobago
Total Importa (36) as a %age (*000 m.t.) of (18)
(36) as a %age 
of (16)
UK net imports 
as %age of 
total world 
imports (%)
UK Con- ? 
sumption ! 
as %aQQ of 
world con-; 
sumption(^
(36) (37) (38) (39) (40)
1951 64 4.3 7.4 12.2 6.8 {
1952 84 6.5 9.5 10.6 6.1
1953 129 5.6 9.0 16.0 6.7 1
1954 134 8.1 8.9 12.3 6.9 “Î
1955 156 10.8 10.2 10.0 6.9 !
1956 116 6.8 8.4 12.0 6.8
1957 125 6.1 7.4 13.3 6.9 ]
1958 128 6.2 8.4 13.2 5.8 ;
1959 129 6.6 8.9 13.2 6.0 J
1960 129 -7.3 9.0 10.5 5.8
1961 119 6.1 8.8 10.0 5.5
1962 128 7.1 8.0 10.4 5.2
1963 141 6.8 7.7 11.0 5.3
1964 130 7.3 7.5 9.5 5.0 ;
1965 140 7.7 7.6 10.3 4.9
1966 123 6.6 7.1 10.8 4.7
1967 143 7.9 8.1 9.6 4.5 1
1968 130 7.2 7.5 10.8 4.3 i
1969 135 6.8 6.8 13.1 4.2
1970 147 7.6 8.2 10.8 4.0
1971 142 7.1 7.2 11.1 3.8
1972 156 7.7 8.3 10.7 3*8
1973 133 6.7 7.6 10.2 3.7
1974 69 3.5 4.5 10.0 3.6
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Table A#7 (contd)
Year Value of Sugar UK Sugar Output Value of Imports Stocks Commonwealth
Imports as %age as a % a g e  of of Raw Sugar of Sugar Agree-
of Total UK World Output (M&) Sugar ment Price
Imports {%) (•000m.t.)(£1 Ton)
(41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
1951 2.9 2.2 114.64 579 32.87
1952 2.8 1.8 97.59 558 38.50
1953 3.7 1.8 122.73 878 42.33
1954 2.9 2.0 96.49 1485 41.00
1955 2.4 1.7 95.22 832 40.75
1956 2.5 1.7 100.43 590 40.75
1957 3.5 1.8 143.90 571 42.17
1958 2.5 1.4 94.41 469 42.83
1959 1.9 1.6 76.69 444 45.14
1960 1.6 1.7 72.49 636 44.44
1961 1.6 1.7 74.78 786 45.10
1962 1.4 1.5 62.77 701 45.76
1963 3.1 1.5 154.99 960 46.04
1964 2.3 1.5 131.08 939 46.04
1965 1.6 1.5 93.35 898 46.57i
1966 1.6 1.4 96.76 905 47.50
1967 1.4 1.4 92.08 940 47.50
1968 1.2 1.4 92.63 901 47.50
1969 1.2 1.4 100.20 992 47.50
1970 1.1 1.2 94.99 955 47.50
1971 1.0 1.4 100.51 1048 47.50
1972 1.1 1.5 118.45 1169 57.00
1973 0.9 1.1 141.75 867 57.00
1974 1.3 1.0 299.50 811 140.00
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Table A.8: Sugar Statistics for the World ♦ 1951-1974
Year Sugar 
Output 
(n m.t.)
Sugar
Consumption 
(M m.t.)
Consumption 
Par Head 
(Kgs, r.v.)
Sugar Free Marl 
Stocks (c.i.f. 1 
(M m.t.) £ / Ton
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1951 33.57 31.55 11.9 7.48 49.60
1952 36.09 33.44 12.5 10.10 45.60
1953 34.99 35.77 13.0 9.57 31.00
1954 38.77 37.29 13.7 11.33 29.80
1955 38.35 38.77 14.1 10.84 31.40
1956 39.71 41.51 14.4 9.61 35.75
1957 41.64 42.61 15.2 8.70 46.98
1958 44.42 44.82 15.3 7,05 31.38
1959 49.61 46.91 15,7 10.44 27.31
1960 50.17 48.76 16.1 13.29 28.48
1961 55.35 52.80 17.1 16.11 25,68
1962 51.64 54.74 17.4 18.47 25.69
1963 51.16 54.88 17.3 19.21 71.70
1964 60.17 55.70 17.2 18.81 51.13
1965 64.82 59.57 18.0 21.14 21.51
1966 64.05 61.13 18.3 22.49 17.87
1967 66.39 63.07 18.5 23.52 19.36
1968 66.83 66.30 19.1 22.31 21.83
1969 69.60 68.41 19.3 23.58 33.83
1970 72.90 72.12 19,9 24,01 40.06
1971 73.96 74.39 20.3 26.41 46.34
1972 75.75 76.01 20.4 30.66 72.85
1973 78.13 78.71 20.7 30.14 99.46
1974 78.70 79.77 20.3 29.01 305.13
Table A.8 (contd)
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Year World Net 
Exporta 
(M m.t.)
Exports as Total Exports 
a % a g e of to the Free
Output {%) Market (M m.t.)
Free Market Free Market 
Exports as a Exports as 
^age of total a % a g e  of 
Exports {%) Output {%)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1951 12.05 35.9 5.94 49.3 17.7
1952 12.19 33.8 5.36 44.0 14.9
1953 14.35 41.0 6.65 46.3 19.0
1954 13.46 34.7 5.98 44.4 15.4
1955 14.48 37.8 6.27 43.3 16.3
1956 14.15 35.6 6.79 48.0 17.1
1957 15.44 37.1 7.09 45.9 17.0
1958 15.61 35.1 7.51 48.1 16.9
1959 14.82 29.9 7.74 52.2 15.6
1960 16.85 33.6 9.42 55.9 18.8
1961 19.51 35.2 8.04 41.2 14.5
1962 17.46 33.8 8.76 50.2 17.0
1963 18.82 36.8 7.62 40.5 14.9
1964 18.84 31.3 7.21 38.3 12.0
1965 17.52 27.0 7.89 45.0 12.2
1966 17.15 26.8 7.81 45.5 12.2
1967 18.78 28.3 8.54 45.5 12.9
1968 16.67 24.9 9.57 57.4 14.3
1969 15.18 21.8 7.88 51.9 11.3
1970 18.05 24.8 9.06 50.2 12.4
1971 17.34 23.4 9.52 54.9 12.9
1972 18.94 25.0 11.57 61.1 15.3
1973 19.37 24.8 11.66 60.2 14.9
1974 19.68 25.0 10.69 54.3 13.6
Table A.8 (contd)
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Year Proportion of 
Total Output 
from Cane (#)
(11)
Total Output 
from Cane 
(M tons)
(12)
Proportion of 
Total Output 
from Beet {%)
(13)
Total Output 
from Beet 
(M tons)
(14)
Sugar 31 
as a %a\ 
Output 1
(15)
1951 58.3 19.57 41.7 14.00 22.3
1952 61.4 22.17 38.6 13.92 28.0
1953 61.8 21.61 38.2 13.37 27.4
1954 57.8 22.40 42.2 16.37 29.2
1955 61.3 23.51 38.7 14.84 28.3
1956 60.3 23.95 39.7 15.75 24.2
1957 61.5 25.59 38.5 16.06 20.9
1958 59.3 26.34 40.7 18.09 15.9
1959 58.1' 28.84 41.9 20.77 21.0
1960 59.1 29.66 40.9 20.51 26.5
1961 55.6 30.77 44.4 24.55 29.1
1962 57.3 29.60 42.7 22.04 35.8
1963 57.3 29.32 42.7 21.83 37.5
1964 54.7 32.92 45.3 27.32 31.3
1965 57.9 37.51 42.1 27.29 32.6
1966 56.8 36.39 43.2 27.62 35.1
1967 57.0 37.83 43.0 28.60 35.4
1968 55.9 37.34 44.1 29.49 33.4
1969 55.6 38.73 44.4 30.87 33.9
1970 59.8 43.58 40.2 29.32 32.9
1971 58.2 43.04 41.8 30.92 35.7
1972 57.4 43.44 42.6 32.30 40.5
1973 59.0 46.13 41.0 32.01 38.6
1974 62.0 48.78 38.0 29.92 36.9
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Appendix B: Additional Data on Mauritius for
a Case Study under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
Notes: 1 metric ton = 1 tonne = 1000 Kgss= 2204*6 IBs*. = 0.-9842 long ton = 1.1023 short ton1 acre = 0*9588 arpent = O.404686 hectare
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Table B»1*. Additional data on Mauritius. 1951—1974-
Year
Sugar Cane Production (#000 m.t*)
(1)
Sugar Production (#000 m.t*)
 (2)
Cane/
SugarRatio
(3)
Acreage under 
C ^ e  (#000 acres) 
 (4)
Cane per acre (tons)
— I D ___
1951 4355 457 9*00 1581952 4097 484 8.75 1671953 4643 468 9*07 172
1954 4280 512 8*58 1741955 4228 499 7.93 176
1956 4421 533 7.72 1751957 4344 593 7*73 1751958 4329 562 8*23 1751959 4743 562 8*18 184i960 2393 232 10*14 191
1961 4943 544 8*94 1961962 4625 525 8.68 1941963 5747 675 8.38 2021964 4381 511 8.44 2021965 5985 ,654 9.01 204
1966 4843 553 8*62 2141967 5815 664 9*11 2161968 5152 622 8.63 2141969 5824 697 8*71 2171970 5120 601 8*89 219
1971 5256 657 8.46 2201972 6315 727 9.21 220
1973 6239 761 8*69 2231974 5966 738 8*56 226
27.5624.5326.9924.60
24.02
25.26
24.82
2 4 . 7 425.78
1 2 . 5 3
25.22
23.8428.45
21.65
29.34
22.6326*92
24.07
26.8423.38
23.89
28.70
27.9826*40
Table B.1. '(contd.)
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Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
DomesticConsumption(tons)
(6)
21.G 
22*4
21.722.6
23*2
Per caput sugar consumption (Kgf t.1.)
 (1) - - -
42*1
42.4
40.0
41.0 
40*1
Population
(#000)
_ X S L
508
520
534
552
575
Gross National Product (Rb m.)
—is)....
549567586
594623
GNP per head
(Rs.)
(10)
1,081
1,116
1,0971,076
1,083
1956
1957
1958
19591960
23.524*425.0 
25.2
27.0
39.6 
39*9
39.6 
39.5 
40.4
594610
625632
640
659680
674721
654
1,109
1,115
1,078
1,141
1,022
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
28.628.828.6
29.730.0
43.3
42.3 
40.741.1
40.6
655
664680
700
740
761
789
1,012
876
916
1,162
1,1881,498
1,2511,238
1966
19671968
1969
1970
30.8
31.4
31.733.233.8
40.6 
40.8 
40.1 
41.5
41.7
760
770
790800810
963
9649631,037 
1,055
1,267
1,252
1,219
1,296
1,302
1971
1972
1973
1974
35*4
35.3
37.535.0
43.1
42.4
44.5 
44.4
820828838
850
1,168
1,343
1,868
3,125
1,4241,732
2,229
3,676
Table B.1. /contd.)
•400-
Year
Retail 
price of sugar (cents/lb)
(11)
Producerprices(Rs/ton)
(12)
Free market price of sugar. (Rs/Ton)
(13)
ExchangeRate
(Rs per £)
M L
Yield per acre
(tons)
(15)
1-9511952195319541955
1956
19571958
19591960
19611962
19631964
1965
1966
19671968
1969
1970
1971.1972
1973
1974
34.8 363.04 661.32 13.333 2.892
36*8 4-11*93 607.98 13.333 2.898
37.4 442.75 413.32 13.333 2.709
37.3 473.41 397.32 13.333 2.943
38*5 458.73 418.66 13.333 2.835
37.8 448.56 476.65 13.333 3.046
37*5 480*48 626.38 13.333 3.38937*8 473.57 418.39 13.333 3.211
37.5 462.53 364.12 13.333 3.05438.1 468.95 379.72 13.333 1.215
37.8 503.87 342*39 13.333 2.776
38.5 438.25 342.52 13.333 2.70638.2 590.89 955.98 13.333 3.342
39.0 433.13 681.72 13.333 2.530
39.6 409.34 286.79 13.333 3.206
40.6 421.53 238.26 13.333 2.584
44.1 . 424.40 258.13 13.333 3.07447*1 428.39 291.06 13.333 2.90749.2 445.00 451.06 13.333 3.212
49.0 471.70 534.12 13.333 2.744
57.2 522.64 617.85 13.333 2.986
65*5 641.43 971.31 13.333 3.30574*3 790.21 1,326.10 13.333 3.413
96.0 1,877.59 4,068.30 13.333 3.265
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fflBLlOGRAPHY
SOURCES OF DATA
1* Commonwealth Sugar Exporters’ Association, Annual Review, 1962,
1967, 1973, London.
2. Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Year Book, 1972-1974, London.
3. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Commodity 
Bulletin Series 32. Trends and Forces of World Sugar Consumption# 
by A.l/iton and F.Pignalosa, 1961, Rome.
4. .. ..— "— , Commodity Bulletin Series 22, Sugar, Rome, September 1952.
5. ......... -, Commodity Reports, Fertilizers. Various issues, Rome.
6 ...... . ....... , Fertilizers, An Annual Review of Production, Consumption
and Trade. Various issues, Rome.
7. — -..... Production Year Book, Various issues 1950—1974, Rome.
8 . ... ..... .The World Sugar Economy in Figures, 1880-1959, Rome.
9. — — — — , Agricultural Commodity Projections, 1970-1980, Rome, 1971.
10. « Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Rome,
various issues.
11. International Sugar Council, The World Sugar Economy Structure and 
Policies; National Sugar Economies and Policies, Volume 1, London 1963.
12. é...— y The World Sugar Economy Structure and Policies; The World
Picture, Volume II, London 1963.
13.  — .-, Sugar Year Book, various issues, London.
14. —  — — , Statistical Bulletin, various issues, London.
15. — ..—  , Annual Report, various issues, London.
16. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
1968 to 1975, Washington, U.S.A., also Annual Data, 1951-1975, and
1952-1976.
17. F.O.Lichts, World Sugar Statistics (Weltzuckerstatistik), Ratzeburg, 
Germany, 1961 to 1975.
18. Lynsky Mver. Sugar Economics, Statistics, and Documents, U.S.Sugar 
Refiners’ Association, New York, 1938.
19. OECD, Food Consumption Statistics, OECD Secretariat, Paris, 1971.
20. Plantation Crops, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, various issues.
21. United Nations, National Income Statistics, 1946 to 1974, New York.
, U.N.Statistical Year Book, 1958 to 1974, New York.
, U.N.Trade Year Book, 1956 to 1974, Geneva.
, U.N.Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 1962 to 1976, New York.
, Year Book of International Trade Statistics, various issues.
22.
23.
24.
25.
New York.
26. UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 
New York, 1969.
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